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1ABSTRACT OF THESIS.
The purpose of this study is an analysis of the 
administrative system of the East India Company from 1780 to 
1827 with special reference to the Madras Presidency. The 
questions examined are all essentially concerned with the 
decision-making processes, both in London and in Madras. How 
did the different bodies who together administered India 
relate to each other? How were policies conceived, adopted 
and implemented? To what extent were the formal, official 
channels of communication and authority adhered to, 
bye-passed or simply ignored? Could individuals within the 
Company influence its policies and, if so, what methods 
might they employ?
The developments that occurred in the Company's revenue and 
judicial administrations in Madras during a period of 
British expansion and consolidation have been selected for 
this study. The ideas behind the Permanent Settlement of 
Bengal and the reasons for extending it into the territories 
of Madras are examined together with the development of the 
Village Lease and Ryotwari Systems in South India.
Similarly, the introduction of the Cornwallis Legal System 
into Madras and the subsequent attempts to modify it are 
investigated.
At the same time, the relationships between the interacting 
components of the British administration of India are 
scrutinised. Within this context, a number of interest or 
pressure groups in centres as far apart as Madras, 
Westminster and the Company's headquarters in Leadenhall 
Street are identified and their impact on the Company's 
policies evaluated.
Because of the central role that he came to play in the 
debates and the significant influence he exercised on the 
local and home authorities, the career of Thomas Munro has 
been employed to chart the developments in the Company's 
administration and the changes in its structure and 
policies. In the course of the close examination of M u n r o 1s 
career for the light it sheds on these and the 
decision-making processes of the British administration of 
India, other aspects of the Company's administration are 
also analysed, in particular recruitment and promotion in 
its services. The operation of patronage and influence on 
career structures is evaluated and a number of conclusions 
about the ways in which the East India Company's bureaucracy 
was staffed and operated are drawn. In addition, the 
attempts by the Company to introduce a coherent training 
programme for its employees in India, especially the 
attempts to encourage its civil servants to master the local 
languages and the impact of these on appointments, are 
examined.
2Lastly, in the course of this study, a general survey of the 
relations between the British and the Indian rulers and 
peoples of South India between 1790 and 1827 emerges. The 
research of various authors on different aspects of the 
history of South India and of the Company in Britain during 
this period are brought together.
The thesis is based on research into a wide range of 
contemporary sources, official and unofficial, including the 
Munro Papers.
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In his study of Munro's career T H Beaglehole described the
development of the ryotwari system of revenue settlement and
the changes which were introduced into the East India
1
Company's judicial administration in Madras. He was
principally interested in tracing the manner in which 'a
system of administration emerged (in Madras) in many ways
2
markedly different from that established in Bengal'. 
Correctly assessing the importance of the part played by 
Thomas Munro in this process, Beaglehole used his career as 
the framework of reference in which to place his study of 
how a body of ideas on administration grew up and was
eventually adopted. However, at the time that he was
writing, the Munro Papers were not available to historians 
and it therefore proved impossible for Beaglehole to achieve 
his principal objectives. He was unable to analyse the way 
in which Munro's ideas developed or the manner in which they 
were adopted as administrative policy by the home 
government. In consequence, Beaglehole's research left 
unanswered a number of important questions regarding the 
operations of the East India Company, in particular ones 
concerning the methods employed by individuals and parties 
to influence policy decisions and their subsequent
7implementation. Dealing almost entirely with the formal 
operations of the Company which were recorded in the 
official records, he examined the controversies which 
divided the administration in the terms of conflicts of 
ideas rather than of personalities and ambitions. He 
therefore devoted little attention to the private motives 
behind individuals' advocacy of specific policies and 
consequently produced a somewhat oversimplified picture of 
events.
Some of the questions which were incompletely analysed in
Beaglehole's book had already been fully examined by C H
Philips in his study of the East India Company's home 
3
government. In the course of a detailed account of the 
organization, activities and influence of the home 
government, this book had thrown considerable light on the 
decision-making processes of the Company in Britain. In 
particular, it illustrated how powerful groups were formed 
for the promotion of special interests and the influence 
these had on how policies were formulated and which were 
adopted. However, because Philips was primarily concerned 
with the operations of the home authorities and relations 
between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, he 
was unable to devote as much attention as they deserve to 
the changes which took place in the Madras administration.
It is the purpose of this study to attempt a new analysis of 
the administrative system of the East India Company from 
1780 to 1827 with special reference to Madras in the hope of 
achieving a clearer understanding of how decisions regarding
8the allocation of resources and the selective adoption of
values were reached. While Philips was principally concerned
'to estimate the influence exerted by the home
government...on British policy in India1, 'to assess the
relative value and importance of the parts played by these
authorities' and to analyse the influence of East India
4
interests in Britain on the administration of India, this 
study intends to concentrate on analysing the influence that 
men working in the Madras Presidency had on the activities 
and decisions of both the local and home authorities. In the 
course of this investigation a number of general questions 
are examined, all of which are essentially concerned with 
the decision-making processes. How did the different bodies 
who together administered India relate to each other? How 
were policies conceived, adopted and implemented? To what 
extent was the decision-making process contained within the 
formal structure of the Company and the official channels of 
communication and authority adhered to, bye-passed or simply 
ignored? How far did individuals within the Company 
influence its policies and what methods did they employ in 
their attempts to do so? What were the factors which 
governed their activities and the considerations which 
influenced their support or opposition to new ideas?
In order to make this analysis of the decision-making 
process, a framework of reference similar to Beaglehole's is 
employed insofar as the career of Thomas Munro is closely 
examined. There is some justification for approaching the 
questions from this angle. First, the study of Munro's 
career reveals much about the ways in which the East India
Company's bureaucracy was staffed and operated. Secondly, it 
illustrates the extent to which individuals could influence 
policy as well as the principal means by which they did so. 
Thirdly, it supplies new information about the influence and 
interactions of the many parties or interests which formed 
in centres as far apart as Madras, Westminster and the 
Company's headquarters in Leadenhall Street. Last but not 
least, a clearer picture emerges of the events which 
dominated an important and formative period of British rule 
in India in an area which has hitherto been incompletely 
researched.
In chapter one the formal administrative structure of the 
East India Company is analysed. Its constitution, the 
regulations governing relations between the various bodies 
which composed it, the chains of authority and channels of 
communication are described. In the second chapter Munro's 
childhood and early career in India are examined. The 
experiences which had a formative influence on his character 
and ideology and so conditioned his responses to events and 
his perception of his environment are investigated. Chapters 
three and four trace the early development of the ideas 
behind the policies which, when eventually adopted, were to 
form what become known as the Munro System. In chapter five 
the first attempts to have these ideas adopted as official 
policy are reviewed. From these chapters a picture emerges 
of the formal and informal operations of the Madras 
Government. The relative importance of personal as opposed 
to policy factors in decision making is revealed. The role 
of personal factors such as career considerations, the
10
desire for wealth, status, influence and authority, and 
involvement with external interests as motivating forces 
behind individuals' participation in the Company's politics 
is evaluated. In chapter six the events surrounding Munro's 
first visit to Britain, during which he was instrumental in 
getting significant changes made in the revenue and judicial 
policies of the East India Company, are described. These 
throw new light on the relationships between the bodies 
which together composed the home authorities. Chapters seven 
and eight, which deal with the introduction of the Munro 
System into Madras, analyse relations between the home and 
local governments. In the conclusion the important features 
of the Company's administrative structure, which influenced 
its operations and had a considerable impact on the 
decision-making processes during this period of its history, 
are distinguished and analysed. In particular the manner in 
which these encouraged the development an informal system 
alongside the formal is examined. Finally, the importance of 
the operations of the informal system on the decision-making 
processes is evaluated.
This new study of the developments that took place in the 
Madras administration between 1780 and 1827 and the 
reappraisal of Munro's role in the formation and adoption of 
policies which influenced them has been made possible by the 
recent availability of Munro's papers at the India Office. 
The close investigation of Munro's career that access to 
these permits not only reveals many of the motives behind 
his actions and much about the perceptions that governed his 
ideas but also considerable information regarding the daily
11
twists and turns which characterized the Company's politics.
Throughout the text, the spelling of proper names has been 
modernized. This has however been done with a view to 
keeping these names recogizable to the non-specialist.
12
Chapter One
The Background:
The Formal Organization of the Eas t ^ India Company •
The East India Company, which had been founded in 1601, had 
originally been a purely commercial organization, a joint 
stock trading company with its head office in London and 
factories, as its local headquarters were called, in India 
at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The British State initially 
had no concern with its internal affairs or with its 
relations with the Indian rulers within whose territories it 
operated. The day-to-day business of the Company and the 
management of its finances had belonged exclusively to the 
Court of Directors, a body elected by the Court of 
Proprietors. In 1764 Major Hector Munro had won the decisive 
battle of Buxar against a coalition of Indian princes in the 
course of which he destroyed their armies. This victory 
marked a new development in the history of the Company which 
became a government as well as a trader even if it at first 
refused to admit that it had territorial responsibilities.
William Pitt had taken the opportunity of this change in the 
East India Company’s circumstances to announce that all
13
Indian territory must be brought under the sovereignty of 
the crown. In the ensuing debate, the role of the East India 
Company and its relations with the State had become 
political issues. However, the political climate in Britain 
at that time had not been ready for any radical reform of 
the situation and Grafton's settlement with the Company in 
1767 had done little more than give the government a share 
in the profits of India. In 1772, the Company's affairs had 
again become a political issue and the government had once 
more announced its intention to bring the administration of 
India under the control of the State. Yet at the same time 
the general opinion was that the State might not itself take 
over the direct administration of India. It was believed 
that the Company's stake in Bengal, Madras and Bombay was 
still a trading one to which the complicated problems of 
administration were, so to speak, fortuitously tacked on. 
Lord North's solution to this problem, which was contained 
in the Regulating Act of 1773, had therefore been a 
compromise which had left the East India Company responsible 
for the administration of British interests in India.
By 1780, the East India Company had, in response to the 
pressures placed on it by these circumstances and by 
geographical factors, evolved a complex bureaucracy composed 
of a set of inter-related bodies designed to perform the 
various and sometimes antagonistic tasks of operating both a 
commercial concern and a political organization. Relations 
between these bodies were governed by rules and regulations, 
some of which derived from the Company's constitution while 
others had been laid down in specific Acts of Parliament.
14
This was the formal organization of the East India Company.
Before 1784, the home government of the East India Company
consisted of the Proprietors of India Stock and the twenty
four Directors of the Company. The Proprietors, and anyone
who possessed shares in the capital stock of the East India
Company was a Proprietor, were entitled to attend the
meetings of the General Court of Proprietors where, provided
they possessed £500 of stock or more, they might cast up to
four votes on motions introduced. The predominant interests
in this Court were the banking, shipping and commercial
2
concerns of the City of London, which had invested money in
the Company’s operations, and the men returned from India,
the 'Nabobs', who often acquired India Stock, 'either as a
convenient form of investment yielding a sure dividend of 8
per cent or as a means by which they could gain influence,
3
...power and patronage in the Company'. Although the Court 
of Proprietors might reverse the Directors' decisions and 
could, until 1784, pass resolutions binding on them, its 
most important official functions were those of electing 
every April the Directors who formed the executive body of 
the Company, declaring the dividend and sanctioning by-laws. 
The Court of Proprietors had however another important role 
to play within the overall structure of the Company, that of 
providing a forum or arena in which debates on policy could 
take place. These debates enabled interested parties to 
bring the activities and the measures adopted by the Court 
of Directors to the public attention and also opened 
opportunities to the home authorities to test opinion.
15
Since 1709, twenty four Directors had made up the Court of 
Directors. The Regulating Act of 1773 had established a 
system whereby six Directors were annually elected to 
replace six retiring Directors who were ineligible for 
re-election before the following April. The Court of 
Directors had early developed a tendency to become co-optive 
and it was customary for the Directors in office to ensure 
the return of those out of it by annually issuing a 'House 
List' of recommended candidates to the Proprietors. In 
consequence the Direction consisted of thirty members 
virtually elected for life. In five yearly cycles, these men 
held office for four years and then stood down during the 
fifth.
Only the deaths, retirements or disqualifications of
Directors opened vacancies and competition for these was
always fierce. Candidates frequently announced their
intention to stand for election some years before the first
opportunity, actually presented itself. Once a candidate had
determined to seek election, he was faced by the prospect of
a long and often expensive canvass for votes which, in view
of the scattered constituency of Proprietors throughout
Britain, had to be largely conducted by post. Even then, if
the candidate could not depend upon the support of one or
more of the East India interest groups, he had little chance
of being elected. There were exceptions to the general rule
and, as C H Philips observes, personal merit could
4
occasionally secure a man's election. Although obvious 
bribery was not a feature of the Company's elections, a 
considerable amount of behind the scenes trading always
16
occurred. 'Help in the canvass was often afforded only on
the condition that the candidate, if successful, would repay
5
his helpers in patronage'.
It appears that control of the Company's patronage was one
of the principal attractions of a Directorship. Although the
Directors received salaries, the Chairmen £500 a year and
the other Directors £300, these cannot be considered to have
. 6
been a sufficient inducement to men usually already wealthy.
Other considerations such as those of status and involvement
in Indian affairs were no doubt important but hardly to be
compared with that of control of the patronage. The
patronage at the disposal of the Directors in theory
extended from the right to appoint the Governors, Army
Commanders and Members of Council to the selection of the
most junior civil servants or writers, cadets and assistant
surgeons. The Directors also appointed the officers of the
Bombay Marine, barristers, attorneys, chaplains and the
Company's staff in both East India House and the warehouses.
All this patronage was annually apportioned amongst the
Directors according to customary rules of seniority by which
the Chairmen received double that of the ordinary Directors
who, it has been estimated, might expect to have an average
7
of six or seven appointments a year at their disposal.
The main considerations guiding the Directors' distribution 
of patronage were those of family, friendship, politics and 
commerce. Of these, that of family was the most important. 
The allocation of Chinese writerships was a striking example 
of this in operation. These writerships were considered the
17
most valuable, so much so that a Director accepting one
relinquished his other patronage for the season, and they
were nearly always given to immediate relatives. In 1795, 12
of the 20 writers stationed at Canton were near relatives of
8
the Directors. The examples of individual Directors also
illustrate this point. Laurence Sullivan hoped to use his
position in the Court to restore his family's fortunes by
employing his influence to advance his son's career in 
9
India. Henry St George Tucker, whose career with the Company
spanned over 60 years, sent five sons to India. Colonel
Alexander Lawrence, who was related by marriage to the
Director John Huddleston, obtained appointments in India for
10
four of his six sons through his relative's generosity. On
average, 23 per cent of all appointments to the civil
11
service and the army went to the Directors' relatives. This
tendency of the Directors to employ their patronage on
behalf of their families exercised a considerable influence
over the Company's policies as well as its composition.
According to Warren Hastings, while he was in Bengal, 'there
were...so many sons and cousins of the Directors' in India,
it was impossible for him to prune the administration
12
without provoking 'an army of opponents'.
The Directors, apart from sharing the responsibility and 
privilege of disposing of the Company's patronage, also 
formed its highest executive body. They met together as the 
Court of Directors at least once a week in East India House. 
In the Court all letters from India were read, appeals from 
the Company's employees heard, final decisions taken and 
despatches to the local governments approved and signed. All
18
points at issue were decided by ballot and important, 
controversial decisions required the presence of at least 
thirteen Directors to form a quorum before they could be 
settled. When the numbers in a vote were equal, the 
Treasurer's lot decided the question. The only supervisory 
controls exercised over the Court were those granted 
Parliament in Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773. The 
Directors were required to lay before the Treasury all 
correspondence from India dealing with the revenues and they 
had also to supply the Secretary of State with everything 
that dealt with or concerned the civil and military 
administrations.
To expedite the Court's business, the Directors divided much 
of their work among a number of Committees of which the most 
important was the Secret Committee. Established, as C H 
Philips's research reveals, in 1683, the Secret Committee
dealt with matters which appeared to require the quick and
\
efficient management which only a small, expert group of men
13
can readily give. It was therefore generally composed of the
Chairs and one or two of the most senior Directors. In time
of war, the Committee directed the Company's military and
naval operations, conducted negotiations with Indian states
and frequently represented the Court. From 1778, the
Committee exercised extensive political powers after the
Directors authorized it to 'consider and proceed upon all
matters relating to the Company as shall appear to them of a 
14
secret nature'. There were twelve other Committees, each 
dealing with specific areas of the Company's business, and 
these were each composed of nine Directors and the two
19
Chairmen, who 'were of all Committees'. The criterion 
guiding the appointment of Directors to the various 
Committees was seniority and neither merit nor qualification 
were considered. Thus the nine senior Directors sat on all 
the major Committees, including those of Correspondence and 
Treasury.
Presiding at the head of the Court, and sitting on all the
thirteen Committees, were the Chairman and Deputy Chairman.
Although their annual election by the Court of Directors
constituted some check on their power, these men exercised a
considerable control over the Court's proceedings. According
to custom, no subject was initiated, officially debated or
decided without the Chairman's sanction. Richard Atkinson
observed in 1784 that 'the Chairman brings forward what he
pleases, when he pleases' and this situation enabled the
better tacticians among them to determine the Company's 
15
policies. They could carry measures they felt desirable by 
waiting for the absence of their opponents or defer the 
consideration of those they objected to for as long as they 
remained in office.
Supporting the Directors in their role as the Company's 
executive body were the office staff of East India House. 
There were about 150 of these men and they were divided into 
departments that corresponded with the Committees of the 
Court. The most important of these departments were those of 
the Secretary and the Examiner of Indian Correspondence. The 
Secretary's department took charge of the bulk of the 
business conducted by the Court of Directors while all
20
despatches for India were prepared in the Examiner's 
department. The Examiner and his chief assistants often 
exerted considerable influence in the preparation of replies 
to letters from India. These, when they arrived at 
Leadenhall, were first read in the Court and then 
distributed by the Secretary among the branches of the 
Examiner's department. Here they were abstracted and copies 
of these abstracts, together with extracts from the records 
and copies of documents which might be useful for the 
preparation of replies, were sent to the Directors. Draft 
despatches were originated in the department, sometimes 
under the supervision of the Chairs who always scrutinized 
them carefully with reference to the documents on which they 
were based before they were presented to the Court. It would
not be an exaggeration to claim that, when important issues 
or interests were not at issue, the Court frequently did 
little more than rubber stamp the work of the Chairs and the 
departments.
The organization of the local governments was, of necessity,
somewhat different to that of the home government. Prior to
1773, the highest executive body within the administration
of each of the three Presidencies was formed by the
President and his Council. The Presidents and the members of
the Councils were all appointed by the Directors under the
powers delegated to them by the early charters of the
British Crown and Parliament. The Councils, which varied in
size from between ten and sixteen members, consisted of the
Company's most senior officials in the Presidencies,
16
including the Chiefs of the subordinate settlements.
21
Unfortunately there was an inherent defect in this system.
•All power was lodged in the President and Council jointly
and nothing could be transacted except by a majority of 
17
votes'. This conspired against the uniform application of 
consistent policies. Small changes in allegiance could 
result in major shifts in the balance of power and this 
encouraged the formation of parties within the Councils. The 
tendency was for personal interests or animosities to 
predominate, often to the extent where they interfered with 
the conduct of the Company's public business.
To overcome these problems whose inconvenience the 
exigencies of conflict had exaggerated, Select Committees 
with much smaller memberships were formed - in Bengal in 
1756, later in the other Presidencies. These, each composed 
of the President and three senior Council members, at first 
only dealt with important military and political matters. 
However they gradually assumed most of the powers of 
government until the Councils were left with responsibility 
for little more that the conduct of the Company's commercial 
f unc tions.
The Regulating Act of 1773 significantly restructured the 
Bengal Government and altered the balance of power between 
the three Presidencies. The Government of Bengal was 
constituted the Supreme Government and the President 
promoted to the position of Governor-General. The large 
Council was dismantled and the Governor-General and his four 
new Council members instructed to assume responsibility for 
the business previously conducted by the Select Committee.
22
This substantially reduced the possibility for faction but
the decision to continue majority rule did not completely
remove it. More significantly, the Act gave the Bengal
Government a controlling authority over the other two
Presidencies. Their governments were prohibited from
declaring war or making peace without the consent of the
Bengal Government in all cases except those where 'imminent
18
necessity' should make it dangerous to postpone a decision. 
Unfortunately the Act fell short of its intentions and only 
gave a superintending power which was hedged about with 
exceptions and limitations. In practice, the 
Governor-General and his Council only had the power of 
saying 'yes' or 'no'. It still lay within the power of the 
subordinate governments to follow policies which could 
render war or peace inevitable and they also had at their 
disposal a variety of ways of frustrating the Supreme 
Government's wishes. In particular, it was left to the 
subordinate governments to decide when 'imminent necessity' 
should be applied to the individual situations they were 
required to deal with.
From 1777, the Government of Madras consisted of a President
and Council, the latter being composed of the five most
19
senior civil servants in the Presidency. In 1781, the
Council was enlarged to eleven members, one of whom was a
20
military employee of the Company. In practice however, this
did not greatly affect the operation of the system. Of the
five oldest and most senior members of the Council, all
Chiefs of subordinate settlements, only one resided in
21
Madras and regularly attended the Council's meetings.
23
Whatever the theoretical strength of the Council, in reality
it was often a considerably smaller body. Macartney, when he
arrived as Governor in Madras in 1781, informed Warren
Hastings that, on his arrival, he only found 'Messieurs
Smith, Johnson and Williams in Council; all the other
members happened to be absent except Mr Sadleir, who had 
22
been suspended'.
The Madras Government also had a Select Committee similar to
Bengal's, operating as a cabinet within the Council. From
the same letter of Macartney, it appears that the members of
the Select Committee were chosen by the Governor. Only one
rule limited his freedom to select which members of the
Council should serve with him, that which 'incapacitated
from sitting in such committees persons married into French
23
or Dutch families'.
Prior to 1784, there were no firmly established rules
governing promotion in the Company's Indian administrations
and patronage, which was exercised in a peculiarly
demoralizing manner, played an important role. As Dodwell
observed, the Directors, 'not content with having the
nomination of the persons who were to enter the Company's
civil and military services, also sought to control their
promotion. Covenanted and military officers would take a
trip to England in order to gain admission to council,
appointment to some lucrative office, or the command of a
regiment or an army out of their turn.... The necessary
result was that the government in India lacked the most
24
salutary power of rewarding merit by promotion'. In
24
addition, it was not unusual for the Directors to appoint 
men in Britain who were not members of the covenanted 
services to special posts in India. Thus men with powerful 
connections or influence were constantly appearing in India 
where they expected to be provided for. The only general 
rule to apply, until Macartney's appointment, had been the 
customary one of appointing a member of the Company’s 
covenanted civil service in Madras to the post of President 
or Governor of that Presidency.
Certain features of the East India Company’s structure at 
this period deserve particular notice. Firstly, while 
Parliament could exercise some supervision of the Company 
through Select Committees and at such times as the Charter 
came up for renewal, it had no direct means of controlling 
the Court. Likewise, the principal means at the Ministry's 
disposal for controlling the Directors was the use of its 
influence amongst the Proprietors during the elections to 
the Court. Secondly, while the system was essentially an 
adjudicative one, delays resulting from geographical factors 
undermined the arrangements. Authority was divided among too 
many people in the various bodies and this introduced 
stresses into the system. Parties in dispute were encouraged 
to push disputes up the hierarchy and this, together with 
the system's failure to clearly define the components' 
powers and responsibilities, made the implementation of 
consistent policies difficult. Thirdly, the structure 
generated dependency. The importance of patronage and 
influence in the selection process and their impact on the 
career structure resulted in the Company's employees
25
perceiving themselves peculiarly dependent on the higher 
1 eve 1s .
By the 1770's, the Company was in financial difficulties, 
receiving aid from the Treasury and struggling to meet an 
abnormal number of bills drawn on London. In India,
Hasting's government had been marked by bitter and perpetual 
disputes within the Bengal Council and between the Council 
and the chief of the Judiciary. Pressure emerged in Britain 
for a greater degree of government regulation of the 
Company. Public opinion, the Reports of the Select and 
Secret Committees of 1781 and the apparent failure of the 
Regulating Act forced Parliament to seek a new system of 
administration for both the home and Indian governments of 
the Company. The decision to do this was in part defended on 
the grounds that the state had a just interest in 
administrative revenues in India, that the stability of the 
Company was essential to the London money-market, and that 
sound administration and peace were the concern of the 
public. However, all attempts to bring the Company under 
state control encountered the great prejudice of the period 
against an increase in the powers of the executive.
Initially this defeated attempts to reorganize the East 
India Company until, in 1784 after the failure of Fox's two 
bills, Pitt introduced a bill of his own. The apparent idea 
behind Pitt's bill was that 'the state should take the 
Company into partnership, assuming the position of 
controlling and predominant partner in all matters relating 
to the higher branches of government, but leaving to the 
Company the monopoly of trade, the disposal of its valuable
26
patronage under Crown sanction and the details of the 
25
administration'. By leaving essential points, such as the 
exact division of authority, ambiguous and ensuring that the 
patronage of the Company, at least in theory, remained with 
the elected Directors, Pitt carried his bill through the two 
Hous e s .
Pitt's India Act of 1784 substantially changed the formal
structure of accountability in the East India Company by
more directly bringing it under the control of the State
(diagram 1, p 27 ). The Act created a Board of Commissioners,
more commonly referred to as the Board of Control, to
supervise the Company's civil and military administrations.
Although composed of one of the Secretaries of.State, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and four other members of the
Privy Council, all of whom were unpaid, actual control of
the Board soon passed to its President. This de facto position
was formalized in 1786 when the ex-officio members withdrew
from attending the Board's meetings. However, even after
Dundas had achieved the ambition which he expressed when he
wrote that he hoped he would 'not only in reality but
declaredly, ...be understood as the cabinet minister for 
26
India', the President still required the formal assent of 
two, later only one, of his colleagues to legalize his 
proceedings.
The Board exercised extensive powers. It had access to all 
the Company's papers and its approval was required for all 
despatches dealing with matters not strictly of a commercial 
nature. In special cases, especially those concerned with
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war, peace and negotiations with Indian rulers, the Board
might send its own despatches to India through the Secret
Committee of the Directors which could be required to sign
these and despatch them in the Company's name. When the
Board chose to exercise this power, the Secret Committee of
the Court of Directors had neither the right to discuss nor
to disclose the Board's orders. The Board's powers were,
however, restricted in certain significant ways. Most
importantly, it was not entitled to give orders to the
Company's employees in India. Furthermore, though the Board
of Control could alter the Directors' instructions to
conform with its ideas, it was not entitled to send
instructions of its own in its name. Officially the Court of
2
Directors was the 'organ and channe1...for governing India'. 
In addition, the India Act stated that the appointments of 
Governor-Generals, Governors and Commanders-in-Chief were to 
be made by the Court of Directors alone, the Crown merely 
having a power to recall. Lastly, the Directors were given 
the right to appeal to the Privy Council against the 
decisions of the Board. However, since the six Commissioners
of the Board were all members of the Privy Council, this
privilege hardly represented a significant restriction of 
the Board's authority.
Under Dundas's supervision, the Board quickly evolved an 
administrative structure to cope with its work. The 
President was assisted by paid Assistant Commissioners, a 
Secretary, a personal secretary and a number of office 
clerks. The work itself and the records were divided into 
departments dealing with each of the Presidencies
29
separately. C H Philips observes that this was done almost
immediately and that, from September 1784, following the
office routine of the Treasury, the Board's correspondence
(Public, Revenue, Secret and Commercial) was conducted on
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this geographical basis. In many respects it was this 
development that was to prove the most significant 
consequence of Pitt's Act. Prior to the creation of the 
Board of Control, the Directors had been required by the 
Regulating Act of 1776 to lay before the Treasury all papers 
relating to the Indian revenues. They had also been required 
to keep the Secretary of State supplied with everything that 
concerned the Company’s civil and military administrations 
in India. The 1781 Act had extended state control in a 
clause which permitted the Government to amend orders 
concerning relations with Indian states. However, lacking a 
specialized staff to handle this material, the Government 
had been unable to take advantage of the information 
available to it to exercise any detailed control over the 
Company's activities and its powers had never been fully 
used. It may with justification be argued that it was not so 
much the creation of the Board of Control as that of its 
specialized bureaucracy which marked a significant
29
development in relations between the State and the Company. 
Without the expertise of its staff, the Board of Control 
would have found itself no more able to superintend, direct 
and control the civil and military administrations of India 
than the Treasury and the Secretary of State had been, even 
in the years after 1781.
The Board's principal means of controlling the Court rested
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in the Act's requirement that all despatches should receive 
its approval. Under the terms of the Act, the Board had 
however to return draft despatches to the Court within a 
fortnight. This was quickly discovered to be too short a 
period and an informal practice soon developed as a 
pragmatic solution to the problem. Proposed courses of 
action were informally discussed by the President and the 
Chairman. The latter then proposed an unofficial draft 
despatch which, together with the material on which it was 
based, was sent to the Board. This, known as a Previous 
Communication, was referred by the Board's Secretary to the 
appropriate department, examined, revised and given to the 
President who then discussed it in private with the Chairs. 
After this stage, during which significant revisions of the 
original draft might be made, the Previous Communication was 
returned to India House to be reworked into a Draft. Once 
this was done, the Draft entered the official phase of its 
existence. It was submitted to the Committee of 
Correspondence who revised it again before the Court as a 
whole examined it. The Draft was then sent to the Board of 
Control which now found little difficulty in returning it 
within the statutory fortnight to the Court. Once back in 
the hands of the Court, the Draft was re-examined by the 
Committee of Correspondence who studied any alterations made 
by the Board and either accepted or appealed against them.
On the occasions when the Court appealed against the Board's 
changes, an official correspondence between the Court and 
the Board occurred. Ultimately however, the Board held the 
power to force the Court to accept its decision and could 
secure obedience by obtaining a mandamus from the Court of
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K i n g 's Bench.
Pitt's Act did more than just create the Board of Control to 
supervise the Company's activities. It significantly altered 
the pre-existing structure of its administrative system in 
Britain. The Court of Proprietors lost the right to veto the 
Directors' proposals once these had received the Board's 
approval. Its most important function, apart from electing 
new Directors, was now to act as a forum in which public 
opinion might be expressed on the Company's measures in 
Britain and India. The Secret Committee of the Court was 
established as a statutory body and its composition defined. 
Henceforth it might consist of no more t h a n  three Directors, 
the Chairmen and one other senior Director. Although the new 
Secret Committee's powers were much more limited than the 
extensive ones it predecessor had exercised, its position 
vis-a-vis the Court was somewhat different. It became, in 
effect, the Company's cabinet and was able to exert a 
considerable influence over policy. Its members had the 
right to consult with the President of the Board and the 
Ministers on Indian matters. On occasions the Committee 
actually originated secret despatches and it was not 
infrequently able to force the Board to modify its orders. 
When unable to alter the Board's decisions, it still 
retained the right to record in minutes its reasons for 
dissenting with the higher authority's policies.
It was not only the home government of the Company that was 
re-structured by Pitt's Act. Significant changes were made 
in the internal structure of the Bengal Government and the
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balance of power was shifted further away from Madras and
Bombay to Calcutta. The Governor-General's Council was
reduced from four to three members, one of whom was to be
the Commander-in-Chief of the Company’s forces who now
received 'a voice and precedence in the Council next after
30
the Governor-General'. The Governor-General's ability to
control his Council was considerably strengthened. Besides
holding the casting vote, his privileges were extended. He
could secure prior consideration of his proposals by
postponing the discussion of his Councillors' propositions
31
for up to forty-eight hours.
At the same time, the Act of 1784 extended the powers of the
Supreme Government over the subordinate Presidencies. These
were specified and significantly enlarged. The
Governor-General in Council was given the power to
superintend, control and direct the operations of the
governments of the other Presidencies where they related to
the 'transactions with the country powers or to war, or
peace, or to the application of the revenues or forces of
32
the Presidencies'. The Act also specified that the Bengal
Government might assumed control of other areas of
government in the subordinate Presidencies on receipt of
orders from the Court. The subordinate governments were
directed to promptly obey the orders of the Supreme
Government unless they had received 'positive orders and
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instructions' from the Court to the contrary. To enable the 
Bengal Government to efficiently supervise their activities, 
the governments of the other two Presidencies were required 
by the Act to send the Bengal Government exact copies of all
33
their orders, resolutions and measures.
Under the terms of the Act, the Government of Madras was
re-structured on the Bengal model. From 5 February 1785, the
full Council consisted of the Governor, Commander-in-Chief
and two covenanted civil servants from the Madras 
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Presidency. The Council divided its work among three
committees; a Political Committee to manage civil and
revenue matters, a Military Committee and a Commercial
Committee. Each of these committees had its own secretary
who organized its business and supervised the administration
of the its department. In addition to these three
secretaries, there was a fourth who acted as the Chief
Secretary to the Government and fulfilled a role in the
Presidency's administration similar to that of the Secretary
of the Court in London. Like his counterpart in the Court's
structure, he had a department of his own. While in theory
the civil administration was split into independent
branches, in practice this rarely was the case. Under Webbe
and then later under Buchan and Thackeray, the secretaries
of the Madras Government were really only deputies of the
Chief Secretary, by whom all the important business of each
35
office was performed.
The Council presided over and, at least in theory, 
controlled the Company's civil and military administrations 
in the Presidency. The civil administration of Madras 
employed 160 European civil servants who were assisted by 
approximately 1600 Indian officials. The Company's military 
department employed 800 European officers and 4000 European
34
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soldiers together with a substantial force of Indian sepoys. 
In practice, the two branches of the Company tended to be 
mutually antagonistic towards each other and their quarrels 
made it difficult for the Council to impose its will on 
either. The civil servants, significantly outnumbered by the 
military, feared that officers would be employed in what 
they regarded as strictly civilian posts and that, in 
consequence, their own prospects and status within the 
overall administration would be destroyed. The army resented 
its ultimate subordination to a civil authority and 
frequently complained of intolerable civilian interference 
in military affairs. Matters were further complicated 
because the army itself was divided into two distinct 
establishments by the presence of Company and Crown forces 
in the Presidency. This twofold division of the army did not 
always have altogether happy consequences. In particular, 
the ascendancy given the K i n g ’s officers over the Company's 
led from time to time to jealousy between the two 
establishments. The Company's officers resented, for 
example, the King's officers higher emoluments and their 
right to issue orders to the Company's officers of equal 
rank.
Pitt's Act did more than just re-structure the Company's 
administration. It also introduced other important changes 
which had a considerable impact on the decision-making 
process. The Directors' exercise of their patronage was 
curtailed and an attempt made to establish a career 
structure. The Act forbade the Court to fill vacancies in 
the Councils with other than covenanted servants except in
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the cases of Governor-Generals, Governors and
Commander-in-Chiefs. In other than exceptional cases,
promotion was in future to be strictly in due order of
seniority. Concurrent with this reform, the practice of
making appointments from Britain to special posts was also
curtailed. These changes marked the beginning of a
redistribution of responsibility within the Company's
administration. 'Save as regards the highest posts of all,
the tendency was for the Directors to be limited to the
recruitment of their services by the nomination of writers
and cadets, while the executive governments in India
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determined their promotion and employment'.
This development significantly altered the balance of power 
between the Governors of the Presidencies and the Court. As 
observed earlier, the principal attraction of a directorship 
was the patronage it gave to individuals who usually 
exercised it to secure positions in India for their families 
and friends.. Now that the opportunities open to the 
Directors in Britain to secure advancement for their 
proteges in India was limited, they were forced to rely upon 
their influence with the local authorities to achieve this, 
to them, important goal. It is clear that this was an 
influential factor governing the Directors' formulation of 
policies. They deliberately sought, whenever possible, not 
to antagonize their Governors, Commanders- in-Chief and 
Councils who might retaliate by attacking the Directors' 
proteges under their authority or refuse to assist people 
recommended by individuals in the Court. Although this 
proved to be one of the most significant consequences, it
36
was not one of the principal intentions of the Act. The
intention behind this reform appears to have been a desire
to strengthen the authority of the local governments over 
their respective staff.
The Amending Act of 1786 introduced two more changes.
Firstly it invested the Governor-General and the Governors 
with power to override the decisions of their Councils and 
act without their concurrence in 'extraordinary' cases.
These were defined as those in which it was the
Governor-General's or the Governor's judgement that the
interests of the Company or the tranquility of the British 
possessions in India were threatened. Secondly it limited 
the nomination to vacancies in the administrations to the 
Company's employees on the spot and laid down prescribed 
rules for appointments to various offices. These required 
that employees should have served specified numbers of years 
before becoming eligible for posts with certain rates of 
pay.
The formal structure of the East India Company as it emerged 
after 1784 (diagram 2, p . 37) had two distinctive features. 
Rising up through the Company, there were official channels 
of communication. Starting from the lowest levels in the 
administration, each unit was required to inform that above 
it of its activities in order that they might be examined 
and approved or disavowed. They were also required to make 
proposals and send general information concerning matters 
under their responsibility to their immediate superiors. At 
each level, decisions might be taken and orders given but
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all of these, with the exception of those originating from 
the Board, were subject to confirmation and possible 
revision. Where a superior body disagreed with the proposals 
of an inferior authority or issued orders that the inferior 
authority questioned, it was open to the subordinate body to 
request that the matter be referred to a yet higher one. 
Subordinate bodies were officially forbidden to breach the 
formal channels of communication by directly approaching any 
authorities other than those placed immediately above them 
in the hierarchy. When individuals or bodies failed to 
adhere to the official channels of communication and 
attempted to enter into direct relationships with higher 
authorities, there were nearly always protests from those 
passed over. In particular, the Court objected strongly to 
attempts by their local governments or individuals in them 
to communicate directly with the Board of Control, members 
of which were not averse to encouraging the practice.
Running parallel but in reverse to the official channels of 
communication, there was a formal chain of command 
stretching down through the Company's administration from 
official body to official body. Just as authorities were, in 
theory, not permitted to communicate directly with any 
others apart from those immediately above them in the 
organization, superior authorities were prohibited from 
sending their orders directly to the lower echelons. Any 
attempts to bye-pass points in the formal chain of command 
were strongly resisted, often with success. In 1802 
Castlereagh, then President of the Board, twice tried to 
send sealed orders to India through the Secret Committee,
39
thereby indirectly bye-passing the Court. On both occasions
the Court was able to force him to reveal the contents of 
38
his despatches.
These two features of the Company's formal organization were 
the direct consequences of its hierarchical structure in 
which authority was concentrated at the apex while 
responsibility was delegated downwards. This structure 
reflected 18th century political thought in Britain which 
was characterized by suspicion and fear of executive power. 
Inspired by the philosophy that human nature is so 
essentially corrupt that men will always abuse whatever 
executive power is granted them unless closely supervised, 
the formal structure of the Company was constructed to allow 
the operation of a government of checks. Consequently the 
formal decision-making process of the Company was conceived 
in terms of adjudication. The intention of the system was 
that parties at every level in the organization should 
regard those bodies immediately above them as adjudicating 
authorities. They were expected to offer these authorities 
the information, opinion and argument which would enable 
them to formulate the policies which were to allocate 
resources. Eventually the adjudicating authorities were 
expected to pronounce decisions which had always to include 
summaries of the information and explanations of the 
judgements. The proceedings of each of these adjudicative 
bodies were in turn subject to the supervision of superior 
bodies which might either sanction or reverse their 
dec is ions.
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While the formal structure of the East India Company 
successfully created clearly defined arenas to which 
disputes over the selective adoption of values might be 
referred for settlement and succeeded in supply the means by 
which decisions could be formally sanctioned, it suffered 
from a number of inherent defects. Firstly, it was 
cumbersome and slow. To some extent, any system constructed 
at this time would have suffered from these defects since 
geographical distances and primitive communications imposed 
unavoidable limitations. The problem was however exacerbated 
by the deliberate imposition of checks. This feature of the 
Company's administration was recognized at the time but the 
supposed advantages of the system were considered to 
outweigh the disadvantages. Secondly, in attempting to 
ensure that the decision-making process should be strictly 
adjudicative while at the same time acknowledging the 
concept of checks and therefore permitting unsatisfied 
parties to appeal against decisions taken at every level, 
the formal structure generated internal stresses which its 
arrangements proved too narrow to accommodate. Thirdly, the 
system deliberately emphasized the 'dependency' of 
subordinate individuals and bodies in the structure on 
superior authorities. This had a number of consequences. It 
generated feelings of ambivalence in people and bodies 
towards superior authorities and was the cause of tensions 
in relationships between subordinates and superiors. More 
importantly, it had a detrimental impact on the total 
system's ability to gather information and evaluate its 
performance. Subordinates' perception of the importance of 
obtaining positive evaluations discouraged them from
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reporting on the adverse effects of policies and from 
submitting information likely to elicit a negative response 
iii their superiors. Last, but not least in importance, the 
f orma1 s ys tern required that a fairly high degree of 
consensus concerning its purposes and goals should exist 
among the people operating in it. Without such consensus, 
the adjudicative system broke down as stresses generated 
within the structure threatened to tear it apart. While such
a consensus appears to have existed in the first half of the
eighteenth century, with the conquest of India the situation 
changed. Parties emerged at all levels of the administration 
composed of men who were determined to take control of the 
Company and adapt its policies to their own ends, ends often 
at variance with those of other groups equally anxious to 
seize control.
In the following chapters the ways in which decisions were 
actually taken in the Company are examined. The different 
parties and interests which emerged within its 
administration and those which operated on it from outside 
are distinguished. The extent to which these influenced the 
decision-making process and the means by which they did so, 
together with the considerations which determined the 
policies they pursued, are analysed. In the course of this, 
evidence is produced which reveals that the various bodies 
which composed the Company and the individuals employed by 
it frequently failed to observe the formal arrangements
which were supposed to define their powers and regulate
their activities. At the same tim e , significant features of 
the Company's administration, in particular the important
42
role played by reciprocal requirements of patronage, are 
discussed.
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Chapter Two
The Formative Years:
Munro's Childhood and Early Career.
In his introduction to his study of the introducton of the
'Munro System' Beaglehole observes that, 'though the system
marked a reaction against that of Cornwallis, the reaction
was one which, for Munro and those of his contemporaries at
Madras who shared his views, was the result more of the
study of the institutions of their part of India than.of any
1
theoretical objections to the Bengal system'. He qualifies
this statement with the remark that it must be remembered
that Munro's perceptions were 'to some extent determined by
2
his character and preconceptions'. However, having made this 
observation, Beaglehole does not return to it but 
consistently treats the development of Munro's ideas outside 
the context of his personality. In this chapter an attempt 
is made to distinguish some of the formative experiences of 
Munro's childhood and earlier career and to examine them for 
the information they supply about his personality 
development. At the same time a picture emerges of the 
important role played by private influence in determining 
promotion within the Company. In addition, the origin and
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development of significant divisions within the structure of 
the local administration are traced.
Thomas Munro was born in Glasgow on 27 May 1761, the second 
son of Alexander and Margaret Munro. His father was a 
successful Glasgow merchant who, in partnership with a Mr 
Cumming and a Mr Mackenzie, was extensively involved in 
trade between Scotland and Virginia. He was a moderately 
prosperous representative of the mercantile bourgeoisie whom 
social and economic developments in Britain were 
establishing as the rising class within society. The head of 
a small household of family and servants, Alexander Munro 
owned his house in Glasgow and rented a second, called 
Northside, a few miles outside the city near the banks of 
the Kelvin. Both he and his wife, whose maiden name was 
Stark, were distantly related to families which belonged to 
the gentry and the aristocracy. Like the majority of people 
at all times, Alexander Munro seems to have held no very 
strong political convictions and was content with affairs as 
they were provided they left him in peace to conduct his 
life and business as he wished. Even so, he clearly believed 
in the possibility and responsibility of the individual to 
advance his status and, in consequence, placed a high value 
on education.
His father’s prosperity, his expectation that his son would
enter the family business and his appreciation of its
benefits ensured that Thomas Munro received a very good
education. He was first sent to an English day school and
3
then went to the grammar school of Glasgow. At the age of
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13, he left the grammar school and was enrolled at the 
College and University of Glasgow where he studied 
mathematics under Professor Williamson and chemistry with 
Doctor Irvine. By the time he left the university, Munro had 
learnt French, Italian and Spanish, the last of which he had 
taught himself so that he might read Cervantes's Don 
Qu ixote, one of his favourite books, in its original 
language. He had also studied classics, history, geography 
and political economy. At the completion of his formal 
education, Munro was a well-read young man acquainted with a 
wider range of subjects than was usual for the period.
During these same years, Munro's character began to be
formed. His family, composed of his parents, four brothers
and two sisters, was the predominant influence on his life.
It was an extremely close-knit family and Munro appears to
have found it difficult to form relationships outside its
intimate circle. He made few friends at the schools he
attended and kept in contact with only a couple of these
after he completed his education. His first biographer wrote
that 'there was a degree of prudence about him which
hindered him, even in boyhood, from indiscriminately
4
lavishing his regards upon every playfellow'. From
preference, Munro spent much of his childhood away from his
peers, staying either in the house with his adored sister
Erskine or rambling alone in the countryside round 
5
Northside. It is possible to detect an element of 
insecurity, even of estrangement, in Munro's psychology and 
it was probably this, rather than the prudence Gleig 
perceived, which made him so reserved. One of the sources of
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this character trait can be traced to Munro's deafness, a 
disability with which a childhood attack of measles had left 
him for life .
In 1777, Munro entered the counting-house of Somerville and
Gordon. Here, where he was very happy, he would have
remained until he had gained sufficient experience to be
able to enter his father's company had not events in the
meantime overtaken his family. In 1776, the war between
Britain and the American Colonies had led to the Congress of
the United States passing the Act of Confiscation. The
partnership of Cumming, Mackenzie and Company lost several
shipments, was unable to recover outstanding debts and had
insufficient capital to sustain these loses. The company
collapsed and Alexander Munro, although he only held 12 of
6
the 125 shares, was forced into bankruptcy. For several 
years, Munro's father attempted to salvage something but 
only succeeded in adding numerous personal debts to those he 
had already incurred in his business. Indebtedness now 
became an established feature of Alexander Munro's life and 
he was never to completely extricate himself from a position 
of financial dependence.
The collapse of Alexander Munro's business had traumatic 
consequences for all the members of the family and the 
concealed strengths and weaknesses of their characters 
emerged under the stress. Alexander Munro, always a weak, 
rather credulous and naive man, now alternated between moods 
of unfounded optimism and acute anxiety. His sense of 
identity threatened by his bankruptcy, he placed an
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exaggerated importance on being treated with the respect he 
considered his due. This made him slightly arrogant, very 
quarrelsome and extremely unforgiving. Margaret Munro was 
quite unable to come to terms with the sudden loss of 
wealth, position and friends or cope with the demands that 
the new situation placed on her. She appears to have 
suffered some form of mental breakdown and was left in a 
state of fairly severe depression for most of the rest of 
her life. Munro's latent insecurity and sense of alienation 
was encouraged to develop as all his expectations were 
destroyed. A tendency towards defensiveness began to 
characterize his social relationships though this was 
somewhat tempered by the emergence of an intense ambition to 
succeed.
After his father's bankruptcy, it soon became apparent that 
new careers would have to be found for Munro and his 
brothers Daniel and Alexander. Munro left the counting-house 
but not before he had been introduced to the economic 
theories embodied in Adam Smith's W e a 1th of Nations which
7
were receiving wide currency in Scottish commercial circles.
These made a profound impression on him. They appealed to
his individualism and his intense desire for personal
independence which he expressed when he wrote of the
frustration of being forced to comply with the wishes of men 
8
he despised. A decision was taken that Munro's brother 
Daniel should go to the West Indies where his father had 
some influence. An old friend, Hercules Ross, was 
successfully building a fortune in Jamaica where his 
friendship with the Governor, General Campbell, placed him
48
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in a position to advance Daniel's career. At the same time,
it was decided that Munro should go to India. In later life,
when Munro wrote bitterly of parents who sent their children
'in pursuit of riches but in reality to encounter
disappointment and poverty' and stated that ' the golden
days...have long been over1, he must have had in mind the
considerations which had prompted his father to send him to 
10
India.
Positions in the East India Company were very difficult to
obtain and, without personal contacts, sources of influence
or the ability to buy them, there was little possibility of
securing a cadetship or a writership. Munro's father
investigated the possibility of buying his son a writership
but discovered that it would cost about £3000, a sum he
11
could not hope to raise. On 20 February 1779, Munro accepted 
the best post which could be found him and enlisted as a 
midshipman on the Company's ship Walpole. Shortly afterwards 
he left Glasgow and travelled to London to join his ship in 
the Thames. In the interval before his ship sailed, Munro's 
prospects were unexpectedly improved. His father was 
delegated by the Glasgow merchants to go to London and argue 
their claims to indemnities for losses sustained during the 
war with America. Although Alexander Munro failed to achieve 
this principal objective of his visit to London, he did 
become acquainted with Laurence Sulivan, a director of the 
East India Company. Sulivan, as a gesture of his 
friendship, gave Munro a cadetship with the Company's army 
of Madras.
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While in London, Alexander Munro also met other influential
men with East India Company connections. The family was
distantly connected, through Margaret Munro's Sterling
relations, to Lady Stuart, wife of Sir John Stuart who was
himself an important figure in Scottish society. Through
Lady Stuart, Alexander Munro had an introduction to her
nephew, Andrew Stuart, a man actively involved in British
politics and the brother of Colonel James Stuart who was to
succeed General Sir Hector Munro as Commander-in-Chief of 
12
Madras. Andrew Stuart promised to write to his brother and
recommend Munro to him. Munro's father also met Sir William
James, Chairman of the Court of Directors, to whom he was
introduced by Laurence Sulivan. This man offered Munro's
brother Alexander a Bengal cadetship, which his father was
encouraged to accept on his behalf by a promise from Lord
Blantyre's brother, Charles Stuart, that he would advance
the young man's career when he received the appointment to
11
the Bengal Council that he was expecting.
Munro sailed for Madras in June 1779. He took with him
letters of introduction to George Macpherson, John Lennox,
Alexander Ross, David Haliburton, Deputy Adjutant General
14
Burne, and General Sir Hector Munro. The experience of his 
father's bankruptcy had left Munro a slightly embittered 
cynic at the early age of 19. He had seen his parents 
deserted by their friends, had had his expectations 
destroyed and learnt the true worth of empty promises. He 
seems to have felt himself in some measure socially inferior 
to his fellow cadets and to have been acutely conscious of 
his lack of influence. This, together with a desire to
50
assert his independence, explains why, though he hated the
life, he continued to work as a midshipman on the voyage to
India until some of the military officers on board persuaded
15
him  to leave the c o c k p i t  for the c a d e t s 1 mess. As a
consequence of this outlook, Munro placed little confidence
in his letters of recommendation though he appears to have
entertained some hopes that the ten he possessed to the
C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f  wo u l d  be usef ul . As he later e x p l a i n e d  to
his sister, he had formed the erroneous idea that the
General would not disoblige so many people with an apparent
16
interest in his career.
W h e n  Mu n r o  landed t h r o u g h  the surf on the b e a c h  b e f o r e  Fort
St George on 15 January 1780, he entered what, for the
Europeans, amounted to a frontier society. The number of
Britons in the c o m m u n i t y  was small. The C o m p a n y ' s  civil
establishment was composed of the Governor, his five Council
members, 67 senior merchants, 38 junior, 11 factors and 71 
17
writers. The military establishment was only somewhat larger
18
with 800 officers and 4000 European soldiers. The 
territories of the Presidency of Madras were not extensive. 
In 1756 and 1763, the British had been granted the districts 
of the Jagir by the Nawab of Arcot for the services they had 
rendered him. In 1765, the territory of the Northern 
Circars, which consisted of the districts of Chicacole, 
Rajahmundry, Ellore and Cundapelly had been added. Although 
the British had attained military supremacy here as they had 
in Bengal, they had not followed this up by taking political 
control quite so quickly. The explanation for this seems to 
be that the area was not rich enough to bring the interests
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of the Company's officials into direct conflict with those 
of the Nawab and so encourage them to take over the 
administration. Far from wishing to remove the Nawab, the 
Company's officials had discovered that their best interests 
lay in lending him money. By 1780 the position was such that 
the Nawab controlled a large portion of the local officials' 
private savings and was therefore able to exert a 
considerable influence over the Council and, through it, 
over policies.
The small British society in the Presidency was
characterised by faction and intrigue, split by jealousies
and riddled with power struggles. In 1776, the Governor,
George Pigot, had been arrested by the army's
second-in-command, Colonel James Stuart, apparently on the
orders of a group of conspirators led by Paul Benfield and
19
supported by the Nawab. Pigot had arrived in Madras with 
orders to restore the district of Tanjore to its raja, 
orders which threatened the interests of many of the Nawab's 
European creditors. His determination to carry out his 
orders had brought him into conflict with these men. At the 
same time, he had alienated his own Council when he claimed 
the power of adjourning it and refused to follow policies he 
disagreed with. Faced by a determined resistance, the 
Governor had next attempted to strengthen his position by 
excluding his principal opponents from the Council. His 
arrest served to reveal how unstable the Madras Government 
had become. The power of some of the interest groups in the 
Presidency was further illustrated by the ability of certain 
sectors of the Company to openly oppose a succeeding
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G o v e r n o r ,  Sir T h om a s Ru mb o l d.  R u m b o l d  had o r d e r e d  the
zamindars of the Northern Circars to come to Madras to make
their revenue settlements. In doing this, he had taken a
very profitable business out of the hands of the local
chiefs. These men retaliated by seeking his disgrace and
eventually succeeded in having a bill of pains and penalties
exhibited against him in February 1783 which was not
20
abandoned until the following June.
The administration of the Presidency was further 
destabilised by the deteriorating relations with the Kingdom 
of Mysore. Haidar Ali's hostility had been aroused by 
British attempts to gain possession of Guntur, their 
expedition against the French settlement of Mahe which he 
regarded as under his protection, and their refusal to renew 
the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance they had 
concluded with him in 1769.
For a s h o r t . t i m e  after  his arri val , M u n r o ' s  p r o s p e c t s  looked
bleak. He was i n f o r m e d  that he w o u l d  have to w a i t  at least
three years before he might expect to be appointed an 
21
ensign. He discovered that his letters of introduction were
of little value insofar as the majority of them were to men
with insufficient influence to advance his career. George
M a c p h e r s o n  was dead, J ohn  L e n n o x  only a w r it e r , D av i d
H a l i b u r t o n  a junio r m e r c h a n t  and A l e x a n d e r  Ross a p r i v a t e
trader with no position in the civil administration. Burne,
the D e p u t y  A d j u t a n t  G e ne ra l , of f e r e d  to e n s u r e  that M u n r o
should be appointed to the regiment of his choice but was
22
u n a b l e  to do mo re  for him. G e n e r a l  Munro, a l t h o u g h  he told
M u n r o  that he w o u l d  be glad to see him, p o l i t e l y  d e c l i n e d  to
23
take any other i n t e r e s t  in his career. M un ro  a s c r i b e d  the 
G e n e r a l ’s lack of i n t e r e s t  to the a p p a r e n t l y  e no rm o us  number 
of his S c o t t i s h  r e l a t i v e s  wh o had a p p e a r e d  in M a d r a s  ho p in g  
to pr o f i t  from his in flu en c e.
D u r i ng  the first  m o nt h s , M u n r o  lived w i t h A l e x a n d e r  Ross in
Ma dra s w h e r e  he app e a rs  to have r e m a i n e d  o u t si d e  the
m a i n s t r e a m  of E u r o p e a n  soc iety. His e x p e r i e n c e s  of his
fath er' s b a n k r u p t c y  had left him w i t h  a deep fear of debt
and his e x t r e m e  p o v e r t y  p r e v e n t e d  him  from t a k i n g  pa rt  in
social ac t i v i t i e s .  He was f u r t h e r  d i s c o u r a g e d  from e n t e r i n g
so cie ty  by his p e r s o n a l  i n s e c u r i t y  and a p p a r e n t  f ee l i n g s  of
a l i e n a t i o n  from his peers. S o m e w h a t  older than the m a j o r i t y
of the other ju n io r  e m p l o y e e s ,  b e t t e r  e du c a te d ,  mo re
e x p e r i e n c e d  and yet e n c u m b e r e d  w i t h  a sl ig ht  i n f e r i o r i t y
co mp l ex  a r i s i n g  fr om  the d i f f e r e n c e s  in so cia l b a c k g r o u n d ,
Mu n r o  t hr ow his e n e r g i e s  into study, in p a r t i c u l a r  of Ara b i c
24
and then Persian.
The o u t b r e a k  of the F i r s t  M y s o r e  War a b r u p t l y  c h a n g e d  the
course of Munro's career. In July 1780, Haidar Ali descended
onto the C a r n a t i c  plai ns,  b u r n i n g  crops and d e v a s t a t i n g
vi ll a g e s  un t il  a c o r d o n  of b l a c k e n e d  de se r t  was f o r m e d  round
M a d r a s  fr om  P u l i c a t  in the no r t h to P o n d i c h e r r y  in the south
and extending 50 miles inland. The destruction of Colonel
B ai l l i e ' s  d e t a c h m e n t  gave M u n r o  a n . e a r l y  a p p o i n t m e n t  as an 
25
ensign. More im p or t a n t l y ,  G e n e r a l  M u n r o ' s  and the G o v e r n o r  
John W h i t e h i l l ' s  d i s a s t r o u s  h a n d l i n g  of the war e n c o u r a g e d  
the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l ,  H a s t in g s , to send Sir E yre  C o o t e  to
replace the former and to suspend the latter. Sir Eyre Coote
a r r i v e d  in Ma dr a s wi t h  his p e r s o n a l  s e c r e t a r y ,  T hom as
Graham. Thomas Graham was the son of one of Alexander
Munro's oldest friends in Glasgow and his brother George was
26
a constant visitor at the family house. On arrival, Graham 
sought out Munro, re-introduced him to General Munro and
persuaded the latter to appoint him, in November 1781, the
27
quartermaster of the 5th Brigade. He would have obtained for 
Munro the post of adjutant had not Munro's deafness given 
the General an excuse for refusing it. The appointment, 
although it was only temporary, represented a significant 
promotion for Munro and it also dramatically improved his
financial situation. From only 48 pagodas a month, his
28
income was increased to over 100.
Even b ef ore  M u n r o  r e c e i v e d  his p r om o t i o n ,  e ve nts  had
occurred which were to make the appointment precarious. Lord
George Macartney had arrived at Madras on 22 June 1781 and
i m m e d i a t e l y  a s s u m e d  the of fic e of G o v e r n o r .  M a c a r t n e y
arrived determined to restore peace to the territory as
q u i c k l y  as p o s s ib l e . As G o v e r n o r  of G ra n a d a ,  he had been
forced to unconditionally surrender the island to a superior
F r e n c h  force and had then be en  he ld a p r i s o n e r  for some time
29
before he was released and returned to Britain. This
experience seems to have disposed him towards pacifist
p o l i c i e s  and p e r s u a d e d  h i m  of the f u t i l i t y  of war. The
conditions he discovered in Madras strengthened his
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to av o id  long d r a w n  out h o s t i l i t i e s .  The
Ma dr a s  a u t h o r i t i e s  we r e c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  a ser i ou s  r e f u g e e
30
problem which was aggravated by a famine. Land
55
communications with Bengal had been severed and all supplies 
had to be imported by sea, British command of which had not 
been absolutely secured.
Macartney's Council supported his view that peace should be 
restored to the Carnatic as quickly as possible. The army, 
however, opposed this policy which it felt to be against its 
interests. While the civil servants generally prospered in 
times of peace, the military did so in those of war. 
Casualties opened promotion prospects while campaigns 
created opportunities for men to make names for themselves. 
Opinion in the army tended to favour Hasting's view that 
hostilities should continue until the enemy was compelled to 
sue for peace. This conflict of interests between the 
military and the civilians quickly led to the emergence of 
ill-feeling between the two parties. Long held suspicions 
among the civil servants that the military would, given an 
opportunity, encroach on their privileges by occupying posts 
in the administration normally reserved for covenanted civil 
employees did little to allay the hostility.
The hostility between the two branches of the Company's 
administration was heightened at this critical juncture by 
the quarrel that developed between Coote and Macartney over 
the question of military command in the Carnatic. Coote, who 
had been invested with separate and independent powers, 
interpreted these in the widest possible sense, failed to 
attend the meetings of the Select Committee of which he had 
been a member since 7 November 1780, and refused to explain 
his conduct. At first Macartney had tried to humour the
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Commander-in-Chief. 'The General and I', he wrote to John
Macpherson in Bengal, 'are at bottom the best of friends....
I have courted him like a mistress and humoured him like a 
31
child'. Soon, however, the relationship deteriorated. Coote
complained bitterly that the Government was deliberately
interfering in his management of the war and at the same
time making his job impossible by failing to keep the army
properly supplied. Macartney retaliated by accusing Coote of
having, by his extravagance and poor management, exacerbated
the situation. 'It is true', he wrote, 'that the army
marched light but, notwithstanding all the complaints...with
which Sir Eyre Coote's letters are filled, you see what can
be done in case of emergency and what savings might be made
if he added to his other great qualities that spirit of
arrangement and detail which, however undervalued, is
32
particularly necessary at this time'.
It is clear that Coote was impatient of civilian control and
had an exalted view of his position in Madras. Macartney's
agent at Calcutta reported that Coote had declared that,
unless he was given sole command, he must resign and return 
33
to Bengal. It is equally obvious that the difficulties 
Macartney was experiencing as a result of Coote's truculent 
behaviour were making him unduly suspicious of the military. 
He appears to have allowed himself to be convinced by the 
civilians in Madras that the military intended to subvert 
the civilian government. He blamed the attitudes of the 
Supreme Government and the Court for the situation, claiming 
that they had encouraged the army to imagine itself 
independent of and superior to the civil authorities. He
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wrote to Laurence Sulivan stating that 'the lead and
authority which your military have been permitted to assume
within these last few years, if not soon properly checked
and regulated, may prove as fatal to the public interests as
34
the attacks of the enemy'. He excited himself with 
ill-defined fears of a military dictatorship.
The real threat facing the administration of Madras was not
that of a military coup but of the collapse of the entire
structure. The problems that the Council were experiencing
with Sir Hector Munro clearly reveal this. General Munro
had, in a fit of pique, taken a vow never to sit with
Sadleir, a member of the Select Committee. Macartney wrote
to Laurence Sulivan describing the difficulties this caused.
It not only deprived the Council of the General's military
advice, it also made it very difficult for it to issue
orders. 'The difficulty lay', according to Macartney, 'in
Sir Hector Munro's determination not to act under orders
signed by Mr Sadleir. To obviate all objections and to
accelerate the service, the Select Committee...very
handsomely vested me with powers to enable me to carry any
expedition.... The instructions, letters, etc, were
regularly laid before the Committee, tho' only signed by 
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me'. To some extent Macartney sympathised with the General's
feelings for Sadleir whom he described as being 'so
obnoxious to the whole settlement and so much disliked that
his standing forward in any measure is almost a certain
36
method of defeating it'. This did not however disguise the 
fact that the administration was collapsing as a result of 
the divisions appearing within it.
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The disagreement between Coote and Macartney came to a head
when the Select Committee, against Coote's wishes, ordered
the Company's troops to take the Dutch settlements on the
coast and the harbour of Trinkomali. Both Coote and
Macartney complained to Bengal about the other's behaviour.
Hastings, who had himself already quarrelled with Macartney
whom he suspected was seeking to undermine his position at
home with a view to securing the Governor-Generalship,
37
preferred to support Coote. On 11 March 1782 the Bengal
Council recommended that Madras should give Coote the full
powers he demanded and at the same time rather tactlessly
observed that this recommendation could just as well have 
38
been an order.
Although Macartney accepted this recommendation, he did so 
most unwillingly. The Governor-Genera 1's refusal to support 
him had both angered and disappointed him. He believed that 
Hastings was deliberately enhancing Coote's powers with the 
intention of undermining his authority and possibly even the 
independence of the Madras administration. At the same time 
however, Macartney felt unable to attack the decision on 
these grounds. He had insufficient evidence to support his 
suspicions. Instead he employed the argument that it 
threatened the very structure of the administration. 'I 
fear', he wrote to Warren Hastings, 'that...the barrier 
between the civil and the military is almost entirely 
annihilated. I cannot bring myself to imagine that it could 
be your intention to depress the civil and raise the 
military above it, but it may be worth while to reflect a 
little on what latitude the disposition of some men might
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give to your letter of the 11 March on the subject of Sir
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Eyre Coote's powers'. He warned Hastings that the
recommendations of the Supreme Government might have
disastrous consequences. 'It appears to me', he observed,
'that, having once parted with powers of such consequence as
those which you have thought fit should be exercised by Sir
Eyre Coote, an attempt to resume or overrule them in any
material point, under the present circumstances of the army
and of our situation in general, might be attended not only
with serious difficulties but perhaps with a total 
40
c onvu1s ion'.
Hastings refused to revise the Supreme Government's
recommendations and the Madras Government was resentfully
forced to accept them. Relations between the military and
the civil branches did not, as a consequence, improve. Coote
refused to attend the meetings of the Select Committee and
left it in complete ignorance of his plans. He continued to
send private letters full of censures on the Government to
Warren Hastings and his public letters to the Bengal
Government were hardly less critical. The general behaviour
of his officers seems to have done nothing to alleviate the
jealousy of the civil servants. Macartney informed
Macpherson that the Supreme Government's policies generated
discord between the two services. 'Since the General's late
transfiguration', he wrote, 'the military of all ranks from
a truncheon to a drumstick are so cock a hoop that they look
upon a poor civilian with as much contempt as a tragedy king
41
does a candle snuffer'.
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Looking for a scapegoat for his troubles and not wishing to
be seen to ascribe them all directly to Coote, whom he knew
had powerful supporters and a great deal of personal
influence in India and at home, Macartney blamed Thomas
Graham, C o ote’s secretary, for the quarrel between the
General and the Government. Macartney personally disliked
Graham whom he accused of being without honour, talents or
42
even good character. He was convinced that Graham had turned
Coote against him and frequently observed in his letters
that, while Graham was away from the General, relations were
43
much more relaxed. On the occasion of Graham's return from
Bengal, where he had been presenting C o ote’s case against
the Madras Government, Macartney wrote to Macpherson that he
wished Graham had been kept at Calcutta because 'letters
have increased considerably in length and peevishness since 
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his return'.
Munro, whose career prospects were already threatened by the 
Government's displeasure with his patron, Graham, regarded 
the next developments in the situation with alarm. On 28 
September 1782 Coote returned to Calcutta, taking Graham 
with him. In the meantime Munro's only other friend with 
sufficient influence to promote his career, Deputy Adjutant 
General Burne, had died. Munro now saw little future for 
himself in India and he appears to have become very 
disillusioned with the army. 'The life of a soldier in the 
Carnatic', he wrote, 'is perhaps more laborious than in any 
other part of the world. In a few campaigns a young man has 
all the appearances of age and a broken constitution. He has 
no prospects to balance the fatigues he has undergone....
There is no profession in any part of the world amongst
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which fortunes are more uncommon1. He was once more acutely
aware of his lack of influence and bitterly complained that
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qualifications alone were insufficient to win promotion. At 
home his father was doing what he could to advance his son's 
career. He held small meetings in Glasgow at which he read 
Munro's letters to acquaintances and encouraged them to 
mention him in their correspondence with friends and 
relatives in India. His efforts were, however, barely 
rewarded.
At this time, probably because he felt that his career
prospects had been destroyed, Munro started to play an
active role in military politics. The hostility and
suspicion that existed between the military and the civil
authorities were open opportunities to disappointed men like
him to find some vent for the resentment they harboured
against the whole system. From the time that he assumed the
governorship of Madras, Macartney had been beset by
financial problems. The Treasury was empty and the troops'
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pay in arrears. Neither the Nawab nor the Raja of Tanjore
were disposed to contribute whole-heartedly to the war
effort. The situation was so serious that Macartney had
constantly to appeal to Bengal for funds. In January 1782 he
actually informed Macpherson that if Bengal did not speedily
send large sums to Madras, the army would have to be 
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disbanded. He claimed it was already on the edge of mutiny.
Later in that year however, Macartney allowed the army's pay
to go a full twelve months into arrears and he then
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cancelled the half batta allowances. Although he justified
62
his acts with the argument of economic necessity, there
seems little doubt that they were also partly inspired by
his irritation with the military in general and Coote in
particular. His measures produced widespread discontent
within the army and the officers of both the Company's and
the King's regiments formed committees of correspondence to
petition the Government. Munro acted as the secretary for 
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one of these.
In the meantime, upon Sir Eyre Coote's return to Bengal, 
General James Stuart was appointed the new
Commander-in-Chief. Stuart was the officer who had arrested
Pigot in 1776 and he had only been cleared by a court
martial of the charges resulting from this action in 1780.
News of Stuart's appointment seems to have immediately
restored Munro's optimism. He and his family now entertained
hopes that their relationship to Lady Stuart would encourage
the General, her nephew, to advance Munro's career. Munro
started to fill his letters with praise for the new
Commander-in-Chief and his father showed these to Lady
Stuart in Scotland and to Andrew Stuart in London. Andrew
Stuart, who was interested in any correspondence which
supported his brother, in turn showed these letters to the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Treasury, William
Pulteney, John Robinson who was Lord North's confidant, and
Laurence Sulivan who was then the serving Chairman of the 
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Company. In Madras, Munro presented letters of introduction 
from Andrew Stuart to the General but initially received 
rather short shrift. He reported to his father that he had 
heard the following story from Colonel Elphinstone. When the
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Colonel asked the General whether he had received any
letters from England, the latter replied, 'Jesus Christ,
Colonel Elphinstone, would you believe me I have not
received a single confidential line from my brother
Andrew...not a single line but a long faldrum daldrum
application for an aunt's cousin's grandson or devil and he
desires me to make his fortune. Jesus Christ, does he think
I will make aunt's cousin's and so forth's fortunes before 
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my o w n '.
Faced with this apparent rebuff, Munro turned to other 
avenues. However, before doing so, there is evidence that he 
attempted another direct approach to the General. This 
second time, having heard that Stuart and Alexander Ross 
hated each other and probably worried that his known 
connection with the latter might prejudice the General
against him, Munro appears to have abandoned his former
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benefactor. Rebuffed a second time and concluding it was a 
bad time to approach the General who was extremely busy 
having only just succeeded Coote, Munro attempted to attract 
his attention by less direct methods. Taking advantage of 
the hostility that existed in the army towards Macartney,
Munro contrived to promote himself as a spokesman for its
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grievances. He believed that the General was in sympathy 
with the military's aspirations and that, by stoutly 
defending them, he would attract Stuart's favourable 
attention. There is evidence that he was achieving 
considerable success when the entire situation changed.
From the start Macartney's relations with Stuart were worse
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than his with Coote had ever been. After the troubles he had
experienced with Coote, Macartney was determined that the
new Commander-in-Chief should not be granted powers that
would enable him to challenge the Government. He had even
written to Laurence Sulivan at the Court asking him to try
to ensure that the new Commander-in-Chief should have no
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seat on the Council or the Select Committee. Although this
request was not granted, Macartney was able to ensure that
Stuart did not receive the special powers which Coote, when
Commander-in-Chief, had been invested with. The Select
Committee assumed control of military affairs. Stuart deeply
resented this, paid the Committee most unwilling obedience
and even departed in some points from its actual
instructions. He went so far as to announce that, as
Commander-in-Chief of the K i n g ’s forces, he would obey the
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orders of the Company's civil servants as he saw fit. In 
addition, Stuart corresponded directly with Coote in Bengal, 
criticising the Select Committee's management of affairs. 
Coote placed these letters before the Council in Bengal
57
where Hastings used them in his disputes with Macartney.
Personal animosity soon clouded the issues. Stuart appears
to have had little but contempt for the civilians. 'I have',
he wrote to the Directors, 'at the age of fifty, cheerfully
dropt a bloody limb while others at their ease are only
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dropping ink on their paper in black characters'. Macartney 
was markedly hostile to Stuart. He wrote to John Sullivan 
that; 'ever since Major General Stuart has had a seat in the 
Select Committee for military and political affairs, I have 
experienced nothing but opposition and vexatious
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counteraction from him.... Under Stuart there is little to 
be expected. He is old, over cautious, totally
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unenterprising and, I think, a good deal impaired'. When 
Macartney used the word 'impaired', it was as a synonym for 
senile. Referring to the amputated leg which Stuart was so 
proudly regarded as honourable evidence of service to the 
Company, Macartney merely observed that the General had 
'made the last campaign in a go-cart' and added; 'I need not 
tell you the little respect which either the conveyance or
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his personal character will entitle him to from the troops'.
By now Macartney had a profound contempt for soldiers and
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for what he was pleased to term their 'silly trade'.
At first Macartney exercised considerable forbearance in his 
dealings with Stuart. His reasons for doing so were not 
quite so admirable as he would have wished people to 
believe. It seems that regard for the influence Stuart's 
brother Andrew had with the Ministry and for the possible 
trouble that the General's supporters in India and Britain 
might cause for him, played a greater role than the
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moderation of his temper to which he ascribed his actions.
However Macartney soon felt that the situation was becoming
intolerable and decided that drastic action was now
unavoidable. When news reached Madras from Europe that peace
had been concluded with France, Macartney ordered Stuart to
relinquish command of the army and return to the capital. On
the 2 July 1783, Mr Sadlier, still a member of the Council,
and Mr Stanton, Macartney's private secretary, relieved
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Stuart of his command. In Madras the dispute developed with 
vigour and threatened the stability of the Government until
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Macartney had the General arrested and returned to Britain.
With Stuart's departure, there is evidence that Munro found 
himself in a difficult position. He had openly espoused what 
was now seen as a defeated cause. Having been deputed by his 
fellow officers to complain to Lord Macartney about their 
arrears of pay and loss of batta, he had become in the 
Government's eyes a prominent figure in the military 
opposition to the civil authorities. A letter he had written 
to General Stuart in his capacity as secretary of a
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correspondence committee had greatly angered Macartney.
Huddleston, who was then Secretary to the Government,
harboured such ill-will towards Munro that, 30 years later.
when he was serving as a Director, he alone dissented to
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Munro's appointment as a Special Commissioner. Munro could
no longer rely on Thomas Graham's influence to protect him
and had not yet managed to find another patron. In the
circumstances, it was hardly surprising that Munro,
encouraged by his father, considered the possibility of
66
resigning from the army and entering a trading house.
To extricate himself from this awkward situation, Munro
tried to ingratiate himself with General Bruce. He wrote to
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his family asking them to furnish him with an introduction.
While he waited for their replies, he sought to win the
favour of John Erskine, General Bruce's nephew and 
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secretary. His father persuaded Lady Stuart to write to him
about Munro while his mother encouraged her friend Lady
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Christian Erskine, John's brother, to do the same. Alexander 
Munro suggested that Munro approach Erskine and ask him for
a commission to supply the army, these being particularly
lucrative. He believed that an offer from Munro to share the
profits of such a venture with Erskine or, as he put it, 'to
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run smacks with him', would prove irresistab 1e .
At the same time, Munro continued to play an active role in 
the dispute between certain influential factions in the army 
and the civil administration, clearly siding with the 
former. When the Madras Government dismissed Stuart in 
September, Macartney had appointed Sir John Burgoyne as the 
new Commander-in-Chief. Stuart insisted on retaining command 
of the King's troops and Burgoyne, who questioned the 
Governor's right to remove the commander of the King's 
forces, declared that he would only obey Stuart. To escape 
from this impasse, Macartney and the Select Committee 
nominated Colonel Ross Lang of the Company's service to the 
post of Commander-in-Chief. Several general officers 
withdrew from the army but not before they had directed 
their subordinates to obey orders issued by Lang. Macartney, 
who was unable to accept this situation, had Burgoyne placed 
under arrest and ordered that the dissenting officers were 
to be refused staff allowances until they should submit. All 
this generated considerable discontent amongst the military 
who resented what they considered to be unwarranted 
interference by the civil authorities in military matters. 
Some of the officers' hostility was directed towards Lang 
himself, who was regarded in these quarters as the willing 
tool of the civilians, the instrument with which they 
intended to subvert the military's independence. Munro, who 
referred to Lang as a 'despicable old woman', linked his
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fortunes with those of the discontented. The fact that he
had lost his post of quartermaster as a result of Lang's
army reforms probably encouraged him to take this course of 
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action.
However, while his activities undoubtedly brought him to the
attention of many senior officers who sympathised with his
opinions, they damaged his immediate career prospects.
Munro, who believed that he had as good a claim to them as
other men, was passed by when posts were distributed. In
particular, General Lang, who had 'the disposal of more
appointments than any of his predecessors', refused to give 
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one to Munro. His successor, General Dalling, also refused
to advance Munro despite the fact that he had promised
Alexander Munro's friend Hercules Ross, to whom he owed
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£2000, that he would do so.
Munro's father did not understand the situation Munro had
placed himself in. He blamed Munro's failure to advance his
career on a lack of social grace. He insisted that Munro was
not persistent enough in his efforts to put himself forward
and accused him of failing 'to flatter the great'
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sufficiently. He urged Munro to leave the Company's service 
and set up as an independent trader. There is little doubt 
that there was some truth in Alexander Munro's remarks.
Munro was staunchly independent and could be obstinate in 
his adherence to views once he had espoused them, even when 
they clearly opposed those held by the people in power. 
Disappointment with his career and resentment towards the 
establishment in which patronage, the one thing he lacked,
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played so predominant a role, alienated Munro from his
peers. He reacted by proclaiming a determination to rely on
his own abilities and industry. Optimistically, he expected
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to achieve success and fortune in eight years.
Only a fortuitous series of events appears to have saved
Munro's career. In England Sir Adam Ferguson, an old friend
of Munro's father and a sitting member of Parliament, was
appointed to the committee deputed to investigate the recent
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events in Madras. This man, a political ally of Andrew
Stuart and therefore interested in the fortunes of General
Stuart and his supporters, seems to have been of some
assistance to Munro. John Muir, an old classmate of Munro,
had recently been elected with the Duke of Hamilton's
patronage to Parliament and was using what influence he
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possessed in London to help his former school fellow. In
Scotland Captain Alexander Park married Thomas Graham's
sister and, when introduced to Alexander Munro by George
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Graham, took an interest in Munro's future. Since Captain
Park was actively participating in an extensive business
with a £200,000 capital, a business in which several of the
Directors were also deeply involved, his support for Munro
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carried some weight. In Bengal Charles Stuart, a distant
relation of the Munro family who had been newly appointed
President of the Council of Commerce, also took an interest 
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in his career. It was even mooted at one point that he might 
take on Munro as his secretary if Munro could manage to 
obtain a civil appointment in place of his military one.
The event to have the most significant impact on Munro's
70
early career was Macartney's resignation. From 1782 there
had been serious disagreement between the Governments of
Bengal and Madras over the assignment of the N a w a b 's
revenues to the Madras Government, which had delegated their
management to a Committee of Assigned Revenue. Hastings
attempted to annul the assignment but the Madras Government
obstinately refused to obey the orders from Bengal until
they had been confirmed by the Court of Directors. Hastings
failed to overcome the opposition in his own Council to his
plans to suspend Macartney and the parties remained
deadlocked until the matter was settled in 1785 by the
arrival of orders from the Court that the assignment was to
be cancelled. Macartney, unwilling to carry out policies he
was convinced were wrong, resigned and returned to Britain.
Munro, who blamed Macartney for his disappointments and
harboured a grudge against him, was relieved to see him
leave. His opinion of the Court of Directors was not raised
when he heard later that they had granted the ex-Governor a
£1500 annuity and he seems to have taken a vindictive
pleasure in the news that Colonel Stuart had severely
82
wounded the unfortunate man in a duel in Hyde Park.
A year earlier Munro had heard from his father that Sir
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Archibald Campbell was to be the next Commander-in-Chief. 
This news had raised his hopes because Campbell, while 
serving as Governor of Jamaica, had formed a close 
friendship with Hercules Ross, Alexander Munro's West Indian 
contact and friend. As a mark of his friendship, he had
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taken an active interest in Ross's protege, Daniel Munro. 
While in London Campbell had continued to concern himself in
the a ffa ir s of M u n r o ' s  bro ther. W h e n  Da ni el  was tried at the
Old Baile y for the m u r d e r  of A r c h i b a l d  M a c l a n e , a ma n  he had
k i l l e d  in a q u a r r e l  w h i l e  r e t u r n i n g  to B r i t a i n  on the Hero
C a p t a in S i n clair, C a m p b e l l  sent two of his a i d e s - d e - c a m p  to
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s u p p o r t  him d u r i n g  the trial. For a w h i l e  A l e x a n d e r  M u n r o
was c er t a i n  that C a m p b e l l  w o u l d  take Da ni el  to In dia wi t h
him  on his staff. M u n r o  now h ea r d  that C a m p b e l l  was to be
a p p o i n t e d  the next G o v e r n o r  of M a d r a s  as well as
C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f .  A l t h o u g h  he k n e w  C a m p b e l l  came from a
c lo s e  A r g y l e s h i r e  clan, had a h os t  of r e l a t i v e s  h o p i n g  for
p a t r o n a g e  and was be s t  a p p r o a c h e d  in Gaelic, M u n r o  c l e a r l y
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b e l i e v e d  his f or t un e s  had changed.
O t h e r  news also e n c o u r a g e d  hi m in this belief. His fa t h e r
had b r e a k f a s t e d  w i t h  Co l o n e l  Ma c k e n z i e ,  Lord M a c l e o d ' s
b ro th er , and this man, af te r  r e a d i n g  some of M u n r o ' s
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letters, p r o m i s e d  to secu re him a post. The new A d j u t a n t
G en e r a l ,  C o l on e l  Whyte, came fr om G l a s g o w  and M u n r o  b e l i e v e d
8
that  this wo ul d  give hi m a good i n t r o d u c t i o n  to the off icer.
C o l o n e l  Stuart, w h o  was now at ho me  and u n d e r  the i m m e d i a t e
i n f l u e n c e  of his s i s t e r - i n - l a w ,  L a d y  Stuart, c o n t i n u e d  to
take an ac t iv e  i n t e r e s t  in Munro. He w ro t e  to his gr e a t
friend, C o r n w a l l i s ,  who  was n ow G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  of Be n g a l
and asked him to see if he could h el p the f a m i l y ' s  d i s t a n t
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r e l a t i v e  and protege.
I n i t i a l l y  M u n r o ' s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  w e r e  a g a i n  d i s a p p o i n t e d .  Sir 
A r c h i b a l d  C a m p b e l l  lived up to his r e p u t a t i o n  as a n e p o t i st .  
M un r o  wr o t e  to his f a t h e r  te l l i n g  him: 'I h av e  no well
fo u n d e d  hopes of a n y t h i n g  be ing done for me d u r i n g  this
72
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  for I have no inter es t. The G e n e r a l  has so
m a n y  r e l a t i o n s  that there is a lwa ys one r ea d y  to step into
ev er y  vac a n cy .  He has c r e a t e d  three b a z a r m a s t e r s h i p s ,
u se l e s s  a p p o i n t m e n t s  but the m o s t  l u c r a t i v e  of any held by
m i l i t a r y  men, and they have be e n f i l l e d  by two C a p t a i n
C a m p b e l l s  and a C a p t a i n  Ramsay. A n o t h e r  C a p t a i n  C a m p b e l l  is
M u s t e r  M a s t e r  and a no th er , his nephe w, is T o w n  M a j o r  of 
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Ma dr a s '.  In a s ec o n d  letter he w r o t e  that 'there is such a
n o r t h e r n  in u n d a t i o n ,  such a c h a i n  of c l a n n i s h  and p o l i t i c a l
c o n n e c t i o n s  a bou t the Ge n e r a l  that it is r i d i c u l o u s  for an
u n s u p p o r t e d  s t r a n g e r  to think of b r e a k i n g  t h r o u g h  or even
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s ne a k in g  into it'. M u n r o ' s  c a re e r  had r e a c h e d  such a na d i r
that, w he n  it was d e c i d e d  at his s t a t i o n  that one o f fi c e r
m u s t  lose his p ost  to ma k e wa y for a F o rt  A d j u t a n t ,  he was 
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s ele ct ed . M u n r o ' s  b i t t e r n e s s  was on this o c c a s i o n  t em p e r e d  
by a belief that his t r a n s f e r  to V e l l o r e  had saved his life. 
H ad  he not been remo ve d, he w o u l d  h a v e  had to take pa rt  in 
e x p e d i t i o n s  a g a i n s t  local r e f r a c t o r y  rajas, e x p e d i t i o n s  
d u r i n g  w h i c h  it was u su a l  for t w o - t h i r d s  of the f or ce to die 
or c o n t r a c t  i n c u r a b l e  fevers.
A l e x a n d e r  Munro, w ho  had o r i g i n a l l y  r a i s e d  M u n r o ' s  ho pes
w i t h  his news of C a m p b e l l ' s  a p p o i n t m e n t ,  n o w  c l a i m e d  that he
had alway s fe ar ed  the G e n e r a l  w o u l d  do li t t l e  for him. He
r e p o r t e d  that the m a n  was n o t o r i o u s  for f a v o u r i n g  his
r e l a t i v e s  and that c o m p l a i n t s  had b ee n r e c e i v e d  at the Co u r t
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of D i r e c t o r s  ab ou t his b e h a v i o u r .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  the Ge n e r a l  
c o m m a n d e d  so m u c h  i n t e r e s t  at the B oa r d  of C o n t r o l ,  it was 
i m p o s s i b l e  for the D i r e c t o r s  to do m u c h  a b o u t  his n e p o t i s m .  
C a m p b e l l ' s  c lo se  f r i e n d s h i p  w i t h  Dund as , the P r e s i d e n t  of
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the B oar d of C o n t r o l  had o r i g i n a l l y  g a i n e d  hi m the 
G o v e r n o r s h i p .  Du nd a s  had i n f o r m e d  the D i r e c t o r s  that, w e re  
they to e x e r c i s e  their p r e r o g a t i v e  and send orders  
a p p o i n t i n g  one of their s er van ts , Ho l l a n d ,  to the post, the 
B oar d w o u l d  r e ca l l  him. To e n su r e the a p p o i n t m e n t  of his 
friend, Du n d as  m a d e  the fi r s t use of the po we r  of r ec all  
P i t t' s  India Act had v e s t e d  in the C ro w n  and w h i c h  was to 
f i n a l l y  put the s u p e r i o r  a p p o i n t m e n t s  in I nd ia  c o m p l e t e l y  
into the M i n i s t r y ' s  hands.
For a w h i l e  it look ed as if M u n r o ' s  luck had b e g u n  to
change. He b e ca m e  a c q u a i n t e d  w i t h  L i e u t e n a n t  M a c a u l e y ,  the
P e r s i a n  S e c r e t a r y  to the G o v e r n m e n t .  M a c a u l e y  w i s h e d  to
r e s i g n  his of fi c e  and r e t u r n  to B r i t a i n  and he p r o m i s e d  to
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try to p e r s u a d e  C a m p b e l l  to give M u n r o  the v a c a n t  post.
D u r i n g  the long p e r i o d s  of e n f o r c e d  in a c t i v i t y ,  M u n r o  had
c o n t i n u e d  his s t u d ie s  of the local l a ng u ag es ,  st u di e s  he had
b e g u n  w i t h  H a l i b u r t o n ' s  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  w h e n  he had fi r s t
a r r i v e d  in Ma dr a s . H a l i b u r t o n ,  w h o  was h i m s e l f  a p p o i n t e d
Persian Translator to the Government in 1795, had continued
to h el p  Munro, s e n d i n g  hi m i n t e r e s t i n g  and i n s t r u c t i v e  
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d o c u m e n t s .  M u n r o ' s  d e s c r i p t i o n  of his s t u d i e s  to his fri e n ds
u n d e r s t a t e d  the i m p o r t a n c e  he a t t a c h e d  to them but it did
not c o n c e a l  his m o t i v e s .  'I have ',  he w rot e, 'been for some
y ear s pa s t  am u si n g , or. r a t h e r  pl a g u i n g ,  m y s e l f  w i t h  the
H i n d u s t a n i  and P e r s i a n  l a n gu a g es . I b e g a n  the st ud y of them
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in the hopes  of th ei r be i n g  one day of use to m e ' . M u n r o  had
in fact been ta ki n g his s t ud i e s v e r y  s e r i o u s l y  indeed,
translating Persian from 10am to 1pm every day and spending
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the a f t e r n o o n s  u n ti l  s u n s e t  t a lk i ng  w i t h  Indi ans .
L i n g u i s t i c a l l y ,  he was we ll  q u a l i f i e d  for the p o st  M a c a u l e y  
w i s h e d  to ob ta i n  for him.
M u n r o ' s  hopes h o w e v e r  w e r e  soon d a s h e d  again. He had been  so
c e r t a i n  that he w o u l d  r e c e i v e  the a p p o i n t m e n t ,  he had t u rne d
d o w n  the offer of a less er post. Now that a n o t h e r  officer,
w h o m  M u n r o  cl a i m e d  had g r e a t e r  i n t e r e s t  than  he, had
o b t a i n e d  the office he so wa nt e d , he b i t t e r l y  r e g r e t t e d  his
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h a s t y  r e j e c t i o n  of the other. By n ow  M u n r o  had d e v e l o p e d  a
t h o r o u g h l y  c y n ic a l  a t t i t u d e  t o war ds  the C o m p a n y  and its
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in Mad r as . He g r e e t e d  the news that G e n e r a l
M e a d o w s  was s h o r t l y  to a rr i v e  as the n e x t  G o v e r n o r  w i t h  no
e n t h u s i a s m  even th o ug h his fa t h er  w r o t e  to him  that a
f ri en d,  Mr Young, had w r i t t e n  to his b r o t h e r  John, a
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c o n f i d e n t  of the Ge n e ra l,  on M u n r o ’s b eh alf . ' Ex pe ri enc e',
he r e p l i e d  to his father, 'might have t a ug h t  men, at least
in this society, to bu i l d  less u p o n  g r e a t  names for they
h a v e  seen so m a n y  i m p o s i t i o n s  on the u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of
m a n k i n d  i nv e s te d  w i t h  h igh  off i ce s  and r e c o m m e n d e d  by c o m m o n
fame as were e n o u g h  to p r e j u d i c e  the m a g a i n s t  m a n y  wh o come
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a m o n g  them w i t h  such c r e d e n t i a l s ' .
U n d e r  such c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  it was h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g  that
M u n r o  sh o u ld  feel d e p r e s s e d .  'I am s i t t i n g  he re  in the m i d s t
of this deser t' , he w r o t e  to his mo t h e r ,  ' a d v a n c i n g  fast in
y ear s and as o b s cu r e  and u n k n o w n  as w h e n  I left m y  f a t h e r ' s
h o u s e . . . .  I c o n s i d e r  ho w l i ttl e p r o g r e s s  on the ro ad  to
f o r t u n e  I have m a d e  - s i x t e e n  years have n o w  p a s s e d  over my
h e a d  w i t h o u t  my  h a v i n g  b e en  able to do a n y t h i n g  of 
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c o n s e q u e n c e ' .  He b e g g e d  his p a r e n t s  not to send his y o u n g e r
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brothers to India. He assured them that there were no
futures for young men in the country any more. 'Hardly one
in fifty of those who come from Europe return to it with a
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fortune', he informed his brother James. Only two
considerations seem to have sustained him. Munro was driven
on by his determination to restore his family's fortune.
Almost every letter he received from his father catalogued
fresh horrors to which his family had been subjected by
their poverty - constantly dunned, unable to pay household
bills, without even sufficient money to buy clothes decent
enough to leave the house in. Under such circumstances,
Munro felt his own poverty to be a trifling consideration
and wrote to his parents that 'the only cause that I have
for repining is my inability to assist my father as I would 
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wish'. He also, despite all the evidence to the contrary,
maintained confidence in his ability to eventually succeed.
'I am', he wrote, 'a great castle builder and cannot get it
out of my head that I should do something very grand one day 
104
or o ther ' .
In 1788 an event occurred that was to be a turning point in
Munro's career. Captain Alexander Read, who had not yet met
Munro but knew of him through his friendship with Munro's
sister Erskine, heard about his proficiency in Persian and 
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Urdu. Read asked that Munro might be appointed to the 
intelligence corps he was commanding. Read was a rising 
figure in Madras. He had joined the Madras army in 1770 and 
in the following years had established a reputation for 
himself as a proficient linguist and an expert in Indian 
political affairs. In 1786 he had been involved in
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negotiations with the Court at Hyderabad and later he had 
been specially consulted by Sir Archibald Campbell about the 
occupation of Guntur. Now, as commander of the intelligence 
corps, Read was in constant communication with 
correspondents at the courts of the Nizam and Tipu.
Munro had reservations about accepting the appointment. He
believed that the expenses would outweigh the allowances and
he was far from certain that the intelligence corps had any
futu re.  'All the m e m b e r s  of the G o v e r n m e n t  e x c e p t  the
President', he wrote, 'say that the Company ought not to be
burdened with charges for intelligence during the most 
106
profound peace'. In addition, Munro considered the job a 
dull one which promised few opportunities of attracting 
attention to himself. He would be principally engaged in 
translating reports sent in by spies the Company employed in 
the towns and armies of the Nizam and Tipu. However, despite 
of his inclination to decline Read's offer, Munro allowed 
his friends to persuade him, with hopes of where the job 
might lead, to accept it in July 1788.
During the next four years Munro made a number of
friendships with men who were to play significant roles in
his later c ar eer . G e n e r a l  S tu a r t  sen t h i m  let te r s of
introduction to his nephew, Basil Cochrane, and to the
D e p u t y  A d j u t a n t  G en e r al ,  Ba rr y Close, w ho  had be e n a p p o i n t e d
S t u a r t ' s  p e r s o n a l  P e r s i a n  S e c r e t a r y  af t e r  he a t t r a c t e d  the
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General's attention with his linguistic expertise. Munro 
took advantage of these introductions, observing of Close: 
'He is a rising character whom it is desirable to have on
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your side'. The intimate friendship he formed with his
superior, Captain Read, was of greater consequence for his
i m m e d i a t e  future. Re ad was r a p i d l y  e m e r g i n g  as one of the
rising stars of the Madras Presidency. In 1789, he sent Sir
Archibald Campbell an elaborate report on the Country Powers
w h i c h  was w el l r e c e iv ed .  In the f o l l o w i n g  years he
established his reputation as an efficient and completely
honest administrator with the work he did when organizing
transport for the army and with his temporary management of
K o l a r  and B a n g a l o r e  d u r i n g  th eir o c c u pa t i on . In the co ur se
of his duties, he regularly corresponded with the
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l .  C o r n w a l l i s  was i m pr e s se d  by R e a d ’s 'zeal
and ability in conciliating the good will of the inhabitants
and in arranging the settlements of the districts that
( h a d ) . . . b e e n  p l a c e d  u n d e r  (h i s ).. . m a n a g e m e n t ' as well as by 
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his in te g r it y .  C o r n w a l l i s  b e l i e v e d  that the latter  en s u r e d  
t hat Read was i n c a p a b l e  of ' at t e m p t i n g  to o b t a i n  the
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s m a l l e s t  e m o l u m e n t  b e y o n d  that w h i c h  is open and al low e d ' .  
The d e c i s i o n  to a p p o i n t  Sir Ch a r l e s  O a k e l e y  as G e n e r a l  
M e a d o w ' s  s u c c e s s o r  to the G o v e r n o r s h i p  a b s o l u t e l y  e n s u r e d
ill
R e a d ' s  f u r t h e r  a d v a n c e m e n t .  Re ad was Lady O a k e l e y ' s  uncle.
While Munro was laying the foundations for his future career 
by attaching himself to men whose own careers were in the 
ascendant, an event occured whose consequences were to 
change the course of his life. When, on 29 December 1789, 
Tipu launched an attack on Travancore, he precipitated a 
crisis which, apart from throwing the Company's home and 
Indian authorities into political turmoil, directly 
influenced later decisions regarding the employment of
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m i l i t a r y  of fi ce r s in the civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  The raja was,
u n d e r  the T r e a t y  of M a n g a l o r e ,  an al ly of the B r i t i s h  but
the M ad r a s  G o v e r n m e n t  i n i t i a l l y  r e f u s e d  to i n te r v e n e .  This
p r o m p t e d  Co r n w a l l i s ,  who  was i n d i g n a n t  at the d i s g r a c e f u l
s a c r i f i c e  that he b e l i e v e d  'had b e e n  m a de  of B r i t i s h
h on o u r ' ,  to i n t e r v e n e  in pe rs on . He sent a le tt e r to the
G o v e r n m e n t  in w h i c h  he c o n d e m n e d  its c on du ct , c l a i m e d  orders
sent in N o v e m b e r  had be e n d i s o b e y e d ,  p r e p a r a t i o n s  not m a de
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and al l i e s b et r a ye d .  M or e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  he o r d e r e d  that sums
set as i d e for the p a y m e n t  of the N a w a b 's debt s w e r e  to be
e m p l o y e d  in the war effo rt . His a c t i o n s  o f f e n d e d  m a n y  of the
C o m p a n y ' s  civil s e rv a n t s  and a l i e n a t e d  the N a w a b ' s
c r e d i t o r s .  Ed wa r d J oh n  H o l l a n d  and his b o t h e r  w e r e  d e e p l y
i n v o l v e d  in ill i c it  d e a l i n g s  w i th  v a r i o u s  I n di a n pri n c es
w h i l e  other m e n  like Taylo r,  a m e m b e r  of the Co un ci l , w er e
so e m b r o i l e d  in the N a w a b ' s  f i n a n c i a l  i n t r i g u e s  that the
s u s p e n s i o n  of the p a y m e n t  of his debts  t h r e a t e n e d  them w ith  
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b a n k r u p t c y .  C o r n w a l l i s ' s  d e c i s i o n  to p r o s e c u t e  the war  
a g a i n s t  Tipu, a l t h o u g h  it d e l i g h t e d  the m i l i t a r y ,  t h r e a t e n e d  
the i n t e r e s t s  of m a n y  in the C o m p a n y ' s  ci vi l employ. Ma n y of 
th es e  m e n  r e t a l i a t e d  by d e l i b e r a t e l y  d e l a y i n g  the 
p r e p a r a t i o n s  for war.
C o r n w a l l i s  c o n s i d e r e d  that the s it ua t i o n ,  w h i c h  he b e l i e v e d  
c l e a r l y  r e v e a l e d  that the M a d r a s  c i v i l i a n s  co ul d  not be 
t rus te d,  r e q u i r e d  i m m e d i a t e  a t t e n t i o n .  He p l a n n e d  to leave 
B e n g a l  and a s s u m e  c o m m a n d  in Ma dr as . 'I t h o u g h t  m y s e l f  
c a l l e d  u p o n ' , he wr ot e,  'to take so d e c i d e d  a step f ro m its 
b e i n g  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  my k n o w l e d g e  that th e r e was no t a 
s u f f i c i e n t  h a r m o n y  and m u t u a l  c o n f i d e n c e  b e t w e e n  the Ci vil
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and Military departments and that there was evident
backwardness in the Civil part of the Government to consult
the officer commanding the troops under the Presidency.... I
thought myself called upon by a sense of duty to the
Company...to stand forth and endeavour to avert the
misfortunes with which the negligences and misconduct or
jealousies between the Civil and Military departments might 
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be attended'. Only the arrival of Meadows prevented him from
immediately leaving for Madras. He hoped the appointment of
the new Governor, with a military background, would lead to
reforms in the Government which, in his opinion, had been
conducting itself in a very criminal manner. He blamed the
behaviour of the civil servants on the Company's policies.
In a letter to Henry Dundas, the President of the Board of
Control, he wrote that 'the whole system of the Presidency
is founded on the good old principles of Leadenha11-street
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economy - small salaries and immense perquisites'. In
another letter to Dundas, he spoke of the 'wretched policy
of the Company (which) has invariably driven all their
servants to the alternatives of starving or taking what was 
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not their o w n '.
The controversies which now raged in India had repercussions 
in Britain. Disgruntled civilians complained to their 
friends and patrons at home who saw opportunities to use the 
discontent in Madras for their own purposes. The matter 
became embroiled with British political issues. The Ministry 
was assailed in both Houses on the question of the Company's 
responsibility for the war. John Coxe Hippisley, a retired 
Madras civilian who appears to have suffered a severe
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f i n a n c i a l  loss as a r e s u l t  of the s u d d e n  fall in the va l ue
of the C o m p a n y ' s  stoc k c o n s e q u e n t  to the o u t b r e a k  of
h o s t i l i t i e s ,  b l a m e d  the Board of C o n t r o l  for the war. 'Any
p ea ce ',  he argued, 'where the h o n o u r  of the c o u n t r y  is not
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b a r t e r e d  away, is b e t t e r  than the m o s t  s u c c e s s f u l  war'. In
the H o u s e  of Lords, Lo rd  P o r c h e s t e r  c l a i m e d  that the 'war
was p l a n n e d  and d e t e r m i n e d  by the B oa r d  of C o n t r o l  b e f o r e
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the p r e t e n c e s  exi s te d' .  The O p p o s i t i o n  s e i z ed  the o c c a s i o n  
to a t t a c k  their o pp o n e n t s .  The M i n i s t r y  h o w e v e r  was e a s il y  
e qua l to the o c c a s i o n  and D un das  was able to c o m p l e t e l y  
v i n d i c a t e  b ot h  the Bo a r d ' s  and C o r n w a l l i s ' s  c o n d u c t  by 
p r o v i n g  that Tipu had be e n  long p l a n n i n g  a g g r e s s i o n  a g a i n s t  
the B r i t i s h  and that the war  was a d i r e c t  c o n s e q u e n c e  of his 
ac ti o n s.
In his l ett ers  to his f a t h e r  and f r i e n d s  in B ri tai n,  M un r o
had f r e q u e n t l y  b ee n  c r i t i c a l  of the c i v i l i a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
in Madras. As early as 1780, he had written accusing them of
' v i o l a t i n g  their p ub l i c  f ai t h  w i t h  the same ease and
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u n c o n c e r n  as they do their p r i v a t e  p r o m i s e s ' .  His ac ti v e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in m i l i t a r y  p o l i t i c s  had e n c o u r a g e d  hi m to 
take a j a u n d i c e d  v i e w  of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  He had also 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  ar gu e d  that the B r i t i s h  s h o u l d  f o l l o w  an 
a g g r e s s i v e  p o l i c y  of e xp a n s i o n .  His b e l i e f  that any other 
p o l i c y  c ou ld only lead to d i s a s t e r  had hardened into a 
c o n v i c t i o n  d u ri n g  the p e r i o d  that he had w o r k e d  in the 
i n t e l l i g e n c e  corps. In a d d i t io n ,  like m a n y  other o ff ice rs ,  
he b e l i e v e d  that wa r w o u l d  im p r o v e  his c h a n c e s  to m a k e  his 
fo rt u n e.  He told his f a t h e r  that he had m a n a g e d ,  w i t h  g r ea t  
d i f f i c u l t y ,  to save one t h o u s a n d  p a g o d a s  but, if a war
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should last twelve months, he could certainly double this
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figure.
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On 17 January 1790, Munro wrote a letter to his father. In 
it he roundly criticized the Madras Government. He claimed 
that the Presidency was quite unprepared for war. 'I fea r 1 , 
he wrote, 'that we are not yet in the state of readiness 
which we ought to be.... Since the conclusion of the late 
war, we have acted as if we had been to enjoy perpetual 
peace. The distresses and difficulties which we then 
encountered... have not cured us of the narrow policy of 
preferring a present small saving to a certain, though 
future, great and essential advantage'. He criticized the 
Government's failure to do more to support the raja of 
Travancore and claimed that their excuse for inaction was no 
more than 'a subterfuge of Government to cloak their dread 
of war under a pretended love of peace'. He urged an 
immediate assault on Tipu and attacked the view many people 
held that Tipu's state should be preserved as a buffer 
between the British and the Marathas. To support such a 
policy was, he argued, 'to support a powerful and ambitious 
enemy to defend us from a weak one'.
By the time that the letter reached Alexander Munro, 
treaties had been signed with the Marathas and the Nizam. 
From June the Company had been openly at war with Tipu. It 
was already clear in Britain that the Ministry was going to 
easily defeat the attacks on it and that both the Board's 
and Cornwallis's actions would be completely vindicated. The 
prevailing, predominant opinion was that Tipu should be
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d e s t r o y e d  and the C o m p a n y ' s  t e r r i t o r i e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y
in cr e a s e d .  Dundas  h i m s e l f  f a v o u r e d  the c o m p l e t e  e x t i r p a t i o n
of T i p u ' s  po w e r and c l a i m e d  that 'a p a t c h e d - u p  pe a c e w o u l d
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be a sad p o li cy' . A l e x a n d e r  M u n r o  i m m e d i a t e l y  r e c o g n i z e d
t hat  the co n t en ts  of his son's l ett er s u p p o r t e d  the views of
p r e d o m i n a n t  party. Be f or e  its a r r i v a l  he had be en  d oin g w h a t
he c ou l d  to a s s i s t  M u n r o ' s  ca re e r by ta ki n g a d v a n t a g e  of
e v e r y  o p p o r t u n i t y  to i n t e r e s t  i n f l u e n c i a l  m e n  in his futur e
but had found that his lack of c o n t a c t s  and his p o l i t i c a l
and so cia l i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  w e r e p r e v e n t i n g  h im f r om  h a v i n g
m u c h  suc c e ss  in his d i r e c t  a p p r o a c h e s .  N e i t h e r  he nor M u n r o
had e n o u g h  to offer in r e t u r n  to ga in  the a c t i v e  p a t r o n a g e
of m e n  in a p o s i t i o n  to e f f e c t i v e l y  a s s i s t  the c a r e e r  of an
u n k n o w n  junio r officer. He now t h o u g h t  that he c o ul d  ad v a n c e
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M u n r o ' s  c a re e r  by p u b l i s h i n g  his letter. He b e l i e v e d  its 
p u b l i c a t i o n  w o u l d  m a k e  his name m o r e  w i d e l y  k n o w n  and w i n  
h im  the fa vo u r  of b o t h the Bo a r d and C o r n w a l l i s ' s  
s u p p o r t e r s .
The le t te r was p u b l i s h e d  on the f ro n t  p ag e  of the L on don
Chronicle on 9 September 1790. When Munro heard what his
f a t h e r  had done, he was h o r r i f i e d  and w r o t e  f o r b i d d i n g  h i m
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to r e p e a t  the e x p e r i m e n t .  It is cl ea r  that M u n r o  was not 
u p s e t  that his fa t h er  had tried to b r i n g  his le tt er  to the 
a t t e n t i o n  of i n f l u e n t i a l  p e o p l e  w h o  m i g h t  a p p r e c i a t e  the 
s u p p o r t  it o f f e r e d  to their p o l i c i e s .  He had ne v e r  
c o m p l a i n e d  b e f o r e  w h e n  his f a th e r had p r i v a t e l y  c i r c u l a t e d  
his l et ter s a m o n g s t  m e n  in L o n d o n  i n t e r e s t e d  in Ind i a n  
a f f a i r s  and there is some e v i d e n c e  he w r o t e  a few of his 
l e t te r s  w i th  just such a w i d e r  a u d i e n c e  in mind . It is also
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clear that he had not changed his opinions in the meantime.
In August 1791, he wrote to George Brown arguing the case
for the destruction of Tipu and further British expansion.
'Shall we then', he asked, 'alarmed by an idle dream of
policy and balance of power, hesitate to crush, while we
can, such a rival?... Our strength and our security would be
augmented in a very great proportion by the conquest of
Baramahal and Coimbatore with a part of the Malabar Coast
125
because these countries are rich'. It is clear that it was 
not publicity per se that Munro objected to but only the 
indiscriminate publicity his letter's appearance in a 
newspaper guaranteed.
Munro had three reasons for regretting the publication of 
his letter. First, he feared that it would offend men in the 
Madras administration who could only see it as public 
criticism of themselves by a junior officer with a 
reputation as a dissident. They might retaliate and, in a 
system where appointments were dependent upon influence, 
they could threaten his career prospects. Secondly Munro 
realized that the views expressed in his letter would offend 
the powerful minority factions in Britain who had so 
recently attacked the Ministry. Munro had had sufficient 
experience of the Company's politics to know that they were 
unstable. Today's minority might easily be tomorrow's 
majority and he was distressed to be so publicly associated 
with one side. Munro's third reason for regretting his 
father's action was much the most important. The letter was 
almost certainly guaranteed to also offend the very people 
his father hoped to impress with it.
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Amongst his criticisms of the civil administration, Munro
had also attacked the recent moves to increase the numbers
in the King's forces at the expense of the Company's army.
He claimed that European troops did not fight efficiently in
126
India and were less effective than the Company's forces. He
also argued that the officers in the King's forces lacked
experience and knowledge of India and consequently acted in
ways which brought the ridicule and hostility of their
soldiers down upon them. It is impossible to be certain
whether Munro believed these claims or not. They might have
just reflected the strained relations which existed between
the Company's and the King's forces. In 1782 Macartney had
informed Laurence Sulivan that the mixture of the two forces
was c a u s i n g  p r o b le m s . 'The Ki ng 's  t ro ops ',  he wr ot e,  'look
upon themselves as having a separate interest from the
C om p a n y ,  are full of j e a l o u s i e s  and vani ty,  and give us
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almost every trouble and embarrassment they can'. What is 
however clear is that Munro was trying to defend his own 
interests as an officer in the Company's army by attacking 
the retrenchments which he believed were threatening his 
career prospects and present status. Unfortunately these 
views were certain to irritate Dundas who held quite 
different ones.
Early in 1785, when the Home Authorities were planning
economies in the Indian establishments, Dundas had insisted
on a reduction in the Company's forces which had resulted in
600 of the Company's officers being thrown out of active
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employ on half-pay. In 1787 Dundas had urged that the King's
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f orc es  be g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  and the C o m p a n y ' s
c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  re du c e d.  The D i r e c t o r s  had o b j e c t e d
s t r o ng l y . The m e a s u r e  not only t h r e a t e n e d  to s e v e r e l y
r e s t r i c t  their p a t r o n a g e  but also p r o m i s e d  to be e x p e n s i v e
for the Company. The Company was required to pay £20,000 a
ye ar to the T r e a s u r y  for each royal r e g i m e n t  sent to India.
The D i r e c t o r s  r e g a r d e d  the w h o l e  p o l i c y  as b e i n g  a d i s g u i s e d
p l a n  to i n c r e a s e  the K in g' s forces at the C o m p a n y ' s  expense.
A p o we r  s t r u g g l e  b e t w e e n  D und as at the B oa r d  of C o n t r o l  and
the D i r e c t o r s  had en s u e d  in w h i c h  the C o u r t  c h a l l e n g e d
P a r l i a m e n t  to d e f i n e  the limits of the B o a r d ' s  a u t h o r i t y
over the C om pan y.  Pitt had b ee n f o r ce d to i n t r o d u c e d  a bill
into the Co m m o n s  w i t h  the exp r e ss  p u r p o s e  of 're m o vi n g  all
d o u b t  as to the po we r of the Board to or de r p a y m e n t  of any
e x p e n s e s  w h i c h  m i g h t  be in c u rr e d  in s e n d i n g  out and
m a i n t a i n i n g  such troo ps  as sh o u ld  be ju d ge d  n e c e s s a r y  for
the s e c u r i t y  of the B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i e s  and p o s s e s s i o n s  in 
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India'. In the House, Pitt was a c c u s e d  by Fox of d e c e i t f u l l y  
g r a s p i n g  the C o m p a n y ' s  p a t r o n a g e  by u n d e r h a n d  m e t h o d s  and 
only a m e n d m e n t s  to p r e v e n t  any i n c r e a s e  in m i n i s t e r i a l  
p a t r o n a g e  had sa ve d his bill.
A l t h o u g h  D u nd a s  had tr iu mp h ed ,  his v i c t o r y  had b e e n  a n a r r o w  
one. He could h a r d l y  have be e n  e x p e c t e d  to w e l c o m e  the 
p u b l i c a t i o n  of a ju ni or  o f f i c e r ' s  lette r c o n t a i n i n g  w h a t  
m i g h t  be r e g a r d e d  as a d i r e c t  c r i t i c i s m  of a p o l i c y  he had 
b e e n  pu r s ui n g . F o r t u n a t e l y  his f a t h e r ' s  i n d i s c r e t i o n  a pp e a rs  
to have done M u n r o ' s  c a r ee r  litt le  d a m a g e  and it did not 
p r e v e n t  M u n r o  f r o m  c o n t i n u i n g  to w r i t e  l et t e rs  o b v i o u s l y  
d e s i g n e d  for a w i d e r  a u d i e n c e  than his i m m e d i a t e  family. His
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subsequent instructions to his father however make it quite
clear that he expected his friends to be more selective when
they circulated his correspondence. There is a revealing
note from Alexander Munro to an unnamed friend attached to a
letter from Munro, a letter containing a description of the
recent war and criticisms of the Madras Government and the
recent opposition to the war in Britain, which found its way
into the India House records. Alexander Munro wrote; 'I must
now request, because my son has requested it of me, that you
will not allow any of these extracts to go into the papers -
but, if you should think them worth the attention of your
fr ie n d s,  I give you full l i be r t y to read them to these 
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f r iends ' .
The whole episode did not discourage Alexander Munro in his
attempts to promote his son by bringing him to the attention
of influential men. He constantly urged Munro to publicly
s u p p o r t  the views of the le a di n g  fi g u r e s  in the Home
Administration. In 1792 he suggested to his son that he send
a treatise on recent events in Madras to Pitt, a treatise so
composed that Pitt might use it if he wished to combat
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opposition in Britain to the war. He also urged him to try 
to maintain the friendly interest of people with sufficient 
influence to assist him. In particular, he encouraged him to
write flattering letters to Lady Stuart.
In 1791, Munro heard of an event which must have raised his
hopes of rapid future promotion. His father informed him
that Thomas Graham's sister had married Mr Cherry,
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Cornwallis's Persian Secretary. The Grahams had done more
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for M u n r o  than any o the r of his fr ien ds  and p a t r o n s  and 
T hom as  G r a h a m  in p a r t i c u l a r  had i n t e r e s t e d  h i m s e l f  in his 
p r o t e g e ' s  career. N o w  he p r o m i s e d  to use the i n f l u e n c e  his 
s is t e r ' s  m a r r i a g e  ga ve  him w i t h  C h e r r y  to h av e  M u n r o  
r e c o m m e n d e d  to C o r n w a l l i s .  At the same time, Tho m as  G r a h a m ' s  
own r e c e n t  a d v a n c e m e n t  in the C o m p a n y  also gave him 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  to a s s i s t  his friend. He had b e e n  a p p o i n t e d  a 
p r o v i s i o n a l  m e m b e r  of the B eng al C o u nc i l  d u r i n g  C o r n w a l l i s ' s  
a b s e n c e  and it had b e e n  o r d e r e d  that he s h ou l d  be g i v e n  a 
seat on that body at the n ex t vacan cy .
The a p p o i n t m e n t  of Sir C h a r l e s  O a k e l e y  as G o v e r n o r  of M a d r as
was, a l t h o u g h  he was u n a w a r e  of it, a n o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t
ev ent  for Munro. O a k e l e y  was not a p a r t i c u l a r l y  o u t s t a n d i n g
a d m i n i s t r a t o r  nor an able man. C o r n w a l l i s  ho w ev e r ,  in a
lette r to Dundas, e x p r e s s e d  a g u a r d e d l y  f a v o u r a b l e  o pi n io n
of him. 'Sir C h a rl e s  Oa k e l e y ' ,  he said, 'though no t a very
c a p a b l e  man, is, I be l i e v e ,  the be s t  of all the c iv il
s er v a n t s  of this e s t a b l i s h m e n t  that coul d h av e b e e n se l e c t e d
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to fill the s t a t i o n  of G o v e r n o r ' .  At the same time, 
C o r n w a l l i s  r e c o g n i z e d  that it m i g h t  be a m i s t a k e  to e m p l o y  a 
m e m b e r  of the C o m p a n y ' s  M a d r a s  G o v e r n m e n t  in that post. 'It 
is v e r y  d i f f i c u l t ' , he obs e r ve d ,  'for a m a n  to d i v e s t  
h i m s e l f  of the p r e j u d i c e s  w h i c h  the ha b i ts  of t w e n t y  ye ars 
have c o n f i r m e d  and to g o v e r n  pe o p l e  who  hav e lived  w i t h  him 
so long on a f o o t i n g  of e q u a l i t y ' .  T h o u g h  there is little
d ou b t that O a k e l e y ' s  c a r e er  and e x p e r i e n c e s  did not
e n c o u r a g e  him  to a t t e m p t  any r a d i c a l  r e f o r m  of the 
G o v e r n m e n t  or a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  he was p e r s u a d e d  to tackl e one 
o u t s t a n d i n g  pro b le m,  the a p p a r e n t  re f u s a l  or i n a b i l i t y  of
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the civil servants to master the local languages.
From shortly after its inception the Company had been
anxious to encourage its employees to learn the vernacular
and official languages of India. As early as 1671, the
Company had offered an award of £20 to any of its employees
134
who could demonstrate proficiency in an Indian language. In
1714 the Court ordered that preference was to be given to
employees who had learnt a local language whenever
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appointments were made to vacant offices. They also made 
provision for the distribution of special rewards to 
employees mastering Persian. The Court placed considerable 
emphasis on the importance of their employees acquiring 
proficiency in these languages because they feared that the 
failure to do so always resulted in an over-reliance on 
Indian servants. The generally held opinion in the Company 
was that the Indians were essentially corrupt and, given any 
opportunity, would abuse their authority and oppress their 
countrymen unless closely supervised. To some extent this 
view was supported by the facts but it seems to have been 
also inspired by the Europeans' failure to recognize the 
fundamental differences between the two cultures. They 
failed to acknowledge the possibility of the existence of 
different but equally valid frameworks of perceptual 
reference.
Sir Charles Oakeley had become concerned with this problem 
during his career in Madras. He was worried that the civil 
servants' failure to learn the languages would have wider 
consequences than just the general employment of Indians in
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r e s p o n s i b l e  p o s i t i o n s  of au th o r i t y .  C o n v i n c e d  that these
Indians were abusing the trust placed in them and indulging
in corrupt practices, Oakeley feared that the British would
become, possibly unwittingly, associated with their
extortions. He believed that the Indian population would
assume that the officials could not be acting in this manner
without the knowledge and approval of their British masters.
He feared that this would damage the high esteem in which he
thought the Company's administration was held by its Indian
subjects. Ultimately, he believed it might lead to the
population failing to see any advantage in foreign rule and
possibly withdrawing support for the British. In November
1790, he had entered a minute in which he proposed that
promotion in the service should be more closely linked to
linguistic acquirements. In 1791 his proposals, which also
included one for the provision of an allowance to civil
servants wishing to employ munshis, were sent to the Court
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of Directors for their consideration. Oakeley's proposals
aroused considerable interest in the Court which adopted
them extremely quickly and returned their approval of them
137
only eight months later.
The interest generated by the issue was fortuitous for Munro 
and made possible the next step in his career by paving the 
way for the decision to employ linguistically qualified 
military employees in posts which would have normally been 
restricted to the civilian members of the Company's service. 
Only the combination of the Court, the Governor-General and 
the Governor, all convinced of the importance of proficiency 
in the local languages as a qualification for employment,
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c o u l d  have o v e r c o m e  the o p p o s i t i o n  in the ci vil  s e r v i c e  to 
the a p p o i n t m e n t  of o f f i c e r s  to w h a t  had b ee n  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
c i v i l i a n  pos t s .
By the end of the war, M u n r o ’s vi e w s of w h a t  B r i t i s h  p o li c y
in South India s h ou ld  be had d e v e l o p e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  for him
to em er ge  as an a d v o c a t e  of e x p a n s i o n .  'There are times and
s i t u a t i o n s ' ,  he wrote, 'where c o n q u e s t  not only br i n gs  a
r e v e n u e  g r e a t l y  b e y o n d  its ex p e n s e s  but b r i n g s  a ls o
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a d d i t i o n a l  s ec u r it y ' . He r e j e c t e d  the a r g u m e n t s  of those who 
b e l i e v e d  that, r a t h er  than d e f e a t  and r e p l a c e  them, the 
B r i t i s h  s ho ul d enter into a l l i a n c e s  w i t h  the s u r r o u n d i n g  
I n d i a n  states. Mu n r o  was c o n v i n c e d  that these w e r e  too w e a k  
and u n s t a b l e  to g u a r a n t e e  or even m a i n t a i n  peace. 'Nothing', 
he obs erved, 'can be m or e a bs u r d  than our r e g a r d i n g  any
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n a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t s  as p o w e r s  w h i c h  are to last for ages'. In 
a n o t h e r  letter M u n r o  c l a i m e d  that p e o p l e  wh o  s e r i o u s l y
b e l i e v e d  in the s e c u r i t y  of tr e a t i e s  k n e w  li t t le  indeed  of
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Ind i a .
To some e x t e n t  these vi ews  of Munro,  in p a r t  d e r i v e d  from  
his a n a ly s i s  of the s i t u a t i o n  in M a d r a s  but als o i n f l u e n c e d  
by his p e r c e p t i o n  of his own i n t e r es t s , w e r e  f a i r l y  
c o m m o n p l a c e  am on g the m i l i t a r y  in M a dr a s . T hey  w er e  
c e r t a i n l y  not u n i q u e  to h im and a n u m b e r  of i n f l u e n t i a l  m e n  
h e l d  vi ews w h i c h  were, to a g r e a t e r  or less er exte nt , very 
s i m i l a r  to his own. C o r n w a l l i s  o p p o s e d  any idea of an 
i n c o n c l u s i v e  end to the war  t hr o u g h  a t r e a t y  w i t h  Tipu. He 
c l a i m e d  that those w h o  he ld  the v i e w  that Ti p u f o r m e d  a 
u s e f u l  bu f f er  b e t w e e n  the B r i t i s h  and the M a r a t h a s  w o u l d
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mistakenly employ a tiger as a barrier against deer. Dundas,
before temporary setbacks in the British campaign caused
unrest in Britain which seemed to threaten the uneasy peace
between the Board and the Court, also held a similar
opinion. In answer to Francis's allegation that 'the war was
impolitic in so far as it went to aggrandise the Marathas by
142
the demolition of M ysore', Dundas replied that this showed a
faulty grasp of Indian affairs. He claimed that the Marathas
'can never be dangerous to the British power. We, by
preserving peace, can keep them all in the same 
143
disposition'.
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Chapter Three
The Foundation of the Munro System;
^ an ^ Munr o in ^ the B a r am a h a 1 , ^ 1  7 ^ 9 2  - 9 .
As the war with Tipu Sultan drew towards an end, Munro had 
little reason to contemplate his career hitherto with any 
degree of satisfaction. He was still a junior officer with 
few, if any immediate and obvious prospects of further 
promotion. Temporarily charged with the command of a Prize 
Guard of two hundred sepoys, he suspected that this post 
might be abolished with the return of peace. However, 
although he. as yet unaware of it, the foundations had, 
largely fortuitously, been laid for his future career in the 
Company's civil administration. In this chapter the factors 
which led to his selection to serve under Read in the 
administration of the Baramahal are examined. The origins of 
the ryotwari system of revenue settlement and motives behind 
Munro's enthusiastic support for it are analysed. An 
explanation is offered for the emergence of two distinct and 
mutually antagonistic schools of thought in the Madras 
administration, designated respectively as the 'Old' and the 
'New School' by contemporaries. Their origins are traced and 
the considerations which determined the conflicting ideas
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each group espoused are described. The influence that this 
and other divisions within the structure of the Company's 
Madras administration had on the decision-making process, 
both in India and Britain, is examined. In the course of the 
chapter, evidence also emerges of the methods employed men 
in the Company's service to influence policy decisions and 
to advance their personal and group or party interests.
Cornwallis signed the Treaty of Seringapatam on 16 March
1792. He had been under pressure from the Company's Indian
allies to negotiate a peace as soon as possible and a number
of considerations had encouraged him to do so. The alliance
between the British, the Marathas and the Nizam was
generally regarded by the British as fragile and it was
believed that, under the circumstances, it would be unwise
to test it by unnecessarily prolonging hostilities.
Cornwallis was himself unhappy conducting the war with .
Indian allies. 'I hardly need state to you', he wrote to the
Directors, 'that in transacting business with people
differing so much from ourselves in language, manners and
customs ...(who are) so ignorant of military science and so
liable to be biased from the pursuit of a general good by
private and selfish views, many difficulties are unavoidably 
1
experienced'. The British forces had not been more than 
adequately supplied during the campaign and there were fears 
that, the longer it lasted, the greater the logistical 
problems would become. Cornwallis was aware that the war was 
also placing a heavy burden on the Company at a time when 
its finances were a source of anxiety in Britain. In 
addition, sickness in the army was beginning to take a toll
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and there were serious anxieties that this might undermine
its strength to a point were its ultimate success would be
threatened. Cornwallis had also to consider the orders he
had r e c e i v e d  from Brit ai n. At the b e g i n n i n g  of the M y so r e
War Dundas had favoured the complete extirpation of Tipu's
power but in September 1791 the news of temporary setbacks
2
had caused him to to alter his opinions. He had orders sent
to Cornwallis directing him to make an 'honourable peace' at
the first opportunity. The Governor-General was told that,
if it appeared necessary, he should even sacrifice all the
-3
gains the British had made during the war. Although 
Cornwallis had been able to postpone the implementation of 
these orders, he could not totally ignore the wishes of the 
home authorities.
Under the terms of the Treaty, Tipu surrendered half his 
territory. A large portion this went to the Marathas, the 
Nizam and the raja of Coorg, who was given the independent 
rule of his state. The Company also acquired extensive new 
territories. These included all Tipu's lands on the Malabar 
coast between Trancore and Kaway, the district of Dindigul 
and the area known as the Baramahal. Cornwallis's decision 
to incorporate these last two districts into the Madras 
Presidency was principally influenced by his desire to build 
a protective barrier between Mysore and the Carnatic.
The immediate problems facing Cornwallis and the Madras 
Government were those of how best to restore some form of 
order to the territories that the Company had acquired, 
settle their revenues and collect them. The conditions
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prevailing in the area threatened to make this extremely 
difficult. The recent wars, which had seriously disrupted 
economic and social life in South India, had been the 
culmination of a long period of political instability in the 
area, itself the consequence of the incessant warfare which 
the decline of the Mughal Empire, the presence of two rival 
Europe powers and the resultant unleashing of disruptive 
forces had provoked in the country. Preoccupied with 
external affairs and internal power struggles, no ruler in 
the Peninsula had been able to devote much attention to 
administrative matters other than those concerned with the 
collection of the land revenues. The inhabitants had 
consequently been forced to look towards their own small 
communities for the provision of social and economic 
structures within which to organize their lives.
The social fragmentation that had occurred presented the 
Company with a serious problem. It meant that there were no 
centralized bureaucratic structures that it could assimilate 
into that of its own organization, a dearth of records and 
little other information easily available about conditions 
in the provinces. In addition the Company's Government in 
Madras was far from sure just what its position in the area 
vis-a-vis the property in the land and the administration of 
justice was. While the Company was satisfied that it had 
acquired all the rights of full sovereignty in the Jagir, 
which it had received as inam land under a Mughal firman in 
1765, its position in the other districts was less well 
defined. As a consequence, the Company had little involved 
itself with the overall administration of its territories.
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In the N o r t h e r n  C i r c a r s  for e xa m pl e ,  the C hi e f s  and C o u n c i l s
only claimed the right to dispose of the haveli lands which
they defined as those 'portions of territory not in the
hands of zamindars...and in which it was therefore optional
to adopt any system of management for collecting the land 
4
r e v e n u e s ' .  All ot h e r land was d e s c r i b e d  as z a m i n d a r i  
p r o p e r t y .  The B r i t i s h  ch o se  to d e f i n e  these lands as p r i v a t e  
p r o p e r t y  which, p r o v i d e d  the r e v e n u e s  w e r e  p r o m p t l y  paid, 
m i g h t  not be i n t e r f e r e d  with . A p a r t  fr om  the r i g h t  to 
m a i n t a i n  pu b l i c  order, the C o m p a n y  laid no c l ai m s to the 
r i g h ts  of s o v e r e i g n t y ,  le as t of all to that of the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of justice. This had p r e v e n t e d  the civil 
s e r v a n t s  f rom  a c q u i r i n g  m o r e  than a r u d i m e n t a r y  k n o w l e d g e  
a b o u t  the s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e s  g o v e r n i n g  their 
terri t o r i e s .
The situation was further complicated by other factors which 
had disposed the inhabitants of the Company's new 
territories to actively resist efforts on the part of the 
central government to uncover information about current 
conditions. Principal amongst these were the consequences of 
the very high rates of assessment that Indian governments 
had imposed on the land revenues and the unfortunate methods 
they had employed to gather them. While the sastras 
authorized the state to collect 20 per cent of the gross 
agricultural product for its support, the actual percentage 
collected by most rulers was substantially higher. Haidar 
Ali had set the state's share at 60 per cent, the M a ra th a  
ruler of Tanjore took 80 per cent and, in 1784, Muharamed 
Ali, the Nawab of Arcot, enhanced the state's claim to 84
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per cent. In ad di ti o n , the o f f i c i a l s  e m p l o y e d  to co l l e c t  the
r e v e n u e s  had often im p o s e d  f u r t h e r  levies on the p o p u l a t i o n .
In the c o u r s e  of c o l l e c t i n g  these  re v en u e s,  o ff i c i a l s
f r e q u e n t l y  r e s o r t e d  to the use of to rture, e m p l o y i n g
s c o u rg e s , wh i p s  and thum b s cre ws and s o m e t i m e s  eve n a p p l y i n g
6
i r r i t a n t s  to cause b l i n d n e s s .  A l e x a n d e r  Dyce, c o m m a n d e r  of
M a d u r a i ,  r e p o r t e d  that 'n u m be r l e s s  w r e t c h e s  are i m p r i s o n e d
and e x p o s e d  to b a r b a r o u s  tor t u re s .  For some time past,
m y s e l f  and f a m i l y  ha ve had our sl ee p t o t a l l y  d e s t r o y e d  by
the m o s t  p i e r c i n g  cries of a g o n y  and d i s t r e s s  t h r o u g h o u t  the 
7
w h o l e  night'. Thes e p o l i c i e s  had e n c o u r a g e d  the p o p u l a t i o n  
to p r a c t i c e  the ta ct ics  of eva s i on .  Th ey  saw it as b ei ng to 
th eir  a d v a n t a g e  to p r e v e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a bo u t  the true state 
of the e c o n o m y  from r e a c h i n g  the c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  w h o s e  
i n t e r e s t  in such i n f o r m a t i o n  was s u s p e c t e d  of be i n g  c l o s e l y  
c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  an i n t e n t i o n  on its pa rt to r ai se the 
c u l t i v a t o r s '  rents.
The B r i t i s h  w er e  a d d i t i o n a l l y  h a n d i c a p p e d .  T he ir n at u r a l  
t e n d e n c y  to a n a l y s e  e v e r y t h i n g  w i t h i n  a E u r o p e a n  f r a m e w o r k  
of r e f e r e n c e  c o m p l i c a t e d  the e n t i r e  si t ua t i o n .  T he y  b r o u g h t  
w i t h  them f ro m  E u r o p e  the idea that p r o p e r t y  ri gh t s we re  
i n v i o l a t e  and they w e r e  f r e q u e n t l y  e x h o r t e d  by the home  
a u t h o r i t i e s  to p r o t e c t  those  of the C o m p a n y ' s  In di a n  
s u b j e c t s .  The civil s e r v a n t s  of ea ch  P r e s i d e n c y  had, in 
p a r t i c u l a r ,  r e c e i v e d  order s to e s t a b l i s h  wh o p o s s e s s e d  wh at  
r i g h t s  in the land and to m a k e  t he ir s e t t l e m e n t s  
a c c o r d i n g l y ,  p r o t e c t i n g  th ese in the p r oc e s s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y  
the e n t i r e  s t r u c t u r e  of the I n d i a n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e c o n o m y  was 
a l i e n  to them and c u l t u r a l  and l i n g u i s t i c  b a r r i e r s  p r e v e n t e d
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them from quickly coming to an understanding of it. Faced by 
a multitude of different claimants to rights in tenure 
systems that were largely unknown to them, they found it 
extremely difficult to decide with whom to settle. Their 
task was made harder by the enormous number of terms, some 
Tamil, Telugu and Ma 1 a y - a l - a i m ,  others Arabic and Persian  
employed to describe the systems. In consequence, the 
British had tended to employ Indians who had had experience 
of collecting the land revenues under Indian rulers and to 
rely upon these men and personal dubashes to handle the 
Company's revenue business. This in turn had resulted in the 
British acquiring little knowledge about the territories 
under their control outside of that necessary for their own 
commercial activities.
Under the circumstances, it was natural that Cornwallis and 
the Madras Government should, in their search for solutions 
to their problems in the south, be significantly influenced 
by the policies which were in the process of being adopted 
in Bengal for the administration of that Presidency's 
revenues. For want of an understanding of the tenure systems 
of South India, the Madras Government was forced to operate 
within a perceptual framework of analysis derived from the 
Bengal experience. It is necessary to very briefly examine 
the developments in the revenue administration of Bengal and 
the debates that accompanied them in order to understand 
Cornwallis's policies in Madras.
The first unified policy of rural administration to 
influence the Company had been formed in Bengal by Warren
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Hastings between 1771 and 1777 when he adopted a system 
whereby the land was divided into estates. The right to 
collect the State's share of the agricultural gross product 
from these estates had been auctioned and the highest 
bidders had received quinquennial leases which entitled 
them, in return for the payment of fixed rents to the 
Treasury, to collect the land revenues from the cultivators, 
keeping the balance on these as a commission. When Hastings 
introduced this system, he claimed that ownership of the 
land in India was vested in the state which had the right to 
appoint whomsoever it wished to collect the rents and pay 
these into the Treasury. From its inception Hastings's 
system had had its opponents. These men argued that the 
system was destroying the agricultural economy by, on the 
one hand, discouraging investment in the land and, on the 
other, permitting abuses, such as rackrenting, to run 
unchecked. They blamed the operation of these factors for 
the apparent decline of the Bengal economy and they claimed 
that only a permanent settlement of property rights in the 
land with a distinct class of landowners could reverse the 
trend.
Three distinct and yet ultimately interlinked socio-economic
theories influenced the opponents of Hastings's 'farming'
system as they developed arguments to support the
introduction of a permanent settlement. The prevalent
veneration of private property, which was believed to be
'the source of all industry among individuals and, of
8
course, the f o u n d a t i o n  of pu b l i c  p r o s p e r i t y ' ,  led them to 
f o l l o w  Dow's and Ro u s ' s  a r g u m e n t s  that the State sh oul d m ak e
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no claim to ownership of the land but rather, by investing
it in individuals, encourage the emergence of landowning 
9
classes. The ideas of the Physiocrats were employed by the
proponents of a permanent settlement to add weight to their
a r g u m e n t s .  T he se m e n  had c o n s t r u c t e d  a t he o r y  of va l ue  ba sed
on an analysis of agricultural production in which the
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  the v al ue  of labour po we r  and the va lu e
c r e a t e d  by its use a p p e a r e d  in its m o s t  t a n g i b l e  form. T he y
argued that it was this difference, the net produce, that
landowners appropriated as rent and which they then in turn
e m p l o y e d  to cr e a t e  we al t h . If an e c o n o m y  was to expand, the
P h y s i o c r a t s  b e l i e v e d  that a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  w o u l d  have
to be raised through investment in the land. Patullo,
a p p l y i n g  these ideas to Bengal, c l a i m e d  that this w o u l d  not
occur u n le s s  the p o t e n t i a l  i n v e st o r s w e re  o f f e r e d  s ec u r i t y  
10
of property. The third concept influencing Hastings's 
opponents was one widely held by 18th century Whig 
theoreticians in Britain, the belief that an ideal society 
should be hierarchically structured, its apex and base 
connected by intermediate ranks of landed proprietors.
A most significant contribution to the debate which was 
splitting the Company's administration between supporters of 
Hastings's system and the proponents of a permanent 
settlement was made in 1776 by Philip Francis in his Plan. 
Francis's Plan hinged on the recognition of the right of the 
Bengal zamindars, a heterogeneous group composed of Mughal 
officials, local chieftains and firmly established renters 
who had claimed customary, hereditary rights in the revenues 
and the land, to landed property. His ideas represented a
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synthesis of the socio-political theories of Whig England
with the economic ones of the Physiocrats. He attacked
Hastings's system, claiming that 'agency can never supply
the place of proprietorship because many of the principal
duties of a proprietor are such as an agent has no interest 
11
in performing'. 'These duties', he observed, 'are essential
to the permanent prosperity of the Government itself, since
they belong to the care and improvement of that fund (land)
12
from which the Government receives its support'. He also
attacked the official line that the ruling power was the
proprietor of the land, claiming it was 'not less false in
13
fact than absurd in theory and dangerous in practice'. 
Francis's identification of the zamindars with the landed 
gentry of Britain was a crucial development. He imagined 
that, given the same privileges and responsibilities as 
those of British landowners, the Bengal zamindars would 
develop an ideology similar to their counterparts' in Europe 
that would include notions of agricultural improvement 
through investment and a relationship of 'reciprocal 
obligations of protection and dependence' with their 
tenants. He made no allowance for the cultural factors, not 
recognising that these would cause the Indian zamindars, in 
response to their own cultural values, to adopt different 
patterns of behaviour. Neither did he foresee that other 
factors might operate against the introduction of such a 
policy resulting in the transformation of the zamindars into 
a class of improving landlords somewhat similar in character 
to that which had developed in England. In particular, he 
failed to recognize that a rapidly expanding population 
might lead to a situation in which demand for land would
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result in the zamindars perceiving it as more profitable to 
indulge in rack-renting and sub-letting than to invest in 
improvements and create of a relatively stable hierarchy of 
tenancies with fixed rents.
By 1785, the climate of opinion in Bengal was in favour of
the introduction of some sort of permanent settlement and
the idea had also received support from the home
authorities. Cornwallis himself had arrived at Calcutta
convinced of the need for changes and determined to find
some means of unalterably fixing the revenue assessment on
land. He was soon p e r s u a d e d  of the b e n e f i t s  to be g a i n e d
from a permanent transfer of full property rights in the
land to a class of substantial landholders in return for
rents that would remain unalterably fixed irrespective of
i n c r e a s e s  in a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  On ly this, he
believed, would make land a saleable commodity by
guaranteeing to its possessors a good return on the capital
invested in its purchase and by at the same time encouraging
the freeholders to make improvement. 'Landed property', he
wrote, 'will acquire a value hitherto unknown in Hindustan
and the large capitals possessed of many of the natives of
Calcutta, which are now employed in usury and monopolizing
salt and other necessities of life, will be appropriated to
14
the more useful purpose of purchasing and improving land'.
Cornwallis had a variety of reasons for proposing to make 
his settlements in Bengal with the zamindars. Choosing to 
regard them as the Indian landed aristocracy, he believed 
that by investing them with ownership of the land he would
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make them loyal subjects of the British. He imagined they
would see their interests as being tied to those of the
Company. ’A landholder who is secure in the quiet enjoyment
of a profitable estate1, he wrote, 'can have no motive in
15
wishing for a change'. He also appears to have thought that
his actions would re-establish in Bengal the 'intermediate
graduation of ranks' Whig theoreticians believed essential
to a well ordered society. At the same time, Cornwallis was
a pragmatist. He not only recognized that there might be an
influx of new men but actually welcomed the prospect. In
answer to John Shore's objections that the zamindars would
be unable to adjust to the new situation and merely ruin
their estates through maladministration, he claimed that if
'bad management obliges them to part with their property to
16
the more industrious, the better for the state'.
Enthusiasm for the principles behind these ideas was united 
in the minds of many with a conviction that it would solve 
several pressing economic problems facing the Company in 
India. It was believed that the system would enable the 
Company to reduce its revenue establishments substantially 
and concentrate its limited human and financial resources on 
the protection of persons and property. The home authorities 
had been pressing the Indian governments to make economies 
since 1785 when Dundas had written from the Board of Control 
to the Chairmen that a financial reorganization of the 
Company involving stringent retrenchment of the Indian 
establishments was necessary. The Directors, on Du n d a s 's 
suggestion, had agreed to set up in each Presidency 
standard, reduced establishments and had ordered Cornwallis
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to put this policy into effect. There can be little doubt 
that the Governor-General believed that the transfer of 
responsibility for the detail of the revenues to the 
zamindars would enable him to make a number of substantial 
economies in Bengal's revenue administration and allow, 
without any increase in overall expenditure, the 
establishment of a viable European judical administration.
Cornwallis's proposals were not accepted by all the civil
servants in Bengal without reservations. John Shore, while
he agreed with the majority of Cornwallis's ideas, believed
that decennial leases must be experimented with before a
permanent settlement could be introduced. He argued that the
Company possessed insufficient information about the economy
to permanently divest itself of the right to alter its
demands in the future. Cornwallis, while he generally
admired Shore's grasp of revenue matters, was convinced that
another temporary settlement must further damage the
economy. He had been deeply impressed by what he considered
the iniquitous conduct of a vast number of the European
collectors and he anticipated that, at the expiration of
decennial leases, further opportunities would be opened to
18these men to abuse their authority again. By 1792 the 
question had been referred back to Britain as an issue 
requiring decision by the highest authorities.
Cornwallis appears to have been satisfied that his proposals 
would be accepted and he was sufficiently enthusiastic about 
the principles behind them to wish to see them extended to 
the other Presidencies. He wrote to Dundas immediately after
signing the Treaty of Seringapatam that he intended to
introduce a zamindari system into the Company's new
possessions. 'The rajahs', he informed Dundas, 'are not
independent but now become our subjects and, if we can put
them in some degree on the footing of the Bengal zamindars
and prevent them oppressing the people under them, the
commerce of the country...may become extremely advantageous 
19
to the Company'. To this end Cornwallis decided to appoint 
two Bengal civilians who had had experience of zamindari 
settlements in Bengal to supervise the initial settlements 
of the Company's territories on the west coast. He 
recognized that this would be an extremely unpopular 
decision in Madras but considered that the exigencies of the 
situation justified his action.
The situation in the Baramahal was more complicated, the
social and economic life of the area having been
considerably more disturbed by the recent war. Cornwallis
appears to have harboured doubts as to whether a civilian
administration would be capable of restoring order in the
district. At the same time, however, he was not sure he
could take so controversial a decision as that of placing
the Baramahal under military management. Cornwallis was
uncertain of receiving support from the Directors who had
recently reversed a number of his decisions. They had
reinstated a civil servant whom Cornwallis believed to be
corrupt, adopted plans which both he and the Board of
Revenue had publicly rejected and refused to permit him to
20
appoint his candidate to the office of Advocate General. 
While he was sufficiently sure of Dundas's support at the
Board to be satisfied his proposals for a permanent
settlement would be authorized by the home authorities,
Cornwallis was aware that, should he make too many enemies
among the Directors, the Court could seriously obstruct his
government. His fear that this might occur encouraged him to
adopt extreme views. 'If the Court of Directors cannot be
controlled', he wrote to Dundas, 'I retract my opinion in
favour of their continuance after the expiration of the 
21
Charter'. His situation was made particularly uncomfortable
for him by the fact that the exact limits of his authority
were undefined at a time when he was anxious not to exceed
them. He had recently been pointedly reminded by Landsdowne
that 'it belongs to Ministers to plan, to Governors and
22
Generals only to execute'.
At this critical juncture, Munro persuaded Captain Read to
23
apply to Cornwallis for the management of the Baramahal.
Read, who must have hoped that his relationship by marriage
with Sir Charles Oakeley would have some influence on
Cornwallis's decision, made his application. This was
initially turned down, Cornwallis replying that 'he could
not venture to interfere for it would bring all the
civilians on his head'. Shortly afterwards he changed his
mind and Barry Close, Secretary to the Madras Government,
informed Read on 31 March that the Governor-General had
24
appointed him the Collector of Baramahal.
A number of considerations seem to have influenced 
Cornwallis's final decision. Principal amongst these was his 
distrust of the Madras civilians who had long had a
reputation for corruption that was not undeserved. Macartney
had written of 'the universal intrigue and duplicity' which
25
he had discovered in every department. 'I don't love to
enter into details of this nature', he wrote, 'but, good
God, what is human nature if avarice can degrade it to the
26
point it does in this country?' Stuart Hill later reported a
conversation he had in the 1780's with a poligar who told
him that, though he paid his revenues to the government
cheerfully, he was less enthusiastic about being forced to
27
pay equal sums to the collector. Cornwallis's own
experiences with the Madras civilians, especially during
Holland's governorship, had persuaded him that they could
not be trusted. At one point he had written to the Court of
Directors suggesting that nobody be admitted to the Council
'who will not declare upon their honour that they are not
directly or indirectly creditors of the Naboob...and that
they will not become creditors during the time of their
28
continuance in government'. In addition, Cornwallis was 
convinced that the civilian administration had been less 
than efficient and he was strongly critical of the 
activities of the Chiefs and Councils on the Madras Coast.
Another major influence on Cornwallis's decision to appoint 
Read was his distrust, which he shared with Read, of Indian 
officials whom he particularly wished to remove from all 
positions of authority or responsibility. The 
Governor-General shared the anxiety of the home authorities 
that the civilians' apparent inability to master local 
languages was causing them to depend too much upon Indian 
agents and translators in their management of the revenues.
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The authorities suspected the Indians of corruption and
evidence from the districts appeared to support this view.
The same poligar who told Hill that the local European
collector was corrupt also told him that the man's Indian
officials, especially his dubash, employed their authority
to extort money from the landholders. 'I have already', he
said, 'buried three mothers of the collector's present 
29
dubash'. In Cornwallis's opinion the native officials were
not only abusing their positions and using them to oppress
the population but also withholding information about
conditions in the districts from the Government. Read had a
reputation as a linguist. Cornwallis clearly believed that
Read would be capable of personally supervising the details
of the Baramahal's management, thereby replacing the
indirect administration of the Chiefs and Councils with a
more responsible, direct, European controlled structure. In
a letter to Read, Colonel Ross, a close associate and
adviser of Cornwallis, succinctly expressed the
Governor-General's opinion of the situation. 'I am afraid',
he wrote, 'there are not many Madras civil servants who have
30
language enough to make either good judges or collectors'.
The fact that Cornwallis not only knew Read but also liked 
and admired him must have also played a fairly decisive role 
in deciding the former to give him the appointment. He had 
been impressed during the war by Read's abilities, 
especially his efficient recruitment of native troops. He 
had written to Charles Oakeley in 1791 to express his 
pleasure at hearing of Read's safe return to the army and. 
particularly referred to him as a 'zealous and active
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officer'. He was satisfied that Read might be safely 
entrusted with the responsibility of restoring order in the 
district and of uncovering the information required before a 
permanent settlement of the revenues might be introduced.
Read's appointment and the announcement that his assistants
should also be military men was extremely unpopular amongst
the c i v i l i a n s  in M a dra s. R e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  the civil and
m i l i t a r y  in Ma dr a s had b e e n  s t r a i n e d  for a long time. Hill
later described what had been happening in the districts in
a letter to Castlereagh. 'The collector being jealous of the
a u t h o r i t y  v e s t e d  in the c o m m a n d i n g  o f f i c e r  and he, on the
other hand, not infrequently interposing in the detail of
r e v e n u e  m a t t e r s  (has m e a n t  that) i n s t e a d  of e x e r t i n g  their
joint efforts for the public service, they have often
allowed their private interests to influence their public
duties. Never was this more clearly evinced than in the
32
years 1792 and 1793'. At one point the split even threatened
the Company's structure when the dispute between Captain
Towns and the Chief and Council of Masulipatam caught the
Government in a crossfire of accusations. Towns, breaking
all the regulations, wrote directly to Pitt in an attempt to
33
have the local civil authority suspended by the Ministry.
Cornwallis clearly feared that the civilians would employ 
their influence in Britain and their connections in the 
Court to undermine his standing with the Directors and he 
took measures to defuse the situation. He announced that 
Read's appointment was only a temporary measure that would 
not be extended beyond one year after which collectors would
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be selected from among the civilians. To allay fears that a
military administration would be created independent of the
civil authorities, Read was in effect transferred to the
civilian establishment. He was made directly answerable to
the Board of Revenue. This was very much in keeping with
C o r n w a l l i s ’s overa ll policy. The p r e v i o u s  year he had st at ed
that 'no military men of any rank or description should be
suffered to...affect the least independence of the civil 
34
p o w e r '.
The Board of Revenue, which had been established in 1786,
consisted of four members, three of whom were drawn from the
civil service and a fourth, the Board's President, who was
a l w a y s  a m e m b e r  of the Coun ci l. The only c r i t e r i o n  g o v e r n i n g
a p p o i n t m e n t s  to the Board  of R e v e n u e  a p p e a r s  to have b ee n
that of seniority, occasionally tempered by the
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of p o l i t i c s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  there was no
guarantee that its members had any experience of revenue
management or aptitude for it. One Indian critic wrote that
'the entire management of revenue affairs is vested in the
Revenue Board, which is sometimes composed of qualified
35
persons in revenue affairs and sometimes not'. He observed 
that this was a result of the apparent adoption of the view 
that any civil servant must be 'fit for any situation 
whatever merely by residing a certain number of years in 
India', an indulgence that he noted was not extended to 
Indians. Robert Alexander, President of the Board of Revenue 
in 1816, admitted in a Minute that his whole experience of 
revenue administration had been limited to what he had seen 
in just two districts of the Northern Circars, districts
i
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that had been 'held on ancient zamindary tenure'. Even so, 
this did not prevent him from feeling competent to make 
sweeping generalizations concerning the role played by 
village headmen, a class of people he had never met.
By and large, the Board was ill-equipped to act as more than
a clearing house for information and a link in the authority
structure although in theory it was supposed to collate the
reports of the collectors, analyse their accounts and advise
the Council on revenue matters. It was inadequately housed,
under-staffed and hampered in its activities by
37
communication problems. The majority of the collectors were
stationed too far from the capital for the Board to
supervise their administrations closely or check the
information they were sending it. All too often it did
little more than correspond with the collectors, accept the
reports 'dictated in the best style' these men sent them
with the sketchy calculations which represented their
38
accounts and then applaud everyone's labours.
The members of the Board of Revenue throughout this period
all appear to have shared a prejudice which was common among
the civil servants generally. They were extremely unwilling
to admit, often in the face of overwhelming evidence, that
British revenue officials could be either inefficient or
corrupt. Accounts were rarely properly scrutinized and
occasionally, 'sometimes out of delicacy' according to a
39
contemporary observer, overlooked. On at least one occasion, 
the Court was forced to officially reprimand the Board for 
this. When the Directors approved Macleod's appointment to
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investigate Wynch's administration of Dindigul, they
enquired why the Board had waited five months before
suspending the latter even though it declared that it had
40
long been convinced of his mismanagement. This preoccupation
with the reputations of the collectors could, and often did,
influence the Board's operations. The damaging report Munro
and Sullivan produced in 1816 on conditions in Coimbatore
was initially withheld by the Board because they feared it
contained imputations on the administration of the previous
41
collector, Garrow.
When Read received his appointment from Cornwallis to manage 
the Baramahal, William Petrie was President of the Board of 
Revenue and Thomas Oakes, William Oram and George Mowbray 
sat as the other three members. The Board's accountant was 
Lionel Place. None of these men had had much experience of 
revenue management and all which was theirs had been gained 
in the Carnatic, which was largely administered by the 
N a w a b 's Indian officials, and the Circars , where the Chiefs 
and Councils relied upon native agents and existing 
zamindars to do the detailed work of settlement. In 
consequence Read was given no instructions but left free to 
collect the current year's land revenues whatever way he 
could.
Read was also permitted to select his own assistants. He
approached Munro twice and was turned down on both occasions
because Munro believed that the war was not yet over and his
42
best chances for advancement lay with the army. Munro 
claimed that Cornwallis's treaty might have lost Tipu half
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his revenues but had by no means destroyed half his power.
He was satisfied that it had merely left Tipu anxious to 
renew hostilities and believed that these were imminent. 
After his second refusal, Read took offence and would have 
chosen another assistant had not George Kippen, a mutual 
friend, prevailed upon him to ask Munro once more. By the 
time that Read made his third approach, it was clear to 
Munro that the war was over and, believing that proffered 
post at least offered some remunerative employment, he 
accepted it.
Read and his three assistants, Munro, Macleod and Graham, 
entered the Baramahal in April 1792. The Baramahal district 
(pagelfl4) covered an area of some 8,400 square miles, being 
approximately 140 miles long and having an average width of 
60 miles. Its principal town, Salem, was a major centre of 
commerce. It commanded the trade routes between Madras and 
Pondicherry and those between Malabar and the eastern coast. 
In addition, it was an important centre of manufacture since 
there was a large population of weavers living in the town 
and its environs. However, with this exception, the 
district's economy was dominated by agriculture in which a 
large majority of the population was employed. Cultivation 
in the district followed the rains. The first three months 
of the year were usually rainless and the April fall was 
rarely great. That of May however was normally copious and 
marked the commencement of cultivation, the following three 
months being those of the largest sowings. Although the 
prevailing soil of the area was a red sand which, unlike 
that of Trinchinpoly and South Arcot, was as good as red
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loam, the level of c u l t i v a t i o n  was low. The bulk of the
population were attaining little more than a subsistence 
44
from the land.
On his arr i v al  in the B a r am a ha l,  Read d i s c o v e r e d  that Tipu
S u l t a n  had, d ur i n g  his r e t r e a t  f rom  the t e r r it o r y,  c o l l e c t e d
and removed all the village accounts and other revenue
records. He had also taken with him his own revenue
officials and a large number of the village karnams, the men
who had been responsible for compiling the village accounts
and keeping the records of previous settlements and
ha rv e st s .  The m a j o r i t y  of those k a r n a m s  he had not r e m o v e d
to M y so r e  had fled from their v i l l a g e s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  Read
and his assistants were faced by a dearth of information
regarding previous assessments which they felt precluded
them from even considering the introduction of other than
the m o s t t e m p o r a r y  leases. Th es e  h o w e v e r  we r e  not f av ou r e d
by eithe r the G o v e r n m e n t  or the hom e a u t h o r i t i e s  and Read
believed that his principal duty was the discovery of the
true value of the di s t r i c t .  He d e c i d e d  to a t t e m p t  to do this
by analysing three separate sources of information about the
annual agricultural produce; the previous records where they
were available, the valuations made by the village headmen
45
or patels, and those of other 'respectable inhabitants'.
In the meantime Read recognized that his first priority, 
after restoration of general order, must be the collection 
of the revenues for the fasli year 1792-93. Not only was 
this his principal duty in the eyes of the authorities, it 
was also the only means by which he might make his own
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fortune. The Board of Revenue informed him in September that
he and his assistants would share a 5 per cent commission on
the net receipts of the revenue, he to receive 3 per cent
while the other 2 per cent was to be divided equally between 
46
his assistants. This was not the only reason why it should
have been in his interest to collect the largest sums the
district was capable of supporting. The one thing that the
Board of Revenue took a close interest in was the gross
revenue raised by their collectors. This was the yardstick
by which they measured performance and they were quick to
criticize employees who failed to realize at least as much
as the Board believed the previous Indian administrations
had levied. In 1790 the Board had suspended Hughes,
Collector of Guntur, because, originally, they had been
angered by his failure to collect revenues equal to those
which Sadlier believed the previous Indian government had
47
raised annually.
The pressure on him to collect a high revenue was one reason
why Read decided against adopting a 'farming* system similar
to that which had been employed in the Jagir. He believed
that, should he create a body of rent farmers and allow them
to make the season's settlements, they would defraud the
state by directing a substantial proportion of the revenues
into their own pockets. In addition, he also believed he
would lose an important opportunity to discover the real
value of the district. He was convinced these men would
'sedulously conceal the amount of their collections' in
order to negotiate better terms from the state in following 
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years. The only alternative Read saw to the employment of
rent farmers was for he and his assistants to make the 
settlements directly with the villages.
The prevailing mode of land control in the area was the 
gramawari or village system. The district appears to have 
been divided into individual villages or, more commonly, 
groups of villages with a single main settlement and several 
smaller ones attached to it. The socio-economic structure of 
these villages was hierarchical with privileged elites at 
the apex. The shareholders who composed these elites, under 
the leadership of their patels or village headmen, 
controlled cultivation, administered the villages and acted 
as intermediaries between the state and the bulk of the 
population. Acting as a body, they made the settlements of 
the rents to be paid on the land with the officials of the 
government. These men possessed what amounted to proprietary 
rights to the cultivated and uncultivated village lands 
which they distributed among themselves, either holding them 
jointly with the co-sharers cultivating temporary 
assignments (karaiyedu tenure) or individually after a
49
permanent distribution of the fields (arudikarai tenure).
Beneath the 'superior' landholders were two classes of 
tenants; the parakudi and ulkudi. The parakudi tenants were 
men from outside the village who cultivated some of its 
land, often being paid like hired labourers during the 
growing season before dividing the produce with the 
landlords after the harvest. The ulkudi tenants were 
permanent inhabitants of the village and, unlike the 
parakudi who were tenants-at-wi11, possessed
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quasi-proprietary rights in the fields they occupied. They 
could not be dispossessed provided they rendered the 
customary dues to the 'superior* landholders. The lowest 
strata in the village society was composed of landless 
peasants whose position in the social structure was 
something between that of the independent labourer and the 
serf .
Read decided to make his settlements directly with the 
patels. He and his assistants agreed the rent each village 
was to pay to the government with these men and then left 
them to make their own settlements with the 'superior' 
landholders, the ryots as Read chose to call them. Diagram.3 
(pagell9) illustrates the structure of this settlement 
system which offered two clear advantages to the British. It 
reduced to manageable proportions the number of people with 
whom the British had to make settlements and enabled them to 
leave the detailed allocation of the rents to men with local 
knowledge. Read justified his decision with claims that it 
was not only economic to administer but also less open to 
abuse, it being unlikely in his opinion that the ryots would 
be oppressed by their own patels in the ways in which they 
would be by rent farmers or state officials with no interest 
in the villages other than the realization of revenue.
Read informed the Board of Revenue of what he had done in
May 1792 and it appears to have adopted his ideas with 
so
enthusiasm. The Board wrote to Government the following 
month that, though the ideal system would be one of 
settlement with the ryots, the intricate detail of such made
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it impractical. The best plan was, in their opinion, to make
village settlements. This, they claimed, was the customary
mode of settlement in the Peninsula . At the same time the
Board had clearly not yet adopted any fixed policy regarding
settlements since it stated that 'local and other
circumstances must determine the system most proper to be
employed'. They informed the Government that they were
content to leave everything to 'the experience and judgement
of the collector'. In November, a month after Oakes replaced
Petrie as the Board's President, an official policy began to
emerge. Read was ordered, on the expiration of his first
annual settlements with the patels, to make further
52
triennial or quinquennial settlements with them. In those
villages where the patels refused to co-operate, either
because they believed the revenue demands to be too high or
because they did not wish to accept the quasi-official
status and responsibilities attached to the privileges of
administering their villages, Read was authorized to employ
small-scale renters. Where employed, these men were to be
rewarded with grants of rent free land equal in value to a
commission on the collection. The following month Read was
ordered to conclude quinquennial settlements with the 
53
patels.
The emergence of an official policy was closely linked to
developments elsewhere in the Company where support for the
permanent zamindari settlements proposed by Cornwallis was
growing. It was known that Dundas favoured this plan since
he had already twice publicly announced his intention of
54
adopting Cornwallis's views. In August 1792 he had persuaded
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Pitt to support him and arranged for orders to be sent to
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Cornwallis to make a permanent settlement. The manner in
which he did this is interesting for the light it throws on
the relationship between the Board of Control and the Court.
'Knowing that the Directors would not be induced to take it
up so as to consider it with any degree of attention and
knowing some of the most leading ones among them held an
opinion different both from your Lordship and me on the
question of perpetuity and feeling that there was much
respect due to the opinion and authority of Mr Shore',
Dundas wrote to Cornwallis, 'I thought it indisputably
necessary both that the measure must originate with the
Board of Control and likewise that I should induce Mr Pitt
to become my partner in the final consideration of so
important and contoversal a measure.... We settled a
despatch upon the ideas we had formed and sent it down to
the Court of Directors. What I expected happened; the
subject was too large for the consideration of the Directors
in general and the few who knew anything concerning it,
understanding from me that Mr Pitt and I were decided in our
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opinion, thought it best to acquiesce'.
When the news reached Madras that the home authorities 
supported the Governor-General, both the Board of Revenue 
and Read emerged as strong advocates of permanent 
settlements for Madras. The Board adopted the view that 
Cornwallis's zamindari settlement of Bengal was so excellent 
it might be taken as the model for all other settlements. 'A 
thousand advantages', the Board recorded, 'must result from 
a plan of permanency, not only exciting the people to
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improvements but enabling Government to affect a reduction
of the revenue officers...by reducing in general the charges
of collection, by ensuring regular payments, by rendering
the accounts more simple and, above all, by putting a stop
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to intrigue and corrupt practices'. The Board told the 
Government that, at the end of the five years, the revenues 
would be permanently settled with a zamindari class. It 
seems clear that, in the absence of any existing body of 
zamindars, the Board intended to create such a class by 
treating the patels, who had previously only been the 
representatives of the ’superior’ landholders, as 
quasi-land1 ords of their villages.
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The system Read advocated was slightly different. He wanted 
to permanently invest the patels with the responsibility of 
managing their villages but had no intention of conferring 
on them ownership of the land. He spoke of giving the 
perpetual management of the villages or divisions of 
districts to the patels and of rec omp ens ing these men for 
the responsibility by lowering the rents on their personal 
lands so as to give them a remuneration equal to a 
commission on the revenues they collected for the state. He 
intended that the patels should organize cultivation in 
their villages, equitably apportion shares of the village 
rents among the ryots and deliver the revenues to the 
collectors’ kachahris. In this way Read imagined the 
collectors would be left free to administer justice 
rigorously enough to ensure that the patels should not abuse 
their quasi-official positions to oppress the ryots. Read's 
intention was not to make the patels quasi- land 1ords but to
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establish them as the representatives of the government by 
incorporating them into the revenue establishment.
R e a d ’s proposals represented a compromise solution to a
complex problem of conflicting social and economic
considerations, an attempt to balance the requirements of
the state against the interests of the ryots. He believed
that the best settlements must ultimately be those made with
the individual ryots since these would raise them from
’extreme indigence to comfort', from dependence to
independence. He recognized however that, until the
agricultural economy was stablized, such settlements would
not be in the state's interests. The ryots' poverty and
vulnerability to crop failures in poor seasons would be
'detrimental to cultivation and make the revenue
p r e c a r i o u s ' .  As long as the e c o n o m y  was d e p r e s s e d ,  he
acknowledged that 'the arguments in favour of improvements
and the certainty of the revenues are...in favour of giving
a number of villages in farm to wealthy individuals with
security for, having stock at command, they enter into more
extensive undertakings and make up for losses sustained in
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one or more villages by their profits on others'. This was 
the classic zamindari system.
Read now suggested an alternative system which he believed 
would offer all the advantages of settlements with zamindars 
without the obvious disadvantage of the destruction of 
existing property rights. He suggested that the role played 
by the individual in the Bengal system might just as easily 
be filled by 'superior' landholders in the villages if they
were constituted into semi-official corporate bodies. 'The
assigning whole villages individually or in number to the
most responsible of their present tenants, giving each a
grant of his farm or estate for the time of the lease on
condition of paying the rent that may be regulated...,
binding each to be separately answerable for the payment of
their rent and jointly for the payment of their
corporation's, is a mode that has occured as the best for
combining all advantages to the inhabitants in general and 
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to the revenue'. Read claimed that, were such settlements to 
be made, the ryots would naturally act like 'companies in 
Europe, selecting the ablest among them to conduct
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undertakings for improvement, to regulate contributions'.
Read believed it was only necessary to discover the true 
value of the Baramahal by analysing the figures for a few 
years' harvests and to then, after a detailed survey of the 
cultivated and uncultivated lands, allocate permanent fixed 
rents to the different classes of land. Once this was done, 
he saw no reason to continue to make lease settlements at 
periodic intervals and argued that the present landholders 
could be invested with full proprietary rights to the land 
they had traditionally cultivated.
While Read was formulating his ideas for a permanent 
settlement, Munro's attention was fully occupied by a 
dispute he was engaged in with Robert Dashwood, the 
Company's Commercial Resident at Salem. Dashwood's principal 
duty as the Commercial Resident was the purchase of cloth 
and its transport to Madras for export to Europe as part of
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the Company's Investment. He knew that his performance would 
be judged by the quantity of cloth he managed to purchase 
and by the prices he paid for it. These considerations 
encouraged him to attempt to control, even monopolize, the 
trade by forcing the weavers to work for the Company rather 
than independently. He feared that, should the Company be 
forced to compete with Indian merchants in an open market 
for the cloth, supplies would be uncertain and prices likely 
to be inflated. Dashwood therefore tried to dragoon the 
weavers into contracts with the Company under which, in 
return for advances, they were required to supply stipulated 
quantities of cloth. To this end, he asked Read to abolish
house and loom taxes for weavers who worked for the Company
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while raising them for those who did not. He informed Read 
that he had the Board of Trade's support for this measure.
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Munro was a firm supporter of Free Trade. During the short 
period that he had worked in Glasgow for the merchants 
Somerville and Gordon, he had been introduced to the 
economic theories which were embodied by Adam Smith in his 
book The W e a lth of Nations and had espoused these with 
enthusiasm. He believed that the implementation of Free 
Trade policies was the sine qua non for economic development 
and the emergence of a stable social order. He had been 
particularly influenced by the arguments Smith advanced in 
his chapter entitled 'How the Commerce of Towns contributed 
to the Improvement of the Country' in which he had stated 
that a strong commercial and manufacturing sector had 
benefitted Britain in three ways: 'First, by affording a
great and ready market for the rude produce of the country,
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they gave encouragement to its cultivation and further
improvement.... Secondly, the wealth acquired by the
inhabitants of cities was frequently employed in purchasing
such lands as were to be sold, of which a great part would
frequently be uncultivated.... Thirdly and lastly, commerce
and manufactures gradually introduced order and good
government and, with them, the liberty and security of 
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individuals'. Munro revealed his position in a critical
letter to Read. ’You have given all your attention to the
ryots and adandoned the weavers', he wrote. 'Under all
goverments in the world, the condition of the manufacturer
is better, and ought to be better, than that of the
ploughman for they are ten times more useful. It is they who
make the produce of cultivation valuable - a population of
ryots only will never make a country rich for, where there
are no manufacturers, they will cultivate just enough to
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keep themselves from want'.
Munro's adherence to Free Trade disposed him to oppose 
Dashwood's actions. Personal financial considerations
[
probably supported this inclination. Munro informed his
father that he was forbidden to trade in the Baramahal and
that he had to rely on the returns he derived from investing
in other peoples' activities for any increase in his 
66
fortune. He must have recognized that, were Dashwood's 
example to be widely followed, the operations of independent 
European merchants would be curtailed and, with them, the 
opportunities to profitably invest his savings.
i
! Munro accused Dashwood and his dubashes of forcing the
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weavers to work for the Company and of extorting illegal 
payments from them. He claimed that Dashwood's servants 
deliberately graded the cloth of weavers who refused to
67
! bribe them as being of lower quality than it actually was.
|
i The dispute became bitter when the Resident, still finding
\ difficulty in recruiting weavers, asked that those working
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| for the Company should be freed from thread taxes. Read
referred the dispute to the Board of Revenue who in turn
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referred it to the Government. One of Munro's first friends
in Madras, David Haliburton, was on the Board and it was he
who recommended that the Government follow Munro's advice
that the tax be applied to all the weavers or none. The
Government decided to adopt Munro's advice and ordered that
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all the weavers were to pay the thread tax. Dashwood
retaliated by reporting to the Board of Trade that Munro was
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harassing the Company's weavers. Munro denied the accusation
and countered by informing the Board of Revenue that
Dashwood's servants were deliberately preventing the
independent weavers from buying the raw materials of their 
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trade. Read supported Munro and suggested to the Board of
Revenue that all taxes on the weavers be abolished, this
being the most likely policy to encourage an increase in
overall production to the general advantage of the economy 
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and the Company. In September 1794 the Government finally
adopted Read's suggestion and ordered the abolition of all
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duties on cotton, thread, looms and houses.
The dispute, which had split the revenue and commercial 
branches of the Company's administration in the Baramahal 
for two years, clearly revealed the problems inherent in a
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system whereby the different branches were responsible to
two separate Boards, each with its own distinct and
occasionally conflicting interests. Some of the ideas Munro
was later to express about the unfortunate consequences of
separating the judicial and revenue administrations were
probably formed at this time. It is certain that Munro found
the experience of competing interests unpleasant and
resented the presence of Europeans with independent
authority in what he considered his district. It is
interesting that Munro made no attempt to involve the home
authorities and that he did not write to his father about
the business, even though he believed important policy
issues were at stake. It appears that the reason Munro made
no reference to Britain was his knowledge that what little
influence he possessed was largely confined to the Board of
Control, which had no right to interfere in purely
commercial matters. Although it might be argued that this
was a revenue matter, Dundas was engaged in trying to
conciliate the Court and might have referred the question to
them for their decision. Munro was aware that the Court
would not have taken kindly to a junior employee apparently
attempting to influence policy by going directly to the
Board of Control and so he made a point of using only the
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official channels of communication.
Munro's dispute with Dashwood was not the only reason for 
his lack of interest in land revenue affairs. He was certain 
that Read would not be permitted to continue to administer 
the revenues of the Baramahal beyond the first year and he 
shortly expected to be ordered to return to his regiment,
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his brief career as an assistant collector permanently over.
He informed his father that he and the other officers
expected to be removed from their posts no later than July
1794, 'in order to conform to the system which requires that
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civilians only should be collectors'. Had he not believed 
his post to be temporary, it is unlikely that Munro would 
have risked an argument with Dashwood, especially as he 
might have expected the latter to be supported by the 
powerful interests in Madras who, being extremely hostile to 
the employment of military collectors, would welcome the 
opportunity to show that the officers were interfering, to 
their detriment, in commercial affairs. By the end of 1793 
the situation was quite different. Read and his assistants . 
had been confirmed in their posts for at least another five 
years. Munro's active participation in the formulation of 
revenue policy can be clearly dated as having begun at this 
time .
The decision to try to continue to employ Read to manage the 
Baramahal seems to have been Cornwallis's. Read maintained a 
semi-official correspondence with the Governor-General, 
sending him copies of his more important correspondence with 
the Board of Revenue and private letters in which he 
explained his settlements. Cornwallis was extremely pleased 
with Read's administration, not least because it appeared to 
completely vindicate the decision he had taken in the face 
of stiff opposition to appoint a military administration. In 
December 1792 he informed Dundas of the success of his 
experiment. 'The ceded country on the Madras side' , he 
wrote, 'thanks I believe to my military collectors, turns
77
out much more productive than we expected'. Early in 1793, 
at about the time that Munro persuaded Read to solicit 
Cornwallis to allow him to remain in office, news reached 
India that the home authorities had accepted all his 
proposals. Cornwallis chose to regard this as a personal 
vote of confidence and clearly felt he could now ignore the 
considerations which had originally prompted him to grant 
Read such a temporary commission. No longer feeling himself 
threatened by the influence the Madras civilians might 
command in the Court of Directors, Cornwallis was disposed 
to favour Read's continued employment.
Munro, unaware that Cornwallis already intended to extend
Rea d' s  c o m m i s s i o n ,  tried to g e n e r a t e  i n t e r e s t  in B r i t a i n  for
the military collectors' case. His father had earlier
written to him asking for a comparative statement of the
c i v i l i a n  and m i l i t a r y  m od e s  of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in Madras.
Munr o, w h o  d o u b t e d  that A l e x a n d e r  M u n r o  c oul d have m u ch
influence with the home authorities, asked his father to
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tell him w h a t he i nt e n d e d  to do w i t h  such a st a t e m e n t .  He
was obviously anxious that there should be no repeat of the
u n f o r t u n a t e  p u b l i c a t i o n  of his le tt er in the n e w s p a p e r .  At
the same time however, knowing that his father had some
c o n t a c t  t h r o u g h  the S tu a rt s  w i t h  D u nd a s  and other
influential men, he did send what amount to a plea for
Read's continued employment and an indictment of the civil
c o l l e c t o r s .  'A G l a s g o w  s h o p k e e p e r ' ,  he told his father, 'is
just as well c a l c u l a t e d  for a c o l l e c t o r  as a M a d r a s
civilian, totally ignorant of the language of the country
79
and led by a d u b a s h  as they all are'. It seems cl e a r that
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Munro intended his letter for a wider audience than his 
immediate family.
A l e x a n d e r  M u n r o  sent e xt r a c t s  fr om  this and other letters in
w h i c h  his son had p r a i s e d  Read and a t t a c k e d  the civil
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a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to W i l l i a m  P u l t e n a y  M P . P u l t e n a y  was an
avowed friend of the private traders for whom Dundas also
had some sympathy, especially after his discovery that the
Court of Directors had deliberately misled him about the
clandestine trade that foreign private traders were carrying 
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on with India. The Court's determined resistance to all 
attempts to break the Company's monopoly of the trade with 
India had left Pultenay ill-disposed towards it and he was 
therefore happy to approach Dundas with Munro's letters 
which suggested the Company's territories were, by and 
large, maladministered. Dundas was himself unhappy with the 
Company's civil servants. He had discovered that the 
clandestine foreign trade relied for its chief support on 
the remission to Europe of the private fortunes of the 
Company's servants.
D u n d a s 's r ep l y  to P u l t e n a y  s h o w e d  that M u n r o ' s  a t t e m p t s  to
influence the home authorities had been unnecessary since
the Board had a l r e a d y  d e c i d e d  to a u t h o r i z e  C o r n w a l l i s  to
82
appoint Read to manage the Baramahal until 1799. It did 
however reveal to Munro that his father had access to men of 
considerable influence. 'I can come at Mr Dundas', wrote 
Alexander Munro. 'I can likewise come at some of the 
Directors. Lord Elphinstone got a copy of the extracts to 
send to his brother...who is a Director. So, when anything
occurs to you that you would wish should be seen by people
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in power, forward it to m e 1. The pattern of Munro's future 
efforts to influence policy and manipulate the
decision-making processes was formed now. Much of his future 
correspondence with Britain would be written with an eye to 
a wider readership among influential figures concerned with 
Indian affairs.
Secure in the knowledge that the Baramahal would be left in
his management for a further five years, Read began settling
the revenues with the quinquennial leases he had been
ordered to introduce by the Board of Revenue. However,
perhaps because he was aware that the report he had sent the
Board of Revenue in November 1792 had met with the home
authorities' complete approval and that his reputation in
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Britain was nearly unassailable, he chose to interpret his
orders in such a way as to allow him to introduce a system
of settlement that was significantly different to that which
the Board had sanctified. The Board had ordered Read to make
his settlements with the patels. Instead Read introduced a
system based on that which he had recommended to the Board 
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in June 1793. Individual settlements were made with the 
ryots, each of whom was given a patta signed by Read or one 
of the assistants which specified the rent he was to pay.
The manner in which Read's new system modified his first 
settlements is illustrated in diagram 4 (page 133). The work 
of the collectors and their kachahris was greatly increased 
insofar as they now entered into direct relations with the 
superior landholders or ryots of the villages with whom they
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agreed individual rents for the lands which these men
claimed rights in. The additional work that this involved
the collectors in forced Read to enlarge the revenue
establishment and extend the employment of Indian revenue
officials. The Baramahal was further sub-divided beneath the
assistant collectors into tahsils, each under the control of
an Indian tahsildar. These men, whom Munro described as
'mere receivers of the revenue', were responsible for the
collection of the rents from the villages, dealing directly
with the patels. The patels, in return for reduced rents on
their own lands, were still responsible for the overall
management of their villages and for collecting the rents
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agreed between the collectors and the ryots.
The introduction of this new system required that the 
collectors should possess detailed information of 
cultivation and average gross production. Without this it 
was clear that the collectors would be unable to ensure that 
all their settlements were consistent, that the level of 
assessment should not vary from village to village, from 
ryot to ryot. It was generally agreed throughout the Company 
that the principal criticism of the previous Indian revenue 
administrations had been their failure to establish clear, 
fixed criteria of assessment. It was believed that the 
Indian settlements had been arbitrary and that the 
consequent uncertainty had encouraged rackrenting and 
extortion, had depressed agricultural production and led to 
the emergence of a subsistence economy. Munro succinctly 
expressed the ideas prevalent among the British in a letter 
to his friend Captain Allan. 'The ceded districts', he
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wrote, 'are capable of great improvements. The first step
for the attainment of the object must be the settlement of
the leases at a moderate rent, for all attempts to better
their situation will be in vain as long as the land tax is
not only to high but arbitrary; let it be low and fixed and
it will be soon seen that the prosperity of the farmer will
extend to every source of revenue. By the lease every man
will become sole master of his own land.... The farmer, when
convinced he...is in reality the proprietor of his land and
that all the produce beyond the rent is his own, will begin
to exert himself and, where he now cultivates grain for a
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bare subsistence, will raise cotton and sugar-cane'.
Read decided that the only method open to the collectors to 
acquire the detailed information necessary for the 
introduction of standardized assessments was a field survey 
of the Baramahal. He expected to learn from the results of 
his survey the average yields of the different soils. This 
would then enable him to fix cash rents representing a 
predetermined proportion of the annual harvest to the 
different village lands. Once this was done, Read assumed 
that the actual settlements with the ryots would become a 
simple matter of agreeing with them which fields were to be 
cultivated, both parties knowing in advance the revenue 
commitments possession of these lands would involve.
In common with Cornwallis and the majority of the British in 
India, Read was extremely suspicious of the Indian officials 
he was forced to employ. However, unlike many of the 
Company's servants, he recognized that it was impossible to
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exclude them from the administration. 'It may be observed',
he wrote, 'that however desirous collectors and their
assistants may be of inspecting and directing all the
business of their departments, they are...under the
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necessity of depending on natives'. He also believed that,
however successful the survey might be, its purposes might
be defeated by the intrigues of administration's own Indian
employees. He imagine this danger to be accentuated by the
fact that all the revenue accountants in the Baramahal were
Brahmins who, linked together by religion and common
interests, could easily form collusions to defraud the 
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state.
Read made two suggestions for controlling this problem. His
first solution was to keep the kachahri accounts in three
languages - Kanarese, Urdu and Mahratti - which he assumed
would prevent his Indian officers from so easily concealing
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illegal activities. His second solution was that the Company
should create a 'middle rank' of revenue servants from among
the European orphans in Madras, a proposal that the Board
sanctioned in August 1794 when they sent him eight to be 
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trained. A consideration of the solution Read did not 
propose, that of the introduction of an independent 
judiciary, is as rewarding as that of those he did suggest. 
It seems clear that Read believed that the introduction of 
courts would not prevent the different classes of Indians 
from oppressing those below them because he did not think 
that the society was sufficiently advanced so to regulate 
itself. He informed the Board of Revenue that the Indians 
were too 'timid, inert and depraved from having always acted
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u n d e r  inju st ic e' to take a d v a n t a g e  of a p r o p e r l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  
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judicial system. He insisted that the administration of 
justice should remain the responsibility of the collectors 
who, able to dispense with 'formalities, restrictions, 
obligations and fees', might keep everything 'perfectly 
s imp 1e '.
D u r i n g  the next three years R ea d  and his a s s i s t a n t s  were  
left free to m a n a g e  the r e v e n u e s  of the B a r a m a h a l  as they 
t h o u g h t  fit. The G o v e r n m e n t  of M a d r a s  and the Bo ar d of 
R e v e n u e  w e r e  too p r e o c c u p i e d  w i t h  ot her p r o b l e m s  to d ev o t e  
any se r i o u s  a t t e n t i o n  to R e a d' s  a c t i v i t i e s  and, as long as 
he r a i s e d  the r e v e n u e s  of his d i s t r i c t ,  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
was c o n t e n t  to d e l e g a t e  its role in the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
pr o c e s s  its co ll e c to r .
In August 1792, Dundas had decided to nominate John Shore as 
Cornwallis's successor to the office of Governor-General. He 
and Pitt had been impressed by Shore's grasp of revenue 
matters, believed that his lifetime habit of obedience would 
ensure his co-operation and hoped his appointment would 
convince the British political world that harmony existed 
between the Board and Court. The appointment had been 
welcomed by the Directors who, probably because of the sense 
of security it gave them to know that their employees rather 
than men over whom they felt they had little authority 
filled the highest posts in India, had been unhappy about 
the trend away from the custom of nominating their civil 
servants to these offices. In May 1793, Dundas had decided 
to offer Lord Robert Hobart, the Secretary for Ireland, the
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v a c a n t  G o v e r n o r s h i p  of Ma dr as .  On C o r n w a l l i s ' s  advice, it 
had b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  to H o b a r t  that he w o u l d  e v e n t u a l l y  
s u c c e e d  Shore as G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l .
John Shore had succeeded Cornwallis on 28 October 1793 and, 
a year later on 7 September 1794, Hobart had arrived at 
Madras to assume his office. Almost immediately Hobart began 
impatiently manoeuvring for Shore's post. There can be no 
question but that Hobart was extremely ambitious and saw 
India as a spring-board to a career in British politics. In 
addition, he appears to have believed that Shore's 
appointment had only been a temporary measure. In April 
1795, he wrote to his friend John Bristow, President of the. 
Bengal Board of Trade and Member of Council, asking him to
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send any i n f o r m a t i o n  he m i g h t  have a bo u t  Sho r e' s in t en ti on s.
Bristow unfortunately initially confirmed Hobart's belief
that S ho re w o u l d  not r e m a i n  in India b e y o n d  the n ex t  season.
Th er e  is some e v i d e n c e  to s u gg e s t that this a c c u r a t e l y
reflected Shore's plans at the time. He had been ill for
some time and he m i s s e d  his wife. The C o u r t  of D i r e c t o r s
was, however, determined to try to persuade him to remain in
Bengal. They took a great deal of trouble to send his wife,
accompanied by her two brothers, out to join him. After her
arrival at Calcutta, Shore revised his plans. Under pressure
from his wife, he decided to remain in India until he had
gathered a fortune for himself and provided for his 
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brothers-in-law.
As soon as it b e c a m e  cl ear to H o b a r t  that he w o u l d  not be 
i m m e d i a t e l y  m o v i n g  to C a l c u tt a ,  he b e c a m e  d e e p l y  e m b i t t e r e d .
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He felt that Dundas and the Court of Directors had
deliberately misled him and that Shore had assisted in the
deception. The relationship between Hobart and Shore, which
had opened cordially when the Governor-General had welcomed
Hobart's proposal that they initiate a private
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correspondence, rapidly deteriorated. In August 1795, Hobart 
accused Shore of failing in his duties as the head of the 
Supreme Government, claiming that he nursed a regional bias 
in favour of Bengal when his position demanded the
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consideration the interests of British India as a whole. He
was bitter about a letter Shore had sent to the home
authorities in which he had suggested that Hobart had been
in breach of the 1786 Act of Parliament and resented the
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revocation of two of his appointments. He wrote to Bristow
of 'the known disposition of the Supreme Government to
withhold their support from me wherever the case can
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possibly admit it'.
Bristow tried to keep the peace between the two men. He
begged Hobart not to resign if Shore remained in India
longer than expected and produced a number of ingenious
arguments to bear on the disgruntled Governor. He suggested
that, whatever problems Hobart might be facing in India,
they were nothing compared to those he would be facing were 
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he in Britain. Flattering him that, were he in England he 
must be in the Ministry, he observed that present 
discontent, the war with France and the rising national debt 
must threaten all the members of the government with loss of 
office and disgrace. He assured Hobart that, by remaining at 
Madras for the duration, he might hope to return to Britain
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with his political reputation intact and to profit by this.
Some of his arguments were more confused. On the one hand,
he promised Hobart that the Governor-Generalship was worth
waiting for, telling him that Cornwallis had not only gained
1i
his title through holding it but also a fortune of £300,000.
On the other hand, he a ss u r e d  H ob a r t  that the p a t r o n a g e
a v a i l a b l e  to the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  in Be n g a l  was a c t u a l l y
less than that available to the Governor of Madras. 'The
p a t r o n a g e  of the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l ' ,  he wrote , 'is e x t r e m e l y
limited...so much so that Sir John Shore, in place of
attempting to provide for a natural son whom he has in this
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country, has set him up in an indigo manufacture'.
From 1795, Hobart's attention, and therefore that of the 
Council, was a good deal devoted to his disputes with Shore. 
A major dispute with General Harris, the Commander-in-Chief, 
also directed Hobart's attention away from the detail.of 
daily government in Madras. Cornwallis had proposed placing 
all military patronage in the hands of the
C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f .  A l t h o u g h  the C o u n c i l s  w o u l d  be r e m a i n
responsible for appointments, they were to be bound to
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follow the recommendations of the Commander. The Madras 
Government, under the influence of the deeply entrenched 
suspicion of the military that had so long held sway among 
the civilians, opposed this plan. Hobart, who was clearly 
interested in exercising as much patronage as he could 
obtain, supported the civilians. He told Dundas that he 
feared that so much patronage must necessarily raise the 
Commander-in-Chief 'so much above the civil administration 
as to make it impossible for him to be looked upon in any
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other light than as the head of the British Empire in
India'. Were 'a man of intrigue and address' to fill the
post he might use this patronage to 'substantially assume
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the authority of government, civil and military'. General 
Harris deeply resented what he considered Hobart's 
interference in military matters and a significant division 
appeared in the Council.
The internal squabbles of the Madras Government and the 
bitter arguments that raged between the chief executives of 
the two presidencies were not the only reasons why the 
Madras Government paid so little attention to and exercised 
so little supervision over Read's settlements and his 
administration of the Baramahal. The Board of Revenue was 
fully occupied with two other matters, the replacement of 
the Chiefs and Councils with collectors and the introduction 
of a new judicial administration in the Company's older 
territories.
By late 1794 the home authorities had enthusiastically 
embraced the principles of the new revenue and judicial 
systems that Cornwallis had introduced into Bengal. They had 
been particularly impressed by the manner in which the 
Governor-General had separated the two systems by 
transferring the collectors' judicial functions to a 
different set of officers, not least because, in so doing, 
they imagined he had discovered a successful solution to a 
problem which had been the subject of controversy within the 
Company for some time.
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In 1785 Stuart, a member of the Bengal Council, had
delivered a minute in which he argued that Hastings's remedy
to the perceived problem of the collectors' despotic power,
a centralized concentration of all authority in the
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Government, had failed. He had made out a strong case for
the reinstatement of European collectors and had submitted a
detailed plan which proposed the union of the judicial and
revenue functions of local government in their office. Three
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years earlier John Shore had made a similar proposal. He had 
argued that the combination of functions in the same 
official was what the Indians expected, accustomed as they 
were to despotic authority and used to looking to a single 
master. He also stated that, in his opinion, it would be 
impossible to draw a line between the two jurisdictions 
without introducing collisions of authority which must be 
detrimental to both. Sir John Macpherson had agreed in 
principle with both men but had remained, like many in the 
Company, especially in Britain, doubtful whether the time 
had yet come when the Government might vest its employees 
with such unchecked authority.
The Court of Directors had examined the problem and, after
considerable deliberation, concluded in favour of combining
revenue and judicial authority in the office of collector.
They gave two reasons for their decision. They argued on the
one hand that it accorded with the 'subsisting manners and
usages of the peop le', and on the other that it would be the
most economic and efficient solution to the problems of
106
administering both functions of government. They believed 
that, once the collectors were relieved of the details of
143
revenue business by the introduction of permanent
settlements, they would have ample time to devote attention
to judicial matters. In consequence of this decision, the
instructions Cornwallis had taken with him to India in 1786
had authorized him to reinstate the European collectors in
the districts after vesting them with the special duty of
supervising the administration of civil and criminal
justice. In the course of 1787, Cornwallis promulgated
regulations which gave the collectors magisterial
jurisdiction and which, though they made a distinction
between the revenue and civil courts, ordered the collectors
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to preside over both.
From the start Cornwallis had been unhappy with this system. 
He was steeped in the traditions of English jurisprudence 
which had its emphasis on the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary. He was personally convinced 
of the importance to be placed on the impartial 
administration of justice which he believed was the only 
sure means of guaranteeing to the Company's subjects 
security of person and property. This was, for him, the 
chief aim of civilized government upon the success of which 
depended the happiness and prosperity of the people. In 
consequence he regarded the concentration of executive 
authority in the collectors as a menace to the liberty of 
the Company's subjects. 'The Collector', he wrote in 1793, 
'unites in his own person the high power of judge in all 
matters of property, of magistrate and of receiver of the 
revenue; he is the channel of the information upon which 
Government forms its determination of the revenue to be
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as3essed...and through which it communicates with its
subjects.... Such power vested in an individual and at a
great distance from the seat of supreme control excites
terror in the minds of the people instead of inspiring them
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with confidence in its protection'. In addition, Cornwallis 
believed that there was serious danger that the collectors 
would, acting in their capacity as judges, find themselves 
hearing suits to which they were a party. He was also 
significantly influenced by the prevalent political theory 
that advocated the separation of powers, the theory so 
succinctly expressed by Montesquieu and which had had, only 
four years earlier, such an impact on the authors of the 
American Constitution.
In 1792, Ross had informed Read of Cornwallis's ideas for
restructuring the system. 'The duties of the administration
of justice', he wrote, 'are to be entirely separated from
those of the collection of revenue, making the offices of
judges by far the most important, both in emolument and 
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station'. A year later Cornwallis had reorganized the 
revenue and judicial arrangements for the administration of 
Bengal along these lines. He had introduced a hierarchy of 
courts, presided over by judges drawn from amongst the 
European covenanted servants of the Company, and invested 
these with the responsibility for administering civil and 
criminal justice. The revenue courts had been abolished and 
all revenue cases made cognizable by the newly appointed 
judges. It is illustrative of the relative status which 
Cornwallis assigned to the judges and collectors that he 
suggested the existing collectors might be appointed zillah
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judges while their assistants succeeded to the vacated 
110
revenue posts.
The widespread acceptance of Cornwallis's arguments in 
support of his ideas together with the general excitement 
which accompanied their introduction into Bengal, which was 
seen as marking a significant development in the 
administration of British India, encouraged civil servants 
throughout the sub-continent to examine whether they might 
not be introduced in the other presidencies. Had they been 
aware of it, Dundas's whole hearted support for Cornwallis's 
systems would have undoubtedly further encouraged them.
Dundas did more than approve Cornwallis's arrangements for 
Bengal and ensure the Court's authorization of them. He 
actively identified himself with them to the point that, in 
1796, he wrote to Hobart; ' I do not scruple to say. that I 
feel my own reputation involved in the introduction of these 
regulations'. The only concession that he made to the 
Directors, who were less convinced that Cornwallis's 
arrangements might be immediately introduced in territories 
less developed than those of the Bengal Presidency, was to 
agree that the revenues should be permanently settled before 
an independent British judiciary be established. He accepted 
that the examples of the Bengal collectors and of Read in 
the Baramahal clearly showed that the first step towards 
this goal must be the replacement of the Chiefs and Councils 
in the Madras territories with collectors. Unlike the 
Provincial Councils, who had proved themselves very 
inefficient and invariably operated through Indian officials
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and dubashes, he believed that collectors could be expected 
to uncover the information required before some sort of 
permanent settlement of the revenues might be at temp ted.
Before Hobart had left Britain, Dundas showed him a draft 
despatch that the Board had sent the Court in which the
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abolition of the Chiefs and Councils of Madras was ordered.
Just one month after his arrival, Hobart issued on 15
November a proclamation ordering the replacement of the
113
Provincial Councils by collectors. Shore fully approved of
Hobart's action. 'I cannot but express my hearty approbation
of the substitution of collectors for provincial Councils',
he wrote, 'having had repeated and personal experience of
114
the inadequacy of their corporate establishment'. In the
ensuing correspondence, the ideas which were influencing the
two chief executives clearly emerged. Shore favoured a
gradual introduction of Cornwallis's systems into Madras,
believing that, until sufficient information about the
territories had been gathered, no attempt should be made to
form zamindari settlements. 'I should recommend', wrote
Shore, 'the collections of the revenue to be made amany,
that is by the collectors immediately from the landholders
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or occupants of the soil'. He also opposed the introduction
of Cornwallis's judicial arrangements before the permanent
settlement of the revenues, recommending Hobart to follow
the regulations introduced into Bengal in 1787 rather than
those of 1793, which had removed the collectors' judicial
powers. Hobart, while largely in agreement with Shore,
favoured a system of village leases rather than settlements
116
with individual ryots.
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Dundas was less cautious and more impatient to see
Cornwallis's systems extended beyond the boundaries of
Bengal. He wrote to Hobart, urging him to introduce these
117
into Madras as soon as possible. In the summer of 1795 the
Revenue Despatch, which he had shown a draft of to Hobart,
118
arrived at Madras. In it the Court announced that the home
authorities were convinced that the Bengal revenue and
judicial arrangements were the best in India and that they
wished to see similar arrangements introduced into the
Company's other possessions. The Government of Madras
replied that, though it too considered the Cornwallis's
arrangements the best that could be devised, it believed it
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was necessary for these to be gradually introduced. It 
observed that Cornwallis had not introduced his systems 
until others had been experimented with and that 
consequently there had been a relatively slow transfer of 
the judicial authority from Indian to European officials 
which had given the indigenous population time to become 
acclimatized. The Government argued that a similar period of 
I adjustment would be required in Madras.
I
During the next three years, the Board of Revenue was 
preoccupied by the problems posed by the changes that the 
decision to introduce collectors and an independent 
judiciary had given rise to. There were the problems of 
finding suitably qualified civil servants to fill the office 
of collector since few of the Company's employees in Madras 
had any revenue experience and almost none of them had any
Il
I command of the Indian languages, knowledge of which was
!
considered essential. There were also other difficulties. It
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was c o n s i d e r e d  i m p e r a t i v e  that the e x i s t i n g  za m i n d a r s  and 
p o l i g a r s  sh o u ld  be d i v e s t e d  of the j u d i c i a l  a u t h o r i t y  they 
had h i t h e r t o  e x e r c i s e d  and that they sh ou ld  be c o m p e l l e d  to 
d i s b a n d  their p r i v a t e  fo rc es  of a r me d  r e t a i n e r s .  A t t e m p t s  to 
do this me t wi t h c o n s i d e r a b l e  op p o s i t i o n .  Ther e is also 
s u b s t a n t i a l  e v i d e n c e  to s u g g e s t  that the for m e r In di an  
r e v e n u e  agents, wh o w e re  now  b e i n g  r e p l a c e d  by the 
c o l l ec t o rs '  k a c h a h r i  of fi ci a l s,  we r e d e l i b e r a t e l y  . fomenting 
o p p o s i t i o n  to new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s .
In a d d i t i o n  to the B oa rd of R e v e n u e ' s  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  the
othe r d i s t r i c t s  of M adr as,  the g e n e r a l  a p p r o v a l  and su p p o r t
Re ad was r e c e i v i n g  fr o m the G o v e r n m e n t  and the C o u r t
p e r s u a d e d  the Board  to a l l o w  him to a d m i n i s t e r  the B a r a m a h a l
lar ge l y u n s u p e r v i s e d  as long as he d e l i v e r e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y
high r e ve n u es .  The C ou r t  had i n f o r m e d  the G o v e r n m e n t  in
their revenue despatch of May 1794 that it was delighted
w i t h  Read's w o r k  and Ho ba rt , to w h o m  Read and his a s s i s t a n t s
had be en  e s p e c i a l l y  r e c o m m e n d e d  by C o r n w a l l i s ,  a p p e a r s  to
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have been p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t e d  and i m p r e s s e d  by them.
Between the 1796 and 1798, Read and his assistants 
introduced into the Baramahal a new system of revenue 
management that was to become known as the ryotwari system. 
By the middle of 1795, Read had come to the conclusion that 
lease settlements were impractical in the district because 
the share of the produce taken by the state was too large.
In his op inion, there w o u l d  have  to be a s u b s t a n t i a l  
r e d u c t i o n  in the a s s e s s m e n t s  if lease s e t t l e m e n t s  wer e to be 
s u c c es s f u l.  As long as the stat e c o n t i n u e d  to d e m a n d  a large
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share of the gross produce, there was, Read believed,
'nothing left to the cultivators from which might be created
the capital absolutely necessary for a strict adherence to
121
such engagements'. He was certain that neither the Madras
Government nor the home authorities would authorize him to
substantially reduce the rates of assessment and it was
therefore necessary to abandon the leases. In a circular
that he issued in December 1796, Read outlined the rules for
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making quite different revenue settlements. In place of the 
idea of leases by which tenants agreed to pay the revenue of 
a particular area for a set number of years, these rules 
made provision for 'annual tenants' who were to be required 
to enter into obligations for a single year and only for the 
fields they themselves cultivated. At the same time, they 
were to be allowed to occupy the same fields in the 
following years for as long as they continued to pay the 
established rents for them. The essential feature of the new 
scheme was the manner in which it left the ryots free to 
'extend or reduce their farms, according to their 
circumstances, by retaining or rejecting certain fields, as 
they (chose) from year to year'.
Read decided to link his new scheme with the work that he 
and his assistants had done in surveying the district. His 
idea was that the assessment of every individual field 
should now be fixed permanently. He believed that the 
decision to do this would have two immediate beneficial 
consequences. Firstly, he assumed that this would greatly 
simplify the business of making the settlements since it 
would only be necessary for the collectors to ascertain
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which lands the ryots would be occupying for them to enter 
the year's revenue demand on the pattas. Secondly, he 
believed it would encourage the ryots to make improvements. 
By permanently fixing the state's demands on the land, 
irrespective of the actual increases in its productivity, he 
imagined that the ryots would perceive the advantages of 
investing capital in irrigation works and other long term 
projects.
Initially Munro opposed Read's annual leases. In his 
opinion, the ryots would not be encouraged to make 
improvements to the land until they were assured that their 
investments offered a significant opportunity to increase 
their capital. Munro believed that this would only occur 
after the emergence of land as a saleable commodity. He 
thought that Read's system would discourage such a 
development in the agricultural economy because it did not 
provide sufficient security of tenure. It is clear that 
Munro had already conceived the idea that it was the duty of 
the British to encourage the development of an extensive 
class of independent yeoman farmers. Such men, he believed, 
would not only provide a large market whose existence would 
encourage the development of the manufacturing and 
commercial sectors of the economy, but would also change the 
patterns of agriculture away from a subsistence based 
economy towards one increasingly cash crop orientated. Munro 
was convinced that such developments would not only increase 
the value and range of the Company's exports to Europe but 
would also greatly extend the market in India for British 
imports. Munro analysed the Company's failure to market
151
European goods in India as the consequence of both the
poverty of the Indians and a fear on the part of the
landholders of being thought rich and of consequently having
123
their rents raised. In his opinion both problems might only
be solved by investing the ryots with long leases or the
permanent ownership of their lands. Of the two, he
personally thought it would be better to grant them full
possession of their lands but recognized that other
considerations might not permit this. ’If we look only to
the security of our power in this country’, he wrote, 'it
would probably be wiser to keep the lands as they now are ,
in the possession of Government...than to make them over
forever because there is reason to fear that such a property
might beget a spirit of independence which may one day prove
124
dangerous to our authority'.
During the next two years, Munro substantially changed his
opinions. In 1796, he had expressed fears that the provision
for annual changes would discourage long tenures, writing
that 'the farmers will prefer annual leases... because they
give them the same security and advantages without hindering
them from throwing up their lands whenever they can get a
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better bargain elsewhere'. By 1797, he had observed that 
this was not occurring. He now believed that 'the ryots, 
having changed every field that they wish to get rid of and 
having chosen such as they like, will consider their farms 
as inalienable property and will begin in earnest to improve 
them with their whole means; revenue will be permanent.... 
All the effects of a lease will thus be naturally produced, 
though under a different name, and the system is so simple
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and the rules so few that it may be easily managed by any
collector who bestows on it the most common degree of 
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attention'. More importantly, Munro believed that the
ryotwari settlements were encouraging changes in the
structure of the agricultural economy which he approved of.
It appeared to be assisting men who had always worked as
labourers to take up land on their own account and he
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imagined that a class of yeoman farmers was emerging. He
wrote approvingly of this development which he believed was
creating 'a crowd of men of small but of independent
property who, when they are certain that they will
themselves enjoy the benefits of every extraordinary
exertion of labour, work with a spirit of activity which
would in vain be expected from the tenants or servants of
great landholders. If the expenses of collection be somewhat
increased by the smallness of farms, it is amply repaid by
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the augmentation of revenue1.
It seems clear that M u n r o 1s eventual enthusiastic adoption
of ryotwari was largely the consequence of his conviction
that it would permit, even assist, the gradual emergence of
a new socio-economic structure in India, composed of 'all
the various graduations of rich and poor proprietors, large
129
and small farms'. He saw the day coming when 'every man who 
does not chose to serve another (may) set up for himself' 
and he applauded this, believing that such a development 
must give 'the fairest chance and the widest scope...to the 
progress of industry and population'.
Munro seems to have recognized and applauded the fact that
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ryotwari settlements were radically disrupting the long 
established structure of agrarian society, were serving as a 
catalyst for social change. The manner in which they were 
doing this is illustrated in diagram 5 (page 154)- The poorer 
ryots, no longer protected by the buffer of communal village 
settlements, were losing their lands and being forced to 
work as labourers. At the same time, men who had 
traditionally worked as labourers or farmed as the 
sub-tenants of the ryots were now able to rent lands on 
equal terms with those who had been the superior 
landholders. Agrarian society was becoming fluid. Another 
development was also taking place concurrent with this. The 
role that the patels were being asked to play in the 
administration and collection of the revenues as 
quasi-officia1s of the state was subtly changing the 
position of the villages in society. From having been 
autonomous, to some extent self-sufficient, units which 
negogiated with the central authority, the villages were 
becoming administrative units. The patels, once the 
representatives of their village communities, drawing their 
authority from the superior landholders, were now slowly 
emerging as representatives of the state, to whom they 
looked for their support.
While Read and his three military assistants were 
introducing ryotwari settlements into the Baramahal and 
laying the foundations of what was to become known as the 
Ryotwari or Munro System, opposition, both to them 
personally and to the new order many civil servants 
perceived to be emerging in the Company's bureaucracy, began
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threatening to undermine their position. As early as 1794,
Cockburn at the Board of Revenue had written to Munro of a
division appearing in the Company's ranks between those men
he designated as belonging to 'the old school of commercial
government' and the rising class of civil servants who
regarded themselves as the servants of an imperial power, as
administrators with duties and responsibilities to both the
130
Company and the country.
It is impossible to precisely describe the ideas and 
policies of these two parties in Madras since they did not 
emerge as organized factions with distinctive philosophies 
but as loose groupings of men subscribing to somewhat vague, 
general views. On the one hand, the 'old school' was largely 
composed of the older civil servants who tended to support 
the traditional policies of the Court, opposing what they 
saw as the interference of the Board of Control. Regarding 
the Company's role in India as primarily commercial and 
evaluating its performance in terms of public and private 
profit, they were not interested in further British 
expansion nor concerned with the internal state of India so 
long as the situation was sufficiently stable to allow the 
collection of the revenues and uninterrupted trading. By and 
large, these men took little interest in the country they 
were called to administer, rarely learning the languages and 
relying upon Indian agents and dubashes to conduct their 
public business. On the other hand, the men who loosely 
composed the 'new school' of thought tended to think in 
terms of empire, to support the concept of Parliament's 
ultimate responsibility and authority in India, and to see
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themselves as representatives of Britain. They were, on the 
whole, critical of men who placed their private interests 
before those of the state, quick to make accusations of 
corruption and inefficiency, and more likely to insist that 
qualifications should be the principal criteria of 
appointments. This was not entirely the consequence of 
greater altruism on their part since these men tended to be 
found amongst the younger employees who, unlike their 
rivals, had still to make their careers.
The differences between these two loose factions within the 
Company were to some extent most clearly defined by their 
attitudes towards two questions of policy facing the British 
- how was the Company to treat the local Indian rulers whose 
political functions in society it was assuming and what was 
to be done about the debts these men had contracted with 
Europeans in the period before these engagements were 
forbidden. While members of the 'old school' tended to 
support the claims of the displaced petty Indian chiefs to 
be regarded as the established aristocracy with whom 
engagements should be made, their opponents were more likely 
to argue that the British had the right to restructure 
society to suit British requirements. With regard to the 
debts of the Indian princes, the 'old school' argued that 
these should be considered as public commitments to be 
honoured by whomsoever collected the revenues. The members 
of the 'new school' were far more likely to consider these 
to be largely fraudulent and to argue that, even should they 
be genuine, they must be treated as private debts which 
should not pass to the Company when it assumed control of
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the revenues against which these debts had been contracted.
By the end of 1797, developments had brought this division 
in the British administration of Madras to the fore. Shortly 
after the Court had approved the actions H obart’s Government 
had taken to abolish the Chiefs and Councils, it had ordered 
the introduction of regulations which threatened the future 
careers of many of the men who had been employed under the 
old system. In October 1797, the Court ordered that no civil 
servant was to be considered eligible for the post of 
collector unless he could prove himself capable of
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transacting business without the aid of interpreters. 
Inspired by the example of Read and his assistants, the 
Court stated that, should the Government find there was an 
insufficient number of linguistically qualified civil 
servants to fill all the posts, the Company's military 
officers might be employed in the Revenue Department. The 
Company's older civil servants, the men who had been 
employed on the provincial councils and whose training and 
experiences had left them unable to cope with the new 
demands of the administration, now feared that they would be 
passed over in favour of younger men and military employees. 
It was natural that they should utilize the existing 
animosity amongst the civilians towards the army to attack 
Read and his assistants who seemed to represent the most 
obvious threat to the interests of the civil service.
It quickly became clear however that, because Read 
personally had the support of the Government, direct attacks 
on his administration were unlikely to be successful. This
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did not prevent Munro from playing upon Read's knowledge of
the civil servants' hostility when he wanted to alter his
superior's decisions. When Munro objected to Read giving
Hurdis, a civil assistant, judicial jurisdiction in all the
districts of the Baramahal, he first stated his arguments
against the policy and then used the fact that they were
both officers under attack to try to influence his decision.
'Were I a civil assistant', he wrote, ' I should certainly
make a public remonstrance on the subject but, as a military
man, it would be extremely ill-judged because we should
obtain no redress. It would be falsely construed as arising
from the jealousy of civil influence; it would be turned
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against us by all who wished our removal'. The sudden switch 
from the first person singular to the all-embracing 'we' was 
s ignif icant.
The disgruntled civilians turned their attention to .the
Government itself and began to employ the hostility Hobart's
attempts to assume the control of the civil administration
of the Nawab's and the Raja of Tanjore's territories had
generated amongst their European creditors to try to
undermine his authority. Before Hobart had left Britain, he
had spoken with Cornwallis who had expressed the opinion
that the Company should take possession of the Carnatic.
Shortly after his arrival in Madras, Hobart had written to
inform Cornwallis that he considered this object 'of the
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utmost importance to the interests of the Company'. The 
death of Mohammed Ali gave Hobart an opportunity to attempt 
this. Unfortunately the new n a w a b , Obut ul Omrah, refused to 
comply and appealed to the agreement that his predecessor
had reached with Cornwallis in 1792. This treaty placed the
management of the Carnatic under the the nawab in times of
peace, under the Company in times of war. Faced with the
nawab's refusal to cooperate, Hobart announced his intention
to seize Tinnevelly in order to use the district's revenues
to liquidate the nawab's debts and he demanded the surrender
of the Carnatic forts. The dispute was referred to Shore who
rejected Hobart's arguments that the demands of humanity and
expediency justified his actions and insisted that the
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treaty be upheld. He used his position as Governor-General 
to prevent Hobart from proceeding until the matter had been 
settled by the home authorities, claiming that the 
Governor's actions had constituted an unjust invasion of the 
nawab's rights. While they waited for the Court's orders, 
another dispute developed between Shore and Hobart over the 
latter's treatment of the rajah of Tanjore. Hobart had 
managed to persuade the rajah to surrendered mortgaged 
territory to the Company. Shore, to some extent acting under 
the influence of Hobart's opponents in Madras, decided that 
the rajah had been dragooned into accepting the new 
situation and again insisted that the matter be referred 
back to Britain.
While the disputes between Hobart and Shore developed, a 
distinct alliance of interconnected interests strongly 
opposed to the Madras Government emerged. An analysis of 
this alliance shows it to have been composed of a number of 
groups. There were the disgruntled civil servants who 
believed that the recent reforms and the employment of 
military collectors were threatening their careers. This
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group was joined by the men who, as creditors of the Nawab
and the Raja of Tanjore, believed that Hobart's activities
threatened their financial interests. Also supporting the
civil servants were the Europeans who had previously been
permitted to act as revenue farmers and to rent lands for
large scale agricultural projects such as indigo and cotton
cultivation. These men had been angered by the Government's
decision in 1796 to refuse to allow these activities to 
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continue. In certain cases, such as those of Roebuck and
Abbott, the interests of these men extended to every
category of the opposition and there is evidence to suggest
that their actions were solely inspired by considerations of
personal profit. While not intriguing against the Governor,
Abbott and Roebuck were engaged in trying to get the salary
of the Principal Officer of the Madras Recorder's Court
increased because Abbott's son was the present holder's
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assistant and expected to succeed him soon.
Initially Hobart's opponents appeared unlikely to achieve 
their aim of bringing about his removal. Despite a 
remarkable similarity to the situation under Macartney when 
pressure from the Arcot creditors had forced Hastings to 
cancel the Nawab's assignment of the Carnatic revenues to 
the Company, there were also significant differences. Then 
Laurence Sulivan, Chairman of the Court, had been determined 
to support the Governor-General and Dundas had been 
committed to the creditors' cause. This combination of Court 
and Board, that had then forced’M a c a rtney's resignation, 
seemed, at first, unlikely to reoccur. While Hobart's 
opponents had considerable support in the Court, there was
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no evidence they might expect a sympathetic hearing from the
Board. In August 1796, John Sullivan informed Hobart that he
had spent some time with Dundas and Pitt in Wimbledon where
he had learnt that they favoured his policies, particularly
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those towards the Nawab and the Raja of Tanjore. The
situation, however, changed rapidly during the next six
months as opposition to Dundas amongst the Directors grew
and his ability to control the Court declined. His principal
supporter, David Scott, was due to go out of the Direction
by rotation in April. The Directors meanwhile were
threatening to recommit for discussion the question of the
payment of the Arcot creditors. Dundas could not have
welcomed the possibility of a further investigation of this
question since the evidence afforded by the Board's handling
of the debts in 1784/5 supports the view that Pitt, through
the agency of Dundas, Atkinson, Macpherson and Call, had
received political support from the Arcot interest and that
Dundas had in return promised to procure a settlement of the
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creditors' claims without investigation.
Although Dundas gave Hobart's disputes with Shore and the
unrest in the Bengal army, which Shore reported to be on the
verge of mutiny, as the grounds for his decision to have 
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Hobart recalled, considerations of political expediency
probably had a greater influence. Dundas could not have
forgotten the attacks Burke and Fox had made on the Ministry
in 1785. Paul Benfield was still a member of Parliament and
74 other members of the East India interest had been
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returned in the general election of 1796. There appears to 
be no other logical explanation for Dundas's sudden about
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turn on Hobart's handling of the Nawab and the Raja, which
he now gave to David Scott as his principal grounds for
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recalling the Governor. The importance he placed on the 
Court granting Hobart a good pension on his return suggests 
that Dundas felt the need to salve his conscience with 
regard to the entire affair.
The Court informed the Board on 15 March that it would
recall Hobart and that it intended to vote him a good 
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pension. On the same day, Scott told Dundas that he was
being misled since the Court, probably under the influence
of the more vindictive of Hobart's opponents, had already
decided not to be generous and would vote only £1500, £500
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less than Dundas had suggested. Initially the entire
business was concealed from the public. On 1 July, the
L ondon Chronicle informed its readers that 'the Court of
Directors of the East India Company have appointed the Rt
Hon Lord Mornington to succeed Lord Hobart in the Government
of Madras and eventually that of Bengal'. Hobart himself
received no news of what was happening until copies of this
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paper reached India in November. At first he could not
believe that he would not succeed Shore, being convinced
that Dundas intended Mornington to serve an apprenticeship
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in Madras while he, Hobart, served as Governor-General. It
was not until January 1798 that he was definitely informed
146
that Mornington would succeed Shore.
Read's assistants clearly feared that the political climate 
in Madras was becoming distinctly unfavourable to them and 
that their futures were threatened. In February 1797, Munro
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had written to his father that 'the present members of the
Board (of Revenue) are the only friends we have except Lord 
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Hobart'. He told him that, together with Macleod and Graham,
he was planning to make an application for an increased
salary. He explained why they intended to do this. 'The
military assistants have another object in view besides
salary. They wish, by introducing a discussion about it, to
get the Revenue Board to mention their services in such
terms as may show Government that it is their desire that
they should succeed to their present stations as principals
on Read's going home'. It appears that Read's assistants
wanted to be confirmed in their offices before the Board
discovered that, as a consequence of the ryotwari
settlements which had been introduced without its
permission, the jama or total demand for revenue had dropped
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by 54,000 pagodas on the previous year.
Read, who had at last decided to retire, shared his
assistants' anxiety about their futures. In a letter sent to
Hobart before he left Madras, Read wrote that 'the military
collectors, being justly viewed by the gentlemen of the
Civil Line as detrimental to their prospects, there appears
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a chance of their removal when I resign'. He begged Hobart
to use what influence he possessed in Britain to try to
prevent this on his return to England. In his reply, Hobart
recognized that Read's fears were justified but regretted
150
there was little he might do. A minute of the Board of 
Revenue in September confirmed the military collectors' 
fears that, with Hobart's departure, their opponents' 
position had been considerably strengthened. The Board
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recorded that they had 'understood that the jummah fixed for
1204 (1794-5) was to be considered in force until a survey
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of the lands was made'. They observed that only now had they 
learnt that the lease system 'had been relinquished for 
another plan of annual settlement' which, having been 
introduced without permission, they disapproved of. They 
called for a prompt and minute explanation for the change 
which had apparently resulted in such a loss of revenue. The 
long period of freedom from supervision that Read and his 
assistants had enjoyed was to end.
In May 1799, before Read had given the explanation demanded 
of him, the Company was at war with Tipu again and he and 
his assistants recalled to military duties.
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Chap ter F our
The Emergence of Munro;
Munro in Kanara, 1799-1800.
Although Munro almost certainly had no idea that Hobart's 
recall and Wellesley's arrival in India would do anything 
other than adversely affect his prospects, these two events 
were in fact to mark the second major turning point in his 
career. The British were about to enter another period of 
expansion in the south of India and Munro, who had hitherto 
been only an assistant to a military officer with a 
temporary commission to administer the Baramahal until the 
time was considered ripe for the introduction of the Bengal 
System under a civil establishment, was shortly to find 
himself promoted to a position in which he could make 
significant contributions to policy through the official and 
unofficial channels of the Company's decision-making 
process. In this chapter the reasons for Munro's appointment 
as Collector of Kanara and the factors which subsequently 
influenced his ideas about the Company's revenue and 
judicial administrations are reviewed. In particular, the 
influence which Webbe and Munro had on each others' opinions 
and policies is examined. Also investigated is the extent of
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Wellesley's involvement in the politics of Madras. The 
manner in which he attempted to create a party of supporters 
in the Presidency and the ways in which this influenced the 
careers of the Company's employees is studied with 
particular reference to the increasingly significant 
division within the administrative structure between the 
members of the 'Old' and 'New Schools'.
Th ere  is e v i d e n c e  that, b e f o r e  W e l l e s l e y  had left Brit ai n,
he and Dundas had agreed that the time was ripe for the
further British expansion in India. Bonaparte's invasion of
Egypt in 1798 gave Dundas the excuse he needed to justify
him encouraging Wellesley to pursue aggressive policies. As
early as 1796, Stephen Lushington, the then Chairman of the
Court, had warned Dundas that it might be possible for the
1
French to attack India by land if they controlled Egypt.
J o h n  S u l l i v a n  had f u r t h e r  c o n v i n c e d  D u n d a s  and G r e n v i l l e
that any F r e n c h  a t t ac k  on B r i t i s h  India w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  be
supported by some local powers, in particular Zaman Shah,
2
the ruler of Afghanistan, and Tipu Sultan of Mysore. Since 
the Treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, many of the British had 
regarded Tipu's behaviour as evincing 'the most hostile 
sentiments' towards the Company's government' and they had
believed 'that he only waited for an opportunity of
3
attacking its power'. In 1797 information had reached 
Britain that seemed to support this view. A Frenchman, 
Ripaud, had arrived in Mauritius with two Mysorean envoys 
carrying a message from Tipu in which the latter announced
that he was only w a i t i n g  for F r e n c h  help 'to d e c l a r e  war
4
a g a i n s t  the Br i t is h ' .  The G o v e r n o r  of M a u r i t i u s  had, m o s t
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unwisely, made this message public
But, while Dundas was generally convinced that further
British expansion should be encouraged and in particular
5
wished to see Tipu crushed, the Court was not in agreement
with him. It opposed expansionist policies on principle and
wished to avoid military conflict which it believed must
lead to a rapid increase of the Indian debt. Cornwallis had
expended 60 lacs of rupees just to field the army against 
6
Tipu in 1792. Bosanquet, the Chairman, was not even
convinced that there was a genuine threat from the French to
British India and he suspected that Tipu's proclamation was
merely a French trick to inveigle the Company into war with
Mysore. 'Ought w e 1, he said, 'to push Tipu to a premature
declaration of his intentions and precipitate him into a war
with us? - or would it be more prudent to temporize for the
7
chance of avoiding hostilities altogether'. Dundas however
decided to ignore the Court's views. 'If Tipu has made
preparations of a hostile nature', he instructed Wellesley
in June 1798, 'or if the proclamation of Tipu inviting the
French was his own, do not wait for actual hostilities on
8
his part...attack him'. The news that about a hundred
Frenchmen had landed at Mangalore in April gave Wellesley
the opportunity to follow Dundas's orders and he declared
that 'an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultaun, for the
purpose of frustrating the execution of his unprovoked and
unwarrantable projects of ambition and revenge, appeared to
9
be demanded by the soundest maxims of justice and policy'.
The Madras Government was not convinced that unwarrantable
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projects of ambition were confined to Tipu Sultan and there
was considerable opposition to Wellesley's plans to attack
Mysore. The Government was aware that Dundas and Wellesley
did not have the Court's approbation for their policy of
expansion and further opposition was engendered by the
rivalry that existed between the Supreme Government and the
subordinate Presidency, whose civil servants resented what
they considered to be interference in their administration.
The situation was very similar to that which had preceded
the last war. The Madras administration was unprepared for a
campaign against Tipu's forces, the civilians generally
opposed to any precipitate action and the Treasury was 
10
empty. In particular Lord Clive, who had arrived at Madras 
in 1798, was far from convinced that Wellesley's policies 
were correct. Although partially inspired by a fear of 
antagonizing the Directors, most of Clive's opposition to 
Wellesley appears to have arisen from his dependence on 
Webbe who was personally hostile to the new Governor-General 
and initially allowed these feelings to influence his 
judgement with regard to the letter's policies.
Webbe had special reasons for his hostility towards 
Wellesley. He owed his position as Secretary to the 
Government to Hobart and he was the sort of man who, having 
once given his allegiance, did not easily transfer his 
loyalty to a new master. Like Lord Hobart, he appears to 
have been convinced that Wellesley was personally 
responsible for the late Governor's recall and seems to have 
suspected that he had abused his position on the Board to 
advance his own career at the expense of Hobart's. These
suspicions seem to have been not unjustified. Wellesley’s
finances were in a sorry state and it was open knowledge
11
that he had come to India to restore his fortune. When the 
Board of Control had decided to investigate the policies of 
the Madras, Wellesley, as one of the Assistant
12
Commissioners, had advised Dundas to recall Hobart. However,
whether justified or not, Webbe's opposition to the new
Governor-Genera 1 ’s policies was perceived by the latter as
being largely inspired by personal animosity. In a letter to
Bathurst Wellesley wrote: 'The trouble which I encountered
at Madras arose entirely from Mr Webbe, secretary and
governor to the Government, in both of which offices he was
placed by Lord Hobart....who went home in a passion, as I
understand, particularly directed against me. Mr Webbe does
not scruple openly to condemn the Government at home for
removing Lord Hobart...and I have no doubt that the attempt
by Mr Webbe to impede the execution of my orders on the
occasion of the assembly of the army and of detaching a
force for the purpose of subverting the French party in the
13
court of the Nizam arose entirely from faction'.
It was not unusual for members of the senior officials in 
the Company to ascribe resistance to their own policies to 
faction rather than to genuine disagreement. Not every 
official, once he had adopted a policy, found it easy to 
judge the merits of counter-arguments. In this particular 
case however, Wellesley had some justification for 
entertaining suspicions regarding Webbe's motives. In many 
respects the policies the new Governor-Genera1 wished to 
follow were not very different to those that Hobart and
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Webbe had espoused. Their determined attempts to introduce
reforms in the financial administration of the Carnatic and
to annul the agreement made between Cornwallis and Mohammed
Ali in 1792 had been the fruits of a general perception of
the situation in Madras that was remarkably similar to that
of the Board of Control. Hobart had employed the same
arguments to justify his actions as Dundas was to use when
he urged that Mysore should be annexed by the British rather
than placed under a puppet ruler. ’That species of double
government', Dundas argued, 'has hitherto proved as
unpropitious to the happiness and prosperity of the governed
as it has to the safety, interest and character of the 
14
governors'. In addition, the same basic view of the role
Britain should play in India appears to have influenced
Webbe and Hobart as much as it did Wellesley and Dundas.
Hobart's decision to force the Raja of Tanjore to surrender
mortgaged territory to the Company was, like D undas's
determination to annex Mysore, inspired by the desire to see
15
the British become the 'arbiters of India'.
On the other hand, it is clear that Webbe's opposition to
Wellesley's policies was not quite as factious as the
Governor-General would have had the home authorities
believe. There is some evidence to suggest that Wellesley's
enthusiasm for an immediate attack on Tipu was blinding him
to the facts of the situation although it is possible that
he just had not been sent all the information that was
available to Webbe. The Madras Government had only been able
to raise 12,000 fighting men, all of whom they had assembled
16
on the Mysore border. Wellesley's orders that 5,000 of these
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should be sent to support the Nizam threatened to leave the
way to the Carnatic open to Tipu, should he decide to launch
a pre-emptive strike. Unprepared as they were, the members
of the Madras Government had good reason to fear Tipu, to
hesitate before engaging in hostilities with him.
I n t e l l i g e n c e  re p o r t s  r e v e a l e d  that his f orc es easil y
outnumbered those of the British. He had 30,000 regular
infantry, 7,000 regular and 6,000 irregular cavalry, 2,000
artillery and 5,300 revenue peons whom he might field
17
against the Company's forces.
Wellesley delegated the task of convincing Clive that his
p o l i c i e s  w e re  the b es t to his b r ot h e r Arth ur.  A f t e r  an
initial five hour c o n f e r e n c e ,  Ar th u r W e l l e s l e y  m a n a g e d  to
persuade Clive that his brother did not mean to 'precipitate
18 '
the country into war', a remarkable achievement in view of
the fact that this a pp e a r s  to h ave  b ee n  e x a c t l y  the
Governor-General 1s and Dundas's intention. In the following
months Arthur Wellesley found himself engaged in endless
diplomatic intrigues as he sought to keep peace with Clive
while he prepared the Presidency for war. His policy was to
keep the Governor isolated from the Madras officials, in
particular from Webbe. He suggested to his brother that the
Supreme Government should deliberately avoid disputes with
Clive, even on pe t t y  su bj ec t s , as these m i g h t  er e c t 'the
little men such as Webbe, who have to handle them, into 
19
great ones'. The extent of this initial division between the 
Bengal and Madras authorities is clearly revealed by Arthur 
Wellesley's perception of the role he was playing in the 
south for his brother. 'I cannot but consider myself', he
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wrote, 'and I am afraid that if all were known others would
20(so) consider me, as very little better than a spy'.
Within a comparatively short time however, Arthur
Wellesley's efforts were rewarded when both Clive and Webbe
responded to his blandishments, becoming active supporters
of both the imminent war and Richard Wellesley's views in
general. Lord Clive's conversion is not difficult to
explain. By nature a mild and moderate man, he avoided
responsibility when he could and was easily swayed by those
around him. Richard Wellesley nicknamed him Puzzlestick and
Arthur Wellesley described him as a man of 'heavy 
21
understanding'. He had little interest in his
responsibilities as head of the executive, preferring to
delegate his authority to his trusted assistants. Webbe was
later to observe that the Governor was very indisposed to
work and spent most of his time travelling with his family,
creating gardens or supervising the erection of public 
22
buiId ings.
Webbe's decision to throw in his lot with the new
Governor-General is less explicable. To some extent it may
have been an act of self preservation. In 1798, Wellesley
requested the home authorities to recall Webbe and by early
1799 letters carrying the information that Dundas intended
to squash opposition in Madras were beginning to arrive in 
23
India. These letters made it clear that, though there was 
still considerable opposition in the Court to the Board's 
aggressive policies, the Directors were not prepared to 
seriously resist them. Webbe must have been influenced by
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this news and by the knowledge that Wellesley was on the
24
point of suspending the Governor and the whole Council. It
is also probable that Arthur Wellesley managed to convince
him that not only did his best interests lie in supporting
the new order but that its policies differed little from
those he himself supported. He may also have been influenced
by the views of his friends. Among these was Munro who, as
an ardent advocate of Wellesley's expansionist aims, had
openly supported them. 'Our Government', he had written in a
letter to his father which he fully expected would be
forwarded via Pultenay to Dundas, 'are anxious to avoid a
war: they are alarmed at the expense and dread the event.
For my own part, I think the sooner we have it, the
better...it is the only thing that can make amends for the
extreme folly of the last peace. We never can be safe while
such a power as Tippoo exists nor can the Carnatic be secure
25
till we have Seringapatam'. General Clarke, a mutual friend
of Webbe and Wellesley, did much to reconcile the two men,
persuading the former to shift his allegiance to the new
Governor-General and convincing the latter that the
Secretary to Government's apparent opposition had been
26
largely the consequence of misunderstanding. Most important
of all, the two men met and made a great impression on each
other. Wellesley wrote to Hobart in April 1799 that he had
found Webbe to be full of 'zeal, talent and diligence, as
well as fidelity and honour'. 'For Webbe', he remarked, 'I
have really conceived an uncommon degree of interest; he is
27
a man of remarkably useful talent and knowledge'.
On 3 February 1799, Wellesley gave the order to invade
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Mysore. News from Europe encouraged him to believe that the
time was ripe for the implementation of his aggressive
policies. He wrote to his brother; 'The Irish Rebellion and
French invasion and Bonaparte expedition are gone to the 
28
dogs'. Having just raised a loan to finance the campaign, he 
wished to hear no more of 'fears and fancies about money'. 
There can be little doubt that the prospect of war had 
over-excited the Governor-General who, riding on the crest 
of the wave, had even cherished a design to take the field 
in person. On 4 May, Seringapatam was assaulted and by 
evening the capital of Mysore had fallen, Tipu was dead and 
British victory complete.
The settlement that followed the fall of Seringapatam and
Tipu's death confirmed that Dundas and Wellesley were
determined to establish the British as the arbiters of
India. Prior to the attack on Mysore, Dundas had advised
Wellesley to take over the direct administration of the
C a r n a t i c  arid to s u b s t i t u t e  the V i z i e r ' s  troo ps w i t h  the
29
Company's in Oudh. He had also approved of Wellesley's
subsidiary treaty with the Nizam and had asked him to make a
similar one with the Marathas. Now, before he received news
of the final settlement of Mysore, he wrote urging that the
country should be annexed by the British and directly
administered by them without the employment any fictitious 
30
arrangements. In particular, he warned that Tipu should not
be replaced by a puppet ruler. 'That species of double
government', he wrote, 'has hitherto proved as unpropitious
to the happiness and prosperity of the governed as it has to
31
the safety, interest and character of the governors'.
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Wellesley however found himself unable to annex all of
Mysore for fear of antagonizing the Nizam and the Marathas
and he decided to place a representative of the former
d y n a s t y  on the t hro ne  of the ce n tr a l  Kingd om.  The bulk of
T i p u ' s  t e r r i t o r y  was d i v i d e d  b e t w e e n  the N i z a m  and the
C o m p a n y  d e s p i t e  D u n d a s 's i n s t r u c t i o n s  that, sh ou ld  it be
possible, the former should only receive financial
32
recompense for his help. Under this arrangement the British 
acquired the town and island of Seringapatam, Wynad in the 
south-west, the districts of Coimbatore and Dharapuram in 
the south, and Kanara in the west.
A c o m m i s s i o n  to s et t l e  the M y s o r e  g o v e r n m e n t  and to m a k e  the
p a r t i t i o n  tr e a t y  w i t h  the N i z a m  was e s t a b l i s h e d  at the end
of May. On 4 June Munro and Captain John Malcolm, with whom
Munro had been corresponding since 1797 after Malcolm had
been i n t r o d u c e d  to h im  as one of Er sk ine  M u n r o ' s  G l a s g o w  
33
friends, were appointed as joint secretaries to this 
34
c o m m i s s io n .  M u n r o  a p p e a r s  to ha ve  owed this a p p o i n t m e n t  to
W eb b e  and B a rr y  Close, b oth  of w h o m  were f r i e n d s  of his,
interested in furthering his career and in command of
sufficient influence with Wellesley to advance his
c a n d i d a t u r e .  At the same l ett er  in w h i c h  he i n f o r m e d  M u n r o
of this pos ti n g,  W e b b e  i n f o r m e d  M u n r o  that he m i g h t  hope to
be a p p o i n t e d  c o l l e c t o r  of half of the B a r a m a h a l  af t e r  Re ad 's
35
retirement, which was expected once peace had been restored.
While Munro worked with the commission, he fully expected 
that he should shortly return to the Baramahal and his 
appointment in June as the collector of Kanara appears to
36
have come as a surprise to him. The complexities of the
Company's administration, in which promotion was largely
governed by factors of personal influence and patronage,
make it difficult to be certain just why Munro received this
appointment which Wellesley had originally intended should
37
be given to General Stuart. Only tenuous suggestions can be
advanced for the decision. There is a certain amount of
evidence that Munro owed the appointment to the influence of
several friends who, for personal and political reasons,
were interested in advancing his career. Arthur Wellesley
claimed partial responsibility for it, explaining in a
letter to Munro, with whom he had formed a close friendship,
38
that he had supported it. 'I long ago took the field, in
alliance with my brother Henry, in favour of military
collectors', he wrote. Read believed that Webbe had also had
a hand in the appointment, observing that no one in the
Presidency had more influence over the Governor than the
39
Chief Secretary to the Government. Webbe indirectly
confirmed Read's impression when he told Munro that he had
40
come to Wellesley's attention through Clive.
Malcolm's letter to Munro, in which the latter was
officially appointed to Kanara, suggests another reason why
41
he received the post. It seems clear that Wellesley was 
determined to staff the Company's local administrations as 
far as possible with men loyal to himself and sympathetic to 
his policies. There can be little doubt that Wellesley hoped 
that Munro would regard himself as to some extent acting as 
the Governor-General's agent rather than purely as a servant 
of the Madras Government. This interpretation is supported
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by the fact that, though Munro technically should have been 
directly under the authority of the Board of Revenue and 
charged with the duty of reporting to it, Malcolm informed 
him that he was to consider himself under the 'immediate 
orders of the Governor-General'.
Munro hesitated to accept the appointment and then did so
with extreme reluctance. He believed that the revenues of
Kanara had been over-estimated and that any attempt to bring
them to their estimated value could only lead to failure and
42
an 'unavoidable loss of reputation'. He well knew that the
Board of Revenue would evaluate his performance according to
the revenue he raised and the example of Hughes, whom the
Board had removed from Guntur after his failure to collect
revenues equal to the estimated value of the district, could
not have been far from his mind. He had also suffered a
severe attack of fever early in 1799 and doubted if his
health could sustain the privations he expected to
43
experience in the new territory. In addition, Munro was
reluctant to relinquish the districts he had administered in
the Baramahal. He had just finished the difficult task of
settling the revenues and now 'anticipated the pleasure of
sitting down...and enjoying a few years of rest after so
44
many of drudgery'. Furthermore, he had made the Baramahal
his home when he had built himself a house and garden there.
'To quit it now', he wrote, 'goes as much to my heart as
45
forsaking my friends'.
Two considerations appear to have persuaded Munro to accept 
the appointment. He claimed that he had always placed the
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dem an d s of p u b l i c  duty b e f o r e  all ot h e r s  and that it was his
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of these w h i c h  had p r o m p t e d  him to go to
K anara. 'I c o n s i d e r e d  it was my  d u ty  to g o ' , he w r o t e  to
W e l l e s l e y ,  ' es p e c i a l l y  as I was c o n s c i o u s  that, t ho ugh  I
sh ou l d  ne v er  be able to r e a l i z e  any s a n g u i n e  ideas that
m i g h t  be e n t e r t a i n e d  on the s u b j e c t  of the r e v e n u e  of
Canara, I s hou ld  yet, from p o s s e s s i n g  the a d v a n t a g e s  of long
e xp e r i e n c e ,  be en a b l e d  to r e n d e r  it as p r o d u c t i v e  as it
46
c oul d have b e en  in any ot her hands '.  It w o u l d  p e r h a p s  be an 
i nj u s t i c e  to M u n r o  to do u b t  his c la i m  but it m u s t  be 
o b s e r v e d  that, a m o n g s t  his m a n y  o b v io us  tale nt s, that of 
s e I f - p r o m o t i o n  was one of the m o s t  d e v e l o p e d .  He ra rely, as 
has b ee n a l r e a d y  d e m o n s t r a t e d ,  lost an o p p o r t u n i t y  to 
a d v e r t i s e  him se l f,  to p r e s e n t  h i m s e l f  b e f o r e  his s u p e r i o r s  
in the m o s t  a d v a n t a g e o u s  ligh t p o s s i b l e .  It c a n n o t  ha ve  b een  
c o i n c i d e n c e  that his p e r c e p t i o n  of his p u b l ic  duty  
i n v a r i a b l y  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  his p e r c e p t i o n  of his p r i v a t e  
interest.
M u n r o  had o r i g i n a l l y  come to India to m a k e  his fortune. 
Du ri n g  the e ar l y  years of his c a r e e r  he had c o n s i s t e n t l y  
w o r k e d  t owa rds  the r e a l i z a t i o n  of this goal, s e e k i n g  to 
i n t r od u ce  h i m s e l f  to m e n of i n f l u e n c e  and c a r e f u l l y  
c u l t i v a t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w h i c h  p r o m i s e d  to a d v a n c e  his 
inte res ts . In this r e s p e c t  he was no d i f f e r e n t  from the 
C o m p a n y ' s  othe r e m p l o y e e s  for, b e h i n d  the m o r e  or less 
c o n v i n c i n g  fa c a d e s  of a l t r u i s m  th ese m e n  p r e s e n t e d  to the 
world, its was al w a ys  p o s s i b l e  to u n c o v e r  the o p e r a t i o n  of 
that p o w e r f u l  m o ti ve ,  p e r s o n a l  a m b i t i o n .  W h a t  ma d e  M u n r o  
u n u s ua l  was his p e c u l i a r  a b i l i t y  to f i n d  a l t r u i s t i c
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arguments to justify his proposal of policies that were 
clearly to a great extent inspired by his perception of his 
own interests. Two examples illustrate this point.
During the years that Munro worked under Read, he was
constantly preoccupied by his finances. In 1794, he bitterly
complained to his father that his commission, which he
estimated would be about 3000 pagodas, was 'far from being
47
adequate to the labours of the employment'. As soon as it 
became clear that the Government had no intention of 
increasing his allowances simply on the grounds of the work 
that he was doing, Munro tackled the problem from two 
different angles. On the one hand, he argued that it was in
48
the Company's interest to generously reward their employees.
Claiming that the collectors should receive at least 12000
pagodas a year, he stated that low salaries encouraged
dishonesty which soon percolated down through the Indian
establishments where it ultimately led to the Government
losing large revenues. On the other hand, he applied with
Macleod for permission to rent a private estate of 32 
49
villages. While it is quite clear from a letter he wrote his
brother that Munro's motive for making this request was the
50
desire to build a fortune, the arguments he advanced to the
Board of Revenue were couched entirely in terms of the 
51
public interest. He wrote of the benefits the Company and 
the ryots would derive. He claimed that the Indians, if left 
alone without an example, would never change their customary 
patterns of subsistence agriculture. However, were the 
Indians to see Macleod and himself successfully cultivating 
indigo, cotton, sugar and beetle, they would also switch to
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cash crops. These would be freely and cheaply available to 
the Company which might then remuneratively supply 
international demand for the products.
Taking into consideration this aspect of M u n r o ’s character,
it seems probable that the expectation of an enhanced income
carried more weight in his decision to accept the post in
Kanara than did that of public duty. Munro privately
admitted as much. 'I thought’, he wrote to Arthur Wellesley,
'there was a chance that I should be placed in such an
allowance in Canara as would enable me, in two or three
52
years, to pay a visit to Europe'. On another occasion he
described how he had believed that the financial advantages
of the post might permit him to return 'a year or two sooner 
53
to Europe'.
Shortly after he had accepted the appointment, Munro began
to bitterly regret his decision and he made vigorous
attempts to secure a transfer. He showered his friends with
letters in which he complained of his new situation and
begged them to do whatsoever was within their power to have
him moved to another district. He even persuaded Macleod to
suggest to the Board of Revenue that Munro might take over
the administration of half of his district, despite the fact
that this would have reduced Macleod's commission on the
54
revenues considerably. When Arthur Wellesley observed that
it had been Munro's decision alone to accept the post, he
replied with a repetition of his claim that he had accepted
against his better judgement, inspired solely by
55
considerations of public interest. To Read's and Webbe's
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replies, he had no answer. Both of them bluntly informed him
that he was extremely well off where he was and pointed out
that, should he resign, he would only arm their opponents
within the Company with further arguments against the
56
employment of military collectors.
There can be little doubt that Munro's extreme reaction
against his new appointment was largely the consequence of
disappointment with the allowances that he discovered he was
to receive. The Board of Revenue informed him after his
arrival in Kanara that the Government had decided to limit
the commissions paid to military collectors who had
previously enjoyed a considerable advantage over the
civilians. In addition to the commissions on the revenues
that all collectors enjoyed, the military officials had also
received their full army pay and allowances. Munro
complained about this reduction in his commission to Arthur
Wellesley. Wellesley replied that this decision was in part
the consequence of a general retrenchment. He also observed
that Read's failure to supply the Board of Revenue with an
explanation for the dramatic fall in the Baramahal revenues
was partly to blame. 'The Board of Revenue are against y o u ' ,
he wrote, 'which is the reason why the Government are not so
57
liberal towards you'. It is probable that the Board was also 
angered by Wellesley's decision not to place Munro under the 
Board. Instead Wellesley had first made him responsible to 
the Commissioners of Mysore and then to himself, ordering 
him to report through Barry Close.
Arthur Wellesley's sympathies lay with Munro. In order to
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help him reverse the Board's decision, Arthur Wellesley
proposed to informally present his case to the
Governor-General. He suggested that Munro should write to
him, describing his situation in Kanara and mentioning that
he had been promised some reward for his services in the 
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Baramahal. He promised to pass this letter to his brother
who, as Governor-General, might over-rule the Madras
Government. Munro followed this advise and a month later
Webbe was able to inform Read that the Governor-General had
agreed an especially high allowance for Munro which would
give him a 'greater income than any member of the Board of
Revenue independently of his military allowances' while he
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remained in Kanara. From this date no further complaints 
were heard from Munro about his posting and he appears to 
have resigned himself to remaining in the territory until 
its revenues should be settled.
Munro's first task in Kanara was to establish order. Writing 
later to the Board of Revenue, Munro described the 
conditions that he had found on his arrival in the district. 
'When I entered from the southward in July last, the 
districts of Coomlah and Vittel, lying between Bekul and 
Mangalore, were in the possession of two chiefs styling 
themselves rajas who had long been pensioners of the Bombay 
Government. Jummalabad had refused to surrender. A great 
part of the country, from Neliserum to Barkoor, had been 
ravaged by the Coorugs. In many places the cattle had been 
swept away, the villages burnt and the inhabitants - men, 
women and children - carried off into captivity. The 
followers of Dhondajee had made an irruption from Beddanore
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into the district of Cuddapore; Bilghee was in possession of
a poligar; Ankolah and Sadasewagur were garrisoned by the
Sultan's troops and the Raja of Sondah had entered that
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district as his ancient inheritance'.
The methods Munro employed to establish British authority
and to restore order in Kanara have to be examined against
the background of the general situation in South India as
well as with reference to his own attitudes. The British had
discovered that the prevalent system of social and political
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organization in the Peninsula was poligari. The poligars had 
initially been holders of territories, usually strips of 
land comprising a few villages, which had been granted to 
them in consideration of the military services that these 
men agreed to render to the sovereign and the tributes that 
that they consented to pay into the state treasury. However, 
because of their numerical strength, extensive resources, 
local influence and independent attitudes, these auxiliary 
powers had quickly come to represent a powerful order in the 
political system of South India. Their position had been 
further strengthened when their territories had became 
hereditary possessions, which development had in turn helped 
establish their role in the socio-political structure. They 
had slowly emerged as the heads of the local 
administrations, responsible for maintaining the military, 
police and revenue establishments. In certain respects the 
duties and functions of these chieftains corresponded with 
those of the feudal barons of medieval Europe. The 
possession of estates constituted the fundamental basis of 
their authority and the poligar, like the baron, held
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possession of his land on a military tenure. But, unlike the 
latter, the poligar claimed no proprietary right in the land 
and never regarded the cultivators as his serfs. He was the 
administrator of his territory, renter to his sovereign, a 
commander of forces, guardian of the public welfare and a 
ryot among his people.
The trend of the times, created by the prevailing state of 
turmoil, favoured the expansion of the authority of the 
auxiliary powers. The poligars not only acquired greater 
rights and concessions at the expense of the jurisdiction of 
the central authority and the village communities in their 
palayams, they also extended their power into the circar 
lands. In particular, they used their position to assume the 
authority of the kavalkars which gave them definite rights 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the circar country. 
They slowly evolved from being a class of public servants 
until they more closely represented a domestic militia. As 
they received more of the area's resources, converted their 
detached villages into military posts and strengthened their 
armed establishments, they rendered themselves increasingly 
independent.
When the Nevayet and Wallajah dynasties replaced the Nayak 
rulers, the situation developed further. The new rulers were 
not only strangers in the land and adherents of a different 
faith, they also had no sympathy for an institution that 
belonged to the political arrangements of their 
predecessors. They made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to 
either curb or liquidate the poligari system. Conditions
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however did not favour attempts to reassert the authority of 
the central power which found itself forced to seek the 
military aid of the poligars. In particular, during the 
period following the rebellion of Khan Sahib, the Nawab was 
forced to pursue a policy which augmented the authority and 
receipts of the poligars in order to persuade them to rescue 
his government from the Patans who, in alliance with the 
Kalians and other rebels, were destabilizing Madurai.
As the British extended their possessions in the south and
gradually began to assume responsibility for the
administration of the districts under their control, they
often found themselves actively opposed by the poligars,
particular those in the N a w a b 1s Carnatic territories who
were able to take advantage of the suspicion and rivalry
that existed between the Company's and the N a w a b 's
establishments. The British quickly came to regard the
poligars as a threat to their security and as obstacles to
the establishment of their authority. To some extent these
views were justified by the attitudes of the poligars
towards the British. The poligar of Panjalamkurichi
expressed the sentiments of many poligars when he declared:
'It rains, the land yields, why should we pay tax to the 
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English'. Justified or otherwise, the British were generally 
hostile towards these men. They saw the poligars as 
representatives of a feudal order of society similar to that 
which was being demolished in Europe. The European 
experience was conditioning British perceptions of India.
The majority of the British drew a clear distinction between 
the poligars of Madras and the zamindars of Bengal. However
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they regarded the latter, either as state officials 
delegated to collect the revenues or as landholding 
intermediaries between the state and the ryots, they viewed 
the poligars as little more than feudal warlords, the relics 
of a primitive stage of socio-political development. Few 
questioned this image and what disagreement existed in the 
Company was restricted to two questions - to what extent did 
the individual poligars have justifiable claims to their 
lands and how should the Company deal with them? Largely 
depending upon their answer to the first of these questions, 
officials advocated policies which at one extreme involved 
the complete destruction of the poligars and at the other 
their wholesale conversion into landowning zamindars after 
the Cornwallis model.
The first major clash between the British and the poligars 
occurred during the Second Mysore War when the poligars used 
the opportunity to throw off their mask of loyalty and 
forment open rebellions in the Nawab's territories. The 
Nawab invited the British to intervene and the latter 
acquired for the first time control of the revenue 
administration and the right to deal directly with the 
auxiliary powers. Under the assignment that the Nawab agreed 
with Macartney in December 1781, the British sought to gain 
two objectives - the loyalty of the poligars and their 
submission to the Company's authority. They pursued the 
traditional policies of conciliation and coercion. These 
were only moderately successful and the problems had not 
been solved when the Company surrendered the assignment in 
1785. During the next years British relations with the
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poligars deteriorated as a consequence of the opportunities 
given these men by the conflicts of interest between the 
Nawab's and the Company's administrations which resulted 
from the form of dual government introduced when the 
Carnatic became a British protectorate under the guise of 
the joint system of defence. The Carnatic Treaty of 1792 and 
the annexation of Dindugal aggravated these problems by 
bringing more poligars under the direct authority of the 
Company. The Fifth Article of the Treaty stipulated that the 
Company should have the right to collect the customary 
tribute from the poligars and to enhance demands on them if 
they appeared too low. At the same time the Sixth Article 
preserved the Nawab's rights of sovereignty over the 
poligars who were thus required to serve two masters and 
were consequently able to retain their influence intact.
The dual system exacerbated the ill-feeling between the
British and the poligars. The poligars, because they paid
tribute to the Company, looked to it for protection but the
British refused to defend the poligars' interests because
this would compromise the Nawab's sovereign rights. In
addition, the British frequently enhanced the tribute. The
poligars came to regard them as responsible for their
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problems and resisted their authority. In particular, they
seized ever opportunity to refuse to pay their peshcush. At
the same time the British increasingly chose to regard them
as a turbulent and destabilizing influence in the country.
It was largely as a consequence of these problems that
Hobart presented the Nawab in 1795 with proposals for
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modifying the existing system. He suggested that the Company
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should be entrusted with authority not only to collect the 
revenues but also to reorganize the poligari system. Under 
the influence of developments in Bengal, the Company's 
general policy aimed at transforming the poligars from 
military chieftains into zamindars.
By 1799, the local governments were faced with a major 
dilemma. On the one hand, the home authorities were 
determined not to destroy the rights of the local powers. On 
the other hand, they had authorized a policy designed to 
deprive the poligars of their traditional sources of 
strength and influence. In their despatches of 10 June 1795 
and 5 June 1799, the Court of Directors had issued 
instruction that 'all subordinate military establishments 
should be annihilated'. This conflict was only partly 
resolved when, on the outbreak of the Fourth Mysore War, the 
poligars took the opportunity to organize themselves under 
the leadership of Kattabomman into an alliance to resisted 
the authority of both the Nawab and the Company. Wellesley 
instructed Major Bannerman to command military operations 
against the alliance and his orders clearly revealed a 
definite intention to enforce an already formulated policy 
aimed at the liquidation of the poligari system. 'The 
rebellious conduct of Catabomanaig (Kattabomma 
Nayak)...having rendered it necessary to equip a military 
force for the purpose of suppressing the commotions excited 
by him, the Right Honourable Governor-General has resolved 
to avail himself of this opportunity to carry into effect 
the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors for 
disarming the whole of the Southern Poligars and for
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reducing those irregular chieftains to the authority of the
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civil government'. The Company intended to force the 
poligars to dispense with their armed establishments and to 
assume the military and kaval duties which the poligars had_ 
so longed performed. Deprived of political status, the 
poligars were to be transformed into zamindars.
Wellesley's actions marked the emergence of a definite split
in the Company. In Britain, the Court of Directors, under
the influence of concepts of natural justice, the
prosecution's arguments during Hasting's trial, fear of
widespread revolts against the British and their tendency to
regard the Indian elites as their Eastern counterparts in
society's structure, wished to see the poligars persuaded
into transferring their allegiance to the Company. The Court
and its supporters believed that this might be achieved if
these men were permanently granted their estates as private
property in compensation for the loss of their military and
judicial authority. The dominant school of thought in India,
led by Wellesley and represented by men like Webbe in
Madras, was more prepared to take drastic measures to
achieve the same end, if necessary to eradicate the poligars
should they prove unamenable to this alteration in their
status. Webbe succinctly expressed the 'new school' of
thought's ideas in a letter to Munro. 'My notion at
present', he wrote, 'is that we should begin thumping the
refractory rajahs; and, in order that they may be disposed
of without let or molestation, that the courts of adowlut
should be abolished and military processes substituted until
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the province shall be quiet and subdued'. In common with
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Wellesley, Webbe appears to have believed that the best 
solution to the poligar problem might be found in hanging 
them from the nearest trees.
Munro's personal sympathies lay with the 'new school'. He
had brought with him to India a prejudice against classes of
privileged ruling elites which his background and early
experiences had engendered. In Britain this attitude had
disposed him to regard the members of the nobility and
gentry with a jaundiced eye. It was with a heavy irony that
he had written that he was 'so far from wishing to abolish
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hereditary distinction that I think them useful'. Enlarging 
on this statement, he had revealed that all he meant to 
imply was that pride of birth might prevent the members of 
the British ruling classes from committing acts likely to 
disgrace their names. More importantly, Munro's 
socio-economic concepts, largely derived from Adam Smith, 
encouraged him to regard the poligars as an impediment to 
development insofar as he believed that this class of men 
employed their wealth to maintain large numbers of 
non-productive retainers and to indulge in conspicuous 
consumption instead of re-investing it in capital 
improvements or manufacturing. As such, he regarded them as 
one of the principal obstacles to economic development. In 
addition, he believed that the British had sufficient power 
to remove the threat the poligars posed to their authority 
without anxiety as to the possible consequences. He went so 
far as to express the view that the complete eradication of 
the poligars should be one of the Company's principal 
objectives. 'The reduction of these vagabonds, who are more
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a kind of privileged highwayman, will render us more able to
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resist our external enemies'.
Munro employed the traditional policies of conciliation and
coercion to restore order in Kanara, favouring the latter
but, with an eye to opinion in Britain and averse to
antagonizing some elements in Madras, adopting the former on
o c c a si o n s.  The cases of the K u m l a  and V i t h a l  p o l i g a r s
illustrate his techniques. The Kumla poligar, whose
ancestors had been the hereditary managers of their
districts, had been a pensioner of the British from 1784
w h i l e  ex i l ed  in T e l l i c h e r r y .  At the c o m m e n c e m e n t  of
C o r n w a l l i s ' s  w a r w i t h  Tipu, the p o l i g a r  had r e c e i v e d
assurances that he should be reinstated and in 1799 the
Commissioners of Malabar had led him to believe that, in the
e ven t of a B r i t i s h  v i c t o r y  a g a i n s t  Mys o r e,  he w o u l d  be
entitled to something more than the pension he had been 
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receiving. During the war he and other poligars had been 
encouraged to support the British and issued with arms from 
the Company's store. One of Munro's first acts on being 
appointed to manage Kanara was to issue a proclamation 
forbidding the poligars from collecting the revenues and 
ordering them to withdraw their followers from the Company's 
territory. Although he left his nephew with armed retainers 
behind him, the Kumla poligar had personally complied. In 
addition, after General Hartley had threatened to treat his 
nephew as a rebel and the Commissioners of Malabar had 
stopped his pension, the poligar ordered his nephew to cease 
further opposition to the authority of Munro's amildar.
Aw ar e  that the p o l i g a r  m i g h t  be r e g a r d e d  as an al ly  and
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conscious that the Court of Directors had invariably
disapproved of actions which had threatened the t perceived
r i g h t s  of such men, M u n r o  a n n o u n c e d  h i m s e l f  a v e r s e  to 'using
force whenever a point could be accomplished by patience and 
70
fair m e an s ' . A l t h o u g h  he c o n c l u d e d  that the p o l i g a r ' s
behaviour had been 'extremely irregular', something he
stated ' must always be expected when we avail ourselves of
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the assistance of such allies', he eventually recommended
that the m a n  s h o u l d  be r e w a r d e d  by h a v i n g  his p e n s i o n
doubled provided he agreed to the condition that neither he
72
nor his f a m i l y  s h o u l d  r e s i d e  in Kumla.
But, while Munro pursued a policy of conciliation towards 
the Kumla poligar, he adopted one of coercion towards the 
Vithal poligar. While this man had also been a British 
pensioner, he caused considerably more trouble than his 
compatriot after the war. He ignored General Hartley's 
summons to surrender the arms that the Company had supplied 
him, took over the management of his district and collected 
the revenues. Early in 1800, he combined with other 
disaffected elements in South Kanara to resist the British.
Munro assembled a substantial force in July 1800 and
73 74
d e f e a t e d  the re be ls . S h o r t l y  af te r the p o l i g a r  s u r r e n d e r e d .
Munro, who as long as the m a n  m i g h t  ha ve be e n r e g a r d e d  as a
British ally had intended to treat him as he had the Kumla
poligar, now felt himself justified in following the policy
he personally favoured. 'We may now', he wrote to Colonel
Close, his friend and the Resident in Mysore, 'by making an
e x a m p l e  of h i m  and his a s s o c i a t e s ,  s e c u r e  C a n a r a  f ro m
internal disturbances in the future... It is the mistaken
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n o t i o n  of o b s e r v i n g  on this co a st  to war ds  ev er y pe t t y  chief
of a d i s t r i c t  all the c e r e m o n y  and a t t e n t i o n  that is due to
a s o v e r e i g n  w h i c h  ke eps al ive  idle and d a n g e r o u s  p r e t e n s i o n s
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w h i c h  it ought  r a t h er  to be our aim to e x t i n g u i s h ' .  He
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h a n g e d  the p ol iga r.
In ge ne ra l, it a p p e a r s  that M u n r o  r u t h l e s s l y  s t a m p e d  out 
r e s i s t a n c e  to his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  He was able to do this 
w i t h o u t  a t t r a c t i n g  too m u c h  o p p o s i t i o n  to his m e a s u r e s ,  
ei th e r in M a d r a s  or Brit ain , by e m p l o y i n g  co urt m a r t i a l s  
w h o s e  s e n t en c e s,  u n l i k e  those of the civil co urts, did not 
a lw ay s have to be r e f e r r e d  to the G o v e r n m e n t .  In do i n g  this 
he had the tacit s u p p o r t  of the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  and the 
M ad r a s G o v e r n m e n t  w h o  had sh ow n  the w ay  in their or de rs  to 
M aj o r  Ba nn e rm a n . This o f f i c e r  had be e n told by W e b b e  that, 
'to r e n de r  his a u t h o r i t y  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t ' ,  he was v e s te d  
'with the p ow er to use m i l i t a r y  e x e c u t i o n  a g a i n s t  such
r e b e l l i o u s  p o l i g a r s  and their f o l l o w e r s  as sh o u ld  be found
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in open r e b e l l i o n ' .  C o l o n e l  M i gn o n , in a le tt er  to Mu n r o  in
w h i c h  he i n qu i r e d  w h e t h e r  he was to c o n t i n u e  to e m p l o y  court
m a r t i a l s ,  r e v e a l e d  the e x t e n t  to w h i c h  M u n r o  had p u r s u e d  a
c o e r c i v e  policy. S u g g e s t i n g  that M u n r o  m i g h t  re f e r  fu tu re
cases to the G o v e r n m e n t  for de c i s i o n ,  he a r g u e d  that 'so
m a n y  have a l r e a d y  be e n  c o n d e m n e d  to death, m o r e  e x a m p l e s  of
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that kind m a y  not be n e c e s s a r y ' .
M u n r o ' s  a t t i t u d e  to w ar d s  the p o l i g a r s  not on l y  i n f l u e n c e d  
the m e t h o d s  he e m p l o y e d  to r e s t o r e  p e a c e  and order to K a n a r a  
w h i l e  b r i n g i n g  the c o u n t r y  under, the c o n t r o l  of his 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  it al so  p a r t l y  d e t e r m i n e d  his ideas
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r e g a r d i n g  the sort of r e v e n u e  s e t t l e m e n t s  to be intro du ce d.  
It a p p e a r s  that m u c h  of M u n r o ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  to the p r o p o s e d  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of z a m i n d a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  s i m i l a r  to those that 
C o r n w a l l i s  had e s t a b l i s h e d  in Bengal  d e v e l o p e d  from his 
p e r c e p t i o n  of the ro le  that the G o v e r n m e n t  i n t e n d e d  to give 
the p o l i g a r s  w i t h i n  the new system.
There is strong evidence to suggest that one of the
principal reasons why the Court of Directors wished to see
the introduction of permanent zamindari settlements into the
M a d r a s  t e r r i t o r y  was the c o n v i c t i o n  of the ho me  a u t h o r i t i e s
that such a move offered a sure means of transforming the
poligars into a class of peaceful landholders. It is clear
from the Court's revenue despatch of 1792 that the home
authorities regarded the poligars as a potential threat to
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the Company's sovereignty in the Peninsula. It is equally 
clear that the home authorities were unwilling to 
countenance any solution to the problems these men posed 
which involved the destruction of their perceived rights 
except as a final.resort. The decision to grant the poligars 
their estates represented a compromise solution to this 
d i1emm a .
In the revenue despatch of 1792 in which the Court directed 
the Madras Government to introduce the Bengal revenue and 
judicial systems into its territories, the Directors 
specified that the existing poligars were to be constituted 
as zamindars of their present pollams and explained the 
reasons behind this order. Apart from making the collection 
of the revenues cheaper and easier, the Court observed that
195
the transformation of the poligars into zamindars would have 
three distinct consequences. Firstly, by changing the 
'precarious and discouraging tenure under which they (the 
poligars) held their lands' into one that was 'absolute and 
invariable', the Court believed that these men would see it 
as being to their advantage to support the Company.
Secondly, the Court imagined that the prospect of full 
ownership of their lands would be regarded by the poligars 
as a sufficient compensation for the loss of their judicial 
functions which the home authorities were determined to 
assume on the grounds that the introduction of a judicial 
administration under British control would substantially 
extend the Company's authority. Most importantly of all, the 
Court hoped the offer of their lands as private property 
would persuade the poligars to peacefully accept orders to 
disband their private armies.
This last consideration was the real crux of the matter. The 
existence of the poligars' private forces of armed retainers 
was seen as having disadvantageous economic and strategic 
consequences for the Company. The cost of their upkeep meant 
that revenues which the Court believed should be coming to 
the Company were being directed towards their maintenance 
while their existence enabled the poligars to become 
'formidable enemies' whenever the British were in 
difficulties. The importance the Directors attached to the 
disbanding of these private armies was illustrated by their 
frequent references to this problem. In 1795, the Court even 
went so far as to observe that, should the Government fail 
to persuade the poligars to disband their forces, it might,
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as a final resort, order them to comply on pain of losing
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their possessions.
Once the decision had been taken to transform the poligars
into zamindars in order to dismantle the poligari system, it
was only natural that the Court, under the influence of the
arguments employed in support of the introduction of
Cornwallis's measures in Bengal, should have decided that
the sircar lands ought also to be distributed as zamindari
estates. Their orders that this should be done reversed the
previous policy of the Madras Government which had, on the
recommendation of its Board of Revenue, been attempting to
phase out the zamindars in its territories. The collectors,
who had been ordered to induce the villagers 'by every
reasonable encouragement, to rent their own villages in
preference to any other mode of management and, if possible,
to divide the landed property in the villages into several
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farms to be let to the first and second classes of ryots',
were now ordered to create estates, auction them to the
highest bidders and constitute these men as zamindari 
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proprietors.
While serving under Read in the Baramahal, Munro had shown a 
preference for moderate settlements with small landholders, 
whom he called ryots, and he had clearly wished to encourage 
the emergence of a class of yeoman farmers who would 
cultivate the soil themselves or with the help of hired 
labour. His advocacy of ryotwari settlements had predisposed 
him to oppose the introduction of settlements modelled on 
those of Bengal into the sircar lands of Madras. The element
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of v e h e m e n c e  w h i c h  n ow  e m e r g e d  in his o p p o s i t i o n  to the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of z a m i n d a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  a ros e d i r e c t l y  from 
his c o n v i c t i o n  that the C o u r t ' s  p o l i c y  of c o n c i l i a t i n g  the 
p o l i g a r s ,  of b r i b i n g  them to r e c o g n i z e  the C o m p a n y ' s  
s o v e r e i g n t y  wi t h  offers of the p r o p r i e t o r s h i p  of their 
d i s t r i c t s ,  was i l l - c o n c e i v e d .  On the one han d he a r g u e d  that 
the s u b s t a n t i a l  p o l i g a r s  w h o  still p o s s e s s e d  i n f l u e n c e
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c o m p r i s e d  a th re at  to the C o m p a n y  and s h ou l d  be e r a d i c a t e d .
On the ot her hand he c l a i m e d  that the r e m a i n d e r  of the pe t ty
c h i e f t a i n s  in K a n a r a  had lost all a u t h o r i t y ,  w e r e  b a r e l y
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  f ro m  the ma s s of the p o p u l a t i o n  and sh ou ld
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t h e r e f o r e  r e c e i v e  no p r e f e r e n t i a l  tr e a t m e n t .
M u n r o ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  to the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of p e r m a n e n t
z a m i n d a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  only s l o w l y  e m e r g e d  p u b l i c l y .  Wh il e
a c t i n g  u n d e r  the C o m m i s s i o n e r s  for My so r e , he ap p e a r s  to
have c o n s i d e r e d  his r e v e n u e  du t i es  l im i t e d  to a s c e r t a i n i n g
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the d i s t r i c t ' s  r e so u r c e s ,  a d m i t t e d  to f i n d i n g  his civil
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f u n c t i o n s  i r kso me and c o n c e n t r a t e d  on e s t a b l i s h i n g  order. In
so doing, he r e m a i n e d  o u t s i d e  the r e v e n u e  p o l i c y  debate. In
the beginning of February 1800 however, supervision of
M u n r o ' s  a c t i v i t i e s  was o f f i c i a l l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  to the Board
of R e v e n u e .  The la tt er i m m e d i a t e l y  b e g a n  to put p r e s s u r e  on
hi m to b e g i n  the c o m p l e x  task of s e t t l i n g  and c o l l e c t i n g  the
r e v e n u e s .  The y w r o t e  that th ey  w e r e  u n a b l e  to g ive  hi m any
d e t a i l e d  i n s t r u c t i o n s  u n t i l  he s h o u l d  h av e  f u r n i s h e d  them
w i t h  a r e p o r t  on K a n a r a  c o n t a i n i n g  as m u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  a bo u t
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the d i s t r i c t  as he m i g h t  h a v e  m a n a g e d  to d i s c o v e r .  They also  
r e q u e s t e d  an a c c o u n t  of the a r r a n g e m e n t s  he i n t e n d e d  to 
i n t r o d u c e  for the i m m e d i a t e  c o l l e c t i o n  of the r e v e nu e s . At
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the same time the Board, f o l l o w i n g  orders  f ro m  the
G o v e r n m e n t  w h i c h  had r e c e i v e d  d i r e c t i o n s  fr om the
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  to i n t r o d u c e  s e t t l e m e n t s  s i m i l a r  to those
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that had be en  m ad e  in Bengal, i n s t r u c t e d  M u n r o  to 'keep in
v i e w  as m u c h  as p o s s i b l e 1 the p r i n c i p l e s  of the p e r m a n e n t
s e t t l e m e n t  that had be en c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y  e x p l a i n e d  in the
c i r c u l a r  lett er  the Board  had sent to all c o l l e c t o r s  late in 
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1799.
In this le tte r the Bo a rd  m a d e  it cl e ar  t ha t it u n d e r s t o o d
the p r i n c i p a l  b e n e f i t  lo oke d for fr o m the p o l i c y  of
c o n f e r r i n g  a p e r m a n e n t  p r o p r i e t a r y  r i g h t  to the land on a
class of z a m i n d a r s  was to be i n c r e a s e d  i n v e s t m e n t  in
a g r i c u l t u r e .  They w r o t e  that, af te r  a p e r m a n e n t  se t t l e m e n t ,
'a c o n s i d e r a b l e  p o r t i o n  of the w e a l t h  of the i n h a b i t a n t s
w h i c h  now lies dead or is e m p l o y e d  in other c h a n n e l s  (will
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be) a p p l i e d  to the i m p r o v e m e n t  of the land'. To e n s u r e  that
this sh ou l d occur, the c o l l e c t o r s  w e r e  o r d e r e d  to include
'waste' or u n c u l t i v a t e d  lands in each e s t a t e  as a
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'p rod u c ti v e  p r i n c i p l e ' .  It was h o p e d  that, once the n ew  
l a n d h o l d e r s  r e a l i z e d  that their rents had be e n p e r m a n e n t l y  
fixed, they w o u l d  be e n c o u r a g e d  to e x t e n d  c u l t i v a t i o n  to 
these wa s t e  lands by the k n o w l e d g e  that the r e t u r n s  from 
them w o u l d  be theirs alone. The C om p an y ,  it was b e l i ev e d,  
w h i l e  s u r r e n d e r i n g  its c l a i m  to rent s f r o m land b r o u g h t  
c o n s e q u e n t l y  un de r  c u l t i v a t i o n ,  w o u l d  b e n e f i t  f r o m the 
g en e r a l  in c r e a s e  in p r o s p e r i t y  that s h o u l d  r esu lt . At the 
same time, the B o ar d  was c o n v i n c e d  that the d i v i s i o n  of the 
M ad r a s  t e r r i t o r i e s  into p r i v a t e  e s t a t e s  w o u l d  h elp  en su re  
the C o m p a n y  a r e g u l a r  and p r e d i c t a b l e  r e v e n u e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  as
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the estates themselves would become security for 'the due 
realization of the public jumma' insofar as they might be
sold by auction whenever it was necessary to pay arrears of
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rent.
The second advantage the Board expected from the
introduction of zamindari settlements was an overall
improvement in the relations between landholder and tenants
and between revenue officials and cultivators. While it
recognized that the introduction of zamindari estates would
reduce the bulk of the population to the status of
cultivating tenants, it believed that the example of the
Company's altruism would encourage the new zamindars to
emulate it and practice moderation in their dealings with
the ryots. Furthermore, while the tenants created by the
settlements could have 'no positive property in the soil',
they would have 'a right of occupancy as long as they
cultivated' and this could be protected by making it
compulsory for the new landlords to issue pattas stating,
among other things, the individual tenants' rents and the
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basis on which they had been assessed. The Board was 
convinced that zamindari settlements, supported by a 
judicial system modelled on that of Bengal, would in this 
way lead to less oppression of the peasantry than any other 
of the system so far experimented with.
The Board justified its decision to order the creation of 
zamindari estates by stating that, since all land belonged 
to the state, the Government could make grants of the sircar 
lands without destroying existing property rights. The Board
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found it necessary to reiterate its opinion that the
sovereign was sole proprietor of all land in South India
because the Government had clearly stated that no existing
property rights were to be violated as a consequence of the
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creation of zamindari estates. Five years earlier the Board
had established its position on the existence of private
property in an answer given to the Collector of the Jagir,
Lionel Place, after he had put forward the claims of the
mirasidars. ’Graduation of rank', the Board stated, 'is
inseparable from the growth of society.... From the
operation of it, the mirasi inhabitants have derived their
distinction which consists of a leading rank in the society
of the village and an increased proportion in the division .
of the ryots' share of the crop. The mirasi inhabitants then
bear the same relation as the other inhabitants to
government and both of them establish by hereditary
residence in a village not a right but a preference to the
cultivation of the soil, the proprietary right to which is
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exclusively vested in the sircar'.
The Board made it quite clear to Munro that the Government's
ultimate intention was that Kanara should be settled after
the Bengal System. Thomas Cockburn wrote to him in March,
ordering him to discover 'the general capacity of the
villages and their past average produce' and to begin the
work of dividing the districts into estates annually worth
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between one and five thousands pagodas. At the same time 
Cockburn wrote to Wellesley expressing complete agreement 
with the decision to introduce permanent settlements on the 
Bengal model into the territories under the Madras
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Government. The initial freedom of action granted Munro was
only that which the Board had allowed all the collectors
when they were informed that they were 'at full liberty to
adopt any mode of inquiry or investigation...most likely to
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obtain information1.
Munro was concerned not to be too precipitous in his
judgements and, this being the first time that he had been
*
permitted and required to communicate directly with the
Board, to tread carefully. He wrote to Cockburn to ask for
'a few hints about the etiquette of writing (to the Board)'
and at the same time he informed the Board that he would
require some time before he could provide them with the
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details that they had asked for. He explained that, apart
from the delays occasioned by the poligars and the
occupation of several districts by hostile forces, the
monsoons and the geography of the country made rapid
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progress in his investigations impossible. He also reported
another cause for delay which he considered peculiar to his
co1lectorate; the wide dispersion of the population. 'Both
in Canara and Soondah it is only bazaarmen, fishermen, etc
who live in villages. The cultivators of the soil almost
universally dwell in detached habitations, every man upon
his own land - so many days are frequently lost in drawing
together from the jungles the scattered inhabitants of what
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is called a village'.
By the end of April 1800, Munro had had his reply from
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Cockburn advising him on how to write to the Board. He had 
also completed his work on his first report, which he sent
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to the Board on 31 May. In this report on the district's 
'ancient and present state', Munro was at pains to hammer 
home three points - that prior to Haidar's conquest all 
lands had been held as private property, that the land tax 
had been 'lighter than that of any province in India', and 
that the country had consequently been very prosperous. It 
is clear that Munro wanted to discover these features in 
Kanara since they supported conclusions he had already 
reached in the Baramahal about economic and social 
development. There he had shown his preference for moderate 
settlements with small landholders but had only been able to 
justify his advocacy of these by arguing that such 
settlements encouraged greater investment in the land than 
did zamindari ones. The Company's decision to introduce the 
latter had shown Munro that such theoretical arguments alone 
were insufficient and that he must prove that private 
property had existed in the form in which he wished to see 
it re-introduced and that its presence in the economy had 
resulted in all the beneficial consequences he believed its 
reinstatement would have.
Munro claimed he had discovered after much research among 
the sanads and accounts that, when the Vijayanagar 
assessment had been made, the land had been parcelled out 
among a 'prodigious number' of small proprietors who 
annually paid taxes ranging from 5 to 5,000 pagodas. He 
stated that their estates were regarded as private property. 
The proprietors could sell, mortgage or rent them and the 
state, once it had received its fixed 'rents', had no right 
to make further claims on them. Munro explained that the
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g o v e r n m e n t ' s  grants of inams and jagirs sh o u ld  only be
r e g a r d e d  as grants of Its r i g h t  to the re nts and not as
e v i d e n c e  that cl a i m e d  a p r o p r i e t a r y  r i g h t  in the land. He
a r g u ed  that such gr an t s  c o n f e r r e d  no ri gh t s to the land or
its m a n a g e m e n t  since these w e r e  a l r e a d y  the p r o p e r t y  of the
l a n d h o l d e r s  who w er e  only e f f e c t e d  by the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  gr an t
in sof ar  as they w e r e r e q u i r e d  to pay their rents to the
gr an t e e s  in place of the g o v e r n m e n t .  In v i e w  of these
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  Mu n r o  argued, that the C o m p a n y  co ul d  give the
i n h a b i t a n t s  no n e w  ri g ht s  in the land since  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y
was 'a lready as st r o n g  as p u r c h a s e  or p r e s c r i p t i o n  can make
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it and as w e ll  u n d e r s t o o d  as it is in G r e a t  Br it ai n '.
M u n r o  b e l i e v e d  that the only w a y in w h i c h  the C o m p a n y  m i g h t  
raise the va l ue  of p r o p e r t y  w o u l d  be by r e d u c i n g  the level 
of its a s s e ss me n t,  by l o w e r i n g  the rents. He st at ed that the 
r e v e n u e  de ma n d s had al way s b e e n p i t c h e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  low 
u nd e r  the earl y H i n d u  g o v e r n m e n t s  'to have e n a b l e d  the. 
c o u n t r y  to a t t a i n  a hi gh d e gr e e  of c u l t i v a t i o n ' .  He adde d  
that the d e ma n d s had b ee n  f ix ed so that, u n l i k e  those of 
Myso re,  they had not f l u c t u a t e d  fr om  year to year a c c o r d i n g  
to the s up p o se d  a b i l i t y  of the c u l t i v a t o r s .  This had gi ve n  
'the i n h a b i t a n t s  as m u c h  c o m f o r t  and s e c u r i t y  as c ou l d  be 
e x p e c t e d  un d e r  an a r b i t r a r y  g o v e r n m e n t ' .  H a i d a r ' s  c o n q u e s t  
of K a n a r a  and his and T i p u 's  s u b s e q u e n t  m a n a g e m e n t  had 
r u i n e d  the e con omy . Not only had a g r i c u l t u r e  s u f f e r e d  as 
land was left u n c u l t i v a t e d ,  the p o p u l a t i o n  had d e c l i n e d ,  
f l o u r i s h i n g  towns had b e e n  d e s e r t e d  and c o m m e r c e  b e e n  
d e s t ro y e d.  A l t h o u g h  he a g r e e d  that this had p a r t l y  be e n  the 
c o n s e q u e n c e  of war, g e n e r a l  d i s o r d e r  and c o r r u p t  g o v e r n m e n t ,
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M u n r o  p r i n c i p a l l y  b l a m e d  the ’e x t r a o r d i n a r y  a u g m e n t a t i o n  of 
the land r e n t ’ w h i c h  had o c c u r r e d  un de r  these r ul ers  for the 
e c o n o m y ’s co ll ap s e.  This had r e d u c e d  the once p r o s p e r o u s  
f ar m e r s  to s u b s i s t e n c e  c u l t i v a t o r s  who, w i t h o u t  capital, 
w e r e  f o r c e d  to eke out a p r e c a r i o u s  e x i s t e n c e .  It had, in 
a d d i t i o n ,  r em o v e d  all i n c e n t i v e  to m a k e  i m p r o v e m e n t s .
W h e n  M u n r o  sent this f i r s t  r e p o r t  to the Bo ar d of Reve nu e,  
he was still f e e l i n g  his w ay  and was not yet p r e p a r e d  to 
take too p r o n o u n c e d  a pu b l i c  stand a g a i n s t  the i n t r o d u c t i o n  
of the Benga l z a m i n d a r i  s y s t e m  into M a dr a s , the p o l i c y  he 
k n e w  to be f a v o u r e d  by the G o v e r n m e n t .  W h i l e  he a r g ue d the 
m e r i t s  of a s e t t l e m e n t  w i t h  the small p r o p r i e t o r s  in his
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p r i v a t e  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  i n c l u d i n g  his lette rs  to W e l l e s l e y ,
in his r e p o r t  to the B oar d of R e v e n u e  he r e s t r i c t e d  h im s el f
to s t r o n g l y  u r g i n g  a r e d u c t i o n  in the g e n e r a l  level of
a s s e s s m e n t .  'Whether the Board m a y think it e x p e d i e n t  to
a d o p t  the a s s e s s m e n t  here p r o p o s e d  or any other as the
f o u n d a t i o n  of a p e r m a n e n t  s e t t l e m e n t ,  it is v e r y  clear
t h a t . . . i t  m u s t  be g r e a t l y  b e l o w  the e x i s t i n g  one'. He w r o t e
to C o c k b u r n  that the 'sooner the i n h a b i t a n t s  e x p e r i e n c e  the
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b e n e f i t s  of an a b a t e m e n t  of the rent, the be tt er ' .
M u n r o  had good r e a s o n s  to be c a u t io u s.  N e i t h e r  the 
G o v e r n m e n t  nor the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  s u p p o r t e d  r y o t w a r i  
s e t t l e m e n t s  w i t h  small p r o p r i e t o r s  si nce b o t h  we r e  
d e t e r m i n e d  to i n t r o d u c e  s e t t l e m e n t s  on the Be n ga l  mo del . In 
a le tt er  to Clive, W e l l e s l e y  r e a f f i r m e d  his s u p p o r t  for 
z a m i n d a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  and e x p r e s s e d  a s u s p i c i o n  that M u n r o  
did not  ag re e w i t h  hi m on this p o i n t  and t h e r e f o r e  not to be
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left u n s u p e r v i s e d .  'The m e r i t s  of C o l o n e l  Read are c e r t a i n l y
c o n s i d e r a b l e ' ,  he wrote , 'but his s y s t e m  is f u n d a m e n t a l l y
e r r o n e o u s . . . .  Ma jo r M u n r o ' s  able l et ter  to me aff o r ds  stron g
g r o u n d s  for a c o n f i d e n t  h op e that he is a wa r e  of the
f u n d a m e n t a l  er ror  of C o l o n e l  R e a d' s  s y s t e m  but I am still
c o n v i n c e d  that, to a p e r s o n  of Ma j o r M u n r o ' s  temp er  and
tale nts , the a s s i s t a n c e  of c o l l e a g u e s  w el l  a c q u a i n t e d  w i t h
the i n t e r n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of Be ng al w o u l d  be h i g h l y  
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a d v a n t a g e o u s ' .
E ve n t s  d u r i n g  the five m o n t h s  i n t e r v e n i n g  b e t w e e n  the
p r e s e n t a t i o n s  of his f i rs t  and s ec ond  r e p o r t s  e n c o u r a g e d
M u n r o  to be i n c r e a s i n g l y  o u t s p o k e n  in his a d v o c a c y  of
r y o t w a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  w i t h  small p r o p r i e t o r s .  F i r s t l y  a
n u m b e r  of m e n  w h o m  he k n e w  to s u p p o r t  ideas s im i l a r  to his
own or to be at least a n t i t h e t i c a l  to those b e h i n d  the pl ans
to i n t r o d u c e  the B en g a l  S y s t e m  into M a d r a s  had b ee n  p r o m o t e d
w i t h i n  the civil servi ce.  Some of these m e n  n ow  p u b l i c l y
v o i c e d  th ei r op p o s i t i o n .  In Ma rc h,  Hurd is,  w h o  had served
w i t h  M u n r o  un d er  Read in the B a r a m a h a l  and w ho  had r e c e n t l y
be en  a p p o i n t e d  the C o l l e c t o r  of D i n d i g u l ,  sent a r e p o r t  to
the B o a r d  of R e v e n u e  in w h i c h  he was s t r o n g l y  c r i t i c a l  of
the r e c e n t  mo v e s  to e x t e n d  z a m i n d a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  into the
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M a d r a s  t e r r i t o r i e s .  He o b j e c t e d  to the c r e a t i o n  of z a m i n d a r i  
e s t a t e s  on two gr ou nds ; the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  
w o u l d  d e p r i v e  the C o m p a n y  of a c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e v e n u e  b e c a u s e  
'a g r e a t  p o r t i o n  of the p r o c e e d s  to G o v e r n m e n t  u n d e r  the 
p r e s e n t  s y s t e m  sho u l d b e c o m e  the p r o p e r t y  of the c o n s t i t u t e d  
p r o p r i e t o r s ' ,  and the sale or t r a n s f e r  of land to f or m  these 
e s t a t e s  w o u l d  d e s t r o y  e x i s t i n g  r ig hts . He r e j e c t e d  claim s
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that a permanent settlement with much smaller units, with 
those whom he regarded as the present proprietors - the 
ryots - would increase the likelihood of bankruptcies. 
Provided the assessments were fixed at a moderate level, he 
argued that failures would be infrequent and, even should 
they occur, losses would be negligible since the smaller 
holdings might easily be transferred to new cultivators. At 
the same time he echoed Munro's opinions when he stated that 
the Government, by pitching the level of assessment 
significantly below that previously demanded by the Muslim 
rulers, could encourage agrarian development. 'By drawing 
less', he wrote, 'is greater room given for the employment 
of capital from the ryot's own profits in the improvement of 
his farm...which he would certainly lay out'.
Secondly, the general position of the military collectors
vis a vis the civilians had been substantially strengthened
and Munro had undoubtedly lost some of his anxiety that
civilian hostility threatened his future employment, felt
less need to avoid attracting attention to his position as a
military officer through open criticism of the Government's
policies. In May, Wellesley had recommended to Clive that he
employ two more officers as collectors, suggesting that
Sydenham and Marriott, the latter a close friend of Munro,
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receive such appointments. Clive himself had given clear 
evidence that he favoured the civil employment of military 
men. In June, when Webbe temporarily resigned as Chief 
Secretary to the Government in order to take up the post of 
Resident at Pune that Wellesley had offered him, Clive 
appointed Wilks to the vacated office. Although Wellesley
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overruled him, cancelling this appointment, it was only on
the pragmatic grounds that it had caused such a clamour
among the civilians that there was a danger the Directors
might be unfavourably influenced against the Government by
the 'combination of interest' which would assail them as a
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consequence of it.
A third consideration which undoubtedly encouraged Munro to
publicly express his views was the favour with which
Wellesley had treated the reports on Kanara that Munro had
sent him through semi-official channels. Since his arrival
on the west coast, Munro had been writing to Wellesley in
the hope of persuading him of the benefits to be derived
from the adoption of a policy of making settlements with
small proprietors. In these letters Munro had informed the
Governor-General of his discovery that all land in Kanara
had been held as private property and he had argued that,
prior to the arrival of Haidar and Tipu, the state's claims
had been limited to the rents traditionally fixed to the 
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fields. He had advanced his opinion that these two factors 
had led to land becoming a saleable commodity which had in 
turn encouraged investment in agrarian improvement. This, he 
claimed, was the principal cause of the overall prosperity 
the area had so clearly enjoyed. He expressed the view that 
the present depressed state of the economy was the 
consequence of the excessive revenue demands of Haidar's and 
Tipu's administrations. He believed that these had 
destabilised the system, destroyed the saleability of land 
and thereby directly caused a sharp decline in agricultural 
production. In view of this, Munro argued to Wellesley that,
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r a t h e r  t ha n  im po se z a m i n d a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  on the ryot
la n d l o r d s  of Kanar a, the C o m p a n y  sh o u ld  seek to i nt r o du c e  a
s y s t e m  b a s e d  on a p a r t i a l  r e t u r n  to w h a t  he c o n s i d e r e d  to
have b e e n  the t r a d i t i o n a l  Hi n d u  m ode l. A l t h o u g h  he was not
a b s o l u t e l y  co n vi n c e d ,  W e l l e s l e y  was i m p r e s s e d  by Mun r o' s
letters. 'I ha ve r e c e i v e d  f rom  C a p t a i n  M u n r o  in Cana ra' , he
w r o t e  to Cliv e, 'the m o s t  able  p ap e r  w h i c h  has come un de r my
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o b s e r v a t i o n  since my  a r r i v a l  in India'. Mu nro , w ho  could not 
h ave  b e e n  u n a w a r e  of the a p p r o v a l  w i t h  w h i c h  the 
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  v i e w e d  his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  was e n c o u r a g e d  
by it to r i s k  d i f f e r i n g  w i t h  the M a d r a s  B o ar d  of Re venue.
U n d o u b t e d l y  t h o u g h  the m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  fa c t o r  to in f l u e n c e
M u n r o ' s  d e c i s i o n  to en ter the r e v e n u e  p o l i c y  d e b a t e  as an
o p p o n e n t  of the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of z a m i n d a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  was
the c h a n g e  in the local g o v e r n m e n t s '  a t t i t u d e s  to war ds  the
p o l i ga r s.  W h e r e a s  b e f o r e  the C o m p a n y  had ho p e d  to d i s m a n t l e
the p o l i g a r i  s y s t e m  p e a c e f u l l y  by s l o w l y  t r a n s f o r m i n g  these
m en  into z a m i n d a r s ,  the s u c c e s s f u l  s u p p r e s s i o n  of the
e a s t e r n  p o l i g a r s  of T i r u n e l v e l i  e n c o u r a g e d  the B r i t i s h
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to take a seri es  of c o e r c i v e  m e a s u r e s
c a l c u l a t e d  to curb the i n f l u e n c e  of these a u x i l i a r y  powers.
The r e l a t i v e s  of K a t t a b o m m a n ,  the c h i e f t a i n s  of N a g a l a p u r a m ,
Y e z h a y i r a m p a n n a i , K o l a r p a t t i  and K u l a t t o o r  w e r e  all 
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i m p r i s o n e d .  Th e s e  d i s t r i c t s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  those of
P a n j a l a m k u r i c h i  and K a d a l g u d i ,  w e r e  ta ke n u n d e r  the d i r e c t
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of the C o m p a n y  ev en  though, by v i r t u e  of his
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s o v e r e i g n t y ,  they s h o u l d  ha ve bee n handied over to the Nawab. 
In a d d i t i o n ,  the C o m p a n y  a s s u m e d  t h r o u g h o u t  m o s t  of its 
t e r r i t o r i e s  the m i l i t a r y  and ka va l dutiies w h i c h  had be en  so
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long performed by the poligars and at the same time directly
collected the deshakaval and other established fees which
115
had been their prerogative. Orders were issued which
required the poligars to dismantle their forts and disband
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their armed establishments. Others prohibited the 
inhabitants from carrying fire arms and made the patels 
responsible for ensuring that weapons were not manufactured 
in their villages.
Initially the new policy had appeared to be successfully 
introducing the sort of changes in the political system of 
South India that the predominant party in the Company's 
local administrations had been seeking and, despite the 
anxieties expressed by the Court of Directors, this 
encouraged attitudes towards the poligars to harden. The 
outbreak of anti-British activity early in 1800, which 
certain elements in the home administration had feared, only 
persuaded the opponents of the poligari system that sterner 
measures were required and strengthened the general support 
given to men like Munro who argued that the auxiliary powers 
should be totally destroyed, not compromised with. 
Developments in Munro's attitudes at this time have to be 
analysed within this framework. The revolt, led by several 
prominent poligars among whom were Marudu Pandyan of 
Sivaganga, Gopal Nayak of Dindugal, Kerula Varma of Malabar 
and Krishnappa Nayak and Dhoondaji Waug of Mysore, that 
broke out after an abortive assault on Coimbatore on 3 June 
undoubtedly influenced Munro's decision speak out against 
settlements which would allow the poligars, albeit 
transformed into zamindars, to continue to exercise
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considerable local influence.
The fifth factor which influenced Munro while he prepared
his second report to the Board of Revenue on Kanara was his
appointment on 27 September as Principal Collector of the 
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Ceded Districts. It is some measure of his standing with the
Governor-Genera 1 and the Government of Madras that Munro was
kept fairly closely informed of the developments occurring
in the course of Wellesley's negotiations with the Nizam and
that, as soon as it was known that the Ceded Districts were
to be surrendered to the Company, he should have been
encouraged to apply for the position of Principal Collector.
The orders he received from Webbe on 4 October to leave for
his new district must have encouraged him to offer his
suggestions for the settlement of his old district before he
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should no longer be in a position to influence events there.
Together these factors led Munro to feel more secure in his 
civil career than he had ever done before and it was 
probably as a consequence of this that he felt suuficiently 
confident to risk airing his own views. Now, for the first 
time, he publicly clearly stated his opposition to the 
extension of the Bengal System into the territories under 
the Madras Government and admitted that the settlements he 
had made in Kanara were essentially ryotwari. In a letter to 
Cockburn, whom he knew to be a proponent of zamindari 
settlements, Munro revealed that he had made his settlements 
with over twenty thousand small proprietors, assessing the 
revenues they were to pay according to the existing fixed 
rents that he claimed were both generally known and already
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attached to the fields. Recognizing that Cockburn, as a
member of the Board, would be principally concerned with
ensuring a regular and predictable revenue, Munro explained
the advantages of his settlements in just such terms. In the
report he sent in November to the Board itself, Munro
repeated the argument, stating that he did not believe that,
'by any arrangement for placing a number of small estates
under the collection of one head landlord, any facility in
collection, any security for revenue, would be obtained that
may not be obtained from letting the estates as they now 
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stand'. He insisted that no more difficulties were
experienced collecting the revenues from the large number of
small proprietors than from a few zamindars. However, being
aware that the Board was primarily interested in maximizing
agricultural production, he added a second strand to his
argument. 'The aggregate produce of the land', he wrote,
'may be, and probably always is, greater with small
proprietors than when the whole belongs to a few principal 
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landholders'. Aware that his report would probably be
forwarded to the home authorities, whom he knew to be
particulary concerned that existing rights should not be
violated, Munro included a third argument in support of his
settlement policy. He stressed that private property did
exist in Kanara and stated that 'great proprietors cannot be
established without annihilating all the rights of the
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present landlords'.
But, while Munro was 'decidedly in favour of small 
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proprietors', he had no wish to unnecessarily antagonize 
those who supported the extension of the Bengal System into
the Madras territories. He had at the least to pay lip 
service to his instructions and he therefore put forward a 
few suggestions as to how a form of zamindari settlement 
might be introduced into Kanara. An analysis of these 
suggestions reveals how little his ideas had in common with 
those of the proponents of the Bengal System. The zamindari 
settlements he recommended would not create a class of large 
landowners but rather one of Indian middlemen who, in return 
for accepting the responsibility of collecting the land 
rents on behalf of the British, would be rewarded with 
commissions calculated as a percentage of the net receipts. 
This scheme only differed from that which Warren Hastings 
had attempted to establish insofar as Munro was prepared to 
confer the proprietorship of the ownerless waste lands onto 
these zamindars whom he hoped might be encouraged to invest 
the incomes they derived from the collections into the 
development of these lands.
At the same time that he argued the merits of settlements
with small proprietors and publicly declared his opposition
to the extension of the Bengal System, Munro also expounded
his personal theory of Indian agrarian development which,
not surprisingly, strongly supported his views. Munro
claimed that the history of revenue settlements in India
could be viewed as a process by which large estates were
broken down into smaller ones, settlements with great
landholders gradually replaced by ones with the actual
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cultivators of the soil. He stated that the laws and customs 
of India, where primogeniture and entails were unknown, 
always led to large estates becoming fragmented. His
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analysis of conditions in Kanara, which had first suggested 
these ideas to him, he now employed to support his 
conclusions. Having formulated this theory of general 
development, Munro combined it with an assertion that Kanara 
was the most prosperous of the South Indian territories, 
claiming that the one was the consequence of the other since 
Kanara had progressed further along this path than any other 
area under the authority of the Madras Government. Any 
attempt to re-introduce large estates must, he argued, 
represent a retrogression to an earlier stage of social and 
economic development which, unless Indian customs were 
significantly altered by the British, must ultimately be 
eroded.
During the sixteen months that he was Collector of Kanara,
Munro appears to have paid little attention to the judicial
administration of the district. He was, like Read had been
in the Baramahal, fully occupied with the settlement of the
revenues. However, in the monsoon months during which travel
was restricted, he did preside over a large number of
disputes involving landed property and, on the strength of
his experiences, he suggested that a register of the rents
and produce of all land which became subject to litigation
would, in a few years, enable the British to ’form a more
accurate judgement of the average produce than could be done 
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from a survey’. With this exception, Munro appears to have 
ha.d little time in which to become actively involved in the 
general administration of civil and criminal justice. It 
would, however, be a mistake to extrapolate from this the 
idea that Munro was uninterested in this aspect of the
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district's administration.
Munro believed that, as a collector, he had been invested
with full judicial authority and he felt that this was only
as it should be. Psychologically he found it difficult to
share authority and it suited him to argue, with a variety
of justifications, that the collector should be 'the only
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head man' in his district. His suggestion to Cockburn that,
were it possible, he should be given overall command of the
military forces in his district revealed the extent of his
ambition and his ability to conceal this behind a facade of
public concern. 'If I had had the command in Canara', he
wrote, 'it would have greatly facilitated the settlement and
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possibly have prevented some of the disturbances'. As was so 
often the case, Munro had some genuine justification for 
seeking a modification of the situation which would clearly 
be to his advantage. The existence of fourteen military 
stations in Kanara and the constant changes in command must 
have made his task harder yet it is unlikely that this 
consideration alone prompted him to suggest that he be 
promoted over the heads of senior officers.
Yet, while he recognized he had to share his command with
the military, he was determined that he should be the sole
civil authority. When Colonel Mignon informed him that some
Europeans in Kanara refused to accept the jurisdiction of
the Indian magistrates he had installed and wanted European
judges appointed, Munro refused to consider any dilution of
his authority and insisted that all such cases should be 
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referred to him. He justified his decision the grounds of
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practicality but it seems clear that he was anxious to
preserve his independence of action. The Europeans who had
resided at the Presidency, he stated, might have become
accustomed to British courts but must accept that, in the
districts, the collector's authority was paramount. 'In all
distant provinces', he insisted, 'the revenue, the judicial
authority and every power but the military is in the hands
of the collector. There is no magistrate but him'.
Determined to preserve his position, Munro wrote and
informed Padre Joseph Mendez that, though the Church might
exercise its usual powers of coercion, censure and
excommunication, he could not allow it to otherwise punish
its members. This must remain his prerogative as the
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representative of civil authority.
When Munro left Kanara to take over control of the Ceded
Districts, he took with him well developed ideas of how the
judicial and revenue administrations of the Presidency
should be structured. In the case of the former, he believed
that judicial authority should be vested in the executive,
that the collector should be the unchallenged head of his
district. All the seeds of his future opposition to the
Company'8 judicial line were already sown. In the case of
the latter, he had begun to formulate the basic ideas of a
system which would combine his economic theories with his
observations of Indian actualities. He wanted to see 'a wide
diffusion of property and a permanent certain revenue 
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(demand)'. He believed that the only means by which this 
might be achieved was the adoption of a policy under which 
settlements would be made with small, independent yeomen
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proprietors after unalterably fixed rents had been assigned 
to all fields individually. The theory of India's general 
development that he had evolved now gave him a framework of 
reference within which he might argue his policies. In many 
respect Munro's experiences in Kanara were formative, 
crystalizing ideas he had brought with him and directing 
their future development.
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Chapter Five
The Eclipse of the 'New School':
Munro in the Ceded Districts, 1800-1808.
The period during which Munro administered Kanara 
represented the first high water mark for the 'new school' 
party within the East India Company. Wellesley's authority, 
strongly supported by Dundas at the Board of Control, was 
unchallenged. His policies, while not always meeting with 
the full approval of the Court of Directors, were not 
seriously questioned. In Madras, his supporters had acquired 
a predominant position in the government of the Presidency 
and their ideas were determining British policy. Over the 
next seven years however, the situation was to be reversed. 
In this chapter, the importance of the possession of 
influence as a major factor determining promotion in the 
Company's service emerges. The role that Munro's friends 
among the Governor-General's circle of supporters in India 
played in advancing his career is examined together with the 
other considerations which prompted Wellesley to employ him. 
At the same time, the struggle for power between the 'old' 
and 'new schools', their respective allies in Britain, and 
the Court of Directors and the Board of Control is reviewed.
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Its i m pa c t  on the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  is a n a l y s e d  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  its c o n s e q u e n c e s  for M u n r o  p e r s o n a l l y .  In 
a d d i t i o n ,  the f a c t o r s  w h i c h  i n f l u e n c e d  the d e v e l o p m e n t  of 
M u n r o ' s  ideas c o n c e r n i n g  the C o m p a n y ' s  r e v e n u e  and judi cia l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  are ex am ine d, e s p e c i a l l y  the rea s on s  and 
m o t i v e s  b e h i n d  his e m e r g e n c e  as an o u t s p o k e n  op po n e n t  of the 
Be ng a l Sy st em . The v a r i o u s  m e t h o d s ,  fo r m al  and informal, 
that M u n r o  e m p l o y e d  to a d v a n c e  his p o l i c i e s  are also 
d e s c r i b e d .
The d e f e a t  and de a t h  of T ipu  and the s u b s e q u e n t  B r i t i s h
a n n e x a t i o n  of M y s o r e  r e m o v e d  f ro m  So u th  In dia the p owe r
w h i c h  had b e e n  r e g a r d e d  as the p r i n c i p a l  t h r ea t  to the
C o m p a n y ' s  a u t h o r i t y  in the area. A v a c u u m  n ow a p p e a r e d  w h i c h
had se r i o u s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  for the Bo a r d of C o n t r o l ' s
e x p a n s i o n i s t ,  i mp e r i a l  p o l i c i e s  i ns of a r as they co ul d no
longer r e l y  u p o n  the p e r c e i v e d  t h r e a t  fr om  M y s o r e  to j u s ti f y
a g g r e s s i v e  m e a s u r e s  d e s i g n e d  to e x t e n d  B r i t i s h  control, over
areas w h i c h  the C o m p a n y  had no ot her cl a i m  to. New  enemies
w ere  r e q u i r e d  and Du nd as  fo un d  t he m in the M a r a t h a s  w h o m  he
now ch os e to r e g a r d  as a t h r e a t  to the s t a b i l i t y  of C e n t r a l
India, p a r t i c u l a r l y  to the C o m p a n y ' s  ally the N i z a m  of
H y d e r a b a d .  Th a t the d e c i s i o n  to r e g a r d  the M a r a t h a s  as a
m a j o r  t h r e a t  to p e a c e  was as m u c h  a m a t t e r  of p o l i c y  as a
r e a c t i o n  to the r e a l i t i e s  of the s i t u a t i o n  is pe r h a p s
i m p o s s i b l e  to d e f i n i t i v e l y  pr o v e  but c i r c u m s t a n t i a l  e v i d e n c e
does s t r o n g l y  s u g g e s t  that this was so. D u n d as  had i n fo r m e d
Francis in 1791 that the Marathas could never be dangerous
to B r i t i s h  p o w e r ,  an o p i n i o n  he had s h a r e d  w i t h  C o r n w a l l i s  
1
and W e l l e s l e y .  Now, faced by o p p o s i t i o n  a m o n g s t  the
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D i r e c t o r s  to his p o l i c y  of c o n t i n u i n g  B r i t i s h  ex pan s i on , he
r e v e r s e d  his ea r l i e r  views and e m p l o y e d  the M a r a t h a  threat
to o ve r r i d e  the Co u r t ' s  o b j e c t i o n s .  'As it m u s t  be th rou gh
the M a r a t h a s  that any E u r o p e a n  riva ls m u s t  h e n c e f o r w a r d
l o o k . . . t o  d i s t u r b  our p ow er in India', he argued, it was not
2
only e x p e d i e n t  but g e n u i n e l y  n e c e s s a r y  to e n c i r c l e  them. To
this end, he or de r e d that the B o m ba y  m i l i t a r y  e s t a b l i s h m e n t
be i n c r e a s e d  and s u g g e s t e d  that the po rts of Diu and Goa be
3
p u r c h a s e d  from P or tu ga l.
W e l l e s l e y  e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  e n d o r s e d  D u n d a s 's v ie w s  and took
them m u c h  fu r th e r  than the latter who, f ace d by the rapid
i n c r e a s e  in the India n debt that had be e n  the i n e v i t a b l e
r e s u lt  of his a g g r e s s i v e  p o l i c y  and w e a r y  of war, only
a pp e a r s  to have w i s h e d  to use the M a r a t h a  th rea t as a
p o l i t i c a l  tool to ga in s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t i v e s  in his
i n t e r m i t t e n t  s t r u g g l e s  w i t h  the other b r a n c h e s  of the home
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  W hy else sh ou ld  he have b r o u g h t  the s u b je c t
of E u r o p e a n  ri va l s  into what, u n d e r  the c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  m i g h t
have be en r e g a r d e d  as a p u r e l y  I ndi an q u e s t i o n  w e r e  he not
p l a y i n g  w i t h  B r i t i s h  fears to gain a p o l i t i c a l  a d v a n t a g e ?
W e l l e s l e y  and his s u p p o r t e r s  in India had a qu it e d i f f e r e n t
c o n c e p t i o n ,  v i e w i n g  f u rt h er  B r i t i s h  e x p a n s i o n  as an end in
itself. C ha r l e s  M e t c a l f e ,  w h o  was se r v i n g  in W e l l e s l e y ' s
s e c r e t a r i a t ,  c a p t u r e d  the e s s e n c e  of the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l 's
ideas w h e n  he wr o t e  that the a im of B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  sh ou l d  be
'to a pp l y  the net r e v e n u e s  of c o n q u e r e d  c o u n t r i e s  to the
m a i n t e n a n c e  of a d d i t i o n a l  fo rc e and the a c q u i s i t i o n  of
4
a d d i t i o n a l  force to the a c h i e v e m e n t  of ne w c o n q u e s t s ' .  The 
d i f f e r e n c e  of op i n i o n  that was e m e r g i n g  b e t w e e n  Du nd as  and
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W e l l e s l e y  was b r o u g h t  s h a r p l y  into focus w h e n  the latter
s u g g e s t e d  to the h om e a u t h o r i t i e s  that the Indian army
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  s h o u l d  be i n c r e a s e d  f r om  80,000 to 150,000 me n
and that, s h o u l d  it be n e c e s s a r y ,  m o r e  t e r r i t o r y  be a c q u i r e d
to s u p p o r t  the la rg e r army. Du n d a s  r e f u s e d  to su p po rt
W e l l e s l e y  and i n f o r m e d  him that he was only  p r e p a r e d  to see
5
the army establishment increased to 95,000 men.
In v i e w  of the B oa r d  of C o n t r o l ' s  a t t i t ud e,  W e l l e s l e y  was 
f o r c e d  to p r o c e e d  c a r e f u l l y .  D u r i n g  1800, W e l l e s l e y  m a d e  his 
fi rs t  use of the p e r c e i v e d  M a r a t h a  th r e at  to j u s ti f y  the 
a c q u i s i t i o n  of t e r r i t o r y  by treaty. He a r g u e d  that a bi n d i n g  
a l l i a n c e  w i t h  the H y d e r a b a d  was n e c e s s a r y  if the M a r a t h a s  
were  to be c o n t a i n e d  and in s i s t e d  that, un d e r  the 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  it was v it al that the B r i t i s h  sh o u l d  
s t r e n g t h e n  the N i z a m ' s  g o v e r n m e n t .  He took the t r ea t y  of 
1798, w h i c h  had b e e n  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  Mys o re ,  and m o d i f i e d  
it to take a c c o u n t  of the c h a n g e d  c o n d i t i o n s  by e n l a r g i n g  
its scope u n t i l  it b e c a m e  a g e n e r a l  d e f e n s i v e  t r e a t y  a g ai n s t  
all p o w e r s .  In eff e c t,  the B r i t i s h  w e r e to take the N iz a m  
u n d e r  their  p r o t e c t i o n  in r e t u r n  for w h i c h  he s u r r e n d e r e d  to 
them all the t e r r i t o r i e s  he had a c q u i r e d  fr om  M y s o r e  in 1792 
and 1799.
The c o u n t r y  w h i c h  n o w  p a s s e d  to the C o m p a n y  was k n o w n  as the 
C e d e d  D i s t r i c t s  (Map 2, page  ), an ar ea  of some 20,000 
sq ua r e  m i l e s  c o n t a i n i n g  an e s t i m a t e d  p o p u l a t i o n  of n e a r l y  
two m i l l i o n .  A l t h o u g h  it was cl ea r  that the Ce d ed  D i st r i c t s ,  
ta ken  t o g e t h e r ,  f o r m e d  an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  u ni t far larger 
than any that  h ad  yet b e en  f o r m e d  by the B r i t i s h  in the
M a d r a s  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  Clive, w ho  was t o t a l l y  un d e r the
i n f l u e n c e  of Webbe, s u g g e s t e d  to W e l l e s l e y  that the ar e a
s h o u ld  be p l a c e d  un d e r the a u t h o r i t y  of one man. It w o u l d  be
best, he wrote, to ’ve st the w h o l e  civil g o v e r n m e n t  in one
c o l l e c t o r  w i t h  ge n e r a l  p o w e r s  of s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e  and
co ntr ol , and to a p p o i n t  a s u f f i c i e n t  n u mb e r  of i n f e r i o r
c o l l e c t o r s  for the e x e c u t i o n  of the d e t a i l e d  d ut ies  of
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r e v e n u e  and i n v e s t i g a t i o n ' .  W e l l e s l e y  a c c e p t e d  C l i ve 's
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  and M u n r o  was a p p o i n t e d  p r i n c i p a l  c o l l e c t o r
w i t h  James Co chr a n e,  John R a v e n s h a w ,  A l e x a n d e r  S t o d a r t  and
7
W i l l i a m  T h a c k e r a y  as his s u b o r d i n a t e  a s s i s t a n t  c o l l e c t o r s .
M u n r o  owed his a p p o i n t m e n t  as P r i n c i p a l  C o l l e c t o r  of the 
Ce de d  D i s t r i c t s  to his f r i e n d s h i p  w i t h  W e b b e  and to 
W e l l e s l e y ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  of hi m as a s t a u n c h  s u p p o r t e r  of 
f u r t h e r  B ri t is h e x p an s i on .  We b b e u n d o u b t e d l y  e n c o u r a g e d
Cl ive  to r e c o m m e n d  M u n r o ' s  a p p o i n t m e n t  to the
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  e ven  t h o ug h  he was aw ar e that M u n r o  o p p o s e d  
the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the p e r m a n e n t  z a m i n d a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  
f a v o u r e d  by the Benga l G o v e r n m e n t .  We b b e  ap p e a r s  to ha ve  
c o r r e c t l y  judge d that W e l l e s l e y  was m o re  c o n c e r n e d  to 
a p p o i n t  m en  who s u p p o r t e d  his ge n e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  p o l i c i e s  
than he was to see the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of C o r n w a l l i s ' s  r e f o r m s  
into Madra s, a p o l i c y  that was s o m e w h a t  lower in his list of 
p r i o r i t i e s .  There can be no d o u b t  that W e l l e s l e y  was 
d e t e r m i n e d  to fill the i m p o r t a n t  of f ic e s  in Ma dr as,  
e s p e c i a l l y  those in n e w l y  a c q u i r e d  and p o t e n t i a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  
areas, w i t h  his own men. His a p p o i n t m e n t  of his b r o t h e r  
A r t h u r  to the c om m a n d  of the t ro ops  or d e r e d  to e s t a b l i s h  
B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t y  in the C e d e d  D i s t r i c t s  s u p p o r t s  this view.
222
It is e q u a l l y  c le a r  that he had come to r e g a r d  Mu n r o  as a
m an  on w h o m  he m i g h t  rely for supp ort . 'Tom is in hi gh
f a v o u r  w i t h  L o r d  M o r n i n g t o n ' ,  M u n r o ' s  b r o t h e r  had w r i t t e n  to
8
their f a t h e r  f r om  Bengal.
W e l l e s l e y  did not, h ow e v er ,  m a k e  the a p p o i n t m e n t  w i t h o u t
some r e s e r v a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  M u n r o ' s  r e v e n u e  p o l i ci e s . Six
w e e k s  af t e r  M u n r o  had b e en  or d e r e d  to p r o c e e d  to his new
d is t r i c t ,  W e l l e s l e y  s u g g e s t e d  to W e b b e  that it m i g h t  be a
b e t t e r  idea to r e m o v e  him fr om  the post, a p p o i n t i n g  him
i n s t ea d  the R e s i d e n t  at Myso re . In this p o st  M u n r o  m i g h t  be
e x p e c t e d  to a d v a n c e  W e l l e s l e y ' s  aims w i t h o u t  their
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e i n g  c o m p l i c a t e d  by d i s a g r e e m e n t  over r ev e n u e  
9
po lic y.  In ad d i t i o n ,  W e l l e s l e y  b e l i e v e d  the m o v e  w o u l d  free
B arr y Close , a n o t h e r  s t a u n c h  s u p p o r t e r  of his po li ci e s , and
a l l o w  his a p p o i n t m e n t  as R e s i d e n t  of Pune. In this way
W e l l e s l e y  c o u l d  k eep  We b b e  in his of f ic e  as Chie f S e c r e t a r y
to the M a d r a s  G o v e r n m e n t  and en s u r e  that three of the m os t
i m p o r t a n t  po st s  in South India sh ou l d be fi ll ed  by m en  w h o s e
ideas c o n c o r d e d  w i t h  his own. Webbe,  w ho  a p p r e c i a t e d  M u nr o ' s
s u p p o r t  for his p o l i c y  of s u p p r e s s i n g  the p o l i g a r s ,  did not
w i s h  to lose so v a l u a b l e  an ally from  a p ost  in w h i c h  he
m i g h t  a c t i v e l y  a d v a n c e  this aim. He s u g g e s t e d  to the
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  that M u n r o ' s  p r e s e n c e  in the Ce d e d
D i s t r i c t s  was i n d i s p e n s a b l e  and r e c o m m e n d e d  W ilk s, M a c l e o d
10
or H u r d i s  for the M y s o r e  a p p o i n t m e n t .  In the face of W e b b e ' s  
a r g u m e n t s ,  W e l l e s l e y  a c q u i e s c e d  to M u n r o ' s  c o n t i n u e d  
e m p l o y m e n t  in the r e c e n t l y  c r e a t e d  office  of P r i n c i p a l  
C o l l e c t o r .
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When Munro entered his new district, he must have felt that 
his future was at last secure. He knew he stood high in the 
Governor-General 1s favour and he had no reason to suspect 
that gathering opposition in the Court to Wellesley’s 
policies was about to put his career in jeopardy. Neither 
could he have foreseen that his influential friends in the 
Madras Government were shortly to be removed from power by 
an alliance of dissatisfied civil servants, the Nawab of 
Arcot's creditors and Wellesley's enemies among the 
Directors. Yet, within a year, Dundas would retire, 
Wellesley's administration would be the subject of severe 
criticism, Clive forced to resign, Webbe removed, the Board 
of Revenue staffed by men personally antagonistic to Munro 
and the employment of military collectors under serious 
attack.
In 1797, Scott had maintained that it was necessary to
i nc r e as e  the C o m p a n y ' s  I n v e s t m e n t s  and home sales. As a
means of augmenting the Investment, Scott had persuaded
Dundas to induce the Directors to admit India-built ships
11
into the Company's trade, even though this directly 
threatened the interests of those men who belonged to the 
powerful pressure group known as the 'Shipping Interest'. 
This party, composed of a small group of London capitalists 
who had gained the monopoly of building ships for the 
Company, their agents, the ships1 cap tains and the large 
body of men whose capital was employed in docking, fitting 
and equipping these ships, was centred in London, easily 
mobilized and exercised considerable influence over the 
Court through the large number of votes it could command in
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the Court of Proprietors. Control of these votes enabled it
to ensure the election of supporters and representatives.
The principal concern of the 'Shipping Interest' was the
protection of its members' monopoly of the Company's
shipping which allowed the owners to negotiate high freight
rates with the Company through their representative
12
organization, the Committee of Managing Owners.
Despite the opposition of the 'Shipping Interest', Dundas
had persuaded the Court in May 1798 to sanction a scheme
whereby Wellesley was permitted to appropriate India-built
ships and re-let them to merchants in that country at the
13
Company's normal freight rates. The intention was to 
increase the volume of trade passing through the Company 
without damaging the interests of the shipowners by making 
provision for the transport of freight which had not been 
provided for in the Company's ships. Wellesley however had 
taken advantage of his orders to attempt the removal of the 
Indian trade from foreign hands by making the employment of 
ships under the Company's control more attractive to 
independent merchants. He believed that the Company was 
losing cargoes to foreign ships because its freight rates 
were not competitive and the system of scheduled sailings 
too inflexible. He had therefore appropriated the 
India-built ships and then allowed the owners to settle 
their own freight rates and arrange their sailing dates. 
Dundas secretly approved his plans but was unable, in the 
face of the strong opposition of the 'Shipping Interest' 
which was convinced that Wellesley's actions would enable 
the merchants in India to trade more cheaply than the
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Company and ultimately undermine their shipping monopoly, to
prevent the despatch of orders commanding the
Governor-General to strictly adhere to the terms of the
14
Directors' original plan.
In April 1800, two of Dundas's firmest supporters, Inglis
and Scott, were elected to the chairs and this encouraged
Dundas to intervene on behalf of Wellesley's shipping
policy. He invited the Directors to reconsider the
15
possibility of admitting India-built shipping. He was 
immediately confronted by strong opposition from the 
'Shipping Interest' whose position was strengthened at this 
time by news that Wellesley had permitted part of the 
Investment to be carried by India-built ships, even though
16
some of the Company's ships had been despatched half-loaded.
In January 1801, the Court published a reply to Dundas's
17
letter that was strongly critical of Wellesley's policy.
This encouraged the private traders, led by Thomas Henchman
and Sir George Dallas, to open a pamphlet campaign directed
against the 'Shipping Interest'. They failed however to
undermine the support for Wellesley's and Dundas's opponents
who secured the votes of four-fifths of the Proprietors when
18
the matter was debated in the General Court. Suffering from 
ill-health and discouraged by the opposition he faced in the 
Court, Dundas resigned shortly before Pitt's Ministry left 
office in March 1801. His departure took Wellesley's 
principal source of support from him at the very time that 
his actions had aroused considerable antagonism towards him 
in the Court.
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Meanwhile, the activities of the Madras Government operating
un d e r  the i n f l u e n c e  of C li v e  and W e b b e  w er e  d i s t u r b i n g
another powerful interest group, the Arcot creditors, which
had members in both India and Britain. For some time the
M a d r a s  G o v e r n m e n t  had b ee n d e t e r m i n e d  to e x te n d  its
authority over the Indian states of South India but had been
consistently and successfully opposed by the Nawab and his
advisers in the Carnatic, by Amir Singh in Tanjore and by
the N a w a b 's European creditors who feared that such moves
represented a threat to their interests. Hobart's attempt in
1795 to persuade the Nawab to entrust the Madras Government
with authority to collect the revenues and reorganize the
poligari system had failed when the Nawab declared he would
never deviate from the Treaty of 1792. In 1799, encouraged
by the successful annexation of Tanjore, further attempts
had been made by the Government to assume control over the
Carnatic which only Umdut-u1-Umara's strict observation of
the s t i p u l a t i o n s  i m p o s e d  by T r e a t y  and his d e t e r m i n e d
resistance to attempts to find excuses to proceed with the
annexation of his country had avoided. On 15 July 1801,
Umdut-ul-Umara died after naming his son Ali Hussain as his 
19
successor. Clive immediately advised the new Nawab to
surrender the Carnatic to the British, making this the
condition of British recognition of his title even though,
strictly speaking, no such recognition was required. Upon
Ali Hussain's categorical refusal to comply, Clive
proclaimed Azim-u1-Dou1a the new Nawab. Ali Hussain's
fortuitous death, under suspicious circumstances, a few days
later prevented the emergence of any direct opposition to 
20
Clive's action. The new Nawab, who had little to lose and
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much to gain, accepted an allowance in return for the
transfer of the administration of the Carnatic to the
British. The Carnatic Treaty was signed on 31 July 1801,
21
effectively ending the N a w a b 1s rule.
This action by the Madras Government provoked an immediate
reaction among the N a w a b 's creditors. In a letter to Hobart
in which he informed his one-time patron of his active
participation in the annexation of the Carnatic, Webbe
described how this development had angered these men and
22
made him an object of their hostility. It is probable that 
the creditors had good cause to fear that the policies Webbe 
was pursuing threatened their interests. He was known to 
support the views of Hobart and Wellesley, both of whom had 
expressed doubts as to the validity of the N a w a b 's debts. 
Hobart had opposed the home authorities' decision to order 
the Madras Government to pay all claims and was to say later
that he considered most of the Carnatic and Tanjore debts to
23
be fraudulent. Wellesley informed Hobart that he was of the
same opinion and used the emotive word 'usurers' to describe
24
the creditors. Most important of all, Webbe made no secret
of his opposition to the Court's orders, contained in their
political despatch of June 1801, which instructed the
Government to employ a part of the Carnatic revenues to pay
25
the Nawab's debts. He clearly stated that, in his opinion, 
these debts should be regarded as the Nawab's private 
concern, outside the cognizance and responsibility of the 
Company. The adoption of such a policy would have had far 
reaching financial consequences for the creditors.
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Opposition to Clive's Government was not restricted to the 
speculators in the Carnatic and Tanjore debts. As has been 
observed in previous chapters, there had long existed deep 
divisions between the military and civil branches of the 
Company's service in Madras that were the direct consequence 
of a rivalry which had developed from a perceived clash of 
interests. The decision to employ Read and his three 
military assistants in the Baramahal had exacerbated the 
situation which had not been improved by the appointments of 
Munro, Macleod and Graham as collectors after the Treaty of 
Seringapatam. Closely linked to this division in the Madras 
Administration had been the emergence of two distinct and 
mutually antagonistic schools of thought, known to 
contemporaries as the 'Old' and 'New Schools'. The former, 
largely composed of the older civil servants who felt that 
their careers were threatened by the recent developments, 
had seen their rivals gradually acquiring a predominant 
influence over the Madras Government and with this a 
monopoly of the most important and lucrative appointments. 
Now they feared that Wellesley's activities, which they knew 
had the support of Clive's Government, actually placed their 
future employment in jeopardy.
From the time of his arrival in India, Wellesley had met 
resistance to his policies from the Company's civil 
servants, especially those in senior positions. This had 
encouraged him to conclude that the Company's civil 
administration needed to be drastically reformed in ways 
which would increase his control over its members. Hitherto 
seniority had been the guiding criterion of appointment and
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this had given the Governor-General no means of selecting
only his supporters for influential offices. Wellesley
appreciated that, should such subjective criteria as ability
and qualification which he all too often defined in terms of
support for his ideas replace that of seniority, he could
select his own men to fill important positions in the
administration without breaching regulations. In 1798, he
announced that 'no civil servant should be nominated to
offices of trust and responsibility until it shall have been
ascertained that he is sufficiently acquainted with the laws
and r e g u l a t i o n s ... and the se ve ra l l a n gu a ge s  the k n o w l e d g e  of
which is requisite for the due discharge of the respective
26
functions of such offices'. He informed the civil servants
that, after 1 January 1801, only those who had passed
examinations in these subjects would be regarded as eligible 
27
for employment.
Af ter the de f e a t  of Tipu, W e l l e s l e y  d e c l a r e d  his imper ia l
aims and s ta ted  that the C o m p a n y  w o u l d  n ow  r e q u i r e  'a
succession of able magistrates, wise and honest judges, and
skilful statesmen properly qualified to conduct the ordinary
28
movements of the great machine of Government'. Behind this
smokescreen, he actively began replacing the older,
commercially orientated civil servants who had resisted his
Ideas with younger men who supported his policies and shared
his ideal of empire. He justified his actions with the
s t a t e m e n t  that 'the civil s e r v a n t  of the E n g l i s h  Ea st  India
Company can no longer be considered as the agent of a
commercial concern; they are in fact the ministers and
29
of fi c e r s  of a p o w e r f u l  s o v e r e i g n ' .  A l t h o u g h  the p o w e r f u l
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sovereign he referred to was the British Crown, it was in 
fact his own authority he was consolidating.
His initial attempts to reform the civil service had the
support of Dundas and Scott. 'Your idea that worn out civil
servants should have pensions instead of the revenue and
other offices that they are in (and which are) suffering so
severely by this management', Scott wrote to Wellesley, 'is
30
perfectly correct'. His announcement in 1799 that he
intended to open a college at Fort William where all the
Company's newly appointed writers should spend three years
completing their education and acquiring a knowledge of
Indian languages, law and history received less support.
Dundas feared that 'such an assemblage of literary and
philosophical men w o u l d ... degenerate into a school of
Jacobinism in India' and the Court considered the scheme to
31
be unnecessarily extravagant. Only the Governor-General's
recent success in the war against Mysore prevented the home
authorities from immediately repudiating his actions. In
Madras the situation was quite different. The Government
enthusiastically embraced Wellesley's policy. Clive
expressed considerable interest in the College and called it
32
an excellent idea. On the other hand, those civil servants 
who were already opposed to Wellesley chose to regard it as 
further evidence that the Governor-General intended to 
extend his control over appointments and believed that he 
would employ this authority to promote only his supporters, 
many of whom were military men. Unable to attack the 
Governor-General, those civil servants who opposed him 
directed their hostility towards Clive's Government which
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they regarded as being little more Wellesley's obedient 
instrument.
Five men emerged as the leaders of the opposition to Clive
and Webbe - William Petrie, John Chamier, Murray Dick,
Lionel Place and Thomas Oakes. These men had both political
and personal reasons for wishing to see Clive's Government
removed. Politically, all of them were opposed to further
British expansion, particularly to the annexation of Tanjore
and the Carnatic. Petrie, Dick and Chamier had financial
interests in the Nawab's debts while all five of them
largely owed their influential positions in the hierarchy of
the Madras Administration to the patronage of friends and
supporters amongst the 'Arcot Interest' at the Court of 
33
Directors. It was not surprising then that, in common with 
their supporters at the Court, they should have resented 
what they saw as the undue influence of the Board of Control 
in the Company's management of its Indian possessions. In 
addition however, each of these men was strongly opposed to 
the extension of the permanent zamindari settlements into 
the Madras territories. Place in particular had strong 
feelings about this aspect of Wellesley's administration. 
While serving as the Collector of the Jagir from 1792 to 
1799, he had forcibly argued publicly against Wellesley's 
orders to make zamindari settlements when he had vigorously
34
upheld the claims of the mirasdars to ownership of the land. 
In the course of pressing for the recognition of their 
rights, he had not only argued the impolicy of introducing 
permanent settlements after the Bengal model into the south 
but he had also attacked the whole theoretical basis of
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Cornwallis's revenue system.
The personal motives of these men for their opposition to
Clive's administration were no less important than their
political ones. Webbe and Petrie had long been rivals. When
it was mooted that Petrie might be appointed Clive's
successor, Webbe had openly opposed the move. 'If Mr Petrie
should be permitted to succeed to the Government of Fort St
George', he had written to Hobart, 'you may prepare your
Lordship's mind to expect all the worst consequences of
35
corruption and inability'. While Hobart had been Governor,
he and Webbe had been determined to have Chamier and Place
removed from their posts because of their opposition to
Hobart's Carnatic policy and were only prevented from
achieving this aim by the powerful support these men
36
commanded in the Court of Directors. In addition, both Place
and Oakes were disappointed men. After Tipu's defeat, Oakes
had hoped to be appointed to the post of President of the
Mysore Commission and Place had expected to be moved from
the Jagir to one of the larger and more valuable districts
the Company had annexed. Wellesley's appointments of
37
military men had embittered both.
These opponents of Wellesley and his supporters in the 
Madras Government selected two aspects of Clive's 
administration for specific criticism. They claimed that he 
was undermining the structure of the local government in 
ways deliberately calculated to destroy the Court's control 
of it. By permitting Webbe to treat the Political, Military 
and Commercial Secretaries as no more than his deputies,
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Clive was accused of allowing his Chief Secretary to 
single-handedly manage the Government’s business. They 
stated that this was being done in order to prevent the 
Governor's Council from being able to supervise and check 
the executive'a activities. The idea implicit in their 
criticisms was that the executive had become an instrument 
of the Board of Control as a consequence of the latter's 
control over the appointment of the Governor. They suggested 
that the Council, whose members were still appointed by the 
Court alone and had to be selected from among their 
covenanted civil servants, represented the Director's only 
means of exercising any authority in the local
decision-making process and that it was for this reason that
Clive, under pressure from Wellesley, was deliberately
trying to destroy its ability to act independently by
refusing it access to information. Playing on the Directors'
sensitivity on the subject of their right to be consulted
about and included in the formulation of policy, the
opposition party in Madras insinuated to the Court that
Clive was not only ignoring his Council but the Court as
well. They claimed that the Court was not being fully or
immediately informed of the Government's activities and that
public matters were being secretly settled by Clive and
38
Wellesley in private correspondence.
The opposition's own reasons for selecting this particular 
aspect of Clive's administration for criticism could not be 
concealed and no attempts were made to do so since they 
served to support the general argument. The opposition 
believed that Clive and Webbe were deliberately promoting
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younger men, ignoring the claims of seniority in order to 
establish their own supporters within the bureaucracy. While 
this threatened the careers of men who opposed official 
policy, it also contravened the direct orders of the Court 
which had always placed considerable importance on seniority 
as a guiding feature in its structure, as well as the 
provisions of Pitt's India Act. By using this argument, the 
opposition undoubtedly hoped to alienate Clive's Government 
from both the Court and Parliament. The Directors could only 
view the adoption of appointment by merit as being 
potentially harmful to the careers of their proteges in 
circumstances where merit was too often equated with support 
for the Governor's and Governor-General's policies. 
Furthermore, the Directors' control over their local 
executives was already somewhat restricted by the 
consideration that these bodies might retaliate by attacking 
the careers of their sons and near relations in the 
Company's service. They did not wish to further strengthen 
the local executives' ability to do this. Parliament might 
also be expected to oppose the policy on the grounds that it 
could increase the Ministry's access, albeit indirectly 
through the Board of Control, to the East India patronage.
Closely linked to these criticisms of this aspect of Clive's 
administration were attacks on the Government's policy with 
regard to the poligars. The opponents of the Government 
argued that the local executive was deliberately pursuing a 
policy towards the poligars which not only contravened the 
Court's orders but represented a threat to the stability of 
the districts under the Madras Government. They chose to
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interpret the home authorities' orders, that had not been 
particularly clear, as instructions to recognize the 
poligars's claims to their lands and rejected the 
Government's view that considerations of expediency must 
determine action in individual cases. While the Government 
argued that, despite the fact that some of the poligars 
might indeed be representatives of the old Indian 
aristocracy, the majority were men who had taken advantage 
of the times to establish claims to rights that had no 
historical foundation, its opponents pressed for the general 
recognition of all claims which could not be proved to be 
definitely fraudulent. The two sides represented 
fundamentally different perceptions of how the Company 
should see its role in India. Wellesley's supporters in the 
administration clearly believed that the Company should 
reshape the socio-political structure of society after the 
British model while his opponents conceived its role to be 
limited to the maintenance of order. The former thought in 
terms of empire and development, the latter in terms of 
revenue and commerce.
When Clive and W e b b e 's opponents selected the 
administration's poligar policy as the target for attack, 
they were undoubtedly influenced in their decision by the 
relatively recent debates in Bengal over the position of the 
zamindars there and by the controversies Hastings's trial 
had brought about in Britain. They hoped to prove that 
Clive's Government, being unduly under military influence, 
was acting in a despotic manner towards the Company's 
subjects. For this reason they stressed the essentially
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peaceful character of the poligars and argued that they were
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in fact the Company's natural allies. They rejected claims 
that the poligars were invariably hostile to the British, 
stating that when this was the case, it was always because 
they had been forced into it by the actions of the 
Government.
The vacillating attitudes of the executive and Webbe's
attempts to implement an unofficial policy under cover of
the official, opened opportunities to the opposition for
attack. The official policy of the Madras Government, as it
had been explained to Munro in his instructions for dealing
40
with the poligars, was both unclear and contradictory. On
one h a n d , it was clearly the Government's intention to
reject the claims of the poligars wherever this could
possibly be justified provided this might be done without
arousing unnecessary opposition to its authority. Hence
Munro was informed that, with regard to the Government's
policy of rejecting 'such of the pretensions of the numerous
zemindars and polygars as may appear to have been revived
since the subversion of the Government of Tippoo Sultan',
though its justice could not be disputed, considerations of
local expediency would permit him to ignore it until the
Company should be in a position 'to apply a more adequate
force to the government of the provinces'. In other words,
41
as Beaglehole observes, local circumstances might alter the 
way in which the aggressive policy was to be put into effect 
without in any way altering its end. On the other hand, the 
Government stated that it might also be expedient not to 
dispossess the poligars. Munro was to 'appreciate the
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advantage to be expected from the continuance of hereditary 
possessions to the descendants of the ancient families'.
The unofficial policy of the Madras Government, which might
with justification be described as Webbe's policy, was much
more straight forward. Provided it might be done without
blatant, open aggression on the part of the British and so
long as there was no danger that its adoption was likely to
encourage a general revolt against the Company, the civil
and military authorities were to follow a policy designed to
liquidate the influence of the auxiliary powers in the
42
districts under their control.
Initially, the opposition parties in Madras were able to
make little obvious impact. While Dundas remained in office,
Wellesley was assured of his protection and could in turn
protect his supporters in Madras. Prior to the controversy
between Wellesley and the Court over the question of
shipping, the Directors were also inclined to support their
Governor-General. When the Court at first approved
Wellesley's plans to open his college, the Director Sweny
Toone informed Hastings that 'there appeared to be a
disposition in the Court not to blame anything which was
43
sanctioned by his Lordship'. However, despite appearances, 
the opposition was laying the foundations of their eventual 
success. Employing private correspondence and rumours, they 
were building up an image of Wellesley's and Clive's 
administration in the minds of the home authorities which 
was fundamentally detrimental to it. In particular, they 
emphasized the despotic nature of the 'New School's'
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policies. Reports circulated that, after the fall of
Seringapatam, Wellesley had employed mock trials to enable
44
him to order the execution of Tipu's killadars. They also
argued that the Company’s financial difficulties were the
direct consequences of Wellesley's expansionist foreign
policy and his appointments of military men to civil posts.
In particular, Munro's administration of Kanara was stated
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to have led to a decline in that district's revenues. Most
important of all, some of Clive's and Webbe's opponents, in
particular John Chamier, left Madras and travelled to
Britain where they were able to bring direct pressure on the
Court. Not only were they able to argue the case for the
adoption of their policies, but they also seized the
opportunity to blacken their rivals' names. Webbe later
accused his opponents of having 'endeavoured to enlighten
the Directors during their residence In England* by
persuading the Court that he and his supporters were
'extravagant, injudicious, arbitrary, partial, interested,
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democratical, fraud(ulent) and presumptuous'.
The situation began to change rapidly early in 1801 as news 
of the increasing opposition to Wellesley in the Court of 
Directors reached Madras. Wellesley's letter of September 
1799 urging that India-built shipping should be admitted to 
the trade between Britain and India had reached London. At 
the same time, the Directors had become worried by the 
Company's increasing deficit which they saw as being largely 
the consequence of the Governor-General's aggressive foreign 
policy. Their attitude towards Wellesley changed and they 
were increasingly hostile, critical of his administration.
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At the same time, the Arcot Interest, which was well
represented in the Commons, started to bring pressure on
Pitt's Ministry to have Clive's Government removed. It
appears that Pitt, whose position was becoming increasingly
insecure, responded by urging Dundas to take measures to
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appease the Arcot Interest. Hobart described what occurred
in a letter to Webbe. 'Lord Clive had set his face against
the plunderers in the Carnatic. Lord Clive was supposed to
be governed by your advice. Lord Clive's conduct had
precluded the possibility of a direct proposition for his
remova1...and it was conceived that wounding his feelings
through you and the various other means that were resorted
to for the same purpose would have the effect of producing
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an immediate resignation'. The Directors, recognizing that 
the removal of Clive's Government would also remove 
Wellesley's staunchest allies in India, enthusiastically 
endorsed the Board's decision to remove Webbe and took 
advantage of the opportunity to order his replacement by 
John Chamier who was not only one of the leading members of 
the opposition party in Madras but also happened to be in 
Britain.
To a certain extent, Webbe encouraged the Directors to seek
his removal. He had allowed his enthusiasm for Wellesley's
policies and his anger at the news of the Court's criticism
of the Governor-General to lead him into incautious attacks
on that body. In a letter to Hobart, he had accused the
Directors of having persuaded Dundas that the value of
Indian possessions could only be judged by the revenue
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surpluses they produced. Arguing the case for the creation
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of an Indian empire, he had publicly stated his view that 
the Court, which he disparagingly described as a collection 
of merchants, should be abolished or at least deprived of 
any role in the political business of India's 
administration. On the other hand, Webbe was partly the 
victim of the consequences of the power struggle in Britain 
between the new President of the Board of Control, Lord 
Dartmouth, and the Court.
Shortly after Lord Addington succeeded Pitt as First Lord of
the Treasury, Dartmouth, who hoped to restore his private
fortune, had approached him through Lord Pelham for a
ministerial post and had been appointed President of the
Board of Control but not given a seat in the cabinet. He
came to the Board determined to give Wellesley his
unqualified support and announced his intention of adopting
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Dundas's policy in respect of the Company's shipping. The
Shipping Interest retaliated and forced Scott, who despite
his advocacy of Dundas's policy had been elected Chairman,
to sanction a draft despatch criticizing Wellesley's
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commercial policy. During the following months a power 
struggle between the Court and the Board developed, 
culminating in Scott's resignation in August. In this 
climate, the Court could not countenance the sort of 
criticisms that Webbe had been directing toward them and, 
having linked Wellesley's supporters in Madras with their 
opponents at the Board, were prepared to remove them in 
order to weaken the private traders' lobby.
When news of the Court's decision to remove Webbe first
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arrived in India, Wellesley recognized it for what it
represented, an attack by the Shipping Interest on himself.
He also regarded it as having been partly inspired by the
Arcot Interest. He told Scott that he saw behind the move
the C o u r t ’s intention to annihilate Clive's Government which
had so angered the Nawab's creditors. 'When you have
disgraced Lord Clive and driven him home', he wrote, 'I
advise you to recall me, send Paul Benfield to Madras and
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Sir John Macpherson to be Governor-General'. Scott had
already conceived that such an attack on Wellesley's
supporters might prompt him to resign. Even before he
received Wellesley's letter, he wrote to warn him that his
advocacy of the private trade interest had united the Court 
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against him. To counteract the effect this news might have 
on the Governor-General, he reassured him that he would 
continue to be 'shielded completely by the Board of 
Commissioners' to such an extent that he would not 'feel the 
effects of their (the Court's) resentment'.
In Madras, both Webbe and Clive immediately reacted to the
news. Webbe, who had heard of his imminent removal from
Scott, wrote to Wellesley to ask him to do whatever he could 
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to prevent it. Clive despatched a long letter to the Court
in which he replied to the numerous criticisms his opponents
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had levelled at his Government. In this letter, which 
reveals the extent to which his measures had stirred up 
opposition by threatening the careers of the senior civil 
servants, Clive showed that their fears were not 
unjustified. He denied that he had allowed Webbe to exercise 
an undue influence, rejected the claim that his Government
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had not kept the Court fully informed of its activities and 
assured the Directors that he had not refused to allow the 
other members of Council to participate in decisions. He 
explained that the requirements of secrecy had necessitated 
that he and Wellesley should correspond directly and 
insisted that the Council had been kept informed of the 
contents of their letters. One accusation only did he not 
refute, that of partiality in his selection of men for 
appointments, especially to the Board of Revenue. Asserting 
that he had followed one rule only, that 'merit should be 
preferred to rank', he explained that in doing so he had not 
introduced an innovation. On his arrival, he had found 
White, Harrington and Cockburn at the Board of Revenue, men, 
with high reputations but not particularly senior in the 
service. When he had found it necessary to make new 
appointments to the Board, he had only looked for 
qualification. Answering the complaints that this had 
resulted in the senior civil servants working as collectors 
being forced to obey orders from their juniors on the Board, 
he stated that 'the Board is a constituted public authority 
which supersedes the claims of individual rank'. He 
countered other claims that he had generally favoured junior 
servants with the statement that their lack of 
qualifications had made it impossible for him to employ the 
older men. 'During a residence of 25 or 30 years', he wrote, 
'they have preserved an obstinate ignorance of the manners, 
laws and languages of India in contempt of repeated orders 
of this Government'.
The orders for Webbe's dismissal arrived in late October
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1801. Webbe Immediately wrote to Wellesley, informing him
that the Court had filled the Council and intended to fill
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the Board of Revenue with its partisans. He correctly
predicted Clive's resignation, which came on the 2 November,
telling Wellesley that the Governor had no alternative since
the Court's appointments made it impossible for him to
control the Government. At first, because he was so deeply
embroiled in the local Madras politics, he assumed that it
had been resentment for his championship of military
collectors amongst the civil servants and their influence
with the Court that had led to his dismissal. The inclusion
in the despatch of orders from the Court forbidding the
future employment of military men in diplomatic posts
appeared to support his view. A few days later he told Munro
that his removal actually represented the beginning of a
general attack on the 'New School' party in Madras. 'I have
been found out to be an organizing Jacobin who has
revolutionized the service of Fort George', he wrote. 'It is
therefore become indispensable that those educated in my
school in the detestable maxim of speaking the
language... should make room in order that the more approved
doctrine, founded in the experience of the old savants and
the knowledge of native manners (gained) through the only
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authentic channel of a dubash, may be introduced'. Webbe 
warned Munro to 'anticipate a world of woe' now that he 
could no longer rely on Webbe's support for himself and the 
other military collectors.
Webbe only gradually realized that his dismissal had been 
the consequence of a greater power struggle, that more
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interests were involved than the purely local ones of the
civil servants. He heard from Hobart, who had received the
information from Agnew, that the creditors of the various
Indian princes had brought about his fall because they
feared they would never be paid while he and Clive were in 
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office. Later Webbe himself recognized the part the Shipping
Interest had played when they attacked him in order to
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discomfort Wellesley. Others realized much sooner what was
actually happening. Duncan informed Scott that Wellesley was
aware that the Court had deliberately sought to remove his
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'locum tenens ' from Madras.. Wellesley himself took immediate
action to try to restore his influence and protect his
supporters. He realized that the orders that military men ,
should not be employed in diplomatic posts were not merely
the consequence of civilian hostility but a deliberate
attempt to annul a number of his appointments, especially
those of Close and Wilks. To restore his influence, he
appointed Webbe Resident of Mysore and brought the
administration of the Ceded Districts under his personal
control in order to ensure that the new Madras Council
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should be unable to remove Munro.
Wellesley's and Webbe's fears that, with the collapse of 
Clive's Government, the military collectors, Munro in 
particular, would be the next people to come under attack, 
were well founded. Munro was not only recognized as a loyal 
supporter of the Governor-General' .8 policies but also as an 
outspoken advocate of the aggressive policy towards the 
poligars which had become so associated with Webbe. In one 
of his first letters to Webbe after his arrival in the Ceded
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Districts, Munro had reported that he had found 73 poligars
in the area and that they were resisting his efforts to
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establish his authority. To what extent this was actually
true is difficult to determine but it seems clear that Munro
wished to make a strong case against them that would justify
the aggressive measures he intended to adopt towards them
with the ultimate aim of crushing their power. His
instructions to his assistants to immediately report any
trouble they might have with the poligars in their districts
were couched in such terms as to suggest that he expected
63
them to find cause to complain. He had then informed Webbe
that it was his intention to dispossess the poligars or, at
the least, confine them to the possession of single 
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villages .
Munro had however been aware that there existed opposition
to this policy from men who, he claimed, insisted on
regarding the poligars as 'fallen royalty'. In his letters
to Webbe he had explained that he intended to defuse
potential criticism of his actions by forcing the poligars
into a situation where they would have no alternative but to
act in such a way as to give him 'a pretext for attacking
them, not as poligars but as rebels, without exciting 
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alarm'. Knowing that they were unlikely to obey, he had 
announced that he intended to order them to appear before 
him and to use their refusal as an excuse to dispossess them 
of their lands. Should this policy fail, Munro had informed 
Webbe that he planned to raise their rents. 'My intention', 
he had written, 'is to carry them as high as to render it 
impossible for them to maintain any troops unless by
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withholding their kists, which of course is a good Law of
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Nations argument for expelling them'.
Munro had been encouraged to pursue this course, despite
growing opposition, by the support he knew his policy was
receiving in the army. Colonel Mackay had written to him
suggesting that coercive measures be adopted against the
poligars. 'If we are lucky enough to be able to bayonet a
hundred of them', he wrote, 'it would ensure future good 
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behaviour'. General Campbell had also clearly indicated to
him that he favoured the adoption of an aggressive policy.
'I have long been of the opinion', he informed Munro, 'that
it would be of actual advantage to our honourable
employers... if the poligars were expelled and their
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strongholds levelled to the ground'. In addition, Munro had
received both official and unofficial encouragement from the
Government. His request that Campbell be 'empowered to try
by military process all persons who oppose the Company's
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Government' had been granted. When he had privately written
to Webbe suggesting that he might make some of the poligars
'bite the dust' since this 'would have a good effect on some
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of our subjects', Webbe had unofficially authorized him to
follow this policy provided he did not precipitate a general 
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revolt.
Early in 1801, Munro had decided that the Ceded Districts
were sufficiently under his control to permit him to take
active measures against the poligars and he called out the 
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troops. He selected those poligars whom he considered to 
have doubtful title to their possessions for attack, in
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particular the Vimla poligar. Haidar had expelled the
hereditary holder of this pollam in 1766 and the district
had been managed by sarkar officers between then and 1791.
During the first Mysore war a distant cousin of the deposed
poligar had seized the district, been dispossessed by the
Nizam and then managed to re-establish himself in 1794. He
had held the area from that time until his death in 1799
when, determined to retain their authority in the district,
his servants had set up an old blind man as his successor.
The new poligar's title was at least dubious, based as it
was on an unsubstantiated claim that he was related to the
last holder. Munro had decided to regard him as a pretender
and used the excuse that the poligar had refused to obey his
summons to appear before his kachahri as an excuse to attack
him. On Munro's requisition, Colonel Campbell attacked and
took the poligar's fort, 'the people found in arms were made
examples of', the poligar was seized, dispossessed of his
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lands and given a pension.
As Beaglehole observes, the success of this and similar
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operations had far reaching consequences. The impression 
they made persuaded many poligars to submit to the civil 
authority. Some of these men accepted pensions in return for 
surrendering their traditional prerogatives and their 
territories while others acquiesced in a reduction in their 
status which left them in the position of common headmen of 
their villages. By 1802, Munro was able to inform the Madras 
Government that the more powerful poligars had been 
dispossessed and that he expected only occasional 
disturbances rather than any future insurrections that might
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possibly pose a serious threat to the Company.
Initially, while Clive and Webbe retained control of the
Madras Government, Munro's policies towards the poligars
received general approval. In May 1801, the Board of
Revenue, which was under the influence of Thomas Cockburn, a
man who had supported Munro since the time he had served
under Read in the Baramahal, sanctioned his measures against
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the Vimla poligar. The Board recorded that the poligar had
been 'acting in open rebellion against the Company's
authority' and concluded that Munro's punitive measures had
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been conducted 'in the most public and exemplary manner'.
The Governor in Council also officially approved his 
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actions. At the same time however, Munro had unwittingly
given his opponents the grounds for an attack upon himself.
He had too publicly espoused Machiavellian techniques. He
had, for example, in a characteristic letter to Webbe,
written that 'the object (of completely reducing the
poligars) would perhaps be easier accomplished by raising
the rents so high as to disable them from keeping armed
followers, by seizing territory on every failure as a
compensation, by binding them not to levy any extra
assessments on the inhabitants and by making a violation of
this engagement a motive for the total resumption of their
districts. By following this plan, I imagine that there is
no doubt but the whole of them would furnish us with good
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arguments for expelling them'. Some of his friends 
recognized the danger he was placing himself in. Wilks 
warned him against taking too decided a stand against the 
poligars. Although Wilks agreed with Munro that the poligars
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gMtouid be eradicated, he recognized that such an aggressive
policy was unlikely to meet with the approval of the Court.
In view of this, he recommended that Munro, whatever his
personal opinions might be, should be seen to follow
official policy which he ironically described. ’The object',
he wrote to Munro, 'ought to be not to eradicate these
demons but to convert them. I do not mean to Methodists but
to zamindars, that is to say to convert their swords into 
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ploughshares ' .
In the months following Webbe's removal and Clive's
resignation the situation changed significantly. In the
Council, Chamier and Murray Dick, determined to discredit
Webbe's administration, seized upon the poligar question as
offering the best opportunity for justifying the Court's
decision to dismantle it. Dick recorded a long minute in
which, while criticising Webbe's and Munro's activities, he
argued the case for the recognition of the poligars as the
landed aristocracy of South India. Insisting that these men
were the natural allies of the British, he blamed the
aggressive policies towards them that Webbe had supported
for their apparent hostility to the Company. Webbe tried to
dismiss these arguments by satirizing them. He claimed that
they were no more than accounts of 'what excellent sort of
people the said poligars are when allowed to do as they 
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please'. He suggested that his opponents had either 
completely misunderstood the situation or were deliberately 
seeking political advantage by misleading the home 
authorities.
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Chamier and Dick were supported in their efforts to 
discredit the previous government by Oakes and Place who had 
succeeded Cockburn and Falconar at the Board of Revenue.
Both of these men were not only staunch opponents of Webbe 
but also extremely hostile to the military collectors, 
partly because they regarded these men as Webbe's proteges 
and allies, partly because their employment threatened that 
of the civil servants. Place in particular had reasons for 
regarding Munro with a jaundiced eye. The latter had not 
only been appointed to the office that the former had hoped 
to acquire for himself but he also held views regarding the 
sort of revenue arrangements which should be introduced that 
conflicted with Place's. Although both men opposed the 
introduction of permanent zamindari settlements, Munro 
championed annual* ryotwari leases while Place favoured 
permanent settlements with the mirasidars. Although there 
appears to have been some correlation between Place's 
mirasidars and the men Munro chose to define as ryots, Place 
recognized the tendency inherent in Munro's system to extend 
the right to hold land direct from the state to inferior 
tenants. He believed this would not only destroy the 
existing social structure but also threaten the stability of 
the revenue collections.
Place and Oakes commenced their attack on the military
collectors with criticisms of Munro's work. Firstly they
accused him of having failed to realize sufficiently high
revenues while administering Kanara and of doing no better
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in the Ceded Districts. They then reversed the Board of 
Revenue's previous approval of Munro's measures against the
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poligars. When they forwarded Munro's report of March 1802
to the Governor in Council, they enclosed a critical
assessment of it. 'We cannot but w i s h ' , they wrote, 'that
the alternative of a moderate assessment on becoming subject
to a government, whose principles are so opposite to the
vigorous despotism of preceding rulers, had offered to the
poligars a motive to subordination and dutiful demeanour
rather than by the highest demand ever made on them have
rendered punctuality in their payments difficult, thus
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inducing a failure to be followed by punishment'. As
Beaglehole observes, in making this criticism the Board was
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exceeding its powers. When the administration of the revenue
and civil government of the Ceded Districts was placed under
the Board's control, Wellesley and Webbe had deliberately
reserved political matters 'arising from...the description
and power of different chieftains situated within the limits
of those provinces' to the control of the Governor in 
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Council. Place and Oakes were taking advantage of the 
temporary confusion in the administration, the consequence 
of the fact that while Clive had resigned he still remained in 
office until his successor arrived, to extend the authority 
of the Board of Revenue.
In order to keep up the pressure on Munro, Place and Oakes
next accused him of failing to give the Board the respect
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and deference due it from all collectors. They also employed 
a variety of other ploys to make Munro's situation 
increasingly untenable, probably with the intention of 
forcing him to give them grounds for seeking his removal. In 
particular, the Board of Revenue now insisted that Munro
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keep a diary, to be delivered monthly to Madras, detailing
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how all his time was occupied. Place and Oakes recognized
that this would not only considerably increase Munro's work
but that it would also, to a man of his temperament, be an
intolerable burden. Munro did not find it easy to work under
other men and bitterly resented anything which threatened to
infringe his freedom of action. One of his first requests to
Webbe after entering the Ceded Districts had been that he
should be given the military as well as the civil command of 
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the area. This had not only been the product of his ambition
and his contempt for some of his senior officers, whom he
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referred to as 'useless dogs'. It had also been inspired by
his desire for independence. In addition, Munro was ordered
by the Board to reduce the number of peons he employed,
ostensibly as a measure of retrenchment. Munro chose to view
this as, at the best, an attempt to curtail his ability to
take coercive action against the poligars and possibly even
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a scheme to undermine his authority in the area.
Warned of Place's and Oakes's activities by Cockburn, Munro
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attempted to take counter measures. He explained to the
Board of Revenue that the fall in revenue in the Ceded
District was the direct consequence of the decision to allow
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the poligars to return to their districts. In answer to the
criticisms of his measures against the poligars, he sent the
Board a long report in which he attempted to prove that
these chieftains were only public servants and renters who
had taken advantage of recent unrest to exert their
independence and advance fictitious proprietary claims to 
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the land. At the same time, he sought to prove that the
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poligars alone were largely responsible for the civil
unrest, being by nature turbulent and antagonistic towards
central authority. He also rejected the allegations made by
Place and Oakes that he had not observed a proper deference
towards the Board of Revenue. He denied that he had ignored
either orders or requests for information, that his reports
and diaries were sent in late, and that his letters were
disrespectful. He claimed that he had in fact always been
punctilious in his dealings with the civil authorities, ever
aware that military collectors held ’their situations
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contrary to the ordinary rules of the service'.
However, conscious of the enmity with which he and the other
military collectors were regarded by the new Board of
Revenue, Munro sought to protect himself from its members'
hostility and to reverse some of their orders by bypassing
their authority. He asked Webbe to use his influence with
Clive to persuade the Governor to countermand the Board's
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instructions that he was to keep a diary. Since the strength
of his peon forces might be considered to be a military
matter, he wrote privately to General Stuart, the
Commander-in-Chief, requesting him to reverse the Board's
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orders that these should be reduced. As Commander-in-Chief, 
Stuart had been appointed the Second Member of the Council. 
As such, he and the Governor acting in concert could 
overrule the decisions of the two civilian members and issue 
orders to the Board of Revenue. After consulting with Webbe, 
who was technically no longer officially involved in the 
decision-making process but was still influential, Stuart 
informed Munro that he would support him in his dealings
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with Place and Oakes.
Finding themselves unable, in the face of Wellesley's and
Clive's continued support for Munro, to do little more than
inconvenience him, Place and Oakes turned their attention to
Graham. Graham had been appointed the collector of South
Arcot shortly after Munro had received his appointment to
Kanara. In the letter to Munro in which he reported that his
administration of his district had come under attack from
the Board of Revenue, Graham explained that he had been
making settlements with the ryots similar to those that Read
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had made in the Baramahal. Employing 50 Indian amirs, he had 
tried to make his settlements directly with the ryots 
themselves but had met with considerable resistance. The 
ryots, despite the considerable reduction in the rates of 
assessment offered by Graham, were not prepared to enter 
into cash settlements. They wanted amani settlements under 
which the State received a predetermined share of the crop. 
Unable therefore to make ryotwari settlements, Graham had 
made settlements with some of the patels and employed 
renters to collect the revenues from the other villages.
The Board of Revenue accused Graham of mismanagement, citing
his use of renters and the drop in the district's revenues
as evidence of his unsuitability for further employment as a
collector. The Government called upon Graham to furnish them
with an explanation which, when it was received, was
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considered inadequate. He was subsequently asked to answer a 
number of queries designed to elucidate the situation, in 
particular to clear up the question of whether he had
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illegally been employing rent farmers. In his answers Graham
claimed that his settlements had been village settlements
similar to those made by Read in the Baramahal. One person
in each village, usually the patel, had been appointed
principal cultivator and made responsible for the collection
of the village rents. He was expected to collect a share of
the crops, dispose of this and pay the aggregate village
rent to the collector in cash. To prevent abuses, the
individual ryots had then been given pattas which showed
what proportion of their crops were to be delivered to the
principal cultivator. Only when the patels refused to
cooperate did Graham employ revenue farmers. He claimed
that, out of the 2,697 settlements he had concluded, revenue
farmers were only involved in twelve. In addition, Graham
claimed that, as soon as his survey of the fields was
complete, he planned to introduce a true ryotwari system
under which money rents would be attached to the individual
fields. The ryots would then directly pay to the State money
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rents for the fields they had occupied in that fusli year.
The Government, now under the influence of men opposed to
the employment of military collectors and on the
recommendation of the Board of Revenue, rejected Graham's
explanation. It ordered that, though Graham's character was
not to be criticized, his administration had been inadequate
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and he was to be replaced by Garrow. From the documents 
available, it is impossible to conclude how justified the 
Government's action was but there are good reasons for 
suspecting that Graham's removal had far more to do with the 
fact that he was a military collector than with any
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mismanagement. The appointment of Garrow, who had been
Secretary to the Board of Revenue since 1801 and might
therefore be considered as a supporter of Place, Oakes and
the 'Old School', suggests that these men were determined to
replace the supporters of their opponents in the 'New
School' with their own men. Certainly Graham believed this.
He told Munro that, since the change in personnel at the
Board in February 1802, its proceedings had been marked by
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hostility towards military collectors. As evidence of this, 
he described how even his accidental transmission of a 
letter without an envelope had been construed as a 
deliberate act of disrespect. In Graham's opinion there had 
been an organized conspiracy among the civil servants, 
including those on the Board of Revenue, to destroy his 
reputation and career.
In order to attempt to reverse the Government's decision,
Graham sent Munro all the relevant papers dealing with his
dismissal and asked him to prepare a memorial to the Court 
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of Directors. At the same time, he sought the intervention
of Wellesley whose sister had married a first cousin of Mrs 
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Graham. He also hoped that Webbe, though no longer Secretary
to the Government, might use his influence to find him a 
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military post. It was however Munro who eventually found
Graham another appointment. He used his friendship with
Arthur Wellesley to persuade the latter to obtain for Graham
the post of Collector of A h m e d n v a g a r  , a district that was
not yet under the control of the Board of Revenue. This
district, to which Wellesley had hoped Munro might be 
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appointed, had only recently been annexed by the British,
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was occupied by the army and its administration had 
therefore not yet been transferred to the civil authorities. 
Both the civil and military personnel were under the direct 
supervision of the Governor-General in Council.
Late in 1802, the situation appeared to be improving for
Munro. Despite their successful attack on Graham, Place and
Oakes found that their attempts to dislodge the other
members of the 'New School' were being frustrated by Clive
and Wellesley. Fighting back against their opponents, the
Governor-General and the Governor continued to appoint their
own supporters to influential positions within the civil
administration. Unable to make further military appointments
to civil positions, they exercised their next option and
appointed men who had been trained under Read in the
Baramahal, Alexander Read and Ravenshaw. In addition, to
limit the authority of the Board of Revenue, which was
recognized to be hostile, Clive, on Wellesley's
recommendation, appointed a Commission to introduce a
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Permanent Settlement. This body, staffed by supporters of 
Wellesley's policies, to a large extent superseded the 
Board. In order to protect his existing supporters among the 
collectors, Munro in particular, Wellesley approved Clive's 
decision to permit the military collectors to correspond 
directly with the Madras Government, bypassing the Board of 
Revenue and further reducing its influence.
Place bitterly resented these actions. In a long minute he
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attacked each of the moves. He not only claimed that the 
establishment of the Commission had infringed the Board's
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authority but also that it had done its job badly. By 
ignoring the claims of the mirasdars and concentrating on 
the creation of zamindars, Place argued that the 
commissioners had lost the Company a considerable revenue. 
Attacking the recent appointments of men trained by Read, 
Place stated that these collectors had ignored the Board's 
instructions and, by following a 'hypothetical statement of 
Major Munro', reduced the public revenues of their districts 
to little more than a tenth of the gross produce. He 
continued with a general criticism of the employment of 
military collectors, using the example of Graham to support 
his contentions but being careful how he phrased his 
accusations. 'Of all the situations subordinate to this 
Board, military collectors stand eminently in need of 
reform.... A recent inquiry into the conduct of Captain 
Graham has led to the discovery of an old fact - that he was 
entirely incompetent.... I am not prepared to say that the 
conduct of the other military collectors has been equally 
culpable, for indeed the records of this Board afford but 
little insight of it yet that little shows it to be no less 
exceptional'.
Desperate to besmirch Munro's reputation, in particular 
because of the support his reputation afforded the 'New 
School', Place accused him of ignoring the Board, of 
delegating too much authority to Indian servants and of 
paying them so little as to force them into corrupt 
practices. At least one of these accusations, the last, was 
totally unjustified. Four months before Place recorded his 
minute, Munro had requested the Board's permission to
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increase the salaries of his Indian officials. In addition,
while he had informed the Board that the business of revenue
management was conducted by Indians, he had explained the
importance he attached to the close supervision of their
work and the techniques he employed to control their
activities. These included the establishment of double
kachahris by which men speaking different languages
duplicated each others' work. In recommending double
kachahris to his successors in Kanara, he had further
explained that in these 'so many different interests are
created that a combination becomes impossible and instead of
111
it a rivalry is excited'.
Most importantly of all, Place complained that the Clive had
deliberately undermined the Board of Revenue's authority in
order to protect the military collectors. 'For political
reasons', he wrote, 'a privilege is allowed them of
corresponding with Government.... We (at the Board) have
more than once found our communications to Government
anticipated and the subjects disposed of before they have
112
been imparted to us'. There can be little doubt that Place 
hoped his minute, by stressing the ways in which the 
Governor appeared to be meddling with the structure of the 
Company's administration in Madras, might persuade the Court 
to take further measures to limit Clive's authority. 
Certainly all the evidence points to Place having 
principally written his minute for the eyes of. the 
Directors, to whom he knew it must be despatched, rather 
than for the consideration of the Government.
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The struggle between the two parties in Madras had, by the
middle of 1802, produced a climate of such hostility that
even the most petty matters began to assume an exaggerated
importance. Place gave as his final proof of Clive's
enmity the fact that, though the Government had condemned
Graham's administration, it had recorded personally
flattering remarks about the man himself and made no mention
of either Place's investigations or his other work. Webbe
was well aware of how far the situation had deteriorated and
warned Munro that he must expect further attacks on his
113
administration, particularly on his poligar policy. He 
suggested that Munro should write to the Board and attempt 
to justify his treatment of the poligars but cautioned him 
against using any examples drawn from the Baramahal, Salem, 
Coimbatore or Kanara since all of these districts were under 
the management of military collectors.
Believing themselves again increasingly excluded from the 
decision-making process in Madras, Place and a number of 
other members of the 'Old School' employed a traditional 
method of the dissatisfied to alter policy. They left India 
and returned to Britain where they hoped to exert a direct 
influence on the Court of Directors. They began arriving at 
a critical period when the power struggle between the Board 
of Control and the Court had just passed through a 
particularly bitter phase. The Shipping Interest, which was 
now almost totally hostile to the Governor-General, had 
gained complete control of the Direction with the election 
of their nominees John Roberts and Jacob Bosanquet to the 
Chairs in April 1802. They had used their influence to
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114launch a determined attack on Wellesley’s administration.
Addington'8 refusal to support Dartmouth, probably the
consequence of his fear of antagonizing the 27 East India
members in Parliament he had inherited from Pitt and whose
support he required to retain his majority, had directly
resulted in a complete acceptance of the Court's proposals
regarding private trade. Sir William Pulteney's proposition
in the Commons that an inquiry be held into the Company's
115
trade had been defeated. Dartmouth's refusal to accept the 
situation and his attempt to substitute a number of 
paragraphs in one of the Court's draft despatches for new 
ones that incorporated the free trade ideas of Wellesley and 
Dundas had only led to a direct confrontation between the 
two bodies in the Company's home administration. This had in 
turn been directly responsible for the President of the 
Board of Control's resignation. Castlereagh, who had been 
appointed the new President of the Board of Control in June 
1802, was principally concerned to use his office as a 
stepping stone in his political career. He was therefore 
determined to conciliate the Court.
The disgruntled members of the 'Old School' found that, in 
the fertile climate of controversy, they were welcomed by 
the Directors. In a letter to Munro, Webbe explained one 
reason why this should be. 'They (the Directors)', he wrote, 
'have opened their arms wide to receive all the 
discontented, ignorant and unprincipled people who have 
lately been compelled to return home.... The Directors seek 
to obtain through these instruments the most plausible 
reasons to be subsequently assigned for a conduct previously
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deter mined1. The Directors were influenced by other motives 
as well. Many of the civil servants in India were related or 
otherwise closely connected to members of the Court. Some 
had other patrons in Britain whose good will the Directors, 
for a variety of social, political and economic reasons, 
wished to retain.
Initially Munro had good grounds for wondering whether Webbe
might not be exaggerating, embittered as he was by the
treatment he had received. In Britain, Castlereagh1s careful
handling of the Court had persuaded the Directors to pass
the vote of confidence in Wellesley that the latter had 
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demanded. In Madras, the Government continued to support the
military collectors, Munro in particular. The Government
informed the Board of Revenue in February 1803 that ’it was
not without the deepest regret that the Governor in Council
remarked the sentiments stated... relative to the supposed
mode adopted by that officer (Munro) in the administration 
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of the revenue’. The letter continued by observing that
Munro had the Government's complete confidence and his
poligar policy met with its full approval. Lord William
Bentinck's arrival in August and his assumption of the
Governorship did not have the consequences on his career
that Munro had feared for, far from ordering his removal,
the Governor took an encouraging interest in his ryotwari
settlements. When looking for a suitable candidate for the
office of collector in South Arcot, Bentinck sought Munro's 
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advice. He informed Munro that he was considering either 
Graeme or Cochrane whom he observed had 'the additional 
recommendation of being educated under your immediate
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Inspection in that system of management which has the
reputation of being the most perfect in India1. Furthermore,
Bentinck quickly allied himself with the 'New School'. He
offered Webbe a seat on the Council at the next vacancy and
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approved Graham's re-appointment as a collector.
If Munro was lulled into a sense of security, it was
premature. The opponents of the military collectors were
preparing a major offensive against them. Stuart Hill had
presented Castlereagh with a paper which was deeply critical
of the Madras military and of the policies pursued, with the
approval of Clive's Government, against the poligars by 
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them. Their cause was helped by an unfortunate rebellion in
Macleod's co1lectorate, from which he fled instead of
remaining and attempting to suppress it. There can be no
doubt that Macleod's action seriously damaged the position
of the military collectors at a time when their case had
been seriously weakened by the recent proceedings against 
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Graham. It gave the military collectors' opponents another
opportunity to accuse them of threatening the stability of
the Company's territories with their supposedly despotic
administrations. By April 1804, Place and the other members
of the 'Old School' who had returned to Britain were
exercising a considerable influence over the Court where, as
Munro was informed, they were labouring 'to root out
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military collectors, the source of all evils'.
Under their influence, the Court sent a despatch in April to 
Madras in which, after approving Munro's settlements and 
praising his industry, his treatment of the Vimla poligar
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was questioned. In this despatch, the Directors first
explained the poligar policy they wanted to see followed.
'Our wish', they wrote, 'is to uphold and preserve the
poligars in their rights and enjoyments in the soil whilst
we gradually aim at the reduction of their military power'.
They then stated that they understood the reason for Munro's
action was merely his principle that 'no opportunity should
be lost of expelling the poligars' and observed that this
could not be considered a sufficient justification. The
Directors ordered that, unless Munro could provide
considerably better reasons for his action, he was to be
removed from office and never employed in such a position
again. In another despatch the following month, the
Directors enlarged on this issue. 'It is our most positive
injunction that force be never resorted to against any of
the poligars... unless in case of actual rebellion until
every lenient and conciliatory measure has been tried
125
without proper effect'.
The first despatch arrived at Madras in September where it
was generally accepted as being a product of Place's
126
vendetta with Munro. Initially Bentinck panicked. Fearing 
the Court might hold him responsible for the the continued 
implementation of the late administration's poligar
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policies, he sought to transfer the blame to Cockburne. He 
suggested to Webbe that a commission be set up under his 
supervision to investigate the whole business. Munro turned 
to General Stuart and asked him to defend his actions in the 
Council. Stuart replied that, though he had no authority to 
interfere in the Board of Revenue's business, he 'would
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e n d e a v o u r  to take an o p p o r t u n i t y  of s ta t i n g  p r i v a t e l y  to the
128
G o v e r n o r '  M u n r o ' s  e x p l a n a t i o n s  of his p o s it i o n.  By No vem b e r,
B e n t i n c k  had r e c o v e r e d  his c o n f i d e n c e ,  r e c o g n i z e d  that the
C o u r t ' s  d e s p a t c h  was d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  the m i l i t a r y
c o l l e c t o r s  and no t h i ms e l f,  and d e c i d e d  to su p p o r t  Munro.
'The C o u r t  of D i r e c t o r s ' ,  he i n f o r m e d  Munr o, 'instead of
p l a c i n g  r e l i a n c e  in the c o u n c i l s  of their G o v e r n m e n t ,  ap pe ar
m o r e  w i l l i n g  to have e m b r a c e d  the s e n t i m e n t s  of e ve ry
d i s s a t i s f i e d  and d i s c o n t e n t e d  serva nt , w h e t h e r  h e re  or in 
129
En g l a n d ' .  C l a i m i n g  to be s h o c k e d  by the t r e a t m e n t  M u n r o  had 
r e c e i v e d ,  he told him that he m i g h t  e x p e c t  the G o v e r n m e n t ' s  
full s up p o rt .  He b l am e d the e f f e c t s  of H a s t i n g s ' s  trial for 
the c h a n g e  in the C o u r t ' s  a t t i t u d e ,  s t a t i n g  that it had led 
p e o p l e  in E u r o p e  to be u n d u l y  s u s p i c i o u s  of the m o t i v e s  of 
m en  s e r v i n g  in India. M o st  i m p o r t a n t l y  of all, B e n t i n c k  
i n d i r e c t l y  a u t h o r i z e d  M u n r o  to c o n t i n u e  to p u rs u e  an 
a g g r e s s i v e  p o l i c y  a g a i n s t  the p o l i g a r s .  In do in g  so, he 
tu rn e d the C o u r t ' s  or de rs u p s i d e - d o w n .  The C o u r t  had st ate d 
that no f o r c e  was to be e m p l o y e d  a g a i n s t  the p o l i g a r s  unti l  
e v e r y  other a v e n u e  had b ee n  ex p lo r e d.  B e n t i n c k  told Mu n r o he 
w a n t e d  to see the p o l i g a r s  s u p p r e s s e d  but w a r n e d  him not to 
take any a c t i o n  un ti l  'fair m e a n s  sh o u ld  a p p e a r  to have  
m i s c a r r i e d ' .  His i n t e n t i o n  seems to ha ve  b e e n  to p u r s ue  m u c h  
the same p o l i c i e s  as W e b b e  had a d v o c a t e d  but w i t h o u t  an open 
d e c l a r a t i o n  of his i n t e n t i o n  to the home a u t h o r i t i e s .  They  
we re  to be led to b e l i e v e  that c o n c i l i a t o r y  m e a s u r e s  had 
b e e n  tried, f ou n d  to h ave  f a i l e d  and only t hen  a b a n d o n e d .
M u n r o  f el t d e e p l y  a g g r i e v e d  by the the C o u r t ' s  c r i t i c i s m s .
'I c a n n o t  but feel', he w r o t e  to B e n t in c k,  'that I have be e n
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unworthily treated in being called upon like a criminal to
vindicate my conduct in having taken, in the midst of
difficulties, the only way of restoring order to the 
130
c o u nt r y ' . He c la i m e d  that all his a ct i o n s  had b e e n taken
w i t h  the full a p p r o v a l  of C l i v e ' s  G o v e r n m e n t ,  c a r e f u l l y
refraining from mentioning that this approval had, in fact,
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come largely from Webbe. He no doubt considered it
politically wiser to place the responsibility for his
a ct i o n s  w i t h  a G o v e r n o r  w h o  had r e s i g n e d  r a t h e r  than a Chief
S e c r e t a r y  wh o had b e e n  d is g r a c e d .  E q u a l l y  c a r e f u l l y ,  M u n r o
made no mention of his belief that the Court's criticisms
had f a c t i o u s  origins. He p u b l i c l y  a s c r i b e d  them to the
Directors' distance from events which made it impossible for
them to evaluate the exigencies facing the local 
132
administrations.
P u r s u a n t  on the C o u r t ' s  o rd ers  that he j u s t i f y  his m e a s u r e s
a g a i n s t  the V i m l a  p ol i g ar ,  M u n r o  sent a le tt er  to the Board
of R ev e nu e ,  for t r a n s m i s s i o n  to the C o u r t  of D i r e c t o r s ,
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explaining his actions. He argued that, in view of the state 
in which he found the Ceded Districts in 1801, the reduction 
of the Vimla poligar had been essential if he was to 
establish the Company's authority in the area. He also 
argued that, had he not made examples of some of the leading 
poligars and dispossessed the others, they would have used 
the resources of their districts to build up their military 
might and then seized the first opportunity to attack the 
British or at least prevent their armies collecting vital 
supplies. Rejecting any personal responsibility, he claimed 
that the Government's orders of 25 December 1800 had been a
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direct instruction to reject the claims of the poligars and 
dispossess them. However, despite his attempts to conceal 
it, Munro's hostility to the poligars, whom he regarded as 
the last vestiges of a feudal socio-political system and 
therefore most undesirable, could not be concealed.
Munro's explanation of his measures against the poligars did 
not persuade the Directors to alter their unfavourable
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opinion of the measures he had taken against the poligars.
Their refusal to do so convinced Munro that they had little
understanding of the problems facing the Madras Government.
In a letter to Bentinck, he argued that there would always
be differences of opinion between the two bodies when one
had to face the immediate realities of local conditions
while the other was swayed only by theoretical principles.
'Of the men who argue in favour of polligars', he wrote, 'it
may be doubted whether any one individual rightly
understands what polligars are or has ever seriously
considered what would be the probable consequences of their
reinstatement. They do not know that the polligars of the
Ceded Districts were never regarded as landlords but as
petty princes, ...that they can never be converted into
private landlords who would devote their whole attention to
the improvement of their estates but will always maintain
bodies of armed men and endeavour as far as they can to act
as petty sovereigns.... It is not to be believed that such
men, if reinstated, would ever... beeome in anything like
country gentlemen which the term zemindar has often
135
erroneously been said to imply'.
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Despite the Court's rejection of Munro's views, it no longer
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i ns i st e d  that he sh ou ld  be re mo ve d . A v a r i e t y  of f act ors
probably contributed to the Court's decision not to press
for his dismissal. By 1806, the Court had temporarily won
the p ow e r  s t r u g g l e  in B r ita in.  W h i l e  C a s t l e r e a g h  had been
i n c l i n e d  to s u p p o r t  W e l l e s l e y ,  A d d i n g t o n ,  a wa re  that a
n u m b e r  of his s u p p o r t e r s  am o n g the E a s t  In dia m e m b e r s  of
Parliament were wavering in consequence of the dissensions
between the Government and the Directors, had preferred not
137
to provoke the Court. In May 1804, Pitt had returned to
offi ce and, u n d e r  p r e s s u r e  fr om  the D i r e c t o r s ,  had f i n a l l y
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agreed to recall Wellesley. Under these circumstances, the
Directors, who had apparently achieved all that they might
have wished, had no reason for continuing to attack
W e l l e s l e y ' s  a l l i e s  and s u p p o r t e r s  in India. It was now
clearly in the Court's interest to restore relations between
the home and local g o v e r n m e n t s  and the r e t e n t i o n  of Munro,
w h o m  bo th B e n t i n c k  and the ne w Bo a r d of R e v e n u e  s tr on g l y
su pp o rt e d , c o u l d  only ha v e be e n  s ee n as a small pr ice  to
pay, particularly as the Court itself had been impressed by
his management of the revenues. As early as August 1804, the
Court informed the Madras Government it had 'derived great
satisfaction from the perusal of Major Munro's report of 30
May 1800' and had expressed surprise that Place should have 
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attacked it. In addition, Munro had modified his views of 
how the poligars should be dealt with. Although still 
determined to destroy their power,, he no longer advocated 
direct action against them but suggested that the British 
might persuade their followers to transfer their loyalty to 
the Company. He recommended to Bentinck that the Government
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turn the poligars' armed retainers into peaceful cultivators
with an interest in upholding the Company's authority by
140
granting them inam lands.
Throughout the years that Munro found himself intimately
embroiled in the struggle between the 'Old' and 'New School'
for supremacy within the administration of Madras, he was
also regularly collecting the revenues of the Ceded
Districts. In the course of this, his official employment,
he not only increased the land revenue realized from
1,006,693 pagodas to 1,517,272 pagodas but also developed
his ideas of how the British should administer their
141
extensive territories in the south of India.
Munro claimed to have discovered that all land in the Ceded
Districts belonged to the state and he argued that, unlike
in Kanara, there existed no concept of private property in 
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the soil. He believed that the land revenues had always been
traditionally collected through the agency of the village
headmen who, in return for accepting the responsibility of
gathering the state's shares of the crops from the
cultivators, had been granted small inams. Munro decided to
employ this existing system to make his settlements during
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his first season in the area. He was concerned, at a time 
when he felt his first priorities must be the
re-establishment of order and the assertion of the Company's 
authority, to disrupt existing patterns of settlement as 
little as possible. He instructed his assistants to make 
what he described as village settlements with the headmen.
It is clear from his letter to Thackeray that the
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settlements were in fact made with the superior patels who
were responsible for a number of villages, not with the
144
heads of individual communities. He was, in effect, trying 
to employ a system which would offer the advantages of 
zamindari settlements without what he saw as its 
disadvantages. By limiting the number of people with whom 
the British had to make settlements, the task was made 
manageable. At the same time, by refusing to give these men 
the ownership of the land in their villages, Munro believed 
that the rights of the ryots could be protected.
From the start Munro was dissatisfied with the village
settlements he originally introduced. He believed that,
because the patels had no conception of permanent private
property, they merely took advantage of their position to
extort as much from the ryots as they were able. Even if the
patels could be persuaded to think and act like English
landlords, Munro still felt that such a system would be open
to criticism. He was argued that the patels would encourage
ryot migration in order to increase the size and importance
of their estates by luring the cultivators to their villages
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with promises of cheaper land. He believed that this would 
lead to a general decline in agricultural production and a 
consequent fall in the revenues. A more important though not 
explicitly stated reason for his dissatisfaction with the 
village settlements was his assumption that cultivation 
would only be increased and the economy as a whole expanded 
by arrangements which would give the greatest number of men 
a personal interest, through the retention of profits, in 
raising production.
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For these reasons, Munro ordered his assistants in August
1801 to make their settlements directly with every
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cultivator who paid rent to the government. Recognizing that 
this could impose an intolerable work load on the 
collectors, he suggested a method by which these settlements 
could be arrived at. All the patels and J<arnams of a 
district should be assembled and the total value of their 
villages assessed. Once this was done, the collectors were 
to send amildars into the villages to settle the shares of 
the village rents to be paid by the individual ryots. These 
were to be recorded in writing and signed by the collectors 
who were then to be responsible for seeing that the patels 
did not abuse their position to collect more than the rents 
agreed with the ryots.
From the start Munro made it clear to his assistants that 
this system was to be only a temporary measure, to be 
employed until a complete survey of the Ceded Districts 
could be carried out. Munro had three reasons for wanting 
the survey completed as soon as possible. Firstly he 
believed it would enable him to bring ryot migration to an 
end, something he considered important because he thought 
that it was responsible for a decline in cultivation and a 
consequent loss of revenue to the Company. He argued that, 
once standardized rents were fixed on all fields, the ryots 
would have no reason to throw up their lands in one village 
since there would be no cheaper in any other. They would 
therefore concentrate on improving the land already under 
cultivation and employ the profits derived from it to bring 
waste into productivity. Secondly he imagined that the
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survey would enable him to fix sufficiently precise rents to
ensure that the ryots should receive the highest profits
from the lands with the highest yields. He argued that, in
the past, this had not been the case and economic
development had consequently been retarded. It was, he
stated, the role of government to encourage the cultivation
of high yield land 'both because it is most beneficial to
the revenue and because, by giving the greatest quantity of
food and raw material, it so much more augments the general
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wealth of the country'. Thirdly Munro believed that, with
the survey completed, he could introduce a true ryotwari
settlement system which would not only be that most likely
to encourage economic and social development but also be the
easiest, cheapest and most efficient for the British to
manage. With the country surveyed, 'the individual', Munro
wrote', supersedes both the village and the district
settlement because it is then no longer necessary to waste
time in endeavouring to persuade the cultivators to accede
to the assessment. The rent of every field being fixed, each
cultivator takes or rejects what he pleases and the rents of
all the fields occupied in the course of the year in any one
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village form what is called the settlement of that village'.
The principal objections that opponents of the ryotwari 
settlements had raised to their introduction had been that 
they involved too much detail, that too many individual 
agreements had to be reached and that consequently it would 
be impossible for the collectors to settle the revenues of 
their districts in a season. In their opinion, the ryotwari 
system could only be adopted if the number of European and
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Indian officials employed by the Company was greatly 
increased to handle all the extra work that they claimed 
would be generated. They argued that the expense alone would 
be prohibitive. Supporters of both the zamindari and village 
systems were partly inspired by the belief that such 
settlements, by limiting the number of people with whom 
agreement must be reached, offered the only practical means 
of collecting the revenues. Munro disagreed. He believed 
that all arable land could be divided into clearly defined 
fields of known productive value. Once this was done and 
every field officially recorded, Munro considered it 
perfectly feasible to assign a permanently fixed cash rent 
to every field. These individual field rents would be known 
to all the ryots of the villages. Each year these men would 
decide which fields they intended to farm and could be 
deemed to have entered into a contract to pay specific rents 
to the government as soon as they commenced cultivation. The 
collectors' task would be limited to recording who had taken 
which fields, issuing pattas to these ryots showing the 
aggregate revenue to be paid on their holdings for that 
year, informing the patels of the sums these amounted to for 
their villages, and then taking whatever measures might 
prove necessary to collect these revenues.
While Munro was surveying the Ceded Districts and gradually 
introducing his ryotwari settlements, the Madras Government 
was occupied with the introduction of the Bengal zamindari 
system into other parts of the Presidency. To overcome the 
problem posed by the general absence of zamindars in the 
south of India, the Board of Revenue had proposed that
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estates be artificially formed out of groups of villages and
that these be auctioned to the highest bidders. Thus, from
the start, there was a significant difference between the
Bengal and Madras zamindari settlements for, while the
zamindars in the former Presidency did 'perhaps bear enough
resemblance to English landlords to support those advocates
of the settlement who believed that they would make it their
object to improve their estates', the men who purchased
estates in the Madras territories were essentially revenue
149
farmers not landlords. Beaglehole's observation that support
for the settlement in Madras 'was based not on the aim of
improving and extending cultivation so much as of relieving
government of the duty of assessing and collecting the land
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revenue' seems correct. The Madras Government accepted the
Board's recommendations and appointed a commission in 1802
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to supervise the settlements. During the next two years the 
Northern Circars, the Jagir, the Baramahal and Dindigul were 
settled along these lines.
At the same time that zamindari settlements were introduced 
into Madras, a new judicial system was established which was 
modelled on that of Bengal. A code of regulations was 
promulgated, district judges who were also empowered to act 
as magistrates were appointed to assume responsibility for 
the civil and criminal jurisdiction formerly exercised by 
the collectors, and a new police force of thanadars and 
daroghas was instituted. Wellesley was particularly 
determined to see the Bengal judicial system extended to 
Madras. He believed it would lead to the 'distribution of 
legislative, executive and judicial powers of the state
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analogous to that which forms the basis of the British
constitution'. His ideas were influenced by a particular
152
analysis of Indian society. This argued that the evils of
corruption, extortion and oppression which the British
perceived as characterizing Indian society had their roots
in the long history of despotic government. Under this
analysis, the only solution to these problems appeared to be
the introduction of an independent, impartial judiciary
which, while applying the concept of equality before the
law, should distribute justice according to clearly defined
rules known to all. There can be little doubt that the
Governor-General belonged to the school of thought which
imagined that, should the British introduce into India the
judicial and political structures of England, the country
would then quickly develop along similar social and economic
lines. Bentinck appears to have agreed fully with
Wellesley's views and both were such enthusiastic advocates
of the new judicial system that they were prepared to see it
introduced into areas that had not yet been permanently 
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settled.
Munro was opposed to the introduction of both the zamindari 
settlements and the Bengal judicial system. However, since 
his reasons for opposing each of these policies were 
somewhat different, it is perhaps necessary to examine his 
efforts to reverse them separately.
Munro began his campaign against zamindari settlements by 
trying to influence the Board of Revenue. Falconar had 
returned to the Board on Place's resignation and had
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promised Munro his support. Petrie, who on Webbe's death, 
Clive's return to Britain and the Court's decision to 
acknowledge the Carnatic debts, no longer had reason to seek 
the removal of men like Munro in order to attack the 
administration, was also prepared to assist opposition to 
Wellesley's attempts to impose the Bengal revenue system on 
Madras. Munro wrote to Petrie warning him that zamindari
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settlements would have detrimental effects on the revenues. 
He argued that they would lead to the Company losing revenue 
since the zamindars would receive the benefits of increased 
cultivation together with part of the sircar's share of the
gross produce. He threw doubt on Wellesley's statement that
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the costs of zamindari collections were less than ryotwari.,
While admitting that ryotwari settlements were expensive to
administer, he claimed that the returns were greater and the
costs, as a percentage of the total, therefore smaller. He
also argued that the Government would be deprived of much
information about the values of its territories. The Board
was impressed by Munro's arguments. Petrie forwarded Munro's
views to the Government with the comment that he too could
see no benefit from the introduction of zamindari
settlements. 'On the contrary', he wrote, 'the condition of
the ryots will be worse. The advantages are hypothetical and
questionable, but the loss of revenue certain and 
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inevi table' .
Bentinck was quickly converted, both by the favourable 
letters he was receiving from the Board of Revenue and by 
his own perusal of Munro's reports on Kanara. He informed 
Munro in May that he intended to suggest to Wellesley that
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all future settlements should be ryotwari. His letter to
Munro gave the latter the opportunity he sought to enter
into a direct correspondence with the Governor in the course
of which he became increasingly confident of the
Government’s support for his views. This encouraged him, in
August 1805, to present a report to the Board of Revenue
that represented a major attack on zamindari settlements and
Munro's first clear exposition of his reasons for his
159
support for ryotwari arrangements.
Munro began this report by arguing that ryotwari settlements
had always been traditionally employed in India for the
collection of the land revenues. 'The sovereign has at all.
times been regarded as the sole landlord, the country has
been divided into an immense number of small farms held
160
immediately of him by their respective cultivators'. He
continued by claiming that attempts to alter this
traditional structure of society and remodel the
agricultural economy along English lines were mistaken.
'There is not the same necessity in this country as in
Europe for a body of great or rich landholders and, even if
such a body could be raised up, it would probably in the end
be productive of more harm than good because great landlords
would, in time, become impatient of the dominion of a 
161
foreign n ation1. Next he proceeded from general to specific 
criticisms which he himself perfectly summarized. 'I have 
endeavoured to show that the system of great estates will 
raise less produce from the soil than that of small farms, 
that it is more liable to failures and affords less security 
to the revenue, that it will be less agreeable to the
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inhabitants because they would rather hold their lands under 
government than under private individuals, and that it 
cannot be permanent because their laws and custom 
continually urge on the rapid division of landed property. I 
am therefore induced to recommend the rayetwar system or 
settlement with the cultivators.... The ultimate objects of 
this arrangement should be the rendering the cultivators
162
stationary, the land saleable and the farms small estates'.
Behind all the arguments, Munro's firm conviction that the 
British should encourage an extensive class of small, 
independent yeoman farmers to emerge clearly shone through. 
He believed that such a development was necessary if the 
manufacturing side of the economy was to expand. Such a 
class would provide both the raw materials a nascent 
manufacturing sector would require and a large market for 
its produces. It was a fear that ryotwari settlements.might 
result in subsistence farming and a consequent failure, on 
the part of the agrarian sector of the economy to supply the 
raw materials needed by the manufacturing sector rather than 
an anxiety that the revenues might decline that prompted 
Munro to urge that the ryots should be forced to cultivate 
as much land as possible. Typically though, he concealed his 
motives behind a concern for the cultivators. 'As the 
relinquishment (of land) is attended with loss to the ryot 
himself, it is obvious that there can be no injustice in
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insisting that every district shall keep up cultivation'. It 
was also obvious to Munro that further economic development 
would be dependent on the availability of cheap food. He . 
believed that food prices would only drop if cultivation
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expanded and competition was encouraged. He was satisfied 
that ryotwari settlements would achieve the former and 
argued that a strict insistence on the ryots paying cash 
rents rather than a proportion of their produce would ensure 
the latter. Apart from the fact that the ryots would be 
forced to think in terms of cash crops, the danger that the 
Government would acquire too great a control over grain 
reserves and a consequent ability to control the market,
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which might tempt it to inflate prices, would be avoided.
Bentinck was quickly convinced that M u n r o 1s ryotwari
proposals should be adopted. In January 1806, he recorded
two minutes. In the first, he praised Munro. describing him
as 'one of the best revenue officers and one of the ablest 
165
men in India'. In the second, he revealed the extent of
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Munro's influence over his opinions. Stating, using 
identical arguments to those Munro had employed on him, that 
he believed ryotwari settlements should be generally 
introduced, he explained that he had.intended to tour the 
Presidency to gain first hand information on the subject. 
This having proved impractical, he announced that he had 
delegated Thackeray to make the tour in his stead. It is 
obvious that Bentinck intended Thackeray's report to furnish 
support for the adoption of ryotwari, a policy he was 
already determined on. There is no other explanation for his 
orders that Thackeray should concentrate his researches on 
Kanara, Malabar and the Ceded Districts, areas Munro had 
persuaded Bentinck would verify his ideas. Bentinck did not 
even try to conceal this intention, publicly admitting the 
sole purpose of Thackeray's visit to the Ceded Districts was
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to be an interview with Munro, whose opinions Bentinck 
claimed should be sought on all questions relating to the 
revenues.
Thackeray was already a firm disciple of Munro's ideas. As
soon as Bentinck commissioned him to report on the revenues,
he wrote to Munro for assistance. 'It is a good thing', he
wrote, 'to know the best system. I therefore beg of you to
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write me your ideas'. By the end of April 1806, Bentinck had
received Thackeray's report which, after examining the
arguments for and against zamindari settlements, concluded
168
that they had no advantages over ryotwari ones. The report
owed not a little to Munro. Thackeray informed Munro that he
knew it would meet his approval for it included not only his
169
statements but even his words. Bentinck laid this report
before the Council with a minute of his own in which he
remarked that while he was convinced that the zamindari
system was ideally suited to conditions in Bengal, its
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extension to Madras was i11-conceived. Seeking more evidence
to support his contention, the Governor decided to issue a
questionnaire to the collectors. That this was little more
than a ploy to secure evidence that would legitimize the
position he had already adopted is suggested by the fact
that Munro was asked to draw up the questions. Thackeray
particularly informed Munro that the questions should be
171
phrased to produce pro-ryotwari answers. He warned him that 
Bentinck had decided to issue the questionnaire because the 
Board of Revenue, under the influence of Hodgson, was 
opposing ryotwari settlements and seeking to introduce 
village leases.
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A sample of the leading questions Munro suggested clearly
reveal the arguments Bentinck and Thackeray intended to
employ against zamindari settlements as well as his own 
172
views. 'Are not the zamindars and poligars in general men of 
low caste?.... Is it not true that the zamindars and 
poligars maintain themselves in authority by means of 
terror?.... Do they (the zamindars and poligars) not in 
general consider themselves rather as petty sovereigns than 
as landowners of a country under a superior government?' 
Other questions were designed to reveal that the zamindars 
were invariably hostile to the British and that the 
cultivators actually preferred to hold their lands from the 
State. Munro included with his sample queries an attack on. 
village leases. His main objection appears to have arisen 
from his belief that the patels would be constituted as the 
landlords of their villages. This, he argued, would result 
in the ryots losing their rights in the land as a 
consequence of becoming the private tenants of the patels. 
The village, he asserted, would become the property of one 
man instead of that of forty or fifty farmers.
However, while on one side Bentinck, Thackeray and Munro
were preparing the case for the introduction of ryotwari
settlements, the Board of Revenue was preparing its case for
village leases. A committee, composed of Colonel
Blackbourne, Hodgson and Wallace, was appointed to
173
investigate the revenue affairs of Tanjore. Hodgson used 
this opportunity to make an additional investigation into 
the affairs of Coimbatore and Tinn$velly. Both the 
committee's and Hodgson's reports recommended quinquennial
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v i l l a g e  lease s r a t h e r  than r y o t w a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s .  Aw a r e  that
ryotwari settlements were closely identified with military
collectors and anxious that the Board might be able to
employ civilian hostility towards these men to undermine
s u p p o r t  for his plans, B e n t i n c k  tried  to fo rce  t h ro u gh  his
policies by filling the Board of Revenue with allies. After
examining the possibility that Munro might be appointed
President of the Board and finding that the regulations
w o u l d  not p e r m i t  it, B e n t i n c k  a p p o i n t e d  T h a c k e r a y  a m e m b e r  
174
instead.
Early in 1807, the committee's and Hodgson's reports,
together with a paper from Munro which recommended the
permanent adoption of the ryotwari revenue system, were
examined by the Board of Revenue. On the 25 April 1807, the
Board announced its findings. It stated that it felt a
permanent adoption of ryotwari would be inexpedient since it
would involve 'continual interference with the
cultivators'. . .while the practicality of effecting a
settlement of that nature in perpetuity appeared more than 
175
questionable'. The Board also stated that ryotwari was 
incompatible with the judicial system which was being 
introduced. The Board concluded by recommending quinquennial 
village leases, arguing that they were in themselves a good 
means of administering the revenues and that such leases 
could easily be converted at a later date into permanent 
small zamindari settlements.
While Munro fought what appeared, by 1807, to be a losing 
battle in his efforts to see a ryotwari revenue system
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adopted as official policy in the Madras territory, he also 
campaigned vigorously against the introduction of a judicial 
system and a code of regulations based on the Bengal model. 
He opposed the introduction of the new judicial system 
because he sincerely believed it to be ill-designed to cope 
with the peculiar demands which the conditions in the 
territories under the Madras Government imposed on the 
British. In addition, he had very private reasons for his 
opposition to the innovations whose adoption, he conceived, 
would be certain to threaten his status and future career.
Under the new judicial system, the men serving as 
judge-magistrates were to be established in zillah courts 
with the responsibility for deciding civil and criminal 
cases and supervising the police in their districts. 
Unfortunately the structure of the new system closely copied 
the British model. British rules of procedure and evidence 
governed the operations of the courts and from the start 
these fettered the system. Litigation proved to be such a 
lengthy business and arrears so quickly built up that the 
courts were soon unable to distribute justice. Very large 
arrears of undecided cases accumulated. The costs of 
litigation became prohibitive. For many, the combination of 
expense and delay deprived them of all hope of employing the 
British courts to settle their civil disputes. Munro went to 
the heart of the matter when he criticized the judicial 
system in a letter to Thackeray. 'The fault of our judicial 
code is that there is a great deal too much of it for a 
first essay. Our own laws expanded gradually during several 
centuries, along with the increasing knowledge and
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c i v i l i z a t i o n  of the peopl e, so that they w e re  alwa ys fitted
in some m e a s u r e  to their f a c ul t ie s.  But here, w i t h o u t  any
p r e p a r a t i o n ,  we th r o w th em  do wn in a lump a mo ng a p ar c e l  of
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i g n o r a n t  ryots and e q u a l l y  i g n o r a n t  p u n d it s ' . M u n r o  b e l i e v e d
that the B r i t i s h  we re  u n w i s e l y  t r y i n g  to force the pace of
change. A l t h o u g h  he did not d i s a g r e e  w i t h  the u l t i m a t e  goal,
the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of an i n d e p e n d e n t  jud ic ia r y , he b e l i e v e d
this m u s t  be an a d a p t i v e  p r oc e s s.  ’W h e n  a c o u n t r y  falls
un de r  the d o m i n a t i o n  of a f o r e i g n  p o w e r ’ , he argued, 'it is
u s u a l l y  f ou nd to be the w i s e s t  p l a n  to leave it in
p o s s e s s i o n  of its own laws and c u s t o m s . . . .  E n d e a v o u r  ra t he r
to a m e l i o r a t e  than to a b o l i s h  them and s u b s t i t u t e  others in 
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their room'. A p a r t  f r om  a n y t h i n g  else, M u n r o  b e l i e v e d  that,, 
b e c a u s e  the n ew  civil r e g u l a t i o n s  p i v o t e d  on the d e f i n i t i o n  
and e n f o r c e m e n t  of p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  ri gh t s as u n d e r s t o o d  in 
the Eu rop e ra t h er  than India, they co ul d only f u rt h e r  
c o m p l i c a t e  an a l r e a d y  c o n f u s e d  si tu a t i o n .
As a c o l l e c t o r  r e s p o n s i b l e  for u n c o v e r i n g  the va l u e  of his
d i s t r i c t  and for c o n d u c t i n g  the l e n g t h y  n e g o t i a t i o n s  r e ve n u e
a s s e s s m e n t s  and s e t t l e m e n t s  alwa ys r e q u i r e d ,  M u n r o  had other
r ea s on s  to op po s e the new  system. He b e l i e v e d  that the full
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of the j u d i c i a l  s y s t e m  was l i ke l y  to hold up
the c o n c l u s i o n  of the ov er a l l s e t t l e m e n t  of the r e v e n ue s .  He
ar gu e d  that the l e n gt hy  and in v o l v e d  p r o c e d u r e s  of the
courts  and the ne w r e g u l a t i o n s  m i g h t  so ' e m b a rr a s s the
c o l l e c t o r  w i t h  the o b s e r v a n c e  of fo rms that he w o u l d  ne ve r
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be able to e f f e c t  a p e r m a n e n t  s e t t l e m e n t ' .  In his op inion, 
the s i t u a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  that e x t r a o r d i n a r y  p o w e r s  shoul d be 
v e s t e d  in a s i ngl e per s o n,  the c o l l e c t o r ,  at le ast  u nti l the
285
country should be brought fully under British control, the 
fields surveyed and the revenues settled. Should this not be 
done but the civil and judicial powers be separated, he was 
convinced that the Indians would employ the situation to 
play one branch off against the other in the hope of 
avoiding the payment of their rents. Munro could see no 
Indian objections to his ideas since he was convinced that 
the separation of judicial and civil power was not an 
indigenous concept.
Quite distinct from these, Munro's public objections, were
his private reasons for opposing the new judicial
arrangements. Some of these he expressed officially in terms
of public interest, others in private letters, and a few
have to be extrapolated from his papers. Munro was convinced
that collectors were more valuable to the Company than
judges and he argued that it was a mistake to grant the
179
latter a higher status and salary. He believed that a
permanent settlement of the revenue would do far more to
develop the country than the introduction of courts, stating
that ’a permanent rent would go further in one year in
promoting the improvement of the country and the comfort of
18 J
the inhabitants than the courts of justice in twenty*. He
therefore stressed the importance of encouraging the
Company's ablest men to enter the Revenue Line rather than
the judicial. The fact that, as a military officer, he could
never be employed as a judge but might continue serving as a
collector, obviously influenced his decision to promote the
cause of the revenue officials. His position was distinctly 
partisan however he might try to conceal this fact behind
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a r g u m e n t s  th at  the c o l l e c t o r s ,  b e i n g  a lwa ys  on the m o v e  and 
in da i l y  c o n t a c t  w i t h  the peopl e,  w e r e  in a b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  
to u n d e r s t a n d  the p r o b l e m s  of India and to s u p e r v i s e  the 
C o m p a n y ' s  t e r r i t o r i e s  than the j udg es wh o we r e tied to their 
s t a t i o n s  and had little c o n t a c t  w i t h  the i n h a b i t a n t s .
M u n r o  f o u n d  it e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  to sh ar e a u t h o r i t y  and
was m o t i v a t e d  by an i n te ns e  de s i r e  to m a k e  his fo rt u n e.  Both
of these f ac t o r s  i n f l u e n c e d  his a t t i t u d e s  t o wa r ds  the
judges. He could not t o l e r a t e  the idea that his d e c i s i o n s
m i g h t  be o v e r r u l e d  by judges o p e r a t i n g  w i t h i n  his di s t ri c t .
A l t h o u g h  he e x p r e s s e d  this in terms of an a n x i e t y  that the
s e p a r a t i o n  of p o we r s w o u l d  r e s u l t  in c o n f l i c t s  of i n t e r e s t  ,
and c la s h e s b e t w e e n  the two b r a n c h e s  w h e r e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  
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ov er l a p p e d ,  his real c o n c e r n  a p p e a r s  to ha ve b ee n  to de f e nd
his a u t h o r i t y .  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  the C o m p a n y  d e c i d e d  that it
w o u l d  be n e c e s s a r y  to m a k e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e t r e n c h m e n t s  in
order to pay the costs of the j u d i c i a l  system. The Co ur t
b e l i e v e d  that s a v in gs  m i g h t  be m a d e  by l i m i t i n g  the s a la r i e s
of the c o l l e c t o r s  and by r e d u c i n g  their e s t a b l i s h m e n t s .
H u d d l e s t o n ,  w h o  was o p e n l y  h o s t i l e  to the e m p l o y m e n t  of
m i l i t a r y  c o l l e c t o r s ,  p e r s u a d e d  the C o u r t  to limit  the
182
collectors' commissions to 7,500 pagodas a year. Munro 
perceived this as a threat to his hopes of saving sufficient 
capital to enable him to retire to Britain.
I n i t i a l l y  M u n r o ' s  h o s t i l i t y  t o wa r d s the judges  was 
r e s t r a i n e d .  The G o v e r n m e n t  had to o rd e r  h i m  to tr eat  the 
judges w i t h  s p e ci al  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and p u b l i c  d i s p l a y s  of 
r e s p e c t  but o t h e r w i s e  he was too i n v o l v e d  w i t h  the s ur v e y  of
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the Ceded Districts to devote much attention to the judicial 
183
developments. In 1803 however, Macleod informed Munro that
the new courts had been responsible for the revolt in 
184
Malabar. He stated that the judges, who he claimed supported
the 'Old School1 faction, had made it their duty to
interfere with his work as a collector and had refused to
support him. Webbe supported Macleod'8 contention, though he
argued that it was the judges as individuals who had
destroyed the collector's influence by supporting his
185
opponents and reversing his decisions. He did not accept 
that the system itself was at fault. Munro could not agree 
with Webbe since he was increasingly convinced that the new 
judicial arrangements threatened his authority and his 
financial prospects. The month before he received Webbe's 
letter, he had received a demand from the Civil Auditor that 
he refund to the Company the substantial sum which he had 
taken in commission over and above that permitted by the 
regulations. Munro began to look for opportunities to attack 
the new judicial arrangements.
In 1804, Bentinck gave Munro an opportunity to do this. He
wrote asking for Munro's comments on the Supreme
186
Government's plans for the Judicial Department. At first
Munro only replied with arguments that the collectors should
187
be placed financially on an equal footing with the judges.
It appears that the appointment of his old enemy Oakes as 
President of the Committee of Reform and Retrenchment so 
worried Munro that his commission would be further curtailed 
that he concentrated on this aspect of the question. The 
Court's recent attack on his poligar policies had turned his
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thoughts to retirement and he was consequently more
concerned to save sufficient capital to permit this than he
was to defend the authority of the collectors against that 
188
of the judges.
By 1806 however, the situation appeared to have changed and
Munro was confident that he might expect to be employed as a
collector for some years more and was therefore once more
interested in protecting the status of that office against
encroachments on it by the judiciary. He had also, in the
meantime, developed a comprehensive idea of how the British
should administer the judicial and revenue affairs of their
territories. The establishment of a Committee of Police gave
him an o p p o r t u n i t y  to e x p r e s s  these. The C o m m i t t e e  was
established to investigate the operations of the new police
arrangements and was ordered to examine the views of the
judges and collectors on whether the present system was
satisfactory and how it might be improved. Munro gathered
his ideas together in a series of notes which he then used
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to prepare a report to the Committee. He began with a 
general attack on the Bengal Judicial System, stating that 
it was the most expensive in the world. He added that none 
of the inhabitants of India had wanted it and none were 
pleased with it. He then continued with detailed criticisms. 
It was, he said, based on the theory that the Indians were 
too corrupt to be entrusted with any responsibility for the 
distribution of justice. Not only was this^ in his opinion, 
an absurd proposition but it also had terrible consequences. 
It forced the British to establish a vast and expensive 
judiciary which actually had only one advantage over the
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indigenous systems in so far as it did control the Company's
own executive. On the other hand, it was cumbersome,
inefficient and so slow that, in effect, the inhabitants
were deprived of all hope of having their disputes settled.
Furthermore, Munro believed that the system, by destroying
the influence of the patels, made these men discontented
with the British whereas they had previously always
supported their rule. The new judicial system he wrote, 'is
gradually undermining the whole fabric of the village
constitution (which is) so admirably adapted for the
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preservation of internal peace and security'.
On the basis of these charges, Munro suggested the adoption 
of a completely different system which would enable the 
Indians to play some role in the administration of their 
country. He recommended that the offices of collector and 
magistrate be reunited, that the patels be returned to their 
ancient judicial responsibilities, and that panchayats be 
employed to settle the majority of minor cases, the police 
disbanded and the Company revert to relying on the village 
watchmen to maintain order and investigate crimes. Munro 
gave his desire to see Indians involved in the 
administration as his principal reason for making these 
recommendations and argued that his system would be more 
acceptable to the inhabitants since it would more closely 
resemble that to which they were accustomed. Despite this 
however, it is clear that Munro's principal interest was to 
find the means of making substantial savings for the Company 
in order that the decision to make retrenchments in the 
Revenue Department might be reversed. Since he was already
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hostile to the judiciary, it was natural that he should 
claim that the Judicial Department was the most obvious area 
where savings might be achieved. He did this, stating that 
the only reason why other employees did not support his 
views was their fear they might be thought 'enemies of 
justice'. If the police were disbanded and the village 
watchmen, who required only small inam grants for their 
support, were employed, Munro argued that a substantial 
saving might be effected. More importantly, he claimed that 
even greater savings, in terms of both cost and European 
manpower, could be achieved if the collectors were employed 
as magistrates since this would result in a much smaller 
number of judges being required. Such a scheme had definite 
attractions for Munro. Since the collector would once more 
emerge as the principal figure in the British 
administration, he could, and in Munro's opinion should, be 
suitably rewarded with an enhanced rate of commission and 
salary, something which might easily be done out of the 
overall savings the Company would be achieving.
Although the Police Committee treated Munro's opinions with 
respect, it was clear to him that support for the Cornwallis 
System was too strong for his arguments to make much impact 
on the decision to establish a version of it in all the 
territories under the Madras Government. By and large, the 
new judicial system was supported by all the authorities; 
the Court and the Board of Control in Britain, the 
Governor-General and his Council in Bengal, the Governor, 
the Council, the Board of Revenue and the civil servants in 
Madras. In a letter he wrote to Bruce in July 1806, Munro
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revealed that he was resigned to seeing his judicial ideas
191
at least temporarily shelved.
By the middle of 1806 Munro was seriously considering
leaving India. Although the Government had supported his
claim to be allowed to keep his full commission on his
collections, the Court had turned down his request. The
decision to appoint judges in the Ceded Districts had upset
Munro and he was still bitter about the treatment he had
received from the Court over his measures against the Vimla
poligar. He felt he had been in India too long and appears
to have b e e n  s u f f e r i n g  f rom  d e p r e s s i o n .  'No m o r a l  or
religious book, not even the Gospel itself', he wrote to his
sister, 'ever calls my attention so powerfully to the
shortness of life as does, in some solitary hour, the
recollection of my friends and of the long course of days
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and years that have passed away since I saw these'. In 
addition, he felt himself disappointed in his career. 'I am 
not satisfied', he added, 'with the subordinate line to 
which I have moved and with my having been kept from holding 
any distinguished military command for want of rank'. 
Furthermore, many of Munro's patrons and friends had gone.
In particular, Wellesley had been forced back to Britain and 
Webbe had died in November 1804.
On 10 July 1806 a mutiny broke out at Vellore. Sir John 
Cradock, the Commander-in-Chief had drawn up orders which 
required the sepoys to remove their caste marks and which 
also affected their dress, their turbans and the quantity of 
hair they were permitted to wear on their faces. Bentinck
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sanctioned these orders which were designed to create a 
uniformity of appearance in the ranks. Unfortunately the 
sepoys interpreted the innovations as an attack on their 
religion and, after several months of unrest, they revolted, 
killing 200 of the British garrison of 370 at Vellore. The 
revolt was quickly crushed but not before it had panicked 
the British, both in India and at home. In both countries 
opinion was divided between three explanations of why the 
mutiny had occurred. It was blamed on the innovations of 
Cradock, the activities of missionaries who were said to 
have aroused fears among the sepoys that they were to be 
forcibly converted to Christianity, and to the plots of Tipu 
Sultan's family and adherents who had been moved by the 
British to Vellore.
When the news of the mutiny reached Britain, it found the
Court already divided by an acrimonious dispute over the
activities of British missionaries in India. On the one
hand, Grant and Parry who, along with Wilberforce and Henry
Thornton, were members of the Clapham Sect, an evangelical
body which agitated for the 'universal dissemination of
Christianity in India', had used their positions in the
Court to send ardent evangelical clergymen to fill the
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chaplaincies in India. On the other hand, men like Thomas 
Twining, Baring and Toone in the Court had actively voiced 
their opposition to the activities of Christian missionaries 
and to Grant's policies. They now seized on the Vellore 
Mutiny as an opportunity to attack their opponents, claiming 
its outbreak was directly attributable to the sepoys' fears 
for their religions which Grant's misguided policies had
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raised. Grant and Parry felt they had no alternative but to
completely deny that missionary activity was in any way
r e s p o n s i b l e .  They a c c u s e d  C r a d o c k  and B e n t i n c k  of h a v i n g
acted imprudently by forcing the new regulations governing
appearance on the sepoys and of having failed to heed
r e p e a t e d  w a r n i n g s  that these m i g h t  lead to a mut i n y.  They
guided the Court into recalling both Cradock and Bentinck,
hoping that this would prevent further attacks on the
missionaries. Dundas then proposed that George Barlow should
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replace Bentinck. Grant and Parry, who had just been elected 
to the Chairs, agreed even though it meant that William 
Petrie, who had thirteen years' seniority over Barlow, would 
be superseded. Grant had known Barlow in Bengal and believed 
him to be a supporter of his views, especially on the 
introduction of zamindari settlements. Grant, who had been 
responsible for drawing up the despatch in 1792 which
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sanctioned Cornwallis's plans, was undoubtedly trying to 
build a power base in India which could be employed to. 
counteract opposition in the Court.
For Munro, B e n t i n c k ' s  r e c a l l  was the final straw. Not only
was he to lose his last i n f l u e n t i a l  p a t r o n  in India, the one
man who might yet enable him to overcome opposition to his
attempts to see ryotwari settlements adopted as official
r e v e n u e  polic y,  but he was n ow  to s er ve u n d e r  a G o v e r n o r  who
was k n o w n  to be s t r o n g l y  o p p o s e d  to such s e t t l e m e n t s .  M u nr o
had already been warned by Thackeray that Barlow would not
f avo ur  his ideas. 'If Sir G e o r g e  B a r l o w  comes', T h a c k e r a y
had written, 'he will order the heads of ryotwari men to be 
196 .
cut off'. Munro also had personal reasons for not wishing to
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serve under Barlow. Barlow was related to the girl Munro's
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brother Daniel had married. In 1798, Daniel's wife had run 
off with another man, Pattle, who had then killed Daniel in 
a duel. In the aftermath of this affair, the Munro family 
considered that Barlow had behaved extremely badly towards 
them. The whole business left a degree of ill-feeling on 
both sides which Munro believed had prejudiced Barlow 
against him.
By July 1807, shortly after the news of Bentinck's recall
arrived at Madras, Munro finally decided to return to 
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Britain. It is far from clear whether this decision r e pr es en te d  
a step towards resignation from the Company's service
or a determination to attempt to persuade the home 
authorities to adopt the policies that Munro had so signally 
failed to have implemented by the Madras administration. It 
is doubtful whether Munro himself had any clear plans beyond 
a hope that his presence in London would enable him to 
persuade the Court to permit him to retain the commission 
that he had been ordered to refund to the Treasury in 
Madras. Much of the evidence suggests that he was thinking 
of retiring if he could find employment in Britain and that 
this was why he was so very concerned about the money which, 
were he allowed to keep it, would have substantially secured 
his future. On the other hand, he had the example of Place 
and Chamier to follow and may have hoped to exercise a 
similar influence over the Court to that they had obtained. 
For the first time in his life, Munro had influential 
relatives in the Ministry. His brother-in-law, Henry 
Erskine, had been, on Pitt's death, appointed Lord Advocate
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for Scotland. Francis Erskine, Henry's brother, had secured
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the office of Lord Chancellor. The strongest evidence 
however that Munro hoped to follow Place's example is the 
report he delivered to the Board of Revenue just before he 
left. He may have written this report with motives not 
dissimilar to those that inspired Place to produce the 
minute he delivered immediately before leaving India in 
1802.
In his report of 15 August 1807, Munro comprehensively
expressed all his ideas regarding the judicial and revenue
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administrations of Madras. He listed the advantages and 
disadvantages of zamindari and ryotwari settlements, 
concluding that, in the long term, a ryotwari system was to 
be preferred to a zamindari one. First he argued that no 
comparison could be made between the British and Indian 
societies, stressing that an intermediate class between the 
state and the cultivators similar to the landed gentry of 
England might only exist if the British artificially created 
and maintained it. He continued by stating that, while under 
a zamindari system the Company's revenues would never 
increase, under a ryotwari one they would because the 
Government would retain possession of the waste lands. As 
the population expanded, the waste lands would be brought 
under cultivation and begin paying rents. The Government 
would be the principal beneficiary. Munro also believed that 
ryotwari settlements conformed more closely to the 
traditional pattern of Indian land management where holdings 
were customarily small. He believed that it was wrong to try 
to change this and argued that it was a mistake to attempt
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to create a body of landlords living of their rents from 
tenants. His ideal was a society built upon a large class of 
small, independent yeoman farmers, a class which combined 
all the virtues of the labourer, the farmer and the 
proprietor. Munro stated that, should the ryot be made the 
proprietor of his land, he would prove to be 'industrious, 
frugal and comfortable, preserving the simplicity 
of...manners and respect to public authority'. In addition, 
Munro believed that, were his ryotwari system to be 
introduced all over the Presidency, assessments and 
remissions would be standardized and this would end ryot 
migrations during which the cultivators moved from area to 
area seeking better opportunities. As a consequence, a more 
settled and tranquil society would emerge.
Having argued the case for ryotwari settlements of the 
revenues, Munro proceeded to present a case for changes in 
the judicial system. One of the points the opponents of 
ryotwari settlements had frequently made was that they were 
incompatible with the judicial system. Munro agreed but, 
instead of concluding that a ryotwari system could not 
therefore be adopted, he pressed for changes in the judicial 
administration. He stated that under the present system the 
inhabitants suffered 'great inconvenience and even distress' 
from 'delay, vexation, bribery (and) wrong decisions'. He 
suggested various reforms that included more summary justice 
administered by collector-magistrates, the greater 
employment of Indian commissioners and panchayats to decide 
civil cases, and a general simplification of the legal 
processes. He argued that reappointment of collectors as
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magistrates would enable the Company to make substantial 
savings as would the greater employment of Indian 
commissioners. In the latter case he specifically stated 
that, in a country as large and populous as India, the 
British could never hope to employ sufficient Europeans to 
staff the judicial administration and that justice could be 
'properly distributed only by the means of the natives'. As 
far as the panchayats were concerned, he believed that these 
were not only less open to corruption, more likely to be 
possessed of local knowledge and therefore more certain to 
reach just decisions but also the only mode of settling 
civil disputes that was general and popular among the 
inhabitants. He equated the role of the panchayat in Indian, 
civil legal system with that of the jury in the British 
criminal system. It permitted the inhabitants to participate 
in the judicial process, encouraged confidence in it and 
helped guarantee its independence from the executive. In 
addition, Munro had another reason for urging the use of 
panchayats. Whatever the judicial arrangements employed, 
corrupt decisions were certain to be reached occasionally.
It would be better, in his opinion, that these should be 
seen to be made by the panchayats rather than the zillah 
courts for when the disgrace of such a decision fell on a 
panchayat, the Indians could only lament their own 
depravity. Should a zillah court reach an unjust verdict, 
the reputation of the Company was tarnished in the eyes of 
the Indians and the Government's principal source of 
authority was thereby undermined.
Munro also advanced another idea for the improvement of the
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j u d i c i a l  system. He s u g g e s t e d  that the judges sh oul d not be 
c o n f i n e d  to their zi l l a h  s ta t i o n s  b ut e n c o u r a g e d  to go out 
on ci rc u i t.  He b e l i e v e d  that this w o u l d  not only give the 
judge s a d e e p e r  and m o r e  e x t e n s i v e  k n o w l e d g e  of the c o un t ry  
and its i n h a b i t a n t s  but w o u l d  also re m o v e  a m a j o r  source of 
In di a n d i s c o n t e n t  w i t h  the system. By p e r m i t t i n g  the judges 
to go to the people, such a r e f o r m  w o u l d  r e m o v e  m u c h  of the 
i n c o n v e n i e n c e  s u f f e r e d  by the p a t e l s  and ryots w ho  we r e  
f r e q u e n t l y  fo rc e d  to trave l g re a t  d i s t a n c e s  and w a s t e  m u c h  
time w h e n  they e i th e r  w i s h e d  or had to a t t e n d  jud i c ia l  
sess ions .
It is d i f f i c u l t  to v i e w  this, M u n r o ’s p a r t i n g  shot, as 
m e r e l y  a n o t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  on his p a r t  to the d e b a t e s  on 
r e v e n u e  and j ud ic i al  p o l i c i e s  c u r r e n t l y  d i v i d i n g  the Ma d ra s  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  T her e can be little d o u b t  that M u n r o  w r o t e  
this r e p o r t  w i t h  the C o u r t  of D i r e c t o r s  and the B oar d of 
C o n t r o l  in mind, b ei n g  fu ll y a war e that the B o ar d  of R e v e n u e  
w o u l d  f o r w a r d  it to the M a d r a s  G o v e r n m e n t  w h o  w o u l d  in turn 
d e s p a t c h  it to the C o u r t  for c o n s i d e r a t i o n  by the Di r ec t o r s .  
M u n r o  p r o b a b l y  h op e d  that the D i r e c t o r s  w o u l d  take a d v a n t a g e  
of his p r e s e n c e  in B r i t a i n  to ask hi m  to e x p l a i n  in p e r s o n  
the ideas he had so c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y  and c a r e f u l l y  ex p o u n d e d .  
It is also p r o b a b l e  that, se e i n g  no p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
p e r s u a d i n g  the M a d r a s  G o v e r n m e n t  to a d o p t  his po l i c i e s ,  he 
i n t e n d e d  to try to use the o p p o r t u n i t i e s  o p e n ed  by his 
p r e s e n c e  in B r i t a i n  to br i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s  iii the home  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r ou nd to his ideas. In B r i t a i n  he co ul d  
c o m m u n i c a t e  d i r e c t l y  w i t h  these  m e n  in p r i v a t e  lette rs  and 
m e e t i n g s ,  th e r e b y  b y e - p a s s i n g  the o f f i c i a l  c h a n n e l s  of
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communication. This would permit him to express himself more 
forcibly and perhaps more critically than he felt that he 
could in his official correspondence. Munro was aware that 
there existed a variety of means to influence the 
decision-making process in Britain that were not available 
in Madras. Because authority was more widely distributed, 
the opportunities open to individuals and parties to bring 
pressure on those responsible for deciding policy were 
consequently greatly increased.
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Chapter Six
The Re-emergence of Munro:
Munro's Influence on the Home Authorities, 1808-1814.
When Munro returned to Britain in 1808, it appeared that the 
ideas and policies which he and the other members of the 
•New School' advocated were most unlikely to be officially 
adopted by the Company. The Cornwallis Judicial System, to 
which Munro was so deeply opposed, had been generally 
introduced and the home authorities as yet retained full 
confidence in it. Despite some sporadic criticism of the 
system in Madras and some more sustained attacks upon it by 
a growing number of Bengal civil servants who had been 
disillusioned by their experiences of its effectiveness and 
efficiency, the basic assumptions behind the system remained 
unchallenged in Britain. The generally held opinion was that 
the system at the most required a number of minor 
adjustments or reforms made to it to reduce its costs and 
possibly expedite its operations. There also seemed little 
likelihood that a ryotwari revenue system would be 
introduced into the Madras territories. While the home 
authorities, the Court of Directors in particular, had for 
some time doubted the wisdom of extending the Permanent
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Settlement System, neither they nor the local governments
were prepared to introduce annual ryotwari leases. In
addition, no progress had been made towards the introduction
of the other major reforms to the Company's administration
that the 'New School' had proposed. The majority of the
civil servants still failed to qualify themselves for their
employment by learning Indian languages, relied heavily on
dubashes and showed no signs of developing into the
efficient administrators with whom Wellesley had hoped to
staff the empire. The situation had not improved since 1803
when Webbe, in answer to a request from Munro for an
assistant trained in accounting to help him prepare his
revenue statements, had told him that such a man was
2
impossible to find in the civil service. He had added that 
accounting was not even taught at the College of Fort 
William and had suggested that Munro privately employ 
somebody from on of the Madras agency houses. Appointments 
were still governed by considerations of seniority and 
influence, a factor which operated against innovation and 
impaired administrative efficiency.
Yet only six years later, significant changes in the 
policies of the home authorities had been made. These 
changes, largely the consequence of the adoption of ideas 
developed by Munro and other members of the 'New School', 
resulted in the home authorities ordering both the 
introduction of ryotwari leases into all parts of Madras not 
permanently settled and a complete reform of the judicial 
system. In addition, they encouraged serious attempts to 
establish an administrative structure in which qualification
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and merit rather than seniority and influence governed 
appointments and promotions. In this chapter the roles 
played by Munro, by other individuals, by the Directors and 
by the members of the Board of Control in this process are 
examined. Special attention is devoted to the techniques 
employed by Munro and his supporters to promote his ideas 
and himself with them. In addition, the factors which 
influenced the operations of the decision-making process 
during this period are reviewed, in particular the tensions 
generated between competing parties in the Court which, 
together with Company's seriously weakened financial 
position, resulted in a significant transfer of power to the 
Board of Control. The manner in which the official divisions 
of authority and channels of communication were ignored and 
the ways in which the Board took advantage of the situation 
to extend and even to exceed its formal powers are analysed.
Munro arrived in England on 5 April 1808. He returned to a 
country he had not seen since he left London 28 years 
before, with very mixed feelings. While he was looking 
forward to seeing his family again, it was not the one that 
he had left behind when he travelled to India at the age of 
20. Two of his brothers and his mother had died, his father 
was ill and senile, and his beloved sister Erskine had been 
widowed and then remarried. Munro was also very uncertain 
what his future would be. He had not managed to save as much 
in India as he had hoped to and he appears to have at times 
regretted the decision he had taken to resign his post as 
Principal Collector. The thought that, had he remained in 
the Ceded Districts a few years longer, he might have saved
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sufficient to ensure his future comfort, seems to have 
preyed on his mind. As it was, he was unsure whether he 
would be returning to India again, thought that he would be 
unable to find any employment in Europe, and dreaded a 
retired existence of enforced idleness on a restricted 
income. Fear for the last of these was one of two powerful 
motives which impelled him to try to have the decision 
reversed which had resulted in his losing a substantial 
proportion of the commission he had received as the 
Principal Collector of the Ceded Districts. Ever since he 
had witnessed, as a young man, the traumatic consequences of 
his father's bankruptcy, Munro had been obsessively 
concerned to create and maintain a fortune for himself. 
Another motive behind Munro's determination to regain the 
money was his conviction that it was rightfully his. Munro 
was a man who, once he believed himself right on any matter, 
was prepared to argue his case until others accepted it.
Munro's problem with his commission had begun in 1803 when
the Civil Auditor demanded he refund some of it to the
Treasury, claiming that he had received more in commission
3
than the regulations entitled him to. Munro had then written
to Webbe, complaining that he had expected his income to be
raised, not reduced, when he moved from Kanara to the Ceded 
4
Districts. He told Webbe that he could not deal with a man 
who 'spoke by Acts of Parliament1. Munro expressed a hope 
that Webbe could recover the money for him. Webbe wrote 
back, explaining that the decision had been taken by the 
Court of Directors, who had been persuaded by John 
Huddleston, a man extremely hostile to the employment of
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military collectors, to pass a regulation that no collector
should receive more than 7500 pagodas a year without the
5
Government’s express permission. Munro did not give up and
he approached Bentinck when it was obvious that Webbe could
do little for him. Bentinck confirmed Webbe's letter,
stating that Munro's commission had definitely been limited
6
to 7500 pagodas by the Court's orders. In 1805, Munro
brought the matter up with Petrie who was able to do no more
7
for him than Bentinck and Webbe had. He did though promise
to try to find a way round the Court's orders and promised
to suggest to the Government that certain collectors should
8
receive additional money for 'extraordinary services'.
Petrie's suggestion was accepted by the Madras Government
and later by the Court. Consequently Munro's commission was
raised to 12,000 pagodas but this still fell short of what
he felt himself entitled to. The fact that the newly
appointed judges were receiving higher allowances,
apparently funded from the retrenched commissions of the
revenue officials, appears to have made the issue a matter
of principle for Munro. It certainly embittered him. There
can be little doubt that a desire to personally persuade the
Directors to permit him to keep the £4500 that was to be
taken from him, was a powerful factor in Munro's decision to
return to Britain. He also had good grounds for expecting to
be successful. Before Munro left Madras, Petrie, as
President of the Board of Revenue, had recorded a minute in
which he strongly supported Munro's claim and expressed the
9
hope that the Court would reconsider the matter. The 
Government had concurred and embodied a recommendation that
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M u n r o  be a l l o w e d  to ke ep his full c o m m i s s i o n  in a r e v en u e
10
lette r to the home a u t h o r i t i e s .
On his a r r i v a l  in Londo n,  M u n r o  c o n t a c t e d  his new
b r o t h e r - i n - l a w ,  He n r y  Er sk in e , to ask him to a s s i s t  in
p e r s u a d i n g  the Co u r t  to r e v e r s e  the d e c i s i o n  that had
11
deprived him of £4500. Henry Erskine, who had married
Munro's sister Erskine in 1805, was a man of enormous
political influence. In 1783, he had been Lord Advocate,
t e m p o r a r i l y  r e p l a c i n g  D u n d a s , and he had h el d  of fi ce ag a in
in 1806 under the ministry of 'All the Talents'. In 1808, he
had just been appointed to a commission to enquire into the
administration of justice in Scotland. He was also a noted
Whig, v e n e r a t e d ,  even by his rivals, for his p o l i t i c a l
12
integrity and valued for his sharp wit. He agreed to help
13
Munro. At the same time, M u n r o  p e t i t i o n e d  the Court.
Initi all y,  the C ou r t  r e j e c t e d  the p e t i t i o n ,  i n f o r m i n g  M u n r o
in June that he co u l d not be a l l o w e d  to k eep  the full 
14
commission. Faced by this rebuff, Munro asked Erskine to
15
canvass support amongst the Directors. This was done and
Erskine introduced Munro to several of the leading
Directors, in particular Sir Hugh Inglis, Sir Francis
Baring, Robert Thornton, Abraham Robarts and the Hon William
16
F u l l e r t o n  E l p h i n s t o n e .
On 6 July 1808, Munro prepared another petition to the 
17
Court. In it he laid out the grounds on which he felt he 
should be permitted to retain the full commission. He 
compared his allowances with those Read had received, 
stating that his had been lower despite the fact that he had
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had to work harder and had raised more revenue. He mentioned 
the additional duties he had performed, in particular his 
responsibility for military supplies. He observed that Read 
had received a 5 per cent commission on his supplies to the 
army while he, Munro, had foregone this, believing his 
revenue allowances sufficient for his work. He also claimed 
that the Government had promised him a minimum commission on 
the revenues of 1 per cent in August 1801. Finally Munro 
concluded that he had settled the revenues and collected 
them more cheaply than would have been the case had civil 
servants been employed and argued that the Company could 
easily pay him his full commission out of the savings he had 
made them.
Before Munro presented this petition, he must have been
warned by friends in the Court that the hostility his
treatment of the Vimla poligar had aroused was still acting
against him. He therefore produced a second draft in which
he included a long defence of his poligar policies in
general and of his measures against the Vimla poligar in 
18
particular. The arguments he employed to justify his actions
were identical to those which he had presented to the Board
of Revenue in 1805 and they seem to have made no more of an
impression on the Directors this time than they had when the
Court first reviewed them. Nine months later the Court still
showed no signs of reaching a decision. Munro therefore had
19
no option but to present a third petition. By this time he 
had a number of friends among the Directors prepared to 
support his claim. Even so, the outcome was far from certain 
and Munro could not afford to take any risks. He delayed the
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presentation of his petition for a week until he was certain
that Sir Francis Baring, who had been ill, would be in 
20
attendance.
In July, the matter was finally considered and this time the
Court reached a decision in Munro's favour. Munro described
21
the business in a letter to his brother Alexander. 'The
Committee of Correspondence came to a resolution that the
balances of my commission should be retrenched but that a
present should be made to me of ten thousand pagodas or
£4000. Though I shall in consequence lose about £500, I am
better pleased that the measure has been passed in this way
than if my original claim had been carried for it is more
creditable and may also in the end be more useful'. On 3
August 1809, the Court officially informed Munro that he was
22
to be granted a special payment 10,000 pagodas.
The pursuit of his money seems to have fully occupied what
little time. Munro had to devote to Company affairs during
1808 and the first half of 1809, though he did present Sir
Hugh Inglis with a copy of his report to the Madras
Government on judicial affairs, which Sir Hugh promptly 
23
lost. While it is no doubt probable that Munro did discuss 
his ideas about India when he was in the company of those 
men intimately involved in the country's administration to 
whom his brother-in-law had introduced him, there is no 
evidence to show that he was pressing his views or otherwise 
seriously concerned with Company business. On the contrary, 
there is considerable evidence to suggest that he was fully 
occupied with other interests at this time. Apart from
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wishing to spend as much time as possible with his family
and old acquaintances in Scotland, he wanted to make a tour
of Wa les  and v i s i t  fr i e n d s  he had k n o w n  in India wh o wer e
now living in the West Country. He was also deeply concerned
about his increasing deafness and this concern prompted him
to try progressively more bizarre cures such as the
application of turnip juice or the use of Mr Hawkins
artificial ears. He even visited a Dr Saunders, whom he
24
described as a 'filthy old man almost as deaf as us'. The 
evidence suggests that it was at this time that Munro began 
an affair with Jessy McCorquodale in Edinburgh, which only
25
ended when she presented him with an illegitimate daughter.
Admittedly, in 1809, he tried to persuade Charles Grant and
Joh n B a n n e r m a n  to add their i n f l u e n c e  to that of the other
supporters of his claim to the commission but, unless a
large part of his correspondence, and the more important
part of it, has been lost, much more of his time was spent
dealing with begging letters and requests for his assistance
from those seeking posts for themselves and friends or
relatives in India. It is perhaps a measure of his standing
and involvement with the Court at this time that the
ultimate decision to allow him his money was a close run
affair. The Court first refused his request in one paragraph
of their General Letter of 1809, only to change their minds
26
and reverse the decision in a later paragraph.
Some indications of Munro's general state of mind at this 
time can be gleaned from his letters and they suggest that 
he was slightly depressed, nostalgic, uncertain what his 
future would be and feeling more than ever alienated from
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the s o c i e t y  of his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s .  His le tt ers  m a ke  it qu it e
cl ea r  th at he felt h i m s e l f  s o m e h o w  e x c l u d e d  fr o m  the social
c i r c l e s  he had e x p e c t e d  to e nt er in Sco tl a nd .  He had been
a wa y  too long and no w felt that he had few in t e r e s t s  in
c o m m o n  w i t h  those he had left be hin d.  His m o o d  was pe rh ap s
b e s t  c a p t u r e d  in a lette r he w r o t e  to his si ste r in w h i c h  he
c l a i m e d  th at  'a s o l i t a r y  w a l k  is a l m o s t  the only th ing in
27
w h i c h  I ha ve  any e nj o y m e n t ' .  C o n t i n u i n g ,  he w r o t e  that he
had twice r e t u r n e d  to N o r t h s i d e ,  once the f a mi l y  home, w h e r e
he r e a l i z e d  that 'former times w e re  gone'. By and large,
M u n r o  seems to have b ee n  d i s i l l u s i o n e d  w i t h  Brit ai n,  w h i c h
28
he d e s c r i b e d  as 'cold and dark, w et and dirty'. He ap pe a r s
to have b e e n  p r i n c i p a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  in r e t u r n i n g  to India, .
h o p e f u l l y  to take up his old pos t a g a i n  or a s i m i la r
a p p o i n t m e n t .  It is h o w e v e r  n e c e s s a r y  to q u a l i f y  this by
o b s e r v i n g  that M u n r o ' s  pl ans c h a n g e d  e a s i l y  and f r e q u e n t l y
at this p er i o d.  At one p o i n t  he had ho p e s that Lady Stuart,
who  w i t h  her h u s b a n d  and b r o t h e r - i n - l a w  had done so m u c h  for
h im w h e n  he was a j uni or  o f f i c e r  in India, m i g h t  use her
i n f l u e n c e  in G l a s g o w  to h elp  h im  get e l e c t e d  to Pa r l ia m e n t .
M u n r o  told his b r o t h e r  that, 'even if I fail the atte mpt , it
w o u l d  be u s e f u l  as it w o u l d  pave  the way  for my co m in g
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f o r w a r d  on any f u t u re  v a c a n c y 1.
News r e a c h i n g  M u n r o  fr om M a d r a s  a b o u t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  there,
p a r t i c u l a r l y  some in the r e v e n u e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  w er e
p r o b a b l y  a c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r  to his u n c e r t a i n t y  and
c o n c e r n  for his future. D e s p i t e  i n c r e a s i n g  r e s e r v a t i o n s  on
the par t of the h ome  a u t h o r i t i e s  a b o u t  the e f f i c a c y  of
30
p e r m a n e n t  s e t t l e m e n t s ,  the M a d r a s  Bo ard  of R e v e n u e  c o n t i n u e d
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to advocate them and to pursue policies designed to make
their general introduction possible, even inevitable. While
the Court argued against precipitous action, the local
authorities claimed conditions were ripe for the extension
of permanent settlements to the whole of Madras. The Madras
Board of Revenue, having recognized that the absence of
zamindars made permanent settlements with such a class
impossible, had proposed to conclude similar settlements
with mirasdars and, where these could not be found, with
village headmen. Since the Court had prohibited the
conclusion of permanent settlements without its sanction,
the Board of Revenue had urged, and the Madras Government
31
had approved, the conclusion of decennial leases. It was 
always the Board of Revenue's intention that these leases 
should be made permanent. The argument was that permanency 
would encourage cultivation and thereby increase the wealth 
of the country. In consequence, while the possibility of a 
depreciation of the currency suggested that fixed money 
rents might ultimately lead to a diminution of the Company's 
income from the land revenues, any losses would be more than 
augmented by increases in other sources of revenue such as 
customs and excise.
Once the Madras Government had, under pressure from the
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Board of Revenue, espoused villages leases as the best 
method of settling the land revenues, support in India for 
ryotwari settlements quickly evaporated., A number of 
Munro's supporters, men who had advocated the general 
employment of ryotwari settlements, now abandoned them in 
favour of the village leases, believing it in their interest
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to be seen to follow the lead of the Governor and senior 
civil servants, on whom they were dependent for promotion. 
Thackeray in particular switched his allegiance, though he 
did try to justify this desertion in a letter to Munro. 'We
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have introduced a kind of village rent generally', he wrote. 
'This was acceded to by me at the Board because I thought 
that we had not men to carry on the ryotwari, that the 
regulations and courts were generally speaking incompatible 
with ryotwari, that the economy which they have adopted with 
respect to native servants made it necessary to give them in 
the shape of profit what the Government meant to refuse them 
in the shape of salary, that Sir George Barlow was 
determined upon this system, that upon the whole your 
general system was more likely to be preserved by a modified 
village settlement than by attempting to preserve a pure 
ryotwari which is found every day more and more inconsistent 
with judges, courts and commissioners. I am not Cato, I am a 
Cicero with regard to ryotwari; to keep as much as we can, 
not to risk all by endeavouring to keep all when we can save 
a part by being content with as much as circumstances will 
allow'.
Soon after writing this letter, Thackeray completely 
abandoned the ryotwari system. His principal motive seems to 
have been fear that continued support for the system might 
damaged his career prospects. At the same time however, he 
clearly wished to keep his options open and had no wish to 
offend Munro. 'The village rent', he wrote to him, 'which 
has been almost generally introduced, is not so good as your 
ryotwari managed by you but it is better than ryotwari
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managed indifferently under a controlling power'. Unwilling
to expose his real motives, Thackeray produced an excuse for
his defection which was likely to both flatter and appeal to
Munro. 'We can hardly get men to carry on the village
r ents', he wrote, 'even though we have managed to get the
best young men in the service made collectors; how could we
then get men to carry on ryotwari under increasing
35
difficulties and obstacles that have arisen?'
It is clear that although Thackeray was not prepared to 
support policies which were unpopular with his superiors, he 
wished to remain on private record as being totally in 
agreement with them. In this way, should the political 
situation change in favour of Munro's ideas, he might easily 
return to them. 'Your system was excellent', he informed 
Munro, 'when unchecked by superior authority (the courts) 
and administered by such men as we have not (now) got in our
service. What you say of the courts is true - that their
institution was premature, that many of the regulations are 
absurd, that most of the judges are inexperienced. But it 
would be worse perhaps were these same men both judges and 
collectors as they would have been had the old system 
continued.... Your system is the best abstractly. It is the 
best as far as regards the country itself but not with 
respect to our government. Our government is one of form, 
private interest, of rise by seniority.... I know of many 
rising geniuses in both the civil and military 
departments...but hardly one fit to be the prince which a
collector was formerly. This is the real cause of the
changes of systems, the others which were assigned in public
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w r i t i n g s  w er e p r e t e n c e * .  By a r g u i n g  that only a d e a r t h  of 
q u a l i f i e d  m e n  had c a u s e d  h im  to a b a n d o n  r y o t w a r i  and by 
d i s a s s o c i a t i n g  h i m s e l f  fro m the other a r g u m e n t s  w h i c h  
M u n r o ' s  o pp o n e n t s  had a d v a n c e d  in f a v ou r  of their p ol i c ie s  
and a g a i n s t  his, T h a c k e r a y  c l e a r l y  ho p e d  to r e t a i n  the good 
o pi n i o n  of all pa rti es . Thus he c o n c l u d e d  his d e f e n c e  of his 
act io n s w i t h  the s t a t e m e n t  that v i l l a g e  leases  had had to be 
ad o p t e d  since they a lo ne w o u l d  p e r m i t  the s o cia l and 
e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t s  to occur that M u n r o  look ed for from 
ry otw a r i.
It is impossible to say from the available material how 
Munro's career might have progressed had not events 
overtaken him in the latter half of 1809. With few 
supporters and many active and powerful opponents in the 
Madras administration, his civil career in India seemed 
finished unless he could interest the home authorities in 
his ideas. However, although he was generally respected, he 
was without sufficient influence in Britain to be able to 
hope to become intimately involved in the decision-making 
process of the Company.
The opportunity to enter Indian politics in Britain came to 
Munro when news reached England of the officers mutiny in 
Madras. The mutiny, which was the culmination of a long 
period of unrest amongst the officers in the Company's army, 
was a direct consequence of the Commander-in~Chief's 
indiscreet behaviour. Macdowall, who had succeeded Craddock 
as Commander-in-Chief after his recall, had not been, given 
Craddock's seat on the Council by the home authorities. He
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regarded this as a personal slight and he allowed his 
bitterness to sour his relations with the new Governor, Sir 
George Barlow. There is little doubt that, while Macdowall 
was not looking for a fight with the Government, he was 
sufficiently encouraged by the number of those sympathetic 
to his case to be quite prepared to have one if given the 
opportunity. Amongst others, Macdowall knew he had the 
sympathy of Petrie, who had been superseded when Barlow 
arrived from Bengal to become Governor yet had remained a 
powerful and potentially supportive member of the Council. 
Barlow soon gave Macdowall an opportunity challenge him. 
Having decided to implement a policy of retrenchment in the 
army, he ordered the Quartermaster-General, Colonel John 
Munro, to report on the possibility of abolishing the Tent 
Contract. An unfortunate phrase in Munro's report was 
regarded by his fellow officers, already sensitive and 
threatened by the retrenchment, as a libel on their 
characters. Macdowall, quite happy to embarrass the 
Government, had Munro placed under arrest. When Munro 
appealed directly to him, Barlow ordered his release. 
Macdowall resigned in protest but not before he had signed a 
general order in which he claimed that only his resignation 
prevented him from court-martialling Munro. Barlow 
retaliated by dismissing Macdowall before his resignation 
became effective and suspending the two officers who had 
been responsible for publishing the order, Major Boles and 
Colonel Capper. The suspension of these two officers brought 
discontent with the Government in the army to a head and 
during the following weeks there were acts of mutiny 
committed by some of the Company's officers. Order was only
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restored after Barlow dismissed a few of these men and the
rest agreed to submit to Lord Minto, the new
37
Governor-General, when he arrived in Madras.
The mutiny's impact on the Court of Directors was enormous, 
resulting as it did in the revival of old animosities 
between two competing parties. In the ensuing conflict, both 
sides called on men outside the Court for support for their 
causes and in this way Munro was pulled into the Company's 
politics at the highest level. In the process of assisting 
Grant's opponents, Munro attracted the attention of 
influential men. He was able to use the personal contacts he 
made to interest some of them in his policies and he 
ultimately succeeded in winning their support for his ideas.
In the aftermath of the Vellore Mutiny, wide divisions had 
appeared in the Court of Directors as the arguments raged 
over what had been its actual causes. Though it was 
generally agreed to ascribe the immediate blame to the 
commander-in-Chief, Sir John Craddock, and partial 
responsibility to the Governor, William Bentinck, the 
arguments had continued after their recall when it was 
increasingly believed that the real cause of the mutiny had 
not been Craddock's army regulations but the activities of 
the missionaries and the evangelical chaplains who were in 
India with Grant's sanction and support. Among those who now 
voiced their opposition to the missionaries were many who 
were old friends or political allies of Henry Erskine, most 
notably Baring, T o o n e , Elphinstone and Inglis. To defend 
their position in the face of this attack and to exonerate
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the missionaries, Grant and Edward Parry had rejected the
idea that it was resentment of missionary activities that
had inspired the mutiny. They had blamed it on the
machinations of Tipu Sultan's family, which had been exiled
to Vellore, and on the recent extension of the Bengal
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administrative system. They argued that the latter, by
excluding the Indians from any role in the higher
administration of their country and by removing the
Government's officials from direct contact with the people,
had made the Indians willing to entertain subversive ideas
and had prevented the Government from being aware of this.
When Grant had carried his resolution in favour of the
missionaries and for acceptance of his view of the mutiny in
the face of opposition led by Sir Francis Baring, he had
failed to reconcile the minority who were left embittered
and eager for revenge. Sweny Toone expressed the feelings of
these men when he wrote of Grant and his supporters; 'I
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never loved them, but now I detest them'.
It was therefore not surprising that, when news reached 
England of the officers' mutiny, the divisions in the 
Company should have reappeared nor that the same Directors 
whom Grant had defeated should have looked on it as another 
opportunity to attack him. In this they had the advantage of 
Grant's increasing unpopularity. For a number of years Grant 
had strongly opposed American trade with India and this had 
brought him into conflict with Sir Francis Baring and other 
influential men in London's City. This was part of the 
reason why Baring had been so willing to lead the attack on 
Grant's interpretation of the events that had led up to the
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Vellore Mutiny. Grant had also made himself unpopular with 
some of the other Directors by instigating an investigation 
into abuses of patronage in 1809. Above all, Grant's 
uncompromising and sanctimonious behaviour towards his 
opponents infuriated them while his willingness to bring 
religion into every argument led them to accuse him of using 
it to lend gravity to his intrigues. A typical example of 
Grant's technique was when, during a debate over whether 
missionaries should be sent to India, he asked Toone, who
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opposed him, 'if he was disposed to trample upon the Cross'.
The i m m e d i a t e  r e a c t i o n  of the Court, w h i c h  was un d e r  the
Chairmanship of William Astell and Grant, to the so-called
'White Mutiny' was to support Barlow, confirm his dismissal
of offending officers and recall Petrie, who had criticized
B a r l o w ' s  h a n d l i n g  of the crisis. F r om  the st art  there had
been a m i n o r i t y  of D i r e c t o r s ,  led by the same m e n  w h o  had
op po s e d Gr a n t  over the m i s s i o n a r y  q u e s t i o n s  r a i s e d  by the
Ve l l o r e  Mu ti n y , w ho  r e f u s e d  to a c c e p t  his h a n d l i n g  of this
l ate st  affair. A m o n g s t  G r a n t ' s  cr i t i c s  w e re  E l p h i n s t o n e ,
Inglis, Baring, H u d d l e s t o n ,  B a n n e r m a n ,  Toone, Sam u e l Davis
41
and Robert Thornton. As the Directors went out of office, 
Grant slowly lost his supporters and, between 1810 and 1812, 
the dismissed officers, including Major Boles and Colonel 
Capper, were reinstated, Petrie's recall condemned, and 
finally Sir George Barlow himself recalled. Whatever the 
merits of the contending parties' arguments, the whole 
affair had far more to do with internal Company politics 
than with the mutiny itself. Grant claimed that his 
opponents were motivated by 'personal enmity and political
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intrigue' and he was particularly annoyed that the motion to
recall Barlow was passed at a meeting which his opponents
42
knew he could not attend because he was in Scotland. It is
clear from the correspondence of the time that Grant, rather
than Barlow, was the real target of the officers' supporters 
43
in the Court.
Munro had been interested in the mutiny from the beginning,
both as an army officer in the Company's forces of Madras
and as a personal friend of some of the men involved. Petrie
had recently taken an friendly interest in Munro's career,
supporting his proposals for ryotwari settlements and his
arguments against the introduction of zamindari estates as
well as trying to help Munro retain his full commission on
the revenue collections in the Ceded Districts. Major Boles
and some of the other officers who had been suspended were
also long term friends and acquaintances of his. His
interest was sustained while he was in England by a letter
from Boles, telling him of the grave financial problems that
the writer's dismissal had caused him and asking for Munro's
assistance, both financial and political. Munro, though
always particularly careful and close with his money,
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immediately lent Boles £500.
In addition to those inspired by concern for his friends, 
Munro had other reasons for being interested in the event.
It must have occurred to him that, if Barlow's civilians 
were to totally triumph over the military, his own position 
and that of many of his friends and supporters in Madras, 
already under attack by those who opposed the employment of
319
military collectors, would be disastrously undermined. He
knew that Barlow was strongly opposed to his ideas about the
introduction of ryotwari settlements and for reforms in the
judicial administration, being firmly committed to those
embodied in the 'Bengal System1 that he had helped to
introduce and administer in that Presidency. It was
therefore natural that Munro should support those Directors
who opposed Grant, especially as these were the men to whom
he had previously been introduced by his brother-in-law and
who had already assisted him over the retrenched commission.
It was also natural that they should turn to him for
assistance. He was very well informed of events since he had
received detailed reports of them from Thackeray and Gahagan
and was in possession of copies of most of the relevant 
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documents. He was certainly better informed than Grant, who
anxiously asked Dundas in 1810 if it were true that the army
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had executed the Governor.
The ways Munro was able to use the mutiny and his subsequent 
involvement in the Court's politics to bring his policies 
forward are revealing of the decision-making processes of 
the Company. First he worked to create an image of himself 
as an expert on Indian affairs. There can be little doubt 
that, while assisting Grant's opponents with general 
information about the unrest and disorders in Madras, he 
also argued the merits of his own judicial and revenue 
theories. At the same time his reputation was unexpectedly 
enhanced from another quarter. Colonel Mark Wilks, who was 
not only a close friend of Munro but also of Major Boles, 
whom he later employed as his deputy when he was appointed
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Governor of St Helena, was committed to defending the cases
of the dismissed officers and therefore, like Munro, was
actively involved in the Court's in-fighting. In 1810, Wilks
published his Historical Sketches of the South of India^ a
book which had a significant impact on contemporary thought
and which, because Wilks had so consistently supported them,
attracted the sympathetic attention of the Court's dominant
faction. In the book Wilks strongly supported many of
Munro's views on the employment of Indian judges and the
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judicial administration generally. He extensively quoted 
from Munro and in effect drew attention to him as being the 
expert on the administration of Madras.
At the same time as building a reputation as an expert,
Munro enlisted the support of powerful individuals in the 
Company, using his involvement in the mutiny debate as an 
introduction. Colonel Sir George Dallas was an influential 
figure in the Company. He had served in Bengal under Warren 
Hastings and remained a firm supporter of him all his life. 
He frequently attended the India House debates, where his 
opinions carried great weight, and he was fairly active in 
the Company's politics. Colonel Dallas had two reasons for 
opposing Grant; his membership of Hastings's faction and his 
support of Free Trade, or at least the extension of the 
right to trade with India to the Outports, a policy that 
Grant resisted with determination. He was particularly 
interested in army reform and therefore in the whole 
question of the mutiny. Munro used the shared adherence to 
laissez-faire doctrines and mutual interest in the mutiny to 
enable him to approach Colonel Dallas and then subtly
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manipulate the latter into support for his ideas. Above all
else, Dallas did not wish to see the army retrenched or
reduced in size because he believed that it was the sole
support of British supremacy in India. In 1808, Munro had
prepared a memo on the judicial system of Madras in which he
suggested that the introductions of judicial reforms based
on his ideas would lead to savings for the Company, which
was in financial difficulties as a result of the recent
wars, the Board's decision to repatriate part of the India
Debt, and the unexpectedly high costs of administering the
country. Shortly after the debate over the mutiny began in
England, Munro changed the introduction of this memo to
read; 'The n u m b e r  of troop s n o w  e m p l o y e d  is no t m o r e  than
adequate to the purposes of maintaining tranquillity and
defending the country...no material reduction can with
sa fe t y  be at t e m p t e d .  But, in the ju d i c i a l  branch, a very
large proportion of the whole expense now incurred may be 
48
retrenched'. It was almost certainly this version that Munro 
sent Colonel Dallas.
A third method that Munro now employed to bring sympathetic 
attention to his ideas was to attempt to have friends 
elected to the Court. Originally Munro became involved when 
he canvassed support for the candidates Grant's opponents 
nominated for the vacant seats in the Direction. He soon 
concentrated his efforts on helping those candidates who 
were also personal friends of his or likely to support him 
later. Thus he supported James Taylor, whom he described as 
'a very old friend' and Hugh Lindsay and Colonel Allan, 
whose elections, he said, would give him 'two great friends
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in the Direction'. Once Munro realized the potential of this
means of influencing the Court, he continued to work for his
friends until he left for India, always looking to build a
50
secure foundation of support for himself in the Court.
Although the eventual triumph of Munro's friends over their 
opponents in the Court and his own activities were winning 
him some supporters and the interest of an increasingly wide 
circle of influential people, something else was needed 
before Munro could seriously hope that his ideas would 
prevail. The publication of the F ifth Report of the Select 
Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East 
India Company' proved to be the catalyst that he needed.
The Select Committee had been established in 1808 when
Dundas moved for its appointment in view of the imminent
need to renew the Company's Charter. The Fifth Report itself
was the consequence of three events simultaneously having an
impact on the Select Committee. In 1807, the Board of
Control had been reorganized and its old departments dealing
with each Presidency had been replaced with departments
dealing with particular subjects, one of which now handled
revenue and judicial matters. Previous to this
reorganization, 'neither the President nor the members,
still less the p e r m a n e n t  o f f i c e r s  of the Board, had any
detailed knowledge of what was going on in the several
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departments of India1. It was only after the new departments 
had been created that the necessary expertise and access to 
information needed to produce a detailed survey of the 
Company's administration was available. Then, in 1810, the
323
Select Committee called upon Samuel Davis to assist them in
the preparation of their report. Davis had only recently
returned from Bengal, where he had been a judge at Benares,
but had in the meantime been elected to the. Court of
Directors. He was determined 'to unmask the effects of Lord
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Cornwallis's Code'. In 1811, Thomas Wallace, a member of the
Board and Chairman of the Select Committee, had accidentally
heard of the researches of James Cumming, the head clerk in
the Board's Revenue and Judicial Department and a man who
had devoted much of his official time and a great deal of
his le i su r e  to the i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of the C o m p a n y ' s  j ud i c ia l
and revenue records. It was at Wallace's request that
Cumming wrote his 'Memoir on the Revision of the Judicial
System under the Government of Fort St George with a view to
the reduction of Expenses and the more expeditious and
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efficient Administration of Justice', and it was through
W a l l a c e  that he came to the a t t e n t i o n  of the Boa r d' s
Pr esi de nt,  R o b e r t  Dundas. W h e n  Davi s as ked to be s u p p l i e d
with official records, Dundas referred him to Cumming. It
was largely as a consequence of Davis's discovery of
Cumming's unrivalled knowledge of administrative affairs
that the Committee accepted Davis's suggestion that he
should write the part of the report dealing with Bengal
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wh il e  C u m m i n g  d ea l t  w i t h  Ma dr as .
The report, by removing the principal obstacle to their 
general acceptance, cleared the way for the home 
authorities' adoption of Munro's ideas. It was a damning 
indictment of the Cornwallis Judicial System as a system and 
not just of its consequences in practice. As such, it raised
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doubts in the minds of many who, prior to the Report's
publication, had refused to listen to any criticism of the
system because of the 'reverence entertained for its
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illustrious founder'. But the Report went much further and 
Cumming's treatment of the revenue management of Madras 
presented a strong case for the ryotwari system.
Furthermore, both he and Davis recommended reforms of the 
judicial administration which very closely resembled those 
Munro had advanced. Equally important for Munro, Cumming 
quoted extensively from his writings and from Wilks's book 
in such a way as to suggest that these two men were the 
foremost experts in judicial and revenue matters and that it 
was practical experience rather than empty theorizing which 
had given them their knowledge. In addition, a large number 
of Munro's reports to the Madras Government and Board of 
Revenue, in which he had succinctly presented his arguments 
against the extension of zamindari settlements and the 
Bengal Judicial System, were printed in the Report's 
append ices.
The Fifth Report's support of Munro was not just an example 
of coincidence and fortuitous timing. It is clear that Munro 
had, in a variety of ways, managed to exert a direct 
influence over its contents quite apart from the indirect 
influence his reports and minutes despatched from Madras had 
already had on Cumming. First, he had cultivated a 
relationship with Davis. In this he had been aided by the 
fact that Davis, while a judge at Benares, had been 
Mountstuart Elphinstone's superior and friend. This had 
given him some influence with Mountstuart's uncle in the
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Direction and was probably partly responsible for him 
joining Elphinstone and Munro's other friends in the Court 
in their opposition to Grant over the business of the 
suspended officers. It appears that Munro met Davis at this 
time and impressed him with his views since it was Davis who 
arranged for Munro to speak to the Committee.
It was with his evidence before the Select Committee that
Munro had found a second way to influence the contents of
the F if th Report. In his evidence Munro had consistently
presented the zamindar as either a military chieftain who
posed a threat to the British or, where zamindari
settlements had been introduced, as a tax farmer. On the
other hand, he had argued that the ryot was, 'in almost
every part of India, ...considered as the cultivating 
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proprietor'. Munro had then proceeded to urge the adoption
of ryotwari settlements. Arguing that ryotwari settlements
were no less permanent than zamindari or village
settlements, he stressed that they alone permitted the
Company to benefit directly from any extension in
cultivation. He also claimed that ryotwari settlements were
simple to administer, less open to abuses, and 'better
calculated than any other to bring to view the whole
resources of the country'. In addition, he stated his
opinion that direct settlements with the ryots were the most
likely to encourage the social and economic development of 
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India.
Munro's close friendship with James Cumming had given him 
his third means of influencing the contents of the F if th
326
Report. It was also probably through Davis that Munro had
been introduced to Cumming, whom the evidence suggests he
had not met prior to 1812 despite the fact that Cumming had
long admired his work. Cumming had based his •Memoir on the
Revision of the Judicial System1 on papers Munro had written
in 1806. In this paper, he had followed Munro's layout and
arguments while frequently quoting him. Though it did not
develop overnight, the two men had quickly formed a close
friendship. One of the consequences of this friendship was
that Munro had worked closely with Cumming while the latter
prepared his part of the F if th Report, reviewing what
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Cumming had written and sending him notes.
Gleig claimed that Munro had also been able to influence the
contents of the report in a fourth way by manipulating
public opinion. According to Gleig, a significant number of
authors submitted their reviews, articles and pamphlets on
Indian affairs to Munro for his revision. The subsequent
publication of these not only increased respect for his
ideas but helped establish his credentials as one of the
leading experts on Madras and brought his name before the 
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general public. Although there appears to be no direct
evidence to support this assertion, it would seem difficult
to exaggerate Munro's influence on the Report when one of
its authors could write to him to say that he was 'perfectly
convinced that no two men of ordinary understanding and
unbiased minds who have examined attentively the revenue
records can entertain the least doubt that the ryotwari
principle of government ... is far, very far, superior in
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its good effects to any other'.
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The impact of the Fif th R eport1s publication on Munro's
career was enormous. Prior to 1812, Munro's future had still
been uncertain, even though he had many influential friends
in the Court. His leave was nearly finished and it must have
seemed to him that, for all he had done, he had essentially
failed to establish his views or advance his career. He was
so convinced of this, he had already begun to look around
for a good post anywhere in India. When it was rumoured that
Lord Moira might be sent to India as Governor-General, Munro
wrote to his sister Erskine asking whether she could
persuade her husband to use his friendship with Lord Moira
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to get him appointed to some high diplomatic post. As late
as April 1812, Munro's future seemed in the balance. When
the Board refused to keep him in England because it did not
think his presence necessary, he became seriously worried
that the Court would order him back to Madras before he had
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been able to guarantee himself a position. His anxiety was 
such that he even considered leaving India permanently and 
thought of accepting Wilks's offer of the Deputy 
Governorship of St Helena, the post later given to Major 
Bo les.
After the publication of the report everything began to
change for Munro. People now began to regard him as an
authority on Indian affairs and they turned to him for
information and advice. Even the Directors acknowledged his
new status. In August he wrote to his brother to tell him
that he could not leave London as he was about to be called
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upon by the Company to give his opinions on several topics. 
Admittedly individuals at East India House had approached
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him before. He been asked by M*Cullock in January to prepare
a paper on his settlement of the Ceded Districts in order
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that it might be sent to Bengal and in May Sir Hugh Inglis
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had sent him a paper on military topics for his opinions.
However these had been fairly routine requests which might
have been made to any of the Company's senior officials on
leave in Britain. By the second half of the year the
situation was quite different. He was being inundated with
requests for his assistance. Many of these were addressed to
him privately. M #Cullock and Davis asked him to settle a
disagreement over the differences between khas and ryotwari
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revenue management, Elphinstone asked for papers on the
67
judicial administration, Grant wanted to discuss judicial
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matters with him, and John Campbell, a friend of
Wilberforce, asked his advice on the possibility of
69
converting India. Others were official. He was requested to
attend committee meetings at India House to advise on sundry 
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matters. Munro's policy of promoting himself as an expert on 
Indian affairs was now paying dividends.
It is clear that Munro intended to take the maximum
advantage of the reputation he and others had built up for
him. The Company's Charter was due for renewal in 1813 and
Munro was determined to involve himself in the debates
preceding this. Even before the publication of the F if th
Report had had its full impact on his reputation, Munro was
being urged by Bannerman to return.to Londbn since the
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Charter was already under discussion. But, while Munro's 
contributions to the proceedings no doubt further enhanced 
his reputation and perhaps helped him to disseminate his
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ideas , the really important event in terms of his future 
career was the appointment in March 1812 of Lord 
Buckinghamshire to the post of President of the Board of 
Control.
Buckinghamshire, as Lord Hobart, had been Governor of Madras
from 1794 to 1798. During this time he had supported Read's
and Munro's introduction of ryotwari settlements in the
Baramahal until, in consequence of his quarrels with Sir
John Shore, the Governor-General, the Court had recalled 
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him. The strong criticism to which the Court had subjected
his g e ne r al  p o l i c i e s  in Madr as , its d e c i s i o n  to r e c a l l  him
and the manner in which it had cavilled at granting him a
pe ns i on ,  all left B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e  i l l - d i s p o s e d  tow a rd s  the
Directors. He appeared determined to humiliate the Court.
During the renewal of the Charter, Buckinghamshire
c o n s i s t e n t l y  s u p p o r t e d  m e a s u r e s  to b r e a k  the C o m p a n y ' s
m o n o p o l y  of the In d i a n  trade and the n f u r t h e r  a l i e n a t e d  the
majority of the Directors by insisting that the new Charter
had established the complete predominence of the Board over
the Court. Adding insult to injury, he forced the Court to
send amended despatches in which they were made to speak
approvingly of measures to which they had always been
oppos ed.  At the same time, he i n s i s t e d  on r e f e r r i n g
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slightingly to the Company as a 'mercantile firm'.
Until Buckinghamshire's appointment, Munro had been careful 
to offend as few interests as possible. The notes he 
prepared for use when he gave evidence before the Select 
Committee reveal just how careful he had been to avoid
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incurring the hostility of any of the four major competing
interest groups concerned with Indian affairs - the
Free-Traders and the Monopolists, the pro and the
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anti-missionary groups. To attract the interest of the 
free-trade lobby, he suggested that there was no reason why 
the Company's monopoly should not be broken in the ports 
controlled by the Europeans. To appease the Company 
monopolists, he insisted however that Europeans should not 
be permitted to trade in the interior, arguing that they 
were 'too apt to consider themselves as among a conquered 
people and treat them as an inferior race'. To further 
appease the monopolists, he claimed that there was no real 
demand for European articles in India and what there was the 
Company already adequately supplied. Munro stepped even more 
carefully when he considered the question of the 
missionaries in India. As a sop to Grant's party, he stated 
that he considered that Christian establishments posed no 
threat to the British in India provided the missionaries did 
not actively seek to convert the Hindus. As long as they 
worked in a solely private capacity, they were regarded as a 
'harmless invasion'. On the other hand Munro, who seems to 
have privately doubted that missionary activity was very 
beneficial, stated that, were the Company's governments to 
be seen to support the missionaries, considerable discontent 
and hostility directed against the British would quickly 
emerge. He feared a religious rebellion might ensue, one 
which could easily result in the expulsion of the British.
With Buckinghamshire President of the Board of Control,
Munro appears to have decided that he must connect himself
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now with a specific interest group if he was to advance his
prospects. Early in his career, Munro appears to have
espoused the view that the Board rather than the Court was
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the lynch pin in the Company's administration. He therefore
now decided to throw in his lot with Buckinghamshire and
chose to openly ally himself with the Board and its
supporters. He had a number of good reasons for doing this,
quite apart from the support Buckinghamshire had given to
Read and himself while Governor of Madras. His family
background, his adherence to the economic theories of Adam
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Smith and his friendship with Kirkman Finlay, a leading
member of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures,
inclined Munro at this time to support the opening of the
Indian trade. Buckinghamshire's son-in-law, John Sullivan,
who had joined the Board as a paid Assistant Commissioner,
had served as a civilian in Madras where he had known, liked
and supported Munro. Munro realized that he could reach
Buckinghamshire, who greatly valued Sullivan's advice on
revenue and judicial matters, through his influence with the
latter. In addition, there were Munro's close friendships
with James Cumming, head of the Revenue and Judicial
Department at the Board, and Thomas Wallace, who was serving
as another paid Assistant Commissioner at the Board. These
gave Munro an opportunity to exercise a much greater
influence over the Board of Control than he could ever hope
to exert on the Court of Directors. Furthermore, although
there were now a number of men in the Court on whose support
he knew he might rely, Munro realized that there were
others, among them the influential Director Charles Grant,
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who strongly opposed his ideas. It was therefore clear to
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him that he had little cause to expect to be able to 
influence policy through that body.
There is little doubt that from the start Buckinghamshire
and the other members of the Board intended to reform the
revenue and judicial systems of India along the lines Munro
had advocated. In 1812, the Board and the Court agreed a
despatch which ordered the reintroduction of ryotwari into
Madras but opposition in the Court initially blocked similar
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moves to order a revision of the judicial system. 
Buckinghamshire's reaction to this opposition was to try to 
have Thomas Wallace appointed Governor of Madras in place of 
Abercromby, who was temporarily filling the post which 
Barlow's recall had left vacant. He clearly hoped that 
Wallace in Madras, with the support of the Board at home, 
would be able to carry the reforms. Unfortunately Wallace's 
unpopularity with the Court and Buckinghamshire's tactless 
conduct united the Directors in their opposition. 
Buckinghamshire was forced to withdraw his support for 
Wallace and accept the substitution of Hugh Elliot, Lord 
Minto's younger brother and his own wife's uncle, in 
Wallace's stead.
In November 1813, when it was clear that Wallace would
probably not be appointed the next Governor of Madras,
Munro, Sullivan and Cumming began preparing a judicial
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despatch incorporating all of Munro's ideas. The Court had 
already set up a committee to investigate all aspects of the 
Company's administration, including the judicial, as a 
partial answer to the criticisms contained in the F if th
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R e p o r t . M u n r o  was fu ll y  aw ar e  of w h a t  its f i n d i n g s  w er e
go in g  to be since he was h i m s e l f  i n t i m a t e l y  i n v o l v e d  in its
investigations, as were a number of his friends and 
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s up p o r t e r s .  A l t h o u g h  he was e x e r t i n g  a c o n s i d e r a b l e
influence over the committee's work, he was aware that he
had not fully brought it round to an acceptance of his views
and realized that he stood little chance of winning over the
C ou r t to them. M e n like H u d d l e s t o n ,  wh o had p r e v i o u s l y
supported him, were not prepared to see the ideals embodied
in C o r n w a l l i s ' s  Code t h ro w n  out w h i l e  other s, like Grant,
were d e t e r m i n e d  to op po se M u n r o ' s  p r i n c i p a l  c o n t e n t i o n  that
executive and judicial powers should be reunited in the
office of C o l l e c t o r .  In D e c em be r , a l m o s t  i m m e d i a t e l y  after
B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e  had be e n  m a n o e u v r e d  into a c c e p t i n g  E ll i o t  as
the n ex t G o v e r n o r  of M a d r a s , the B oar d o r d e r e d  the C ou r t  to
i m m e d i a t e l y  p r e p a r e  a d e s p a t c h  to M a d r a s  'upon the s ub j ec t
of the s y s t e m  of c r i m i n a l  j u s t i c e  and p o l i c e . . . a s  w ell  as
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the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of civil j u sti ce '.  Since the B oa rd was
aware that the C o u r t ' s  c o m m i t t e e  was ab o u t to r e p o r t  its
findings and in view of its refusal to allow the Court to
p o s t p o n e  the p r e p a r a t i o n  of a d e s p a t c h  un t i l G e o r g e  B a r l ow
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and Lo r d M o i r a  sh ou l d r e t u r n  to B r i t a i n  and re p or t ,  it is 
m ore  than p r o b a b l e  th at B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e  o r d e r e d  the Co u rt  to 
p r o d u c e  a d e s p a t c h  m e r e l y  to e n a b l e  the Bo ar d  to i n t ro d uc e  
the one it had a l r e a d y  p r e p ar e d.
Buckinghamshire had good reason to.adopt this method of 
presenting the judicial despatch the Board had prepared to 
the Court. Earlier in 1813 he had been responsible for a 
significant deterioration in relations between the Board and
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the Court. In Jul y he had p r i v a t e l y  d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  the
C h a i r m e n  a d e s p a t c h  to be sent to India in w h i c h  the
p r o v i s i o n s  of the n ew  Act of P a r l i a m e n t  w e r e  to be
e xp l a i n e d .  The C ou rt  f o r w a r d e d  a dr a f t  in 'previous
c o m m u n i c a t i o n '  to the B oar d w h i c h  r e t u r n e d  a d i f f e r e n t
draft, one w h i c h  e n t i r e l y  s u p e r s e d e d  the C ou rt' s,  w i t h
i n s t r u c t i o n s  that it was to be sent as it stood to India.
The C o u r t  had o b j e c t e d  s t r o n g l y  to the B o a rd ' s  action,
r i g h t l y  c l a i m i n g  that it al on e  p o s s e s s e d  the po w er  of
o r i g i n a t i n g  d e s p a t c h e s  on o r d i n a r y  su b je c t s.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,
the C o u r t  r e f u s e d  to a c c e p t  B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e ' s  claim, wh i c h
he had i n c o r p o r a t e d  in his draft, that the n ew  Act had
e s t a b l i s h e d  the c o m p l e t e  p r e d o m i n e n c e  of the Bo ar d over the
Court. Grant, Smith, Rob ar t s,  Toone, Reid, H u d d l e s t o n  and
D a n i el l  had b e e n  p r e p a r e d  to a p pe a l for a legal d e c i s i o n  and
only T h o r n t o n ' s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  had p e r s u a d e d  the C o u r t  to send
B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e ' s  d e sp a t ch . A l t h o u g h  the fact that the
m a j o r i t y  of the East India m e m b e r s  in P a r l i a m e n t  w er e
s u p p o r t i n g  the M i n i s t r y  e n c o u r a g e d  B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e ,  there
can be little do u b t  that he did not w i s h  to risk a n o th e r
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c o n f r o n t a t i o n  over his j u d i c i a l  des p at ch .
Whi le  the D i r e c t o r s  p r e p a r e d  their de s p a t c h ,  m e m b e r s  of the
Board b e g a n  to ca n v a s s  s u p p o r t  for their  own. C u m m i n g
c o n t a c t e d  Sir H e n r y  St r a ch e y , a r e c o g n i z e d  a u t h o r i t y  on
Indi an affai rs,  and p e r s u a d e d  h im  to c h a n ge  his vi ews  on
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r y o t w a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s ,  w h i c h  he had o r i g i n a l l y  op po se d. Since 
the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of r y o t w a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  w i t h  the 
C o r n w a l l i s  j u di ci a l s y s t e m  h ad  b ee n  the p r i n c i p a l  r e a s o n  for 
the f o r m e r ' s  r e j e c t i o n ,  it seems cl ear  that the Bo a rd
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in te n d ed ,  now that r y o t w a r i  had b ee n a c c e p t e d  in p r i n c ip l e ,  
to r e v e r s e  the a r g um e nt .  In J a n u a r y  or ea rl y F e b r u a ry ,  the 
Bo ard  r e c e i v e d  the Co u r t ' s  d r a f t  de s p at c h . In it the Co urt  
a d v o c a t e d  the t r a n s f e r  of j u d i c i a l  a u t h o r i t y  to the 
c o l l e c t o r s  in fisc al  m a t t e r s ,  gave them the po w e r of 
m a g i s t r a t e s  to try p e t t y  cases, and u r g e d  the e x t e n d e d  
e m p l o y m e n t  of Indian  c o m m i s s i o n e r s .  But it still left the 
o ver al l a s c e n d a n c y  of the judges l ar g e l y  u n i m p a i r e d  and gave 
the M a d r a s  G o v e r n m e n t  and the Sadr C o u r t  the r i g h t  to re v i s e  
all its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  if they s h o u l d  a p p e ar  u n s u i t a b l e .
The Bo ar d  then sent the C o u r t  its ver s i on .  This c o n t a i n e d  
orders that e f f e c t i v e l y  en d ed  the s e p a r a t i o n  of po wers, ma de  
p o s s i b l e  the w i d e r  e m p l o y m e n t  of Ind ia n s and, m o s t  
i m p o r t a n t l y  of all, took away the d i s c r e t i o n a r y  p o we r that 
the C o u r t  w o u l d  h a v e g i v e n  the M a d r a s  G o v e r n m e n t  to p o s t p o n e  
the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the n e w  a r r a n g e m e n t s .
Only four m e n  a t t e n d e d  the J u d i c i a l  C o m m i t t e e  w h i c h  r e v i e w e d
the Boa r d 's  d es p a t ch .  Th es e w e r e  the C ha i r m a n ,  R o b e r t
Th or n to n ,  the Deputy, W i l l i a m  E l p h i n s t o n e ,  C h a r l e s  Gr a nt  and 
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Ed wa r d Parry. The C h a i r m a n  and the D e p u t y  had c l e a r l y  been
p e r s u a d e d  to a c c e p t  the B o a r d ' s  d e s p a t c h  b e f o r e  it was
b r o u g h t  b e fo r e  the C o m m i t t e e  and had c o n f i d e n t i a l l y  read it
in ad va nc e .  In the C o m m i t t e e ,  they m e t  stiff o p p o s i t i o n  from
Gr an t  and Pa r r y  but w e r e  able to o v e r r u l e  them. H i s t o r i a n s
have h i t h e r t o  b e e n  u n a w a r e  of the e x t e n t  to w h i c h  the Board
once m or e  m a n a g e d  to s u b v e r t  the legal and c u s t o m a r y
a r r a n g e m e n t s  by w h i c h  d e s p a t c h e s  s h ou l d have be e n p r o d u c e d
w he n  it s u c c e e d e d  in g e t t i n g  the C o u r t  to s a n c t i o n  its
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ju di c i a l  d e s p a t c h  to Mad r a s.  A l t h o u g h  the Bo a rd  had
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outwardly followed prescribed procedures by presenting its 
draft as a corrected version of the Court's, it had in fact 
used its power to manipulate circumstances in such a way as 
to permit it to impose its views on the Company.
In the meantime, Munro was approached by the Board and asked
to return to Madras and oversee the introduction of the
reforms. Considering the opposition to them that he knew to
exist in the Court, Munro was initially unwilling to accept
the appointment. In a conversation with Buckinghamshire on
28 February, he first refused the appointment unless an
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official post should be created for him. When granted this, 
he then increased his demands and stated that he also wanted 
a promise of the next Governorship of Bombay.
Buckinghamshire was unable to make this promise but assured
Munro that he never forgot his friends, hinting broadly that
his request would be met. Munro immediately accepted the
appointment and, taking little trouble to conceal his
ambitions, received through Colonel Allan a memo from Sir
Robert Barclay on the salary and allowances of the Governor 
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of Madras.
By March, Munro's appointment was assured but it had had a
stormy passage through the Court and he was asked to keep 
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the news secret. He was also informed that he would be 
travelling to India on the same boat as Hugh Elliot and that 
Sullivan would introduce them before they left. It must be 
assumed that the Board, aware of the strength of the 
opposition in the Court and of the probable opposition in 
Madras, hoped that Munro and Elliot, in their respective
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offices of Special Commissioner and Governor, would command
sufficient authority to carry the day. On 29 April, the
Court authorized the Judicial Despatch and on 4 May Munro
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was officially informed of his new appointment. On the same
day, Munro received a letter which revealed the equivocal
way in which even some of his supporters viewed his
character. In this letter, his long-time friend Colonel
Allan hinted that there were fears that Munro would take
advantage of his post to excessively remunerate himself.
' B a n n e r m a n  and I', w r o t e  Allan, ’e n t r e a t  of you to be as
provident as possible in your expenses. Your honour and our
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credit are at stake'.
The Board celebrated its victory by immediately starting to
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prepare a similar despatch to Bengal. As some measure of the
u n p o p u l a r i t y  of these j u d i c i a l  re f or ms ,  it is i n t e r e s t i n g
that Elphinstone and Davis, two Directors who consistently
supported the Board's views, suggested that this second
despatch should originate from the Board on the grounds that
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the whole idea was repugnant to the Court. In doing this, 
they were encouraging the Board to once again act in a 
technically illegal manner since such despatches were 
supposed to be originated by the Court. However 
Buckinghamshire had now twice succeeded in imposing drafts 
originated by the Board on the Court and he was aware that, 
so long as he was supported by the Chairmen, he might 
continue to act in this manner.
The situation then that Munro left behind in Britain was one 
of open conflict between the Board and the Court. Toone
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w r o t e  to H a s t i n g s  that the D i r e c t o r s  'are at open w ar  w i t h
the B oa rd and the Co u r t  d iv ide d,  a g i t a t e d  b e y o n d  a n y t h i n g  I 
94
ever r e m e m b e r ' .  F u r t h e r m o r e  the Board, un de r
B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e ' s  inf lu e nc e ,  was i n t e r e s t i n g  itself in the
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of Indi a to an e x t e n t  h i t h e r t o  u n p r e c e d e n t e d .
Th om a s C o u r t e n a y ,  w ho  was S e c r e t a r y  to the Board at this
time, later s ta ted  that 'an i n s p e c t i o n  of the o f f ic i a l
dr af t s and lett ers  of r e a s o n s  gi ves a ve ry  i m p e r f e c t  idea of
the e x t e n t  and of the n a t u r e  of the s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e  and
c o n t r o l  e x e r c i s e d  by the Board. In some d e p a r t m e n t s ,
e s p e c i a l l y  in the r e v e n u e  and j u d i c i a l  d e p a r t m e n t ,  that
c on t ro l  was e x e r c i s e d  in L ord  B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e ' s  t i m e . . . t o  a
very g r e a t  e x t e n t  indeed, in m a t t e r s  i n v o l v i n g  gr e a t
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p r i n c i p l e s  as w el l  as in m a t t e r s  of d e tai l'.  This s i t u a t i o n
s uit ed  M u n r o  since, w h i l e  he k n e w  he m i g h t  r el y t o t a l ly  on
the s u p p o r t  of the Board, he was a wa re that, for all his
c a n v a s s i n g  a m o n g s t  the D i r e c t o r s  and his e f f or t s  to have
fr ie n d s and s u p p o r t e r s  e l e c t e d  to v a c a n c i e s  in the Court,
there was a s i g n i f i c a n t  n u m b e r  of D i r e c t o r s  w ho  c o m p l e t e l y
op p o s e d  him. A l t h o u g h  only H u d d l e s t o n  d i s s e n t e d  to the
J u d i c i a l  D e s p a t c h  and to M u n r o ' s  a p p o i n t m e n t ,  M u n r o  k ne w  his
o pi n i on s  were sh ar e d by Gr a n t  and Parry, bo th of w h o m
96
e x e r c i s e d  g r e a t  i n f l u e n c e  over the other Di r e c t o r s .
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Chapter Seven
The Introduction of the 'Munro System': 
Munro's Special Commissionership, 1814-19.
Munro returned to Fort St George on 16 September 1814 after 
a seven-year furlough in Great Britain. He brought with him 
orders from the Court appointing him Special Commissioner 
responsible for the revision of the Madras judicial system 
in accordance with the instructions sent to the Presidency 
government in the Judicial Despatch of 29 April 1814. Even 
before he left Britain, Munro knew that there was strong 
opposition in Madras to any fundamental reform of the 
existing system and he was well aware that, though he could 
rely on the full support of the Board of Control, there were 
a significant number of Directors who opposed the measures 
he was to implement and the principles behind them. The 
ensuing controversy that his work gave rise to therefore 
came as no surprise to him. It was just an additional source 
of frustration, another complication to be considered along 
with the other problems that faced him. It did, however, 
open a window onto the decision-making processes of the East 
India Company which might otherwise have remained closed by 
forcing the conflicting interests and parties to clearly
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emerge in the course of the struggles for power that took 
place. Issues and opinions had to be more precisely defined 
as attitudes hardened and polices were attacked or defended.
In the course of this chapter the events which dominated the 
period of Munro's Commissionership are reviewed and analysed 
for the light they throw on the Company's decision-making 
process. First, significant new information emerges about 
the motives which inspired the supporters and opponents of 
the Munro System in Britain and India. Then the methods used 
by men in the local administration to obstruct and 
significantly delay the implementation of orders from the 
home authorities to which they were strongly opposed are 
investigated. At the same time, the counter-measures taken 
by ths supporters of the new policies are described. In the 
course of this research, the important role played by 
private, unofficial correspondence is examined in detail 
along with the other ways in which the formal arrangements 
of the Company were by-passed. Thirdly, changes that were 
occuring in the Company's power structure are analysed.
On his arrival in Madras, Munro discovered that the 
Company's administration in the Presidency was even more 
deeply divided by a variety of controversies, some of long 
standing and others of recent origin, than was the Court in 
London. Bitter dissension arising from personal and policy 
differences existed between individuals and groups who 
manoeuvred to gain advantages over their opponents. One 
officer described the situation succinctly when he wrote to 
warn Munro that 'if you don't belong to one junta, you must
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to another or not be at all In society'. The most deeply 
entrenched of these divisions was that between the military 
and the civilian employees of the Company which had been a 
source of problems for the Madras Administration from the 
1780's. There is little doubt that part of the enthusiastic 
reception given to the extension of the Cornwallis System to 
Madras by the civil servants arose from their perception 
that it would greatly strengthen their position vis-a-vis 
the military. Their support for the system was a clear 
example of the importance of careerism as an significant 
factor behind individuals' attitudes towards policies. Not 
only did the Cornwallis System reduce the collectors to mere 
fiscal agents collecting fixed revenues from the zamindars, 
it made the district judges the true heads of the districts 
and the real representatives of the government. The judicial 
arrangements, which formed a central feature of the system, 
created many new official posts and at the same time 
restricted these to the civil branch of the Company. Many 
civilians feared that the reforms Munro intended to 
implement would destroy this advantage they held over the 
mili tary.
Munro also discovered that the Madras Administration was 
still split by the long-standing division between the 'New' 
and 'Old School' interest groups. Although the power 
struggle that this division had produced had lost much of 
the intensity that had characterized it between 1800 and 
1804, there remained in Madras a sufficient number of senior 
civil servants, members of the 'Old School', who felt they 
had justifiable grounds for resenting Munro's reappearance
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w i t h  s p ec i a l a u t h o r i t y  to i m p l e m e n t  ideas they had al w ay s  
o pp os ed , for it to be c e r t a i n  that he w o u l d  e x p e r i e n c e  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  o p p os i t io n .
D u r i n g  the years b e t w e e n  the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the C o r n w a l l i s  
S y s t e m  and M u n r o ' s  return, a third m a j o r  c o n t r o v e r s y  had 
a p p e a r e d  to d i v i d e  the C o m p a n y ' s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in Ma d ra s ,  
a p p e a r i n g  this time w i t h i n  the ranks of the civil se r v i c e  
itself. Fr om  its in cep t i on , the C o r n w a l l i s  z a m i n d a r i  
s e t t l e m e n t  s y s te m  had b e e n  s u b j e c t e d  to c r i t i c i s m  in Ma d ra s ,  
la r g e l y  b e c a u s e  the p r e s e n c e  of z a m i n d a r s  in the P r e s i d e n c y  
was the e x c e p t i o n  r a t h e r  than the rule. In Bengal, r e l a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  the z a m i n d a r s  and their ryot t en ant s w e r e  to some 
e xte nt  g o v e r n e d  by local c u s to m s  w h i c h  c u r t a i l e d  the w o r s t  
e x c e s s e s  of the former. In m o s t  of Mad r a s,  no such c u s t o m a r y  
rules and t r a d i t i o n a l  p r a c t i c e s  o p e r a t e d  to limit the 
zam in d a rs '  e x e r c i s e  of their power. The i n d i g e n o u s  m e t h o d s  
of s e t t l i n g  d i s p u t e s  w e r e  u n a b l e  to cope w i t h  the new 
c o n d i t i o n s  and the ju d i c i a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  i n t r o d u c e d  by the 
B r i t i s h  w e re  too a l i e n  to the i n h a b i t a n t s ,  too e x p e n s i v e  and 
too s l o w  to p r o v i d e  a v i a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e .  A g a i n s t  a 
b a c k g r o u n d  of i n c r e a s i n g  c o r r u p t i o n  and op p r e s s i o n ,  the 
r e v e n u e s  had f a l l e n  as the n u m b e r  of es t at e  b a n k r u p t c i e s  
rose s h a r p l y  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  de c li n e d.  O p i n i o n  
w i t h i n  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  over the c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  to be 
ta ken was, from the start, d e e p l y  d i v i d e d  b e t w e e n  th ose  who 
b e l i e v e d  that the C o r n w a l l i s  system, an e s s e n t i a l l y  E u r o p e a n  
s o l u t i o n  to I nd i a n  p r o b l e m s ,  m i g h t  be m o d i f i e d  and m a d e  to 
work, and those wh o a r g u e d  that the C o m p a n y  sh ou ld  
r e - e x a m i n e  t r a d i t i o n a l  In d ia n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r a c t i c e s  and
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adopt a system based on them. Men like John Hodgson, Edward 
Greenaway and Thomas Oakes, who supported the principles of 
the Cornwallis System, had developed the concept of village 
settlements as a means of adapting it to conditions in 
Madras. On the other side, Munro and his supporters, who 
were largely drawn from among the younger civil servants who 
had received their training as collectors under Munro, 
Macleod or Graham in ryotwari districts, had espoused the 
alternative view.
While Munro had remained in Madras and commanded the 
patronage of sympathetic Governors, the supporters of 
ryotwari had been somewhat in the ascendant. In the years 
following Munro's return to Britain, the position had been 
reversed. By 1814, the majority of the civil servants 
supported the village system, partly because it seemed more 
compatible with the new judicial system in whose continuance 
they had a vested interest and partly because, with the 
arrival of George Barlow as Governor, it had been sanctioned 
as official policy. Promotion in the administration was, 
despite rules regarding seniority, largely a matter of 
influence and patronage. Successive Governors used their 
powers of appointment to promote their policies. In 
consequence fundamental switches of allegiance to policies 
were quite normal amongst the civil servants who would adopt 
those they perceived most likely to advance their careers. 
After Bentinck's recall a number of Munro's supporters had 
joined the opposition camp. Even Thackeray, the most 
outspoken of the advocates of ryotwari, sensing the change 
in climate, had joined Hodgson and, feebly justifying his
344
a ct i o n s  to Munro,  e n e r g e t i c a l l y  p r o m o t e d  v i l l a g e  
2
s e t t l e m e n t s .
In Bri ta i n,  M u n r o  and the other s u p p o r t e r s  of r y o t w a r i  
s e t t l e m e n t s  had s u c c e e d e d  in p e r s u a d i n g  the C ou r t  that any 
p e r m a n e n t  s e t t l e m e n t s  m a d e  w i t h  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ,  be they 
za mi n da r s ,  v i l l a g e  pa t e ls  or r e nte rs , w e r e  a m i st a k e.  The 
C ou r t  had a c c e p t e d  that the z a m i n d a r s  had f a il e d  to p r o t e c t  
the ry ots and had had do u bt s  that the v i l l a g e  s e t t l e m e n t s  
w o u l d  pr ove m o r e  s u c c e s s f u l .  M ost  i m p o r t a n t l y  of all, the 
s u p p o r t e r s  of r y o t w a r i  had o v e r c o m e  the o b j e c t i o n  that  
r y o t w a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  we r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  B r i t i s h  m e t h o d s  
of a d m i n i s t e r i n g  justice. The Co u r t  had a c c e p t e d  that the 
only d i f f e r e n c e  was that, w h i l e  u nd e r  a r y o t w a r i  s y s t em  the 
o b s t r u c t i o n s  o c c a s i o n e d  by the j u di c i al  s y s t e m  w er e  
e x p e r i e n c e d  by the c o l l e c t o r s ,  un d e r  other s y st e ms  the 
i n c o n v e n i e n c e  was m e r e l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  to the za m in d a rs ,  
m i r a s d a r s  or v i l l a g e  he a d m e n .  It had also b e e n  a c c e p t e d  that 
the use of i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  did not m a k e  the d e t a i l s  of 
s e t t l e m e n t s  any easier, w h i c h  still had to be c a r r i e d  out by 
so meone. The q u e s t i o n  had b e e n  w h e t h e r  it w e r e  not be tt e r  
that the s e t t l e m e n t s  sh ou l d  be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of the 
c o l l e c t o r s  r a t h e r  than of some other gr ou p c o m p o s e d  of 
Indians. Wi th the q u e s t i o n  p h r a s e d  in this way, the 
D i r e c t o r s ’ i n s t i n c t i v e  s u s p i c i o n  of In di ans  and the 
g e n e r a l l y  h e l d  a s s u m p t i o n  in B r i t a i n  that the C o m p a n y ' s  
of f i c i a l s  s h o u l d  be in a p o s i t i o n  to fu ll y  s u p e r v i s e  the 
r ev e n ue s ,  had i n c l i n e d  the h ome  a u t h o r i t i e s  to s u p p o r t  the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of a r y o t w a r i  system. This d e c i s i o n  had been 
i n f l u e n c e d  by M u n r o  w ho  had b e e n  able to p e r s u a d e  the
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D i r e c t o r s  that he had not fo un d his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  im ped ed  
by the de t a i l s  of r y o t w a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s .  He had arg u ed  that, 
once the in it i a l s e t t l e m e n t s  had bee n c o n c l u d e d  w i t h  
s ur ve ys , the c o l l e c t i o n  w e n t  by itself. In c o n s e q u e n c e ,  the 
C o u r t  had or d e r e d  that r y o t w a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  wer e to be
3
i n t r o d u c e d  as soon as the d e c e n n i a l  v i l l a g e  leases exp ired.
D e s p i t e  the Co u r t ' s  orders, the s u p p o r t e r s  of the v i l l a g e  
leases in M a d r a s  w ere  d e t e r m i n e d  to see them  p e r m a n e n t l y  
adop ted . A p a r t  fr o m s e e k i n g  w i t h  p r i v a t e  l ett ers  and 
of fi c i a l  m i n u t e s ,  re p o r t s  and d e s p a t c h e s  to cha n ge  the 
C ou r t ' s  de c i si o n , these m e n  we r e  p r e p a r e d  to e m pl oy  the 
t e c h n i q u e s  of de l a y and i n a c t i o n  to p r e v e n t  the r e p l a c e m e n t  
of their p o l i c i e s  by ones to w h i c h  they had long bee n  
v e h e m e n t l y  opposed.
It was a g a i n s t  the b a c k g r o u n d  of these d i v i s i o n s  that
o p p o s i t i o n  to Munro, bo th  p e r s o n a l  and p o l i t i c a l ,  was
a l r e a d y  be i n g o r g a ni z e d,  ev en b e f o r e  his a r r i v a l  in
Se pt e m be r .  Munro , a m i l i t a r y  man, a k n o w n  o p p o n e n t  of the
j ud i c i a l  s y s t e m  and an o u t s p o k e n  a d v o c a t e  of r y o t wa r i,  was
b e l i e v e d  to be r e t u r n i n g  to h e ad  a c o m m i s s i o n  inten t 'on
4
t ur n i ng  e v e r y t h i n g  u p s i d e  down'. A d d i t i o n a l  fa c t o r s  fu rt h e r  
c o m p l i c a t e d  the s i tu a t io n.  F o r e m o s t  a m o n g s t  thes e was the 
n a t u r a l  a n i m o s i t y  felt by the local g o v e r n m e n t  t o wa r d s its 
d i s t a n t  m a s t e r s  wh o w e r e  now ac cu s e d,  as they had f r e q u e n t l y  
b een  before , of i n t e r f e r i n g  in m a t t e r s  they did not r e a l l y  
u n d e r s t a n d .  M u n r o  was c l e a r l y  aw a r e of this i n s t i n c t i v e  
r e s e n t m e n t  h a r b o u r e d  by the local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a g a i n s t  the 
Home A u t h o r i t i e s  and s t r e s s e d  its i m p o r t a n c e  w h e n  he w r ot e
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to Cumming that 'most of the men in office about the
Presidency are Regulation-men, sticklers for every part of
the present system and opposers of every reform of it from 
5
h o m e '. He appreciated that the majority of the civil 
servants not only opposed reform but failed to see why, if 
these reforms must be made, they might not be left to the 
local government. In addition there was a general feeling 
that, if a special commissioner had to be appointed, he 
should have been chosen from among the senior civil servants 
in Madras, a number of whom felt that they had been 
superseded. The civil servants quite rightly recognized that 
Munro'8 appointment was an open criticism by the Home 
Authorities of their administration and a vote of no 
confidence on their ability to implement the new policies. 
Hugh Elliot captured the feel of the situation when he wrote 
that 'men of the most distinct party prejudices have been 
huddled together and many secret feelings of personal 
animosity still rankle in the breasts of those who were
6
engaged in former contentions and virulent discussions'.
On his arrival, Munro immediately began work. He adopted two
courses of action, one official and the other unofficial.
Officially he began examining all the reports from the
judges, collectors and commercial residents to the
Committees of Police from 1805 to 1814. He soon discovered
that few of their recommendations had been acted upon and he
seems to have entertained no very high opinion of the
quality of their work. In this he was not alone. Gahagan
informed him that the Committees had done little beyond eat 
7
hearty tiffins. Unofficially, he began to build a personal
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power base within the administration. He wrote to those
civil servants, men like Read, Cochrane, Gahagan, Bruce and
Chaplain, whom he numbered among his friends and supporters.
Under the guise of seeking their advice, which notes he had
already drawn up suggest he felt no real need of, he
attempted to personally interest them in the introduction of
the new measures. He manoeuvred to have George Stratton, an
old friend who had just returned to India, appointed as the
Second Commissioner and the Third Judge of the Sadr Court.
Writing to members of the Board in London, Munro urged them
to attempt to have men like Graham and Thackeray, on whom he
believed he might rely for support, returned to India. He
also asked the Board to arrange for him to be given
authority to by-pass the usual rules of procedure and,
ignoring the Board of Revenue, the Sadr Court and even the
8
Council, directly introduce his new Regulations.
On 24 December, Munro wrote to the Council spelling out what
he understood to be the duties of the Commission as defined
9
in the Judicial Despatch of April. He analysed the despatch,
dividing its contents into two sets of orders - those to be
implemented as soon as possible and those to be considered.
He expressed his opinion that the most important and urgent
of the former was the transfer of magisterial and police
powers from the zillah judges to the collectors. ’All the
rest are', he wrote, 'subordinate to and dependent upon
this. It must necessarily be carried into effect before any
10
one of them can be brought forward'. Munro proposed a short 
regulation which would simply authorize this transfer. This 
would leave the collectors operating under the existing
348
regulations until such time as more comprehensive ones
should be drawn up. In order to give effect to the other
changes ordered by the Court of Directors in the Judicial
Despatch of 29 April 1814, Munro proposed another six
regulations. One to restore the management of the village
police to the headmen and that of the district police to the
tahsildars and amildars under the collectors. A second to
constitute the headmen as native commissioners and authorize
the employment of village panchayats in civil cases and a
third to govern the appointment of Indian district
commissioners and district panchayats. The remaining three
were intended to increase the collectors' authority. They
were to be invested with powers to enforce patta
regulations, to settle boundary disputes and to prevent
proprietors of land from distraining property without their 
11
author i t y .
While waiting for the Council's reply, Munro received
letters from Cumming at the Board and from various civil
12
servants in Madras who supported his views. In the former, 
Cumming regretfully announced that the Board was unable to 
give Munro the unencumbered authority he desired. At the 
same time he informed Munro that the Court's Judicial 
Committee had been disbanded and that he had assumed 
responsibility for drawing up judicial despatches. He also 
told Munro that he was receiving increasing support in 
Britain, both inside and outside the Court of Directors. The 
letters received from the civil servants contained support 
for M u n r o 1s suggested measures together with comments which 
throw much light on the Company's bureaticracy. Gahagan,
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suggesting that Munro might look at two papers on native
commissioners and panchayats prepared in 1812 and 1813,
wrote; 'You will find them in the shelves of the Sudder
Adawlut where everything sticks if they do not concur. They
have hitherto made it a rule never to send up to Government
any proposition of the lower courts where they are of a
13
different op inion'. R e a d , in a letter to Munro telling him
that the Indians expected great changes from his reforms,
criticized the system by which the Government gathered
intelligence. He wrote; ’If I may be permitted to offer an
opinion, it would be to attend more to the information given
you by the natives than Europeans...for it is astonishing
how smooth and easy things are made to appear in the eyes of
our superiors when deputed to report on the states of the 
14
provinces'. In the light of these remarks and the known 
hostility of Hodgson and Greenaway at the Revenue Board, the 
judges of the Sadr Adalat, and some of the members of the 
Council, it becomes clear why Munro wanted the authority to 
by-pass these bodies.
On 1 March 1815, Munro was informed by the Madras Council
that, though it agreed with him that the Court had ordered
the transfer of the management of the police to the
collectors, it did not believe that a similar transfer of
15the magistracy was intended. In their opinion, paragraphs 95 
and 102 of the despatch of 29 April 1814 contained 'only 
incidental expressions favouring that opinion'. It is 
extremely difficult to understand how the Council reached 
this decision. Paragraph 95 states that 'the tahsildars of 
the districts form a part of the regular establishment of
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the collector, to whom we propose to transfer the duties of 
magistrate'. In paragraph 102 there are clear references to 
the collectors working in their 'magisterial capacity' and 
as 'acting as the magistrates of zillahs'. Only a 
determination to resist the Court's orders seems to offer 
any explanation for the decision. The fact that the 
Government was not even prepared immediately to transfer the 
management of the police to the collectors but insisted that 
the implementation of these orders must wait until 
additional information about the present situation was 
available, supports this conclusion. What is however clear 
is that Hugh Elliot was not supporting Munro in the manner 
the Board had expected him to do.
Ther e are a n u m b e r  of p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n s  for E l l io t ' s
behaviour. First it is clear that the new Governor had been
given the impression that 'everything was in the best
possible state'. He was assured by men like Robert
Fullerton, the second member of Council, that the Court's
practical reforms had already been anticipated and that
conditions had changed so much in recent years that Munro
16
s h o u l d  a b a n d o n  his f or m e r  opi n i on s .  But this does not 
e x p l a i n  the v e h e m e n c e  of his r e j e c t i o n  of M u nro . For this 
one has to look e l s e w h e r e .  Th e r e  are p r o b a b l y  two 
e x p l a n a t i o n s .  E l l i o t  m a y  have d i s c o v e r e d  the e x t e n t  of 
M u n r o ' s  a m b i t i o n s  and n o w  f e a r e d  h im  as a ri val  w i t h  the 
c o n s e q u e n c e  that he was u n d u l y  open to c r i t i c i s m  of M u n r o ' s  
m e a s u r e s .  In ad d i t io n ,  E l l i o t  had be e n in B r i t a i n  long 
e n o u g h  to be aw are of the ope n c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  the Board 
and the Court. He r e a l i z e d  that he ha d not b e e n
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Buckinghamshire's choice of governor and may have believed
his best chance of continued employment, which his letters
clearly reveal was his foremost consideration if only
because he needed the money, lay in conciliating the Court
rather than in supporting the Board. He had the example of
Wellesley's stormy Governor-Generalship to encourage him in
this belief. If this was the case, knowing that
Buckinghamshire's overbearing attitude over the appointment
of the new Commander-in-Chief for Bombay had temporarily
united the Directors and aware that Grant, who firmly
opposed the reforms ordered in the Judicial Despatch, was to
be the next Chairman as from April, Elliot probably believed
it to be politic to delay those reforms' introduction. What
is certain is that, at the time the Governor-in-Counci1's
decision was announced, Elliot also announced that he did
not 'view anything contained in the judicial letter in the
17
light of orders'. He added, in a conversation with the 
younger John Sullivan, that he pitied 'the ignorance of the 
poor people in England who had been misled by ill-informed 
persons and particularly pointed out the absurdity of 
trusting for information on judicial subjects to four 
colonels - Munro, Malcolm, Wilks and Smith'.
Munro and Stratton reacted swiftly. On 28 March, they wrote
to the Government insisting that the Court's despatch
ordered that the offices of magistrate and collector should 
18
be united. By doing this, they in effect referred the 
question back to the Home Authorities to whom the Government 
was required to forward their comments. To try to insure 
that the Home Authorities would support him, Munro wrote to
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the Board and to friends among the Directors. He told them 
of the problems facing him and asked them to arrange that 
the local government should receive the clearest orders in 
his favour. To Cumming he wrote, 'I think it necessary to 
caution you that, if it is expected that instructions are to 
be obeyed, the strongest and plainest words must be used'. 
Munro also persuaded his friends at Madras to write similar 
letters to the authorities in London. In particular, he 
encouraged John Sullivan to write to his father at the 
Board, knowing the influence the older Sullivan exercised 
over Lord Buckinghamshire.
At the same time Munro prepared a memo on the 
Governor-in-Counci1 1s decision in which he listed the 
various heads of information that he understood the 
Government to require before he might proceed further with 
the transfer of the police to the collectors and the
20
introduction of the other six regulations he had proposed. 
These included statistics about the distribution and 
allowances of the village patels and additional information 
about traditional policing techniques. He treated this 
matter with urgency because he realized that the Council's 
refusal to allow him to proceed with the promulgation of his 
less controversial regulations, the transfer of the police 
and responsibility for deciding revenue disputes to the 
collectors and the extension of Indian involvement in the 
judicial processes, was really inspired by a desire to delay 
matters rather than a belief that the Government lacked 
sufficient information to act. In a letter to Cumming, he 
remarked that the Government were clearly determined to
353
protract the Commission's business 'far beyond the period
21
l i m i t e d  by the Co u rt  of D i r e c t o r s ' .
In May, the Government discovered another method of delaying
M u n r o ' s  work. E l l i o t  a n n o u n c e d  in C o u n c i l  that he had found
a letter sent in 1804 by the Supreme Government to Bentinck
in which the Government of Madras was forbidden to
promulgate new regulations without first obtaining
22
permission from Calcutta. Claiming not to be certain whether 
this order applied to regulations ordered from Britain as 
well as those drawn up under local initiative, Elliot 
refused to act until he had heard from the Governor-General 
in Counc il.
D u r i n g  the f o l l o w i n g  m o n t h s ,  M u n r o  and S t r a t t o n  w o r k e d  on
the drafts of the seven regulations that had been proposed
in December. Two of these restored some judicial authority
to the patels, three extended and defined the powers of the
Indian district judiciary, one gave the collectors authority
to settle some land disputes, and the last transferred
23
responsibility for the police to the collectors. The 
Government, clearly determined to employ all means at their 
disposal to delay the Commission's work, referred the draft 
regulations to the Sadr Adalat for revision. Here Munro's 
opponents were able to legitimately hold up the whole 
process and there is strong evidence that this is what they 
were deliberately doing. In particular, there is the court's 
refusal to allow Stratton to take part in the regulations' 
revision even though his participation in this process was 
clearly the intention behind his appointment to the court.
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F a c e d  by the p o s s i b i l i t y  of i n t e r m i n a b l e  delays, Mu n r o  
r e a c t e d  by w r i t i n g  m or e  lett er s to the a u t h o r i t i e s  in 
B r i t a i n .  To Cummi ng , he d e s c r i b e d  the t ac t i cs  e m p l o y e d  by
24
the Sadr Adal at,  the G o v e r n m e n t  and the Su p r e m e  G o v e r n m e n t .  
He al so  laid out w h a t  he p e r c e i v e d  to be the four p r i n c i p a l  
g r o u n d s  for the o p p o s i t i o n  to his m e a s u r e s .  Th es e w e r e  the 
ci vil serv ant s' fears of I n d i an  c o r r u p t i o n  and of r e d u c e d  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  for e m p l o y m e n t ,  th eir c o n s e r v a t i v e  
p r e d i l e c t i o n  for the e s t a b l i s h e d  system, and their j e a l o u s y  
of M u n r o ' s  a d v a n c e m e n t .  At the same time, M u n r o  b e g a n  to 
p r e p a r e  to a t t a c k  the p r o b l e m  f r o m  a ne w  angle. He d e c i d e d  
to a t t e m p t  to d i s c r e d i t  the p r e s e n t  s y s t e m  and t h e r e b y  its 
s u p p o r t e r s .
S u l l i v a n ' s  a p p o i n t m e n t  as C o l l e c t o r  of C o i m b a t o r e  gave Mu n r o
an o p p o r t u n i t y  to do this. Sul li va n ,  like his f a t h e r  at the
Board, was an e n t h u s i a s t i c  s u p p o r t e r  of M u n r o ' 8 ideas.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  b e c a u s e  of his f at h e r ' s  office, S u l l i v a n  was
the only c o l l e c t o r  w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  i n f l u e n c e  to o pe nly
c h a l l e n g e  the Board of R e v e n u e  w i t h o u t  e n d a n g e r i n g  his
career . S h o r t l y  af te r his a r r i v a l  in C o i m b a t o r e ,  S u l l i v a n
25
had fo u n d  e v i d e n c e  of m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  The s c e p t i c i s m  w i th  
w h i c h  the R e v e n u e  B oa rd m e t  his r e p o r t s  m a y  ha ve  s u g g e s t e d  
to M u n r o  the idea of t u r n i n g  S u l l i v a n ' s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  into 
an issue. In m a n y  ways, it was an ideal o p p o r t u n i t y .  The 
p r e v i o u s  c ol l e c t o r ,  G a r r ow ,  was dead so there was no 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of o p p o s i t i o n  f o r m i n g  ro u n d  h i m nor any q u e s t i o n  
of p e r s o n a l i t i e s  be in g e n t a n g l e d  in the d e b a t e  w h i c h  coul d 
t h e r e f o r e  c o n c e n t r a t e  on the o p e r a t i o n  of the system. Should
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it be proved to have failed, its supporters would be 
discredited. Furthermore, the Revenue Board's and the Sadr 
Adalat's ignorance of any maladministration would cast 
doubts on the validity of their evidence in support of the 
existing arrangements.
Munro persuaded Elliot, in spite of objections from the
Revenue Board, to appoint him in September to investigate
26
with Sullivan the condition of the district. He immediately
asked Sullivan to gather material proving that the village
27
leases should be ended.
Meanwhiie in London, the Board and Munro's supporters in the
Court had received his letters and were preparing to assist
him. They had clearly not expected Elliot's defection.
Samuel Davis wrote, 'I am not at all surprised at the
difference of opinion between you and the two inferior
members of Government, the Secretaries and the Board of
Revenue. All this was to be expected. But I owe I am greatly
surprised to find that...you have not had the full support
28
and entire confidence of the Governor'. Sullivan at the
Board admitted that 'everything had been assumed as if taken 
29
for granted'. But, despite being caught unprepared, the
Board was able to react quickly to the news. A letter to the
Court was drafted in which the Court was required to order
30
Elliot to support Munro. At the earliest opportunity,
Buckinghamshire sent this to Grant together with another
letter informing him that the Court was to support Munro's
31
interpretation of the Judicial Despatch. Fearing delay, 
Buckinghamshire ordered Grant to immediately place the
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communications before the Committee of Correspondence and 
send a despatch as soon as possible. He added that, should 
Grant delay, the Board would send a despatch themselves.
While Buckinghamshire corresponded with Grant, Cumming was
actively canvassing support for the Board's actions. He
32
became acquainted with M'Cullock, the Assistant Examiner of 
Indian Correspondence at India House and, inviting him to 
dinners with Ravenshaw and Thackeray, converted him to 
Munro1s views. Cumming wrote in a letter to Munro, 'I showed 
M'Cullock confidentially your letters and he is decidedly 
for giving you every support and, as far as his influence 
goes, it will be cordially afforded in the Court'. In fact 
M'Cullock's support proved very important. Many of the 
Directors fixed their signatures to despatches they had not
33
read, relying on the Chairman and his deputy to advise them. 
With Grant opposing the judicial reforms, those Directors 
who supported Munro would have found it, without M'Cullock's 
help, much harder to bring the Court to a quick acquiescence 
in the Board's orders.
As it was, some of the Board's acts at this time, in 
particular Buckinghamshire's support of Major Hart's dubious 
claims against the Company and the decision to attempt to 
clear Graham's name, made support in the Court for Munro's 
measures precarious. Major Hart had, in 1799, sold the 
Madras army 106,000 seers of grain which he claimed to have 
bought privately after he had informed the authorities that 
the army's stores, for which he was responsible, had been 
exhausted. When he had later proved unable or unwilling to
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produce his bills of purchase, the Madras Government had
34
found him guilty of peculation and suspended him. This 
decision had been endorsed by the home authorities who 
dismissed him for contravening regulations which forbade
35
commissaries of grain to possess private stores for profit.
When Hart appealed against this decision, Dundas ordered 
36
that he be paid. The Court took legal advice and were
informed that, since the matter did 'not concern civil or
military government or revenues of the Indian possessions',
the Board of Control had no right to intervene in the 
37
matter. Dundas had therefore agreed to shelve the issue. 
Buckinghamshire, determined to embarrass the Directors,
raised the matter again and ordered the Court to authorize ,
38
the payment of Hart's claim. When the Court refused, 
Buckinghamshire applied for a mandamus. The Directors ' 
appealed to the Privy Council to uphold their authority in 
this matter. However, since the most members of the Board 
also sat on the Council, the Privy Council ruled that the
case lay within the Board's jurisdiction and that the Court
39
must comply with its orders. The whole episode revealed the 
extent of Buckinghamshire's hostility towards the Court and 
his determination to extend the Board's authority over the 
operations of the Company. It also revealed that, in fact if 
not theory, the ultimate authority on all Indian affairs 
had, to all intents and purposes, passed to the Board of 
Control which now possessed the power to legalize even its 
decisions even when these dealt with matters were formally 
outside i18 jurisdiction.
The Board's decision to have Graham reinstated was another
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example of this in action. The decision was taken less with
a view to returning a supporter of Munro to Madras than with
the aim of embarrassing the Court. Cumming told Munro that
the Board intended to reopen the case of Graham's dismissal
and he stated that this would greatly annoy Grant because it
4fl
would discredit men who had been regarded as his supporters.
Cumming, who had personally prepared Graham's papers, was
convinced that they would publicly reveal 'the scandalous
p r o c e e d i n g s  of Oakes and Place' and sh ow  that G r a h a m  had
been made the victim of 'a vile conspiracy' for no other
reason than that he had been a military collector who had
41
belonged to the 'Baramahal fraternity'.
In late December, the Court sent a judicial despatch to 
42
Madras. In it the Home Authorities observed that the 
transfer of the magistracy to the collectors was, in their 
opinion, 'fairly deducible' from the despatch of 1814. and to 
be carried out as soon as possible. They agreed with the 
Commission's suggestion that general regulations should be 
passed immediately and then subsequently adjusted. It was 
also confirmed that regulations drawn up for internal 
administration in conformity with orders from Britain did 
not need to be submitted to Calcutta for the 
Governor-General's sanction. The Government was further 
ordered not to delay the promulgation of new regulations 
until more detailed investigations werei concluded. The 
influence of the Board is clearly discernible throughout the 
despatch but especially where the commissioners are directly 
referred to. The determination to prevent the Madras 
Government from continuing to employ delaying tactics to
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obstruct the introduction of the reforms which is visible in 
the despatch is further evidence of the Board's influence.
While the Court was arranging to send the judicial despatch
to Madras, Munro was occupied in investigating the
corruption in Coimbatore. There was little else for him to
do at this time because the Sadr Adalat, despite
half-hearted requests from Elliot, refused to return the
draft regulations with their comments. These did not reach
43
the Government until December. When the revised regulations
did finally reach the Government, it was clear that the Sadr
Adalat was intentionally obstructing the introduction of the
reforms ordered by the Court of Directors. The Commissioners
however diplomatically chose to publicly regard the Sadr
Adalat's attitude as the consequence of their having
completely misunderstood the purposes behind the reforms.
They observed that 'most of the difficulties seen by the
Sudder Adawlut originate in their viewing the potail, not as
what he is, a head ryot engaged in agriculture and deciding
one or two petty suits in the year, but as a regular judge
solely occupied in hearing causes from one end of the year 
44
to the other'. Stratton, in his answer to the Sadr court's
criticisms, revealed the gulf between the court and the
Commission. 'Our object', he wrote, 'is to administer speedy
and summary justice on petty disputes.... The selection of
heads of villages as judges...affords the only means of
bringing into operation the speedy administration of 
45
justice'. He then laid down a very important principle which 
represented a revolutionary advance in administrative 
practice. He stated that 'all regulations should in the
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beginning conform as nearly as possible to the existing 
customs of the country and be changed progressively with 
these customs. Though justice is everywhere the same, the 
mode of dispensing it differs in all countries and that 
which is acceptable under one state of society may be quite 
the reverse under another. We should therefore give to the 
natives...courts suited rather to the present state of 
society among them than to our ideas of what such courts 
ought to b e 1.
By the beginning of 1816, the tide of opinion was turning in
favour of Munro. Letters started to arrive at Madras which
made it clear to all concerned that the Commission had the
support of both the Board and the Court. Sullivan, for
example, informed Munro that his father was remaining at the
46
Board merely to support the Commissioners. Elliot heard,
probably from Elphinstone, his correspondent at the Court,
that Grant's election to the Chair had not deflected the
Home Authorities from their determination to introduce the
reforms. Delicately weighing the consequences of continued
opposition to the Board's wishes against the benefits to be
expected from the Court, Elliot wrote to Cumming to assure
47
him that he had complete confidence in Munro. Although he 
was as yet unaware of it, Elliot had made one of the 
shrewder moves of his career. A letter was on its way to him 
from Buckinghamshire informing him that, as a consequence of 
the delays, Munro's appointment was to be continued beyond 
the original two years. Buckinghamshire commented that he 
hoped this would 'show to those who have preferred their own 
private system...that the authorities at home are not to be
361
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turned from their course'.
At the same time, the results of Munro's and Sullivan's
investigations in Coimbatore were becoming general knowledge
in Madras. These had disclosed 'a scene of malversation,
fraud and embezzlement' by the Company's Indian employees
and possibly by the last collector which the Court of
Directors were to claim later stood 'unparalleled in the
49
annals of British India'. As Munro had fully intended, these
findings and the report he and Sullivan presented to the
Government in February proved 'a tender subject for most of
the great authorities..., who did not believe there could be
50
any abuses where the regulations were so well understood'.
Its revelations were so unpalatable for many of the
civilians in Madras that it was neither referred to the
Board of Revenue nor sent to Britain for over six months.
But this did not lessen its impact. Although Munro's diehard
critics remained unconvinced, less committed civil servants
and those whose opposition was already wavering in the face
of the Home Authorities' obvious determination to support
Munro began to switch allegiance. Most importantly, Elliot
found in the investigation's results a justification for his
51
new commitment to the commissioners.
In the light of these developments, Fullerton's Minute of 1
January should not only be seen as another attack on Munro's
52
policies but also as a desperate attempt to stem the tide. 
His constant references to Munro and his supporters as mere 
'military authorities' and the manner in which he emphasized 
the remarks which appeared to be attacks on the judges as
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individuals rather than those which dealt with the judiciary 
as an organization clearly indicated that the Minute was 
supposed to rally the opposition. Among his general 
arguments against the new policies, which tended to be 
repetitions of those already advanced, Fullerton presented 
two new ones. First, he stated that Munro had made a 
fundamental error in not recognizing that the present courts 
acted as courts of equity as well as of law and were hence 
far more flexible than Munro gave them credit for being. By 
presenting this argument, Fullerton could attack Munro's 
proposals and drive home the observation that the present 
policies rested only on 'the opinions of military gentlemen 
who have written on the civil judicature'. His second point, 
was particularly interesting since it showed how Munro's 
opponents, having resigned themselves to some reforms, were 
prepared to use arguments in favour of these to try to 
discredit those reforms yet to be introduced. Fullerton, 
recognizing that the village system was definitely to be 
replaced by a ryotwari one, argued that the central 
principle of the latter was the removal from the patels of 
the power to oppress the ryots. This, he claimed, was why 
settlements were made directly with the ryots and, examining 
Read's and Munro's reasons for introducing ryotwari 
settlements into Baramahal, he seems to have had a valid 
point. From this position Fullerton argued that Munro's 
plans to enlarge the native agency and give the patels 
judicial powers would, if carried into effect, give them a 
renewed capacity to oppress the ryots and thereby defeat the 
whole purpose of the re-introduction of ryotwari.
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By the end of January, Elliot was giving Mu.iro the support
which it had been the Board's intention he should, as
Governor, be in a position to supply. He asked Munro to send
him the report on Coimbatore as soon as possible in order
that replies might be drafted to the critical minutes of
53
Fullerton and Alexander. Elliot also expressed himself 'in
very strong terms regarding the systematic opposition and
the want of cooperation evinced on all occasions by the
54
Sudder Adawlut and by the Board of Revenue'. He also 
announced that he would tolerate no further delays and let 
it be known that he would promulgate any further regulations 
without referring them to the Sadr court.
During the next months, the commissioners drew up a final 
draft of the seven regulations which Munro had first 
proposed in December 1814. On the surface, these regulations 
were to give the patels limited judicial powers, to extend 
those of the district munsiffs, to permit the employment of 
panchayats and to transfer the superintendence of the police 
to the collectors. However, behind each of these was a clear 
intention to try to re-introduce traditional modes of 
administering justice and the police. Munro hoped that the 
employment of the patels would restore to them their former 
authority in their villages which the introduction of the 
judicial regulations had destroyed. Satisfied that 
panchayats were commonly employed under Indian governments 
to decide suits, Munro believed that they were as central to 
the Indian conception of justice as juries were to the 
British. The primary purpose of the decision to abolish the 
daroga establishments and return much of the responsibility
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for the police to the villages was clearly to revive
55
traditional practice.
These draft regulations were presented to the Government on
25 April by Elliot. His accompanying minute stated, 'The
President submits to the Board a correct copy of the
regulations formed by the commissioners for the revision of
the judicial system and proposes that the said regulations
be passed and promulgated'. Munro, who must have often
wondered if he would ever see his regulations passed, wrote
with delight and relief on the bottom of his copy of this
minute just three words which summed up all his feelings -
56
'Short and sweet'.
But Munro's relief was premature. Over the next few days
Fullerton and Alexander, the Second and Third Members of the
Council, strenuously opposed the promulgation of the
regulations. Elliot finally informed Munro that 'it will be
left to me to carry through by my own authority, or perhaps
with the concurrence of the Commander in Chief, your amended 
57
regulations'. But, as usual, his words were bolder than his
actions and, under pressure from Fullerton and Alexander, he
accepted the expediency of further delay and consented to 
58
it. It was typical of him that, on the day he agreed in
Council to further delay, he wrote to Munro that this was
59
the one thing he would not do. Had Munro also known that 
Buckinghamshire had died after a fall from a horse on the 4 
February, he might have been very worried.
Towards the end of May the Court's Judicial Despatch, which
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gave unqualified support to the Commission's proposals,
arrived and Elliot immediately sent Munro a private,
60
unofficial copy. With the despatch came Buckinghamshire's
letter to Elliot ordering him to support Munro. Immediately
work on the police and boundary regulations was suspended
and the commissioners directed to prepare three new
regulations. These modified and defined the powers of the
magistrates, transferred them from the zillah judges to the
collectors and established a general system of police under
the collectors as magistrates. The Commission's drafts were
laid before the Council on 8 July 1816 and then sent to the
Sadr Adalat for revision. When the Sadr court tried to
employ delaying tactics again, the commissioners revised and
61
corrected the regulations themselves. The court then
produced an alternative scheme under which the collectors
would act as police magistrates and the judges would remain
zillah magistrates. The commissioners decided it was so much
at variance with the Court of Directors' intentions that it
might be ignored and they persuaded Elliot to pass their
regulations without further delay. There was a last ditch
attempt by the Board of Revenue, now under Fullerton's
62
presidency, to stop this. The Board produced a paper which 
it had hitherto held back but Elliot told Munro that he had 
no doubt that this was a ploy to delay the regulations and 
that he intended to press ahead regardless.
Elliot was undoubtedly encouraged to do this by the news 
that further attempts in Britain to change the home 
authorities' policy had failed. In the Court of Directors, 
Grant and his supporters had attempted to discredit Munro
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and the policies he represented. Sullivan wrote to his son
from the Board that, 'amongst the acts that have been used
to bring the Commission into disrepute, one, addressed to
the popular feeling about economy..., has been exhibited
showing that the disbursements to Munro alone amount to
63
28,000 pagodas a year'. Those who opposed Munro and the
policies he represented clearly hoped that, if they could
win sufficient support at India House, they would be able to
cajole or intimidate the new President of the Board, George
Canning, into reversing Buckinghamshire's policies. They
failed largely because Sullivan and Cumming managed to
convinced Canning that these policies should not be
abandoned. Even so, the attacks in the Court were
sufficiently serious to persuade Munro that something had to
be done. He arranged with Elliot to have Stratton
permanently attached to the Sadr Adalat so that his salary
might appear against the Judicial Department's budget rather
64
than the Commission's.
The entire episode illustrated the importance to Munro of 
the Board of Control's active support. It is clear that 
without it he would have quickly lost his authority in 
Madras where opposition to his reforms would have seriously 
delayed their introduction and probably have significantly 
modified their content. Munro's supporters in Britain were 
well aware of the situation and this knowledge influenced 
their actions. Sullivan in particular placed Munro's need of 
support before his own personal feelings. On his arrival at 
the Board of Control, Canning had abolished the formal 
meetings of the Commissioners and thus openly announced that
367
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the President was in fact the Board. By doing this, he had
indirectly undermined Sullivan's status and influence which
had already been affected by Buckinghamshire's death. In
addition, while Sullivan had realized he could not hope to
exercise the same influence over Canning nor stand on the
same footing with him as he had with his father-in-law
Buckinghamshire, he had been upset when the new President
had made Thomas Courtenay, the Board's Secretary, his 
66
confidant. In the face of Canning's apparent intention to
build a power base for himself at the Board by altering the
balance of power in favour of his friends, Sullivan's
personal inclination was to retire. However, aware that
Munro more than ever needed the support of friends well
placed in the home administration, Sullivan decided to
continue in office. Announcing his decision to his son, he
wrote that he was determined to remain at the Board where he
. 67
could effectively support Munro.
On 13 September, the new regulations were finally passed by 
68
the Council. Fullerton, who at last agreed that these did
represent the home authorities' wishes, still tried to
introduce additional arrangements for the close supervision
of the collectors, probably because these would have
69
preserved the judges' status and offices. Elliot rejected 
his proposals, agreeing with the commissioners that there 
were already sufficient controls. Writing to Elphinstone in 
London, he also succinctly described the new concept of 
progressive development that was embodied in the 
regulations. 'The new judicial system', he wrote, 'must in 
some degree be considered as an experiment called for by the
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defects of the former system which, in its turn, will no
70
doubt be subject to improvement or correction'.
With the strain of the last two years lifted and no longer
constrained by the demands placed on him by continuous
controversy, Munro finally gave vent to all his pent up
frustration and anger. He complained of 'wasting months
talking and writing about matters which might have been
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settled in a few w e e k s '. 'I was never', he wrote, 'in a 
situation which I felt so irksome as my present one for I 
never was in one in which I could do so little alone and in 
which it was necessary to have so many concurring 
op inions...before anything could be done'. Determined to 
rectify this situation now that he could concentrate on such 
matters, Munro began systematically to weed out the 
opposition. Although his own position was now unassailable, 
his standing with the home authorities and the Government of 
Madras did not give him sufficient authority to move for 
Fullerton's or Alexander's removal. Men like Greenway at the 
Sadr court and Hodgson at the Board of Revenue were also 
beyond his reach. All Munro could do was ask his friends in 
the Court and at the Board to try to ensure that future 
vacancies at these levels should only be filled by his 
supporters. The less senior civil servants however were 
within his reach and he appears to have decided to stamp out 
opposition amongst them. It seems probable that, even before 
Hepburn presented him with an opportunity, he had decided to 
make an example of one civil servant to encourage the rest.
In October, Hepburn, the Collector of Tanjore, wrote to the
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commissioners and made clear his opposition to the
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re-introduction of ryotwari and to the new judicial system.
He also injudiciously revealed his intention to delay the
introduction of both. He even explained how he might do this
by choking his office with work. 'The copies of the three
regulations', he wrote, 'occupy twenty four sheets of dummy
paper and they have been found to require one and a quarter
quires of country paper.... There are 6,117 villages.... To
furnish each of these with a copy of the three regulations
would therefore require...183,510 manuscript sheets which it
is calculated would give full occupation to one hundred
scribes for ten months at an expense of almost five thousand
pagodas'. Munro immediately accused Hepburn of obstruction
and of failing to give the commissioners proper respect. He
persuaded Elliot to order Hepburn to Madras and then had him
73
removed from his post.
After Hepburn's removal from his post, systematic opposition
in Madras to Munro, the re-introduction of ryotwari and the
reformed judicial arrangements appeared to quickly die away.
This encouraged Elliot, on 31 December, to inform the
commissioners that their work on the revision of the
74
judicial system was finished. He told Munro that he was now 
free to go on tour and fulfill the second part of his orders 
from the Court by conducting a general investigation of the 
administration in the various districts, especially with 
regard to the revenues.
Munro left for Tanjore early in 1817. Shortly after he had 
left the seat of government, he received news that Hodgson
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had been been given a provisional appointment to the 
75
Council. This immediately revived anxieties among his
supporters that opposition to his measures would reappear.
Davis wrote from London that he had heard that Hodgson was
'a great admirer of Lord Cornwallis's system' and stated
that he believed the Board of Control should more closely
supervise the Court's appointments. In his opinion it was
necessary that 'some distinction should be made in filling
vacancies between those that are well or ill-disposed
towards...the improvements to be introduced'. From Madras,
Thackeray informed Munro that opposition had not been
eradicated in the capital and that some civil servants were
taking advantage of his absence to try to undermine Elliot's
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confidence in the new arrangements.
These anxieties among Munro's supporters were not
unjustified. Fullerton wrote to the Director W F Elphinstone
in May a subtle letter in which, while appearing to praise
Munro's recent measures, he attempted to raise doubts as to
77
the efficiency of their operation. In particular, he
suggested that the collectors were unable to cope with the
extra work their duties as magistrates had imposed.
'Assistants must be everywhere appointed', he wrote, 'while
the judges and registers have little to do'. Elliot was
worried enough to ask Munro to produce a special report on
78
corruption amongst the revenue officials in Salem. 'I 
conclude from various suggestions', he told Munro, 'that 
such a report would be of much use to strengthen the hand of 
those who support the new system at home'.
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Supporters of the new policies in Britain did appear to need 
assistance. Grant and his supporters in the Court were 
fighting a rearguard action to prevent the introduction of 
the 'Munro System' into Madras and its extension to other 
parts of British India. While in fact their actions were 
being dictated by their resentment at what they saw as the 
Board of Control's encroachment of the Court's authority 
rather than by their opposition to Munro's ideas, this was 
not immediately obvious. The motives for their opposition 
had become extremely complex. On the one hand, Grant's party 
disagreed with the new policies because they believed them 
to be wrong in principle and in effect. On the other hand, 
they were strongly influenced by the fact that the policies 
had, by and large, been originated by the Board which had 
forced the Court to adopt them. They feared that the Board 
intended in this way to remove all the Court's independent 
authority and responsibility in the decision-making process. 
In addition, personal antagonisms were clouding the issues.
The actual attack Grant and his supporters launched at Munro
was not so much designed to discredit his ideas because they
were regarded as mistaken as to discredit the Board's
management of affairs. An opportunity to attack this was
opened when the Board's Revenue Department made additions to
the Bengal Revenue Draft 193 without bothering to consult
the Court. Paragraphs were added which urged Moira to
introduce 'the ryotwar settlement throughout the Company's
possessions'. The Court rightly objected to this action
79
which the Department had had no right to take. Grant's 
supporters took advantage of the Directors' indignation to
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add adverse comments on the operation of Munro's measures in 
Madras to the letter which was sent to the Board. They 
quoted a Minute of Fullerton, that had been unofficially 
sent to them, in which he had criticized Munro's reforms.
Canning replied to the Court in a letter drawn up by 
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Cumming. The letter began by suporting the Board's position
with four points. These were that the system of 1793 had not
worked but rather had harmed the interests of the Indians,
that Cornwallis's permanent settlements had failed and
should not be extended, that the creation of zamindars had
been a mistake, and that no settlements should in future be
permanently concluded without considerable research and
surveys being first made. The letter continued with a
defence of Munro's recent measures. Canning stated that he
could not agree with Fullerton's criticisms. In addition, he
attacked the way in which Fullerton's Minute had been
brought to the attention of the home authorities. 'How it
happens that a partial extract from the proceedings of the
Indian Government is circulated through private channels in
England before it has been communicated to the regular
authorities', he wrote, 'I forbear to ask'. In a letter to
his son, Sullivan revealed the reasoning behind the
inclusion of this criticism of the method by which
Fullerton's Minute had been brought to the Court's 
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attention. Fullerton was regarded by Munro's supporters as
the leader of the opposition to Munro in Madras. Sullivan
had already accused him of being 'actively employed in
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exciting doubts and raising difficulties'. Cumming and 
Sullivan now hoped that the evidence that Fullerton had
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permitted his Minute to be sent unofficially to Britain, 
something that had been strictly forbidden, would furnish 
Elliot with an excuse for removing him.
It seems clear that the supporters of the 'Munro System'
decided at this time that, in view of the continuing
opposition to the recent reforms, it was necessary to try to
have Munro appointed Governor of Madras. They employed
indirect arguments to convince the new President of the
Board that this must be done. Sullivan wrote to Canning that
it was vital that Munro should remain in India but that he
doubted he would do so if he was offered nothing better than
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permission to continue to serve as head of the Commission. 
Since the law excluded him, because he was a military rather 
than a civilian employee, from a seat on the Council unless 
he were appointed either Governor or Commander-in-Chief, 
Sullivan believed he must be offered one of these 
appointments. Of the two posts, Sullivan clearly favoured 
the former but feared that the Ministry might not 'find it 
convenient to forgo their general political patronage' by 
placing him in that office when Elliot should leave it.
While Munro's supporters worked behind the scenes in Britain
to have him placed in a position where he might effectively
defend the new policies, the Board of Revenue in Madras
produced a new excuse for refusing to implement the order to
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introduce ryotwari settlements. The Board stated that the 
survey was an integral part of the ryotwari system and that 
it was therefore impossible to make ryotwari settlements 
before full surveys had been completed. The Board also
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announced its intention to severely restrict the classes of 
Indians who were to be permitted to make settlements with 
the State. 'The Board intend', its members wrote, 'to forbid 
the collectors to admit any persons to enter agreements 
direct with the officers of the Government under the 
ryotwari system who are not by hereditary or prescriptive 
right entitled to pay their dues directly to the Sirkar.... 
The object therein is to preserve the right of the 
meerasdars and the cadeems from that infraction in favour of 
their tenants, the pycarrees, which, by admitting both on a 
footing of equality, was the cause of just ground of 
complaint under the former ryotwari system'. In doing this, 
the Board threatened to undermine the whole concept of 
economic development that underlay M u n r o ' s 'ideas since their 
plans would have effectively prevented the emergence of a 
class of independent yeoman farmers.
Elliot and Munro's supporters in the Government, worried by
this latest ploy to delay the introduction of the new
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settlements, wrote to Munro for his opinions. Munro's views
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clearly emerge in the Council's reply to the Board. Because 
he believed it was important that ryotwari settlements be 
introduced as soon as possible, he was prepared to abandon 
the surveys. Consequently the Council told the Board of 
Revenue that detailed surveys were unnecessary since 
settlements could be based on the village accounts for 
previous years. The Council then employed a rather weak 
argument to justify the decision it had reached to permit 
direct settlements with men who had previously been 
sub-tenants. Stating that the Government had no wish to see
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mirasi rights infringed, the Council informed the Board that 
there could be no overall ban on the collectors which might 
prevent them from making settlements with ryots who had not 
hitherto paid their rents directly to the State. As far as 
the Government was concerned, the fact that a ryot should 
pay his rents directly to the State should not affect his 
relations with others in the socio-economic structure. This 
was obviously unlikely to be the case but the Council was 
clearly anxious that the home authorities should not 
conclude that existing rights were being threatened, 
especially as the Court had consistently ordered that these 
were to be protected.
The entire episode revealed the extent to which the Council 
was under Munro's influence. In the course of the Council's 
correspondence with the Board of Revenue one point clearly 
emerged. The Council supported Munro's view that the revenue 
system should be made more flexible in order that new 
classes of landholders might appear and it agreed with him 
that the frugal and industrious should be encouraged with 
expectations of eventually being able to establish 
themselves as independent farmers.
However, just when it seemed that his ryotwari policies 
would be implemented, Munro found himself in a dilemma. 
Because he believed that ryotwari settlements were essential 
for future economic and social development, he was 
determined to see them replace the village leases. At the 
same time, his observations during his recent tour of 
Malabar had convinced him that the village structure of
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agrarian society must be maintained. ’Our government rests', 
he wrote, 'almost entirely upon the single point of military 
power.... Where there is no village establishment, we have 
no hold upon the people.... Our situation as foreigners 
renders a regular village establishment more important to us 
than to a native government; our inexperience and ignorance 
make it necessary for us to seek the aid of regular 
establishments to direct the internal affairs of the country 
and our security requires that we should have a body of
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headmen of villages interested in supporting our dominion'. 
Munro clearly recognized that the emergence of a large class 
of small, independent yeoman farmers threatened the village 
structure. The situation in Malabar and Kanara seemed to 
support this view. It was for this reason that Munro became 
increasingly insistent that village panchayats and munsiffs 
must be employed, even though the statistics suggested that 
the inhabitants very rarely used them. He clearly hoped that 
the patels and superior ryots would accept the loss of their 
economic control of the villages if they were compensated 
with minor judicial and executive authority within the 
village structure.
In July 1817, events overtook Munro when he received orders
from the Government to take control of Dharwar, a district
which the Governor-General had forced the Peshwa to cede to
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the British under the treaty of Poona. In March 1814, Moira
had informed the home authorities that the Pindari problem
in Central India and the political and social anarchy which
he perceived to characterize conditions within the Maratha
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states required urgent attention. He had proposed that 'the
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British Government should become the acknowledged head of a
confederacy' of Indian states by entering subsidiary
alliances and use this authority to suppress all disorderly
elements. In December 1815, Moira had urged the home
authorities to permit him to act on his own initiative, even
to the extent of waging war on the Marathas, to resolve the
90
problems in Central India. In London Canning had found
himself, in effect, called upon to decide whether the time
was ripe to risk the threat of the Marathas and wipe out the 
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Pindaris. The Court had been opposed to any further
extension of British involvement in Central India and in
particular to further acquisitions of territory, as had
Thomas Courtenay, the Secretary to the Board. When Canning
had asked for their advice, Sir John Shore, Wellesley and
Wellington had also opposed any extension of the system of
subsidiary alliances that Moira wished to enter into. Only
Sullivan had supported the Governor-General. In view of the
opposition to Moira's proposals, Canning had sent
instructions under which Moira was 'prohibited from
undertaking extensive operations with the view of
remodelling our (British) political relations and extending
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our influence and control'. He had also been told that the 
home authorities were unwilling to become involved in any 
general war. At the same time however, Canning had given 
Moira a degree of discretion which had been extended in 
further orders.
After receiving the Board's reluctant permission to 
exterminate the Pindaris, Moira had made a series of 
treaties of subsidiary alliance with Nagpur, Gwalior and the
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Rajput states before taking offensive measures against the
Pindaris. These measures prompted the Marathas to take
counter measures and in the following months the Maratha
princes fought the Company one by one, each in turn being
defeated. While these events were dominating Munro's
attention, Elliot had heard of the plans of Munro's
supporters in Britain to attempt to persuade the Board to
have him recalled in order to enable Munro to assume the
Governorship. He immediately attempted to win the support of
the Court, no doubt hoping to play the. Directors off against
the Board. Knowing that the Court strongly opposed Moira's
foreign policies, he wrote letters that were extremely
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critical of them to various Directors. At the same time, 
hoping to destroy the favourable impression that Munro's 
successful operations in the Peshwa's territories were 
making on the home authorities, he also claimed that the 
army was deliberately stirring up unnecessary alarm in order 
to advance its interests.
As he had done once before, Elliot again decided to throw in
his lot with Grant's party in the Direction. In February
1818, the young Sullivan informed Munro that his reforms
were again under serious attack and that the Court's recent
appointment of Hodgson to a provisional seat on the Council
had persuaded many people that Munro's influence was on the 
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wane. He particularly warned Munro that Elliot was 
supporting his opponents, apparently because he believed 
that the balance of power had shifted from the Board to 
Grant arid his supporters in the Court. Munro immediately 
decided that he must return to Britain where he undoubtedly
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hoped to be able to exert a direct influence over policy and
where he may have believed his presence would prove the
deciding factor in winning him the Governorship. He informed
the Madras Government in June that ill health necessitated
95
his resignation and return to Europe.
Elliot was not so easily deceived. He recognized that Munro
was using his health as an excuse to return to London and
clearly suspected his motives. Stratton had told him that
Munro's sore eyes were a temporary disability, merely the
consequence of his having worn the wrong glasses, and that
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his health was otherwise good. Desperate to prevent Munro 
from leaving Madras, Elliot offered him the command of the 
northern divisions of the army and, as an added inducement 
to remain, promised him a special commission to settle the 
revenues of the Northern Circars. Munro, who had heard that 
Elliot's support for the opponents of the recent reforms had 
angered the Board and also believed his opposition to 
Moira's campaign, the success of which had undermined its 
opponents' position, made his recall more probable, refused 
the offer. On 8 August he resigned his command.
For reasons that are not completely clear, Munro did not
leave India immediately but remained in Madras until 24
January 1819. The most likely explanation for Munro's
delayed departure was his desire to produce one final report
on the operations of the new judicial system. In late August
the Board of Revenue published a report which analysed the
replies received from collectors about the effects of the
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transfer of the magisterial duties. In the 17 replies
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received, only three collectors claimed that the new duties
did not complicate their revenue work while ten stated that
they materially interfered with their other duties. To
combat the unsatisfactory impression this report had made,
Munro and Stratton wrote a final paper on the operation of
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the new regulations. In this paper they cautiously asserted 
that some years must elapse before the effects of these 
could be correctly assessed while at the same time they 
insisted that available figures suggested that their 
intentions had been strikingly achieved. In the field of 
civil justice, the number of suits settled by native courts 
had greatly increased and nearly double the total number of 
causes previously decided in any one year had been disposed 
of. In addition, causes were now being settled more cheaply 
and quickly. The operation of criminal judicial system was 
harder to assess since the incidence of crime depended less 
upon provisions for apprehending criminals than upon 'the 
state of society, of the country, of peace or war, of plenty 
or scarcity'. Despite this, Munro and Stratton declared 
themselves satisfied that the new arrangements represented a 
significant improvement in the system.
It is also possible that Munro delayed his return to Britain 
until he was more certain of the reception he would receive. 
By leaving India, he knew he would forfeit the opportunity 
to resume his post of First Commissioner that Elliot was 
prepared to offer him should he remain. Were he not to be 
returned as Governor, he was also aware that it would be 
unwise to reject Elliot's repeated offer of the command of
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the army and revenue administration of the Northern Circars.
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It is significant that Munro delayed his departure until he
had heard from Britain that he had been proposed as the next
Governor of Bombay and had received the important
distinction of being made a Companion of the Most Honourable
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Order of the Bath. Although Elphinstone received the Bombay 
appointment, Munro recognized that it opened the way to his 
appointment to Madras. Canning had made a special point of 
informing the Court that, though the general policy since 
1784 had been to select public men in England as Governors, 
the extraordinary abilities of Elphinstone, Munro and
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Malcolm justified their consideration for high office. In 
view of the fact that members of the Board had already 
decided to try to have Munro appointed Governor of Madras in 
order that he might supervise the continued implementation 
of the Board’s policies, Canning's moves with regard to 
Bombay appear to have been designed to test the climate of 
opinion. If Elphinstone might be appointed to Bombay, why 
not Munro to Madras.
Munro's departure from Madras, though few people realized 
it, was about to close an important episode in the Company's 
administrative history about which a number of significant 
points can be made. Firstly the pre-eminence of the Board of 
Control had at last clearly emerged. Secondly the role of 
Grant's party in the Direction had illustrated that what at 
first sight appeared to have been the Court of Directors' 
policies could, on occasions, be those of no more than a few 
men. The episode had also drawn attention to the ways in 
which the local governments, though technically subservient 
to the Home Authorities, could sometimes thwart their orders
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and always delay them. The complex interplay of personal 
ambition and public service had been brought into sharp 
focus as private animosity, political faction and 
conflicting conceptions of socio-economic development forced 
the British to reappraise their role in India. With a 
clarity not to be found when less controversial issues were 
involved, the introduction of the new judicial system had 
revealed the subtle complexities of the East India Company's 
decision-making process.
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Chapter Eight.
The Passing of the 'New School':
Munro's Governorship of Ma d r a s , 1819-27.
In his study of Munro, Beaglehole dismisses Munro's
governorship as having been 'not marked by great changes or
far-reaching new reforms' and suggests that he had little to
do other than supervise the 'full application of the
judicial reforms carried by the Special Commission in 1816
and the establishment of an effective ryotwari system in
those districts where the decennial village leases were
1
coming to an end'. In fact the situation was rather more 
complicated than Beaglehole implies. The first five years of 
Munro's governorship were initially marked by the 
continuation of the bitter struggle between the Board and 
its opponents among the Directors and then by the collapse 
of the Board's own unity. In addition, far from merely 
supervising the new administrative systems, Munro was forced 
to overcome the considerable opposition towards them that 
still existed in Madras.
Munro left Madras on 24 January 1819 and seems to have 
.arrived in Britain in April. Although there is no evidence 
of exactly how Munro was occupied during the next three
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months, it is probably that he was interviewed by members of
the Board and the Court as he took part in the discussions
leading up to Elliot's recall and his own appointment as
Governor. A letter he received in August from M'Cullock
suggests that Munro was also engaged in preparing papers
defending the new systems and attacking the arguments of his
2
opponents in Britain and India. By August however, the Board
of Control had decided that Munro would return to Madras as
3
the next Governor and informed the Court of their decision.
At first his appointment appeared to have hung in the
balance, probably because of opposition from Grant and his
supporters to his nomination. It was only after Bentinck had
refused the office that Munro was officially nominated in 
4
November. Even then the matter was not fully settled. Munro
requested that Stratton and Thackeray, two men who firmly
supported his views, should be appointed to the Council in
order that he might exercise total control over the local
government. Grant opposed this, insisting that Hodgson and
5
Fullerton should retain their seats. The Board, recognizing
that this would place Munro in an intolerable position,
compromised over Hodgson but refused to permit Fullerton to
6
continue in office.
While Munro and his supporters sought his appointment and
defended his policies in Britain, Fullerton, Hodgson and
other opponents of the new system in Madras continued to try
to discredit it. Fullerton, while appearing to offer
constructive suggestions for the judicial system's
improvement, attempted to undermine Munro's candidature for
7
the governorship. He warned Elphinstone that the army was
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gaining a dangerous ascendancy and that the distinctions
between the civil and military branches of the Company were
being eroded. He was clearly trying to resurrect the
suspicions and fear of the military that had so long
bedevilled the politics of Madras. Hodgson produced a long
minute in which he defended the village leases and attacked
8
the decision to replace them with ryotwari settlements. He 
rejected Munro's claim that ryotwari settlements had been 
the traditional mode of revenue collection, arguing that 
villages leases were the customary method of collection. He 
added that in mirasi villages and others accustomed to 
paying a joint rent, so long as each ryot knew in advance 
what his share of the village rent was to be, the village 
system differed in no significant way from the ryotwari.
Aware that this opposition to Munro's policies continued in
Madras, his supporters tried, by various means, to disarm
it. Cumming proposed that a regulation be passed that would
only permit men who had worked as collectors being appointed 
9
judges. This would not only have ensured that men who had 
experience of ryotwari settlements and had served as 
col1ector-magistrates would fill the administration's higher 
offices but should have also enabled Munro to staff the 
Company with his allies. Cumming recognized that the 
majority of Munro's supporters in Madras were serving in the 
revenue department and that many of the judicial employees 
were hostile to him because they believed he had attacked 
their interests. Unfortunately Cumming had to confess to 
Munro that he had had little success with this proposal 
because he had no control over the Public Department which
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was handling the despatches. In the Court M u n r o ’s friends
were more successfully defending his interests by refusing
to vote for men whose appointments Munro opposed. Ravenshaw
particularly informed Munro that he had opposed one
candidate for the office of Commander-in-Chief because the
man was known to be a friend of Hodgson and might use his
10
seat on the Council to oppose the Governor. 'I will not vote 
for an y o n e 1, Ravenshaw wrote to Munro, 'unless you are 
satisfied that he is a man who will cooperate cordially with 
y o u 1 .
Despite the efforts of his friends, Munro sailed to India
knowing that he was entering an arena of political conflict
and expecting to encounter opposition. The younger Sullivan
warned him that he was returning to an administration in
which 'the advocates of old errors have not ceased to uphold 
11
them'. Ravenshaw took the opportunity of a last letter to
Munro before he sailed to emphasis that his position was not
12
so secure that he might ignore the Court's prejudices. In 
particular, he was warned not to appoint military officers 
to civilian posts since, as Ravenshaw observed, 'nothing 
would be more sure of bringing you into disrepute here'.
Munro arrived at Madras on 10 June 1820. He immediately
succeeded Elliot as Governor and the latter returned to
Britain a deeply embittered man, convinced he had been the
victim of a 'deep lain plot'. There he used the excuse of
ill-health to refuse to see the Court or dine with the 
13
Directors. Despite his fears, Munro discovered that his 
opponents were in disarray and that many were prepared to
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c o l l a b o r a t e  w i t h  him. To a c e r t a i n  exten t, this was a
c o n s e q u e n c e  of news f ro m Br it ain . It was k n o w n  in Ma d r as
t hat Gr a n t  had gone out of of f ic e in April, r e m o v i n g  one of
M u n r o ' s  s t a u n c h e s t  o p p o n e n t s  in the D i r e c t i o n ,  and it was
r u m o u r e d  that C a n n i n g  i n t e n d e d  to s u c c e e d  M o i r a  as the next
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l ,  fr om w h i c h  of f ic e he was e x p e c t e d  to give
14
Mu n r o  p o w e r f u l  sup port. On ly  a few m e n  like F u l l e r t o n  and
H o d g s o n  w e re  p r e p a r e d  to o p e n l y  o p po se  Munro . F u l l e r t o n
r e c o r d e d  a m i n u t e  three days b e f o r e  M u n r o  s u c c e e d e d  El li o t
w h i c h  a t t a c k e d  some of the b asi c ideas b e h i n d  the M u n r o  
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System. In this m i n u t e  he r e i t e r a t e d  his b e l i e f  that the
j udi ci al  and r e v e n u e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  s h o u l d  be c o m p l e t e l y
s ep ar at ed.  'All a r g u m e n t s  a d d u c e d  in s u p p o r t  of the u n i o n  of
r e v e nu e  and j u d i c i a l  p o we r s  se e m  to me', he w rot e, 'to c ar ry
w it h  them i n d i s p u t a b l e  a d m i s s i o n  of c o n t e m p l a t e d
16
o v e r - a s s e s s m e n t ' .  He p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t t a c k e d  the m a n n e r  in
w h i c h  M un r o  had j u s t i f i e d  his p o l i c i e s  by c l a i m i n g  that they
mo st  c l o s e l y  r e s e m b l e d  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  'Arguments
c lo t he d  in the garb of r e s p e c t  for a n c i e n t  u s a g e  come in a
p l a u s i b l e  form', F u l l e r t o n  ob s e rv ed ,  'but we m u s t  not al lo w
o ur s el v e s to be e n t i r e l y  c a r r i e d  away by their p l a u s i b l e
a p p e a r a n c e . . . .  To f o l l o w  cu s to m s ,  u s a g e s  and p r a c t i c e s
r a d i c a l l y  bad b e c a u s e  they w e r e  o b s e r v e d  by p r e c e d i n g
17
g o v e r n m e n t s  is only to p e r p e t u a t e  evil'.
M un r o  r e p l i e d  to F u l l e r t o n ' s  m i n u t e  s h o r t l y  af te r he a ss u m e d
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the g o v e r n o r s h i p .  W h i l e  he a d m i t t e d  that m a n y  as p e c t s  of 
I ndi an  s o c i e t y  w e r e  i r r a t i o n a l  and fo o l is h ,  he p o i n t e d  out 
that E u r o p e a n  h i s t o r y  sh o w e d  s i m i l a r  b l e m i s h e s .  He ar gu e d  
that every case n e e d e d  to be ju dg e d  on its own m e r i t s  and
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c l a i m e d  that E u r o p e a n  c o n c e p t s  of li b e r t y  and eq ua li ty ,  of
ju s t i c e  and c o m m o n s e n s e ,  m u s t  give w a y in the face of Indian
custom. But, a p a r t  fr o m  this m i nu t e , M u n r o  took little
t r o u bl e  to a n sw e r his cr it ic s. He c l e a r l y  felt se cu re  and he
had good r e a s o n  to do so. The home a u t h o r i t i e s  w er e  fully
s u p p o r t i n g  him. H o d g s o n  was r e p l a c e d  on the C o un c i l by
T h a c k e r a y  and G r a e m e  a p p o i n t e d  the P r o v i s i o n a l  M e m b e r
d e s p i t e  the fact that F u l l e r t o n ,  who was his s eni or in the
service, had a b e t t e r  c l a i m  to the post. As R a v e n s h a w
i nf o rm e d  Munro, all a p p o i n t m e n t s  we re  b e i n g  m a d e  w i t h  the
s pe c i fi c  aim of p r o t e c t i n g  the G o v e r n o r  fr o m 'all fa cti ou s  
19
op po s i t i o n ' .  M u n r o  h i m s e l f  was s t e a d i l y  c o n s o l i d a t i n g  his
p o s i t i o n  by d e l i b e r a t e l y  s e l e c t i n g  k n o w n  s u p p o r t e r s  of his
p o l i c i e s  for a d v a n c e m e n t .  He d e f e n d e d  t he s e  a p p o i n t m e n t s  in
a letter to Ca n ni n g .  'The (new) sy stem', he wrote, 'must be
s t e a d i l y  p u r s u e d  for a co ur s e of years and for this pu r p o s e
the m e m b e r s  of G o v e r n m e n t  m u s t  be m e n  w ho  u n d e r s t a n d  and
20
w ill s u p p o r t  it'.
Faced  by M u n r o ' s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to see his p o l i c i e s  prevail,
H o d g s o n  and F u l l e r t o n  each r e a c t e d  qu it e  d i f f e r e n t l y .
H o d g s o n  left the Cou n c il ,  r e s i g n e d  fro m the se r v i c e  and
r e t u r n e d  to B r i t a i n  w h e r e  he i n t e n d e d  to seek e l e c t i o n  to
the Co u r t  and p l a n n e d  to w r i t e  a book w h i c h  w o u l d  d e f e n d  
21
v i l l a g e  leases. F u l l e r t o n ,  wh o w i s h e d  to r e m a i n  in India
w he r e  he h o p e d  to c o n t i n u e  to am ass  a fo rt un e , tried to
a pp e a s e  the G o v e r n o r .  He p r e s e n t e d  M u n r o  w i t h  a pl a n  w h i c h
so a g r e e d  w i t h  the l a t t e r 's p o l i c i e s  it m i g h t  ha ve  be en  
22
w r i t t e n  by him. He s u g g e s t e d  that, sinc e the d i s t r i c t  
m u n s i f f s  and the c o l l e c t o r s  w e r e  no w d o i n g  so m u c h  of the
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work previously done by the judges, retrenchments might be
made in the judicial department and the savings made
employed to increase the number of principal collectors. He
also proposed that the principal collectors should be
ordered to assume the duties of the criminal judges and that
the district munsiffs, the sadr amins and the registers
should be given increased authority. Munro, who recognized
Fullerton's willingness to compromise but was not prepared
to completely trust him, rewarded his change of heart with
23
the offer of a seat on the Board of Trade. The appointment 
was carefully chosen. It offered Fullerton both a position 
of respect and the chance to accumulate capital but 
prevented him from taking any part in the revenue and 
judicial administrations.
While Munro was consolidating his position in Madras, his 
power base at home was being slowly eroded. To a certain 
extent, this was a consequence of the increasingly friendly 
relations between the Board and the Court that a variety of 
factors had brought about. In particular, Grant had stopped 
playing such an active part in the Company's politics and 
his party had lost much of its former influence. Concurrent 
with this development, the great debate over Cornwallis's 
judicial and revenue systems had ceased to be a major issue. 
Partly as a result of these developments and partly because, 
with Sullivan's retirement, it had lost one of its most 
active members, the Board's unity had begun to collapse.
Lord Binney and Canning were too occupied with other 
Parliamentary business to devote much attention to Indian 
affairs. Canning in particular was preoccupied with the Poor
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Laws and the Foreign Trade Committees. Mr Bourne, another
Commissioner, never attended the Board at all. Courtenay, on
the other hand, was determined to make a name for himself by
his work at the Board and seems to have wished to take the
credit for all that was done. To this end, he was attempting
to exclude Cumming from the decision-making process and the
latter frequently found that information was being kept back
from him. As Cumming now informed Munro, he was finding it
increasingly difficult to assist him by bringing forward his 
24
policies.
Other events had also weakened the abilities of Munro's
friends to support him. Allan and Davis, two men who had
been among his staunchest allies in the Court, were no
25
longer Directors. Much more importantly, M'Cullock had been
promoted to Superintendent of Indian Correspondence and Mill
had become responsible for preparing the revenue drafts.
Cumming discovered that Mill was not very good at this job
and claimed that it would have cost him less effort to have
written these himself from scratch than it did to revise 
26
them. In addition, Cumming remarked that he was no longer 
able to exercise much control over the contents of these 
because of the Board's disposition 'to let stand all that 
was not positively objectionable or erroneous in point of 
sentiment or principle in order to avoid possible 
controversy with the Chairs'. From Munro's point of view, 
the worst development had been Strachey's appointment to 
take charge of the Judicial Department at India House. He 
had received the post because of his close friendship with 
the Chairman, Robinson, and, 'contrary to every expectation
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that had been formed of him by his late friend Mr Davis..., 
showed himself a decided stickler for the Judicial and 
Revenue Codes of 1793 and a decided adversary of all 
changes'. Strachey joined Hodgson, Fullerton, Greenway, 
Colesbrook and Grant, 'all sworn advocates of the Cornwallis 
System', and employed two methods to attack Munro's 
policies. He used sly innuendos to discredit Munro's 
supporters and he deliberately avoided 'all notice of what 
appeared in the records to show the good effects of the 
regulations of 1816'. Because of his friendship with 
Strachey, Robinson refused to permit M'Cullock to revise 
Strachey's judicial drafts. Cumming could not rectify the 
situation at the Board because Strachey was also an old 
friend of Courtenay. They had both been educated together at 
Westminster and Strachey was related to Courtenay's Butler 
cousins. Whenever Cumming revised Strachey's drafts, the 
latter went to Courtenay who invariably overruled Cumming.
All these developments meant that Munro could no longer rely
on the complete support of the home authorities and he
appears to have suffered anxiety on this score. Ravenshaw
confirmed Munro's fears when he told him that a large number
of people, men in India who felt themselves ill-used and
their friends in Britain, were criticizing his 
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administration. 'There are members of our Court', he warned 
Munro, 'who are too much given to listen to such 
tittle-tattle and many a measure has before now taken its 
roots in such a frail foundation'. Informing Munro that 
Grant's party might yet return to power, where it would 
undoubtedly attack him and his policies, Ravenshaw admitted
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he could do little other than send Munro all the gossip and
thereby enable him to forestall criticism. Adverse comment
in the Court on Munro's appointment of Colonel Newall as
Resident at Travancore, its disapproval of Major McDowall's
appointment and its orders that Munro must cancel his
appointment of Major Stewart all contributed to Munro's 
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disillusio nm e n t .
Quite apart from these set-backs, other factors inclined
Munro's thoughts towards retirement. He was now in his
sixties and his health was beginning to deteriorate. His
wife, who had had a miscarriage shortly after their arrival
in India and had later been badly hurt in a riding accident*
wished to return to Europe. In addition, many of Munro's
friends in the East India Company's administration, both in
India and Britain, had either retired from public life or
died. In particular, Canning had resigned from the
Presidency of the Board in December 1820 and Munro had been
unable or unwilling to form the same sort of close
relationship with his successors Bathurst and Wynn that he
had had with him. The news in January 1823 that Moira had
relinquished the Governor-Generalship and the disappointment
with which Munro heard that Canning would not be succeeding
29
him, probably decided Munro's mind. In January 1824, the
Court received a letter from Munro announcing his intention 
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t o r esign.
This news p r e c i p i t a t e d  the last m a j o r  c r i s is  in the East
India C o m p a n y ' s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in w h i c h  M u n r o  was to be 
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involved. A former Madras civilian, Stephen Lushington, who
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was n o w  S e c r e t a r y  to the T r e a s u r y ,  p r e s s e d  his cl aim s to the
post. B e c a u s e  of a s s i s t a n c e  he had r e n d e r e d  the M i n i s t r y  in
p r e v i o u s  e l e c t i o n s ,  L i v e r p o o l  was i n c l i n e d  to s u p p o r t  his
c a n d i d a t u r e .  A l t h o u g h  C a n n i n g  and W e l l i n g t o n  p e r s o n a l l y
f a v o u r e d  M a l c o l m  for the office, they w e r e  p r e p ar e d , like
Wynn, to f o l l o w  L i v e r p o o l ' s  lead. The C o u r t  how e v er , h a v i ng
r e c e i v e d  s e v e r a l  r e c e n t  r eb u f fs ,  d e c i d e d  to oppos e
L u s h i n g t o n 1s a p p o i n t m e n t .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  it app e a rs  that the
C h a i r m a n ,  Wi g r am ,  i n t e n d e d  to use the o c c a s i o n  to e m b a r r a s s
the G o v e r n m e n t  b e c a u s e  of its r e f u s a l  to g r a n t  his fa m il y  a 
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Pe er a g e.  The C o u r t  a d o p t e d  E l p h i n s t o n e 's s u g g e s t i o n  that he 
s h o u ld  be t r a n s f e r r e d  from B o m b a y  to M a d r a s  and n o m i n a t e d  
M a l c o l m  his su cc e s s o r .  W h e n  the B oar d r e s i s t e d  these moves,, 
the D i r e c t o r s  n o m i n a t e d  M a l c o l m  as the n e x t  G o v e r n o r  of 
M adr as .
The B oa rd had be e n fa ced  w i t h  a s i m i la r d i l e m m a  w h e n  M oi r a  
had r e s i g n e d  but had b ee n  able to o v e r c o m e  o p p o s i t i o n  in the 
Co u r t  to the a p p o i n t m e n t  of its n o m i n e e  by b u y i n g  off
33
G r a n t ' s  p a r t y  w i t h  the offer of p r o m o t i o n  for G r a n t ' s  son. 
This time the B o ar d  and the M i n i s t r y  w e r e  e it h e r  u n a b l e  or 
u n w i l l i n g  to m a k e  c o n c e s s i o n s .  L i v e r p o o l ,  r e c o g n i z i n g  that 
o p p o s i t i o n  to L u s h i n g t o n  m a d e  it l ike ly  that the D i r e c t o r s  
w o u l d  p u b l i c l y  r e s i s t  his a p p o i n t m e n t ,  a c c e p t e d  C a n n i n g ' s  
s u g g e s t i o n  that Sir C h a r l e s  S t u a r t  be o f f e r e d  the post. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y  S t u a r t ' s  d e m a n d  that he sh ou l d  be p r o m i s e d  the 
s u c c e s s i o n  to B e ng a l  and L i v e r p o o l ' s  r e f u s a l  to b a r g a i n  w i t h  
h i m  r e s u l t e d  in the f o r m e r ' s  r e f u s a l  to a l l o w  his na me to be 
b r o u g h t  f or wa r d .  On ly  the o u t b r e a k  of the B u r m e s e  War, w h i c h  
p e r s u a d e d  M u n r o  to r e m a i n  in of fi c e un t i l  the h o s t i l i t i e s
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were over, enabled the Government to break the deadlock 
between the Court and the Board. As C H Philips observed, 
the episode established 'beyond question that in practice 
the nomination to the superior posts in India lay with the 
Government and that the Directors possessed what was in
effect a power of veto, which they were fully prepared to
35 
use ' .
The war with Burma had been threatening for some years. The
country had emerged since the turn of the century as an
aggressive power intent on extending its territories. In
1818, the King of Burma had sent a demand to the
Governor-General for the surrender of Eastern Bengal. This
had been dismissed but not forgotten and relations between
the British and the Burmese had continued to deteriorate.
Matters were brought to a crisis in 1823 when the Burmese
seized the island of Shahpuri off the coast of Chittagong,
a n n i h i l a t i n g  a B r i t i s h  d e t a c h m e n t  in the p ro c e ss .  Lord
Amherst retaliated by declaring war on the Burmese on 24
February 1824. The Madras Government, which had been given
no intimation that war was impending before 23 November, was
now informed that it would be required to furnish and supply
the sepoy troops that the Governor-General intended to field
36
alongside the Company's European forces.
During the two years the war lasted, Munro was kept fully 
occupied in Madras by the work involved in supplying the 
army with troops, ships, boats, transport bullocks, and 
provisions. At the same time however, he kept up a constant 
correspondence, both official and private, with Lord Amherst
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in w h i c h  he o f f e r e d  the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  his a dv i c e  on a
variety of subjects concerning the administration of the
C o m p a n y ' s  t e r r i t o r i e s  as w e ll  as on the s t r a t e g i c  m a n a g e m e n t
of the war. It can be c l e a r l y  seen from the l at ter  that
M u n r o ' s  v iew s had c h a n g e d  li tt le sinc e he had a d v o c a t e d  an
aggressive, expansionist foreign policy against Tipu Sultan
and Mys o re .  'Our sa f es t  and our s p e e d i e s t  w a y of a r r i v i n g  at
an honourable peace', he wrote after hearing that Rangoon
had been occupied, 'is to consider this first success as
only the beginning of a general war with the Burmese empire
37
and to en ga g e  in it w i t h  our w h o l e  d i s p o s a b l e  force'. A year
later, M u n r o ' s  o p in i o n s  had hardened fur ther  . 'Our chief
object in the present war is security from future
a g g r e s s i o n . . . .  T he r e  are two w ay s of p r e v e n t i n g  fu tur e
aggression; one is by so completely breaking the power and
s p i r i t  of the e ne m y  as to de t e r hi m f ro m  ever r e n e w i n g
hostilities; another is by dismembering or revolutionizing 
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the kingdom'. He expressed however no particular preference 
for either solution.
As soon as peace returned in 1826, Munro renewed his 
application for permission to resign his office. Little had 
occured since 1823 to change the reasons he had then for 
wishing to retire while new ones had arisen. While the war 
had been in progress, Munro had been created a baronet.
This, together with the fortune he had accumulated, ensured 
his position in Britain and he appears to have looked 
forward to his retirement. In addition, his wife's health 
had obliged her to leave Madras for Britain in March 1826 
and Munro wanted to be quickly reunited with her. The Court
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received Munro's resignation in September. Stephen
Lushington'8 nomination as his successor was again proposed
by the Board of Control which this time eventually succeeded
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in forcing his appointment on the Court in April 1827.
While waiting for Lushington to arrive, Munro decided to pay
a final visit to the Ceded Districts. He left Madras at the
end of May and travelled to the Bgllari district. Here
cholera broke out in his camp. On 6 July, Munro contracted
the disease and died that evening. When news of his death
reached the capital, the Government ordered the flag to be
hung at half-mast and 'minute guns, sixty-six in number
corresponding with the age of the deceased', to be fired
from the ramparts of all the principal military stations and 
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posts. At the place of his death, a grove of trees was
planted and a well with stone steps built as a memorial to 
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h im.
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Chapter Nine.
Conclus ion.
In the years between 1790 and 1827, a new system of 
administration emerged in Madras that was markedly different 
to that which had been earlier introduced into Bengal by 
Cornwallis. Unlike the Bengal System which aimed to 
introduce an English pattern of landed property supported by 
a judicial system constructed after the British model and 
largely administered by Europeans, the administrative system 
which was developed in Madras aimed to modify the existing 
social and economic structures the British had found in 
South India. In the preceding chapters an attempt has been 
made to chart the development of the ideas behind what 
became known as the Munro System, to examine the manner in 
which they were adopted by the Company and so influenced its 
official policies, and to evaluate the importance of Munro's 
role in this process. In this concluding chapter, the points 
made in the previous chapters are summarized. At the same 
time, an analysis of the events which took place during this 
period is presented which suggests that the decision-making 
processes of the East India Company were more complex than
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p r e v i o u s  s t u di e s  ha ve c o n j e c t u r e d .
B e a g l e h o l e  s u g g e s t s  that the ideas of M u n r o  and his
s u p p o r t e r s  w e r e  p r i n c i p a l l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by 'both an
a p p r e c i a t i o n  of and a d e s i r e  to p r e s e r v e  the p r o p e r t y  right s
1
and the so c i a l  system' they fo u nd  in So u t h India. He then
argues  that  th ese ideas we re e v e n t u a l l y  a d o p t e d  by the home
a u t h o r i t i e s  af t er  their 'gro win g r e a l i z a t i o n  that the
C o m p a n y  h ad  in India an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e
i n e f f i c i e n t ,  e x p e n s i v e  and f a i l i n g  in its p u r p o s e  of
b r i n g i n g  s e c u r i t y  and ju s t i c e  to the Indians' f o rc e d  u po n
the m the need for m a j o r  r e f o r m s  in the r e v e n u e  and ju di ci a l
2
sys te m s of their t e r r i t o r i e s .  This st u dy  ar gu e s  that ne i t h e r  
of these c o n c l u s i o n s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  e x p l a i n  w h a t  a c t u a l l y  
occur red .
M u n r o' s  c h a r a c t e r ,  p r e c o n c e p t i o n s  and p r i v a t e  a m b i t i o n s  
ex e r t e d  a g r e a t e r  i n f l u e n c e  over his ideas th an  did his 
de si r e  to p r e s e r v e  p r o p e r t y  ri g h ts  and the so ci al  sy s t em  he 
t h o u gh t  he had f o un d  in M a d r as .  His m e r c a n t i l e ,  bo u rg e o i s ,  
S c o t t i s h  b a c k g r o u n d  and e ar l y  e d u c a t i o n ,  the t r a u m a t i c  
i mpa ct  of his f a t h e r ' s  b a n k r u p t c y  and his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of 
A d a m  Smi t h' s  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  d o c t r i n e s  had sh a p ed  M u n r o ' s  
ideas b e f o r e  he a r r i v e d  in India. He had no s y m p a t h y  for any 
soci al or der b a s e d  on b i r t h  and p o s s e s s i o n  of g r e a t  landed 
e s t a t e s  but r a t h e r  an i d e a l i s t i c  a t t a c h m e n t  to the c o n c e p t  
of a s o c i e t y  p r i n c i p a l l y  c o m p o s e d  of i n d e p e n d e n t  y e o m a n  
f a r m er s  w h o s e  i n d i v i d u a l  e f f o r t s  to i n c r e a s e  their own 
p r o s p e r i t y  wo u ld ,  he b e l i e v e d ,  g e n e r a t e  s u f f i c i e n t  w e a l t h  to 
su p p o r t  a c o m m e r c i a l  s u p e r s t r u c t u r e .  His s u b s e q u e n t
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o p p o s i t i o n  to a t t e m p t s  to c r ea t e in the z a m i n d a r s  a class of 
s u p e r i o r  l a n d l o r d s  and to the p o l i c i e s  w h i c h  ai med to 
p r o t e c t  the ri gh t s  of the s e m i - f e u d a l  p o l i g a r s  had its 
or ig i n here.
I n i t i a l l y  M u n r o ' s  p r o p o s i t i o n  that the B r i t i s h  s h ou l d  invest 
the ryot s w i t h  p r o p r i e t a r y  o w n e r s h i p  of their land was not 
so m u c h  the c o n s e q u e n c e  of any be li ef of his that this w o u l d  
p r e s e r v e  e x i s t i n g  p r o p e r t y  ri g ht s  as of his c o n v i c t i o n  that 
only such a m e a s u r e  w o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  s oci al and e c o n o m i c  
d e v e l o p m e n t .  A c c o r d i n g  to his an a ly s i s,  it was n e c e s s a r y  
that the c o m m e r c i a l  and m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c to r s  of the e c o n o m y  
in India s h o u l d  be e n c o u r a g e d  to expa nd . He a r g u e d  that this 
w o u l d  only oc cur if the a g r i c u l t u r a l  se ct o r  i n c r e a s e d  
p r o d u c t i o n  and a s u f f i c i e n t  p r o p o r t i o n  of the r e v e n u e  
d er i ve d  f ro m this r e m a i n e d  w i t h  a b r o a d - b a s e d  class of 
small, i n d e p e n d e n t  f a rme rs . If this co ul d  be done, he 
b e l i e v e d  that the c o m m e r c i a l  and m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o rs  w ou l d  
a cq u i r e  both the raw m a t e r i a l s  and the m a r k e t s  they n e ed e d  
to dev e l op .  As these s e ct o r s e x p a n de d ,  the g e n e r a l  w e a l t h  of 
the c o n t i n e n t  w o u l d  r a p i d l y  i n c r e a s e  as w o u l d  trade w i t h  
Europe. He a r g u e d  that such a d e v e l o p m e n t  w o u l d  d i r e c t l y  
b e n e f i t  the C o m p a n y  w hi ch,  in a d d i t i o n  to the r e v e n u e s  it 
dr ew f r o m  the land, w o u l d  r e c e i v e  a g r e a t l y  e n h a n c e d  income 
fr om c u s t om s  and e x ci s e  duti es .
On ly af t e r  M u n r o  had a d o p t e d  the idea that all r e v e n u e  
s e t t l e m e n t s  s h ou l d  be m a d e  w i t h  the ry ot s did he g r a d u a l l y  
i n t r o d u c e  the other a r g u m e n t s  he u se d to s u p p o r t  his case. 
His a r g u m e n t  that r y o t w a r i  s e t t l e m e n t s  p r o t e c t e d  e x i s t i n g
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rights in the land which zamindari settlements destroyed was 
developed only after he had already espoused the former 
system's cause and it was specifically aimed at the home 
authorities who had consistently expressed their concern 
that such rights should be protected. Although it is clear 
that Munro did believe that both zamindari and village 
settlements were more open to abuse than ryotwari ones and 
frequently resulted in the oppression of the ryots, it is 
clear from the context in which he used such arguments that 
he employed them mainly to raise doubts in Britain about 
settlements with intermediaries. More importantly, once 
Munro had openly committed himself to the policies of 
ryotwari, his own career prospects had become inextricably 
tied to this revenue system's future. Munro had quickly 
recognized that, were it to become official policy, his 
reputation as the leading exponent of and expert on ryotwari 
settlements would ensure his continued employment in the 
civil administration while the system's rejection in favour 
of another must lead to his eventual replacement by a 
civilian.
Munro's private ambitions played a large part in determining 
his ideas. While there can be little doubt that Munro truly 
believed that ryotwari settlements were cheaper to 
administer and represented a more cost effective method of 
collecting the revenues than either zamindari settlements or 
village leases, his advocacy of them was partly influenced 
by the enhanced status such settlements conferred on the 
office of collector. As a collector himself, Munro had no 
wish to see the holders of that office reduced to mere tax
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g a t h e r e r s  and t r e at e d  as o f f i c i a l s  of a s u b o r d i n a t e  
d e p a r t m e n t  s u b j e c t  to the s u p e r v i s i o n  of the C o m p a n y ' s  
j u d i c i a l  o f fi c e rs .  In ad d i t i o n ,  h a v i n g  e x e r c i s e d  e x t e n s i v e  
and large i n d e p e n d e n t  a u t h o r i t y  in n e w l y  a c q u i r e d  
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  M u n r o  fo u nd  it d i f f i c u l t  to c o n t e m p l a t e  
s u r r e n d e r i n g  or s h a ri n g  any pa r t  of this w i t h  the ju d i c i a r y  
af ter  these t e r r i t o r i e s  had b e e n  fu ll y i n c o r p o r a t e d  into the 
P r e s i d e n c y .  A l t h o u g h  he j u s t i f i e d  his p r o p o s i t i o n  that the 
c o l l e c t o r s  s h ou l d  be the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  p r i n c i p a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in their d i s t r i c t s ,  c h a r g e d  not only w it h  
all duti es  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  the r e v e n u e s  but al so  w i t h  those 
of m a g i s t r a t e  and s u p e r i n t e n d e n t  of p ol ic e,  by c l a i m i n g  that 
this p r e s e r v e d  t r a d i t i o n a l  I n di a n  p r a c t i c e  and was t h e r e f o r e  
the a r r a n g e m e n t  the i n h a b i t a n t s  found m o s t  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  it 
is clear his p e r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  w e r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
i n f l u e n c i n g  his views. If ad op te d , it was c e r t a i n l y  the 
p o l i c y  w h i c h  m o s t  f a v o u r e d  his a m b i t i o n s .
The j u d ic i a l  r ef o r m s  M u n r o  a d v o c a t e d  e ven  m o r e  c l e a r l y  
i l l u s t r a t e d  the e x t e n t  to w h i c h  his p o l i c i e s  w e r e  i n f l u e n c e d  
by p e r s o n a l  and ca r e e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  M u n r o ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  to 
C o r n w a l l i s ' s  j ud i c ia l  s y s te m  e m e r g e d  b e f o r e  that s y st e m 's  
d ef e c t s  b e c a m e  a p p a r e n t .  I n i t i a l l y  M u n r o  o b j e c t e d  to the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the R e g u l a t i o n  S y s t e m  b e c a u s e  he f ou nd  his 
a u t h o r i t y  and statu s d i m i n i s h e d  by the p r e s e n c e  of judges in 
his di s t r i c t .  He also fe ar e d that these m e n ' s  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
in re ve nu e, r e n t  and land d i s p u t e s  t h r e a t e n e d  to u n d e r m i n e  
his a u t h o r i t y  to such an e x t e n t  that he w o u l d  be u n a b l e  to 
c o l l e c t  the full r e v e n u e  his s u p e r i o r s  e x p e c t e d  f ro m  his 
d i s tr i c t.  M u n r o  was w e l l  aw a r e that any such f a i l u r e  w o u l d
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destroy his reputation and might even lead to his suspension 
from civil duties. Another factor influencing his opposition 
to the new judicial arrangements was the Company's decision 
to make retrenchments in the Revenue Department to fund the 
high costs of the Judicial, retrenchments which directly 
affected his income as his commission on the revenues he 
collected was restricted.
Even w h e n  M u n r o ' s  ideas a p p e a r e d  to be d i r e c t l y  i n s p i r e d  by
a g e ne r a l  c o n c e r n  for the C o m p a n y ' s  w e l f a r e ,  they we r e in
fact also shaped by his perception of where his private
interests lay. As an officer in the Company's army, Munro
believed that there were greater opportunities open to him
to acquire fame and fortune in times of war rather than
peace. W h i l e  he c o n t i n u e d  to p e r c e i v e  this to be the case,
he supported the view that the British should follow an
e x p a n s i o n i s t  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  in India. He a r g u e d  then that
the consistent implementation of an aggressive policy
represented the most effective means of defending existing
territories. It is significant that Munro only abandoned
these views and argued against further British expansion
after his civil career had been firmly established. In 1800,
he had r e j e c t e d  A r t h u r  W e l l e s l e y ' s  a r g u m e n t s  that fu r th e r
B r i t i s h  t e r r i t o r i a l  e x p a n s i o n  w o u l d  not only ove r t ax  the
Company's resources but actually increase the number of its
p o t e n t i a l  e ne mie s. 'The en e m i e s  we cr e a t e  by d r i v i n g  me n
(I ndian) out of e m p l o y m e n t  (by a s s u m i n g  the m a n a g e m e n t  of
hitherto independent native states), I do not apprehend it
3
can ever do us any serious mischief'. By 1817 however, when 
his future in the civil administration seemed secure and he
403
no longer looked to war for further advancement, he had
reversed his opinions. Now he argued against further
expansion. 'Its consequences', he informed Hastings, 'would
be...to debase the whole people' because the Indians would
no longer have open to them the opportunities of valuable
and respectable employment in public office that the Indian
4
states offered to them.
In one respect only were Munro's ideas significantly 
influenced by his perception of existing conditions in 
India. His experiences with the army convinced him that the 
foundations of British power in India were insecure, resting 
upon the loyalty of Indian sepoys and an indifference 
amongst the general population as to who administered the 
country. Similar considerations had prompted Cornwallis to 
introduce permanent zamindari settlements and his judicial 
arrangements. He had believed that, by investing the 
zamindars with ownership of the land, the British would 
create an influential and powerful body of men who would 
perceive their interests to be inextricably bound to the 
Company's. By establishing an impartial judicial system, 
administered by Europeans, Cornwallis and his supporters 
conceived that all the Company's Indian subjects would 
gradually come to appreciate the advantages of British rule 
over that of their own nationals.
Munro rejected these arguments. He believed that zamindari 
settlements were so alien to Madras that their introduction 
could only result in the emergence of a rapacious class of 
tax farmers whose activities would depress the economy and
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lead to the bulk of the population becoming dissatisfied 
with British rule. At the same time, by removing the British 
from a close contact with their subjects, such settlements 
would eventually result in the Indians seeing no advantage 
in a continued acquiescence to foreign rule; Once the 
judge's remote and and incomprehensible jurisdiction 
replaced the collector's paternal authority, Munro feared 
that the peasantry would look towards their Indian landlords 
for protection and leadership. The obvious dangers this held 
for the Company could only be increased if the poligars, 
whom Munro regarded as intrinsically hostile to British 
rule, were the very men so elevated. On the other hand,
Munro conceived that by investing the ryots with ownership 
of their land, something they had never before enjoyed, a 
large sector of the population would be persuaded to 
identify its interests with those of the British.
Similar considerations partly determined his judicial ideas. 
His wish to see traditional Indian judicial arrangements 
preserved was not so much the consequence of any belief that 
they were better than those introduced by Cornwallis as of 
his conviction that their retention would directly and 
indirectly strengthen support for the British. First, he 
argued that those Indians who exercised authority under his 
arrangements, especially the patels whose influence was 
otherwise undermined by ryotwari settlements, discovered 
social and economic motives for supporting the Company's 
government. Perhaps more importantly, he believed that his 
system, being closer to that which had preceded British 
rule, was more acceptable to the people. What mattered, he
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cl ai m e d,  wa s not h ow  e f f i c i e n t  a s y s t e m  m i g h t  be so m u ch  as
its p o p u l a r i t y  since only the la tt er  c ou ld  ho ld the
a l l e g i a n c e  of the C o m p a n y ' s  s u b j e c t s  w i t h o u t  w h i c h  the
p r o s p e c t s  of B r i t i s h  rule c o n t i n u i n g  long w o u l d  be s e r i o u s l y  
5
e n d a n g e r e d .
In the c o u r s e  of this st udy  the ways in w h i c h  M u n r o  
a t t r a c t e d  a t t e n t i o n  to his ideas and p a r t i c i p a t e d  in the 
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  have be en e x a m i n e d .  An a n a l y s i s  of 
the e v i d e n c e  u n c o v e r e d  r e v e a l s  the e x t e n t  to w h i c h  d eb ate s  
on p o l i c y  took pl a c e  o u t s i d e  the fo rma l ar en as e s t a b l i s h e d  
w i t h i n  the C o m p a n y ' s  s t r uc t u re .  This o c c u r r e d  b e c a u s e  the 
i n d i v i d u a l s  and bo d i e s  w h o w e r e  a c ti ve  in the C o m p a n y  were  
r a r e l y  p r e p a r e d  to p e r m i t  the fo rm al  p r o v i s i o n s  w h i c h  
g o v e r n e d  them to r e s t r i c t  their op e r a t i o n s .  They 
s u p p l e m e n t e d  the o f fi c i a l  c h a n n e l s  of c o m m u n i c a t i o n  open to 
them w i t h  others w h i c h  m a y  be d e s i g n a t e d  as be ing  
q u a s i - o f f i c i a  1 and u n o f f i c i a l .
The fo r m al  s t r u c t u r e  of the C o m p a n y  m a d e  a n u m b e r  of 
p r o v i s i o n s  for i n d i v i d u a l s  i n t e r e s t e d  in its a c t i v i t i e s  to 
take p a r t  o f f i c i a l l y  in the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  pr oc es s .  In 
Brit ain , p e o p l e  m i g h t  p u r c h a s e  s u f f i c i e n t  s toc k to e n t it l e  
them to take p ar t  in the d e b a t e s  held in the C ou r t  of 
P r o p r i e t o r s  and vote in the e l e c t i o n s  of the m e n  s t a n d i n g  
for the C o u r t  of D i r e c t o r s .  In a d d it i o n,  any B r i t i s h  c i t i z e n  
m i g h t  st a n d  for e l e c t i o n  as a d i r e c t o r  in order, sh o u l d  he 
be s u c c e s s f u l ,  to take p art  in the C o m p a n y ' s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  
In India, i n d i v i d u a l s  in the lower  e c h e l o n s  of the C o m p a n y ' s  
se rvi ce , me n  like the c o l l e c t o r s  and judges, m i g h t  send
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formal proposals recommending the adoption of courses of 
action or policies to their immediate superiors. In their 
answers to official questionnaires, they could enter general 
and specific criticisms of existing policies. At a higher 
level in the hierarchy, the members of the boards, 
committees and councils which formed the intermediate 
authorities in the structure, could enter official minutes 
when they dissented with the views adopted by their 
co-workers. In these minutes, they could explain the grounds 
for their dissent and argue for alternative policies, 
knowing that their minutes must sooner or later be 
considered by the home authorities. The frequent employment 
of investigative committees by both the Company and 
Parliament also gave individuals opportunities to directly 
enter into the decision-making process. They might appear 
before these committees, give evidence and present their 
cases. Thomas Munro employed all of these methods of 
influencing policy during his career.
Supplementing the official channels of access to the 
decision-making process, there existed a number of 
quasi-officia1 ways in which members of the Company's 
administration might influence decisions and policies.
These, while not strictly allowed for in the formal 
arrangements, relied upon them for their existence. The most 
important was the ability of all officials and authorities 
to filter information by consciously or unconsciously 
screening the material they transmitted along the official 
channels of communication. In this way they were able to 
exert an influence over the contents and contexts of debates
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and to some extent delineate their perimeters. During the 
period that supporters of the Bengal, the Village and the 
Munro systems of revenue and judicial administration 
competed to see their views adopted as official policy, 
there are several clear examples of interested parties 
deliberately withholding information in order to influence 
decisions.
In addition, it is clear that the Company's officials were
frequently selective in the information they transmitted to
their superiors, filtering out that which they believed
might discredit their work or prove unpalatable to their
employers, emphasizing only those features likely to attract
favourable attention and enhance their career prospects. In
1814, the Collector of Kanara observed that it was
'astonishing how smooth and easy things are made to appear
in the eyes of our superiors when (officials are) deputed to
6
report on the states of the pro vinces'.
The process was not always one of negative selection. The 
Company's officials frequently exercised a form of positive 
discrimination in the choice of information that they sent 
up to their superiors. Munro's activities in Kanara and 
those of Place during his period at the Board of Revenue 
both illustrate the operation of positive discrimination. 
When Munro entered Kanara he brought with him a working 
hypothesis about the operations of the Indian agricultural 
economy. There is little question but that he sought 
confirmation of his preconceived ideas and that, as a 
consequence of the perceptual framework of analysis he
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employed, he uncovered and transmitted information to the
Board  of R e v e n u e  that te nd ed to s u p p o r t  the vi ew s he held.
While employed as the collector of the Jagir, Place
investigated the mirasi land tenures which were common in
that d i s t r i c t .  His f i n d i n g s  led hi m to e v o l v e  a ge neral,
d i s t i n c t i v e  th eo ry  of r e v e n u e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  W h i l e  he
s erv ed  on the Board  of Rev en u e,  w h i c h  he was able to
dominate because neither the President nor the first member
a t t e n d e d  its m e e t i n g s  and the fourth, Oakes, al wa y s d e f e r r e d
to his wishes, Place's views clearly influenced the choice
of issues e x a m i n e d  by the B oa rd  in its p r o c e e d i n g s  and the
7
material transmitted by it to the Council.
Ap art  f ro m  the o f fi c i a l  and q u a s i - o f f i c i a l  m e a n s  of 
i n f l u e n c i n g  the C o m p a n y ' s  p o l i c i e s  a v a i l a b l e  to p e o p l e  
i nt e r e s t e d  in its a c t i v i t i e s ,  there e x i s t e d  a large n u m be r  
of u n o f f i c i a l  or in f or m a l  m e t h o d s .  The m a j o r i t y  of these 
fell into one or ot her  of two c a t e g o r i e s  w hic h, for 
c o n v e n i e n c e ,  m a y  be d e s i g n a t e d  as the p u b l i c  and the p r i v a t e  
a ve nu es  to u n o f f i c i a l  in fl ue n ce .
The public methods of influencing the decisions and policies 
of the Company included the publication in newspapers, 
magazines, pamphlets and even in books of information and 
arguments for and against general policies or specific 
proposals for action on current issues. The principal 
objectives behind the employment of these public techniques 
were changes in the climate of public opinion and the 
attraction of attention to the authors. Between 1790 and 
1825 they were frequently employed, often with considerable
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success. There can be little doubt that Wilkes's publication
of his book Historical Sketches of the South of India
significantly assisted the supporters of what became known
as the Munro System to win wide acceptance of their views.
The impact that it made was also partly responsible for the
decision later to appoint him Governor of St Helena. Other
men tried to follow this path to influence with less
success. On his return to Britain after seeing his village
leases replaced by ryotwari settlements, Hodgson started
work on a book which he hoped would generate new interest in 
8
his ideas. He never finished it. Munro, who employed these
techniques on a variety of occasions during his career, had,
according to Gleig, most success with them when he first
returned to Britain. Gleig attributed some of his influence
then to the publication of a great number of articles and
pamphlets which, while not of his authorship, had been
previously submitted to him for revision and which
9
consequently reflected his views.
By far the most common, and frequently the most important, 
informal and unofficial means of influencing the policies, 
acquiring promotion and generally manipulating the 
administration of the Company were those which may be 
designated the private methods. These may be described as 
private because they were invariably directed at individuals 
or small, defined groups of men and all had one feature in 
common. They were designed to create and then sustain 
personal relationships outside of the formal relationships 
established by the Company's structure. Family connections, 
friendships, social, political and economic obligations were
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all employed to effect introductions with the view to 
establishing private correspondence between men who would 
not normally have communicated with each other through the 
official channels of communication.
When most effectively used, private correspondence could
confer distinct benefits on all the parties involved in it.
An analysis of the reasons why nearly all Governors-General
and Governors established private correspondence with
particular members of the Court of Directors illustrates
this point clearly. Such correspondence ensured that they
would be kept closely informed of the events influencing the
home authorities and have the means of transmitting directly
to the Court views and remarks that they desired to keep
hidden from people in India or which were otherwise better
not included in official letters. The recipient Directors
benefitted by acquiring information which, not being
generally available to their colleagues, gave them an
advantage in the Court's proceedings. It also gave the
Directors direct access to fountainheads of patronage in
India. Macartney corresponded privately with Laurence
Sulivan and used the letter's influence to gain support at
10
the Court for his actions. In return, Macartney employed his 
power of appointment in the Madras administration to 
actively promote the careers of Sulivan's proteges, 
especially member of his family. John Sullivan, for example, 
was unusually quickly promoted to important posts in the 
Madras administration.
The part played by private correspondence in the Company was
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the subject of Intense contemporary debate. Some people 
argued that it had a important role to play in the 
administration while others claimed it undermined the 
carefully balanced divisions of authority and responsibility 
in the formal structure of the Company. Both parties' cases 
were most clearly stated in 1785 when an attempt was made in 
Parliament to suppress the practice. On the one hand, its 
opponents presented it as an instrument of faction and 
intrigue employed by individuals to further their private 
interests, often at the expense of the public's. On the 
other hand there were men, including Edmund Burke who 
expressed great indignation at the practice's prohibition, 
who regarded it as a useful, even necessary, guard against 
the misconduct of the local governments and their officials. 
By and large however, the majority of people interested in 
Indian affairs seem to have regarded the practice as a 
regrettable but unavoidable feature of the Company's 
administration which, since all employed and benefited from 
it, they were prepared to tolerate.
The different unofficial channels of access to the Company's 
decision-making bodies which emerged to supplement to 
official are illustrated in diagram 6 (p 412 )• It is clear 
that they fulfilled an important function in the 
administration. They may be said to have oiled the machinery 
of government and to have acted as safety valves for the 
tensions which were generated within the system, both 
between the different bodies which composed it and between 
individuals within these. More importantly, they provided a 
necessary counterpoise to the influence of the 'dependency'
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The Formal and Informal Channels of Access to the 
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which the formal arrangements of the Company generated. They 
permitted individuals employed by the Company to express 
opinions, make proposals, report observations and forward 
information to their superiors which they would have 
hesitated to do through official channels. Matters of a 
controversial or unpopular nature, which the Company's 
employees might otherwise have suppressed rather than risk 
their careers by bringing them forward officially, were 
privately or anonymously conveyed to the authorities through 
these unofficial channels.
Munro employed all the official and unofficial channels of 
communication to promote his policies. However, the skill 
with which he manipulated these does not alone explain the 
very considerable influence he succeeded in exercising over 
the Company's decision-making process. He owed his rise to 
prominence more to two other factors - the collapse of 
consensus that occurred in all levels of the Company's 
administration and the appointments to influential positions 
of men who were either interested in his ideas or had 
personal reasons for assisting his career.
Throughout the period 1784 to 1827, the Board of Control 
gradually established its authority over the East India 
Company by extending the powers allocated to it under Pitt's 
India Act. It did this by making unauthorized modifications 
to the machinery of government. Its activities met 
consistent opposition from the Directors who periodically 
tried to oppose what they regarded as distortions of the 
Act. The conflict thus engendered between the Board of
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Control and the Court of Directors had a significant impact 
on the operations of the Company's decision-making process 
and permitted individuals, in particular Munro, to exert a 
considerable influence over the policies that were adopted 
and implemented.
The most important of the modifications made by the Board
was its unofficial annexation of the right to appoint the
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  and the G o v e r n o r s  of the s u b o r d i n a t e
Presidencies. In 1784, Pitt's India Act had given the Board
of Control that it established considerable authority, in
particular the right to see all despatches that the
Directors intended to send to India and the power to make
alterations to those which dealt with other than strictly
commercial matters. It had not though given the Board any
authority to make appointments but quite deliberately, for
political reasons, left the Company's patronage to the Court
of D i r e ct o r s.  F r o m  the st art  the Act was not s t r i c t l y
enforced and the Court of Directors permitted the President
of the Board to nominate a certain number of writers and
cadets. Marshall noted that the President of the Board was
normally allotted the same number of nominations as the
11
Chairman of the Court. He also observed that, on occasions, 
Dundas persuaded individual Directors to relinquish their 
patronage to him. Soon however the Board unofficially 
assumed the Court's right to appoint the Governor-General 
and Governors. It was able to do this because, the India Act 
had given the Crown the power to remove from office by 
recall any man employed by the Company in India. Thus, while 
the Board could not legally force the Court to appoint its
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nominees, it could use its power of recall to make any other 
appointment impossible. In practice, this resulted in the 
Board's nominee being appointed. Even when this did not 
happen, as when Lord Lauderdale's nomination was 
successfully opposed by the Directors, the Board was able to 
ensure that whoever was appointed should be someone at least 
as firmly committed to its policies as he might be to the 
C o u r t ' s .
This development could have been foreseen in 1784. Even then
it was clear that no government would be prepared to leave
such important appointments in the hands of the Directors.
Dundas had made his own position clear in the provisions of
his bill of 1783. He had clearly intended that the
Governor-Genera1 and Governors should be primarily regarded
as agents of the Crown rather than the Court and subject to
the Bo ard 's  order s.  A l t h o u g h  Pitt' s Act, due to
'considerations altogether of a constitutional nature', had
left these appointments in the hands of the Directors, it
was only b e c a u s e  he and D u nd a s  had a s s u m e d  that the
Directors 'would in all cases accept the recommendation of
the state in the nomination of their Governors and that they
would leave the appointment of executive officers abroad to
12
those Governors when s>o appointed'.
The Board's unofficial assumption of these appointments had 
far-reaching consequences in so far as it did, to a large 
extent, result in a situation in which the men holding the 
offices of Governor-General and Governor came to regard the 
Board rather than the Court as the body to which they were
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responsible. This position was further accentuated by the 
custom which immediately developed for the President of the 
Board to communicate privately, and therefore unofficially, 
with these men in India.
Under the provisions of the India Act, the Board of Control 
was entitled 'to superintend, direct and control' Indian 
affairs but only through official channels. The Board could 
alter the Court's despatches but it was not entitled to send 
instructions of its own directly to India. The Company had 
secured the removal of the clause in the Act which would 
have permitted the Board to by-pass the Court and 
communicate directly with the local governments. Neither 
Dundas nor subsequent Presidents of the Board were however 
prepared to strictly adhere to regulations which so 
restricted their authority. They therefore adopted the 
simple but unofficial expedient of communicating with the 
Governor-General and Governors in private letters when they 
had matters they wished kept secret, especially those which 
dealt with policies the Board supported but which the Court 
opposed. This practice naturally strengthened the alliance 
of interest which already existed between the Board and the 
men who owed their appointments to its patronage.
Perceiving the Governor-General and the Governor of Madras 
to be instruments of the Board of Control, the Directors 
opposed to what could be regarded as the Board's 
unauthorized assumption of control over the local 
governments sought to reassert their authority by appointing 
their supporters amongst the civil servants to the Councils
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and to other positions of influence in the local 
administrations. In this manner the struggle for power which 
characterized relations between the home authorities was 
exported to Madras where it further divided an 
administration already split into antagonistic groups by 
local issues, in particular by the whole question of the 
employment of military officers in civil posts. The issues 
which divided the home authorities and those which divided 
the Madras administration became inextricably entwined.
The collapse of consensus which resulted had an important 
impact on the Company's administration. It encouraged men in 
the local administrations who opposed the home authorities' 
policies to employ the formal regulations of the Company's 
constitution to obstruct, delay or modify the orders they 
received. In particular, opponents of current policy used 
the formal system to delay the transmission and 
implementation of orders. The difference between refusing to 
obey an order and declining to implement one until its exact 
meaning, intention or authority had been confirmed was a 
subtle one. By requesting the elucidation of orders or by 
interpreting them in particular ways, subordinate 
authorities were able to significantly influence policy. In 
this way, reforms were resisted by their critics who hoped 
to delay their introduction until the situations to which 
they applied had changed or support for them had declined as 
a result of shifts in the balance of power in the superior 
authorities. Other techniques were employed by men in the 
local governments to prevent their opponents from gathering 
evidence to support their cases. While Munro served as First
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Commissioner, members of the Board of Revenue, who opposed
the measures he had been ordered to introduce, published and
circulated amongst the civil servants and Indians reports
critical of his activities. These convinced both Europeans
and Indians that the Commissioners did not have the
Government's support and therefore discouraged them from
13
coming forward to give evidence.
In order to overcome such opposition, the Board of Control,
Governors-General and Governors increasingly made use of
their powers of appointment to ensure the implementation of
their policies. The evidence does not support Marshall's
claim that 'the system of appointments and promotion became
more regular, influence in the Company counting for much
14
less than it had done'. Far from promotion by seniority 
being enforced throughout the service, it is clear that 
political considerations increasingly determined 
appointments. In India, members of the local governments at 
nearly all levels in the administrations sought to augment 
their official authority and protect their interests by 
using what patronage was available to them to build power 
bases within the Company. Governors-General and Governors 
made the most obvious use of the power of appointment to 
place supporters in influential posts where they could 
materially advance their patrons' policies. Wellesley gave 
important revenue and political posts to military officers 
who supported his foreign policies, ignoring in the process 
the claims of civilians who opposed his views. Among Munro's 
first actions after his arrival in Madras as Governor were 
the appointments of friends and supporters to posts in which
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they could effectively assist him to introduce ryotwari 
revenue settlements and reorganize the judicial system. The 
justification for these appointments normally given by that 
Governors-General and Governors, that those selected had 
special qualifications for the posts which other claimants 
lacked, was usually little more than a rationalization 
designed to conceal their real motives and protect them from 
accusations of infringing formal regulations.
Munro was able to take advantage of this situation to
advance his career. Such management invariably became a
two-way process since competing parties in the Company's
administration, who needed to form alliances with groups who
would support their policies, found it difficult to resist
pressure from these groups for aid in furthering their own
particular interests. Governors in Madras, in order to
establish their authority and to overcome opposition from
entrenched interest groups in the civil administration,
employed military officers. Not only were they often cheaper
since their military pay was less than the civilians', their
salaries came out of the military budget so their employment
enabled the local governments to appear to have made
substantial savings for the Company and thereby win the
approbation of the Directors. More importantly, the
employment of military men rather than civilians
strengthened the position of the Governors-General and
Governors in their relations with the Directors. Between
1802 and 1833, an average of only 37 writers a year were
sent to India while in the same period the average number of
15
cadets sent was 258. While the Directors usually gave
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writerships to people to whom they were related, those 
selected as cadets were frequently men who were not closely 
connected with their patrons. Thus military men employed in 
the civil administration, lacking the sort of influence 
amongst the Directors that writers often possessed, were 
much more dependent upon the local governments and therefore 
usually identified their interests with those of their local 
benefactors. At the same time however, the resentment 
military appointments generated amongst the civilians made 
the chief executives peculiarly reliant on the support of 
the very men they had promoted to strengthen their own 
positions. Munro was able to take advantage of the 
reciprocal relationships which developed to promote his 
ideas.
As the employment of quasi-officia1 and unofficial methods 
of influencing policy and of controlling the administration 
undermined the formal arrangements of the Company, the 
system ceased to be predominantly adjudicative and the 
decision-making process was increasingly negotiative in 
character. This permitted men like Munro with actual 
operational experience to enter the arenas of debate. It 
also partly explains why the Board of Control was able to 
establish itself as the predominant authority in the home 
government. Throughout the period the President of the Board 
of Control exercised an untrammelled authority over that 
body. In the Court of Directors there could never be quite 
the same unity of purpose. The individual ambitions and 
interests of the twenty four Directors only very rarely 
enabled the Court to present a united front to the Board.
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Usually the Chairmen had to rely on coalitions of interests
which, because a number of Directors annually went out of
office, were inherently unstable. While, as C H Philips
observed, 'a united Direction could always effectively
16
resist the Government', the formal structure of the Company 
made certain that such unity should never last long.
In conclusion, it must be stated that Munro owed much of his 
rise to prominence to entirely accidental factors. Had it 
not been for such chance events such as his sister's 
marriage to Grskine and John Sullivan's to Buckinghamshire's 
daughter, his own friendships with Read and Webbe, and 
Cumming's emergence at the Board of Control, Munro would 
probably have had a respectable but otherwise not 
particularly distinguished career in India. His manipulative 
talents and the skill with which he recognized and took 
advantage of the opportunities that became available to him 
to influence the Company's policies in ways advantageous to 
himself do not alone explain his success. He was also very 
fortunate to have been in the right places and the right 
times.
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